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Transliteration 
 
The basic purpose for choosing the transliteration system that I have is to avoid 
any special characters that are not on a standard keyboard (with some further 
simplifications). For transliterating/Romanising Tajik names, places and concepts from 
the Tajik Cyrillic alphabet, I will avoid all systems of transliteration that use special 
characters or diacritics.1 Instead, I will use the unnamed system that has become the 
standard commonly used in Tajikistan. Basically, it is the BGN/PCGN system (see 
above footnote) with some small alterations. The alterations: ‘и’ and ‘ӣ’ will both be 
transliterated as ‘i’ (e.g., the first and second ‘i’ in Hisori are different letters in Tajik 
Cyrillic); ‘ъ’ will be omitted (e.g., tarikh, not ta’rikh) in the main text (with one 
exception for the La’li Badakhshon movement) but not in the bibliography and 
footnotes; both ‘ӯ’ and ‘у’ will be transliterated as ‘u’; while ‘э’ and ‘е’ will both be 
rendered as ‘e’. This system may be jarring for those familiar with common 
transliterations of Dari, Farsi, Urdu and Arabic due to name transliterations such as 
Abdullo and Rahmon instead of Abdullah and Rahman. To minimise confusion, the 
new trend of constructing names with an ezafe2 will be avoided. Variants on place and 
people names from Tajikistan that have become commonly accepted in English will not 
be put through the same strict transliteration (e.g., Tajikistan, Uzbek and Pamir; not 
Tojikiston, Uzbak and Pomir). What will be completely avoided in the main text is 
transliterating Tajik via Russian (e.g., Kulob, Qurghonteppa, and Rahmon; not Kulyab, 
Kurgan-Tyube, and Rakhmon). An exception will be made when I directly quote an 
author.  
Bibliography entries and citations in Russian that include Tajik places or people 
will be transliterated using a Russian Romanisation system. The system of Russian 
transliteration for Slavic names in the main text will be the diacritics-free standard 
introduced in 1997 by the Russian government for use in passports,3 with some further 
simplifications for commonly known names (e.g., Dmitry, not Dmitriy). The 
bibliography and footnote references will follow the above-cited transliteration system, 
with an exception for when I repeat another author’s citation in the footnotes.    
 
                                                 
1
 These include transliteration standards known as ISO 9, KNAB, WWS, ALA-LC, Allworth and 
BGN/PCGN. See here for these systems: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Tajik  
2
 Example: President Emomali Rahmon’s son Rustam is often referred to as Rustami Emomali (i.e., 
Rustam-i Emomali, or Rustam [son] of Emomali).  
3
 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Russian#Passport_1997. The only alteration I add is 
that I will omit any transliteration of the Russian hard sign. 
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Map No. 1 Map of Tajikistan with major cities4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Map adapted from: UNEP/GRID-Arendal, ‘Tajikistan, topographic map’, accessed online (May 2011): 
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/tajikistan_topographic_map  
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Introduction 
The focus of this dissertation is the civil war in Tajikistan, in particular the 
massive street demonstrations in the capital city of Dushanbe that preceded the war and 
the devastating fighting in the Vakhsh Valley south of the capital. Generally referred to 
as the ‘Tajik Civil War,’ the violent conflict in southern Tajikistan lasted from spring 
1992 until its official end in June 1997 with the signing of a peace agreement and 
power-sharing arrangement. Narrowing the analysis further, the focus will be on the 
first phase of conflict that finished at the end of 1992. During this early period the vast 
majority of fatalities occurred. Early estimates (that went mostly unchallenged5) for the 
conflict as a whole cited the number of deaths as high as 100,000. A later study put the 
number at 23,500, with 20,000 of these deaths occurring in 1992.6 This should in no 
way lessen the emphasis on the level of suffering during the war. Aside from the deaths 
of combatants and numerous unarmed civilians, the conflict generated a massive 
number of refugees and internally displaced persons, led to large-scale destruction and 
looting of property, resulted in the rape and torture of many, and further harmed the 
already fragile economy.  
 At the end of 1992 the armed opposition suffered a heavy defeat and fled to 
mountainous areas of eastern Tajikistan and, importantly, to a safe haven in Afghanistan 
where the ‘Islamic’ opposition attempted to regroup. The character of the war from this 
point was more that of a counter-insurgency with sporadic guerrilla warfare, as well as 
smaller operations against opposition strongholds in the mountains of the east, rather 
than what was seen during the first year: a complete collapse of the state and a fight that 
was roughly equal until October 1992. Despite the current popularity of studies on 
counter-insurgencies and asymmetric warfare in general, this dissertation will instead 
analyse the outbreak of conflict and the initial mobilisation of fighters as this process 
provides the clearest view of Tajikistan’s social and political cleavages.   
                                                 
5
 This general assessment of problematic estimates for war fatalities matches Tajikistan quite well: “For 
many conflicts, commonly cited estimates employed in media and NGO reports are repeated so frequently 
as to become unquestioningly accepted as truth. […] In many cases, the origin of these estimates is 
unknown or one of the warring parties; even where this information is available, the methodology and 
definitional guidelines used in generating the estimates are rarely transparent.” See: Kristine Eck and Lisa 
Hultman, ‘One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data’, Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007) 237.  
6
 Vladimir Mukomel’, ‘Demographic Consequences of Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in the CIS’, 
Russian Social Science Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2001) 23-4, table 1; Vladimir Mukomel’, 
‘Demograficheskie Posledstviya etnicheskikh i religional’nykh konfliktov v SNG’, Naselenie & 
Obshchestvo, No. 27 (April 1997) table 1. Online: http://demoscope.ru/acrobat/ps27.pdf. In the second 
article, Mukomel points to his longer format study that includes full references: Vladimir Mukomel’, 
‘Vooruzhennye mezhnatsional’nye i regional’nye konflikty: lyudskie poteri, ekonomicheskiy ushcherb i 
sotsial’nye posledstviya’, in Identichnost’ i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh (Moscow: Karnegi, 
1997).   
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This dissertation is not intended to challenge what has become a consensus view 
within the scholarship in regards to how to most accurately describe the Tajik Civil 
War. The most concise explanation is the uncontroversial assessment of Brent Hierman 
that the best way to view the civil war in Tajikistan (with as few words as possible) is 
“as a war fought between regional elites; specifically, following the collapse of the 
center, networks of elites, organized according to region, mobilized their supporters 
against one another in an effort to gain control of the existing state institutions.”7  
What will be analysed are the social and political divisions during the outbreak 
of civil war in Tajikistan and the subsequent first year of conflict. This includes an 
analysis of the cleavages within Tajikistan that resulted in a particular set of strategies 
and tactics. What will be explained is: (1) why the opposing sides had little choice but 
to resort to militarised mobilisation, and why the process continued despite efforts to 
defuse the situation, (2) why the main factions had a regionally-distinct base of support 
due to the legacy of cultural, geographical and political factors, (3) why local agendas 
were attached to what appear to be unrelated national-level cleavages, resulting in a war 
that was overwhelmingly rural and spatially constrained, and (4) why indiscriminate 
violence against the civilian population was used and then mostly abandoned by the 
belligerents all within the first year of conflict. What will not be analysed are the 
variables that resulted in the outbreak of violence. This exercise in dismissing and 
promoting variables can already be found in dissertations by Idil Tuncer Kilavuz, 
Lawrence Markowitz and Jonathan Zartman.8 This dissertation is based on a multitude 
of both secondary sources and primary sources (memoirs, party manifestos, etc.). 
Observations in the field in 2009 back up most of the arguments in this thesis, 
particularly in regards to identity, loyalty and patronage. 
The first phase of the civil war went beyond ethnic Tajiks fighting each other, 
and included ethnic Uzbeks and Pamiris on opposite sides allied to their Kulobi and 
Gharmi Tajik allies, respectively. And even this is too simple of a description, as it is 
not possible to neatly classify the main combatants into monolithic blocs based on 
                                                 
7
 Brent Hierman, ‘What use was the election to us? Clientelism and political trust amongst ethnic Uzbeks 
in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2010) 256. I chose the preceding 
quote because it is concise, not because it is original. 
8
 Idil Tuncer Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict: A Comparative Study of Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 2007; Lawrence Markowitz, Collapsed 
and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Cross-Regional Determinants of State Formation in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2005; 
Zartman, Jonathan K. Political transition in Central Asian republics: Authoritarianism versus power-
sharing. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Denver, 2004.  
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ethnicity and – for Tajiks – region of family origin. Factors such as ideology and 
religion will be deemphasised, in line with much of the later scholarship on the war.9  
 The above-mentioned social and political divisions necessitate an in-depth 
historical and social analysis of ethnicity, religion, social organisation, migration, state-
building, politics and economics in Tajikistan (especially during the Soviet era). All of 
these factors – to varying degrees – affected the loyalties and actions of individuals and 
groups during the pre-war era though the outbreak of conflict. Of course, the historical 
and social analysis will focus mostly on the main zone of violent conflict: the 
economically significant Vakhsh Valley of southern Tajikistan:  
 
Map No.2 – Satellite view of Tajikistan with the Vakhsh Valley circled.10 
 
 
At the beginning of the Soviet era, the Vakhsh Valley was a sparsely populated river 
valley inhabited mostly by semi-nomadic Uzbeks.11  It would soon become a grand 
project of Soviet agricultural and social engineering. After suppressing the Basmachi 
rebellion and securing the Afghan border during the 1930s, the Soviet authorities began 
                                                 
9
 Earlier writings (from journalists, local observers and academics) are mixed, so I do not claim that 
lessening the significance of religion and ideology in my analysis is an act of historical revisionism.  
10
 NASA public domain licence image. Upload credit: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Poulpy 
Modification by author: circle added. 
11
 This includes Uzbek-speakers who claim a tribal affiliation as their primary identity (e.g., Loqay). 
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their transformation of the Vakhsh Valley. The meandering Vakhsh River was soon 
controlled and diverted into a system of irrigation canals as part of a plan to boost 
agriculture in the Tajik Republic. Food production had limited economic significance, 
so agricultural production was focused mainly on cotton – a crop that required 
significant amounts of irrigation in the arid region.  
One of the main requirements for the labour-intensive projects of building 
irrigation canals and farming cotton (by hand) was a large pool of workers. This 
necessitated the massive in-migration of people from throughout Tajikistan and beyond. 
Since the economic potential of the mountain and foothills of Tajikistan was quite 
limited, people from these areas were selected as the primary core of migrants. The 
main groups of settlers were drawn from the mountain valleys of Qarotegin and Darvoz, 
as well as from the foothills of the Kulob region. Here in the valley they, and other 
outsiders (e.g., Pamiris, Russians and others), were settled into the Soviet collective 
farms that were a common feature throughout the rural areas of the Tajik Soviet 
Socialist Republic (hereafter Tajik SSR) and the rest of the USSR. At independence, 
over half a century later, the Vakhsh Valley was part of the Qurghonteppa Province – an 
administrative region with a high degree of social and political-bureaucratic 
fragmentation where competition for resources occurred along lines of ethnicity and, 
most significantly, mainly along lines of region of origin: the Gharmi Tajiks from the 
mountainous area of Gharm (Qarotegin and Darvoz) and the Kulobi Tajiks from the 
foothills of the neighbouring Kulob Province. Again, as mentioned above, the blocs in 
the conflict were not monolithic and should be seen as the end result of not just long-
term historical and social factors, but more recent political and economic competition, 
as well as a result of the initial tactics and strategies of mobilising for political struggles 
and war.  
 The Soviet authorities attempted to shape ethnic identities throughout the USSR, 
and in Central Asia there were particular difficulties as most people here did not see 
their primary identities at the ethnic or national level. As part of the Soviet process, 
languages were standardised, traditions codified, pre-existing sub-ethnic identities (e.g., 
tribe or city) were suppressed (e.g., by being removed as an option in the official 
census), privileges were granted or denied based on ethnic identity, and many people 
found that they were outside the borders of their titular republic (e.g., ethnic Uzbeks 
inside Tajikistan). Despite the continuing rhetoric that the divisions between 
nationalities (i.e., ethnic groups) would eventually disappear and give way to a unified 
people, ethnic identities continued to be strongly promoted in the Soviet republics, and 
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Tajikistan was no exception. However, there were also divisions within the ethnic 
groups. For Tajiks, there was the reality that ethnic Tajiks from different regions had 
obvious differences in dialect and other aspects of their culture.  
Regional differences are a common feature of many countries, but they held – 
and still hold – a particular social, economic and political significance in Tajikistan. 
Tajiks from the northern province of Leninobod (now Sughd) – particularly from the 
city of Khujand – dominated the upper echelons of the Tajik SSR’s government and 
they cultivated patronage networks that were dominated by co-regionals. Besides 
competition within northern Tajikistan, these northern Tajiks then had to contend with 
their less privileged southern counterparts, whose elites also organised intricate 
patronage networks that came to be identified with regions such as Kulob and Gharm. 
Of course, the people in these networks were not completely averse to cooperating with 
outsiders in mutually beneficial arrangements, especially at the higher levels. And the 
networks did not benefit all people in a particular region, so they should be considered 
to be dominated by people from a single region and mostly based there (and in the 
capital) rather than entire regions and their populations competing against each other.  
Nevertheless, the end result was the ‘politicisation’ of regional identities – elites 
and those within their regional networks would benefit or suffer based on government 
appointments and bureaucratic decisions. For example, when a Kulobi held the post of 
Minister of the Interior, the ranks of that ministry were dominated by Kulobi Tajiks. 
And when a Pamiri was appointed to that post during the late 1980s, ethnic Pamiris 
displaced Kulobis from their positions – creating a pool of unemployed (and 
presumably angry) Kulobi former police officers.12  Tajiks from Gharm had a more 
modest level of access to national-level positions, and many turned instead to 
entrepreneurship and ‘gray market’ activities such as selling agricultural products to 
markets not just in Tajikistan, but in other republics as well. This activity was especially 
significant in the Vakhsh Valley, which was now home to many Gharmi and Kulobi 
Tajiks. At a more official level, the competition for government posts at the district and 
provincial level, as well as for the top positions in the collective and state farms of 
Qurghonteppa Province (at times subsumed within Khatlon Province), was particularly 
fierce. An official position gave a person access to resources and jobs that they could 
then distribute. Losing one’s position meant far more than one disappointed Communist 
Party cadre; an entire network would then be at risk of losing benefits such as jobs, 
equipment, fertilisers, and other political and economic goods. 
                                                 
12
 This anecdote is fully analysed in chapter 3.  
 13 
The authorities in Dushanbe and Moscow were generally able to control this 
process within the authoritarian system of the Soviet Union. However, this ‘control’ was 
only in the sense that cadres did not challenge the arrangements at the highest levels. In 
Tajikistan, corruption was pervasive and local cadres competed to replace each other – 
but within the system. Finally, in the mid-1980s, this system began to break down in the 
Tajik SSR. Anti-corruption campaigns and perestroika reforms resulted in the removal 
and replacement of many apparatchiks in the republic, leading to Gharmis and Pamiris 
obtaining positions that were previously out of reach. In the Vakhsh Valley the turn-
over of leadership at the district and province level, as well as in the collective and state 
farms, was unprecedented. Kulobis and Gharmis, often living in mixed settlements, 
competed against each other for these positions as they were all-important in securing 
economic and social benefits locally. The local positions were then tied into the political 
wrangling at the republic level, giving locals a strong stake in national politics.  
Around the same time (very late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s), the 
political and social atmosphere became less restrictive. Civil society groups and 
political parties began to form and agitate for further changes. After some time the 
political foes settled into two opposing coalitions: the incumbent leadership dominated 
by elites from Leninobod along with their primary junior partners from Kulob and 
Hisor, and the opposition coalition that included new political parties such as the mostly 
urban Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Gharmi Tajik-dominated Islamic Revival 
Party, and the Pamiri party La’li Badakhshon. The first post-independence presidential 
election of November 1991, after some difficulty and the replacement of the top 
government candidate, was won by the incumbent forces’ candidate Rahmon Nabiev at 
the expense of the opposition coalition and their cinematographer-turned-politician 
candidate Davlat Khudonazarov – a man supported by anti-conservative politicians at 
the Union/CIS level. This was followed by a period of government crackdowns and 
harassment of the opposition, resulting in large street demonstrations in the capital 
starting in early spring 1992. The largest contribution to the opposition’s demonstration 
was by the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). Meanwhile, the incumbents, geographically 
isolated in the capital from their home base in northern Tajikistan, relied instead on their 
junior Kulobi partners whose province was adjacent to the capital. The IRP’s 
mobilisation effort also had a regional aspect. The leadership of the IRP, despite their 
pretentions to being a party for all (Sunni) Muslims, was more accurately a party for 
Muslims that was overwhelmingly dominated by Gharmi Tajiks. As the demonstrations 
intensified and eventually turned to violence, political and social authorities who could 
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not quickly mobilise manpower for violent conflict became powerless. The skilled 
technocrats increasingly lost power to savvy rural strongmen and religious leaders (e.g., 
mullahs) who could call on the support of men willing to fight. The urban intellectuals 
and reformists of groups such as the Democratic Party were helpless in the face of 
military mobilisation. Soon it was clear that the real players in the conflict were the 
Kulobi Tajik militias allied to local Uzbeks and militias from Hisor on one side against 
the IRP’s mullahs and their Gharmi Tajik followers allied to Pamiri regular police and 
militias on the other.  
 What is written above is not a highly original analysis. While there is no single 
authoritative narrative and analysis of the civil war in Tajikistan,13  there are many 
sources that provide a strong analysis on aspects of the conflict. The only problem here 
is that the analysis in this literature is focused mainly in two areas: causes of the 
conflict 14  and post-conflict state-building. 15  This is understandable as people, 
institutions and governments want to know what causes conflicts, and, once they have 
commenced, how they may be resolved. However, my focus is more on the ‘processes’ 
of conflict. First of all, this requires both a full narrative and analysis of the transition 
from political competition to violent conflict (late 1980s to May 1992) and a similar 
treatment for the mobilisation of forces and the first phase of the war (May 1992 to the 
end of the year). Other accounts give far too little information about these two periods 
as a whole, or provide great analysis on only a narrow aspect of the political 
competition and conflict. To restate the goals, this dissertation will demonstrate that (1) 
there was a ‘perfect’ logic behind the outbreak and continuation of conflict, (2) the 
cultural and political factors present shaped the opposing sides into regional and ethnic 
blocs, (3) seemingly unrelated local agendas were easily grafted onto national-level 
politics, and (4) there was a rationale behind both the use of violence against civilians 
and its abandonment at the end of 1992. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive historical and social analysis is required in order 
to explain the Tajik Civil War. And this necessitates a full historical background to the 
                                                 
13
 The best candidate for this would be a Russian-language book: V.I. Bushkov and D.V. Mikulski, 
Anatomiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane (etno-sotsial’nye protsessy i politicheskaya bor’ba, 1992-
1995) (Moscow: Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk, 1996).  
14
 The above-mentioned sources (all dissertations) are the most complete of these attempts: Kilavuz, 
Understanding Violent Conflict: A Comparative Study of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Markowitz, 
Collapsed and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Cross-Regional Determinants of State Formation 
in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; Zartman, Political transition in Central Asian republics: Authoritarianism 
versus power-sharing. 
15
 See, for example: M. Olimov (editor) Mezhtadzhikskiy konflikt: put’ k miru (Moscow: Rossiyskaya 
Akademiya Nauk, 1998); John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and 
the Emergence of Legitimate Order (London: Routledge, 2009); Luigi De Martino (editor) Tajikistan at a 
Crossroads: The Politics of Decentralization (Geneva: Cimera, 2004). 
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modern state of Tajikistan, the social structure of the country, and the shaping and 
formation of identities and loyalties in Tajikistan. The structure of my dissertation is as 
follows: 
 
1. Conceptual model for violent conflict in Tajikistan 
 
2. Historical background and social context 
 
3. Transition from political competition to violent conflict 
 
4. The civil war of 1992  
 
5. Mobilisation, Islam, ethnicity and the regionalisation of forces 
 
Conclusion: The Outbreak, Spread and Eventual Decline of Conflict  
 
 
The first chapter will outline the analytical model that will be applied to the case study 
throughout my dissertation and especially in the conclusion chapter. Tajikistan will be 
mentioned sparingly in this section. The second chapter will provide a full social and 
historical context so that there is not a need to endlessly introduce historical and social 
commentary in later parts of the dissertation. The third chapter will provide a clear 
analysis of the increasingly fragile nature of the state and the increasingly combative 
politics and social competition that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s up until 
the start of the war in May 1992. The next chapter will provide a full narrative of the 
conflict, and a complete analysis of all the factors relevant to the arguments that will 
follow in the chapter on the dissertation’s conceptual framework. 
  
Chapter 1 
 
Conceptual Model for Violent Conflict in Tajikistan 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis will analyse the outbreak of civil war in Tajikistan and the 
subsequent first year of conflict. This includes an analysis of the social and political 
divisions that resulted in a particular set of strategies and tactics. The concepts of the 
‘security dilemma’ and the ‘credible commitment problem’ will be used to explain why 
the two sides felt they had no choice but to mobilise militarily and why they continued 
to fight despite efforts to end the conflict through negotiation and mediation. In order to 
analyse the reasons for the regional bases of support for the fighting formations, and the 
actions of leaders and followers within those groupings, this dissertation will borrow 
from social movement theory – particularly the concept of ‘mobilising structures’ and 
‘framing.’ For analysing the convergence of national-level issues with highly localised 
politics, the theory of ‘alliance’ will be applied. And finally, in explaining the reasons 
for the use and eventual abandonment of violence against civilians, this thesis will 
borrow from the theory of ‘indiscriminate violence.’ 
 
 
Security Dilemmas and Commitment Problems  
 
 
The Security Dilemma 
 
 
A group suddenly compelled to provide its own protection must ask the following 
questions about any neighbouring group: is it a threat? How much of a threat? Will the 
threat grow or diminish over time? Is there anything that must be done immediately? 
The answers to these questions strongly influence the chances for war. 
 
    -Barry Posen, 1993.1  
 
 Barry Posen was the first to comprehensively apply the realist international 
relations concept of the ‘security dilemma’ to ethnic conflict.2 This dissertation will 
                                                 
1
 Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993) 27. 
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demonstrate that this tool works just as well in describing the conflict in Tajikistan, 
even though the majority of the conflict was not inter-ethnic, but rather within the Tajik 
ethnic group between hastily-mobilised militias often based upon regionally-defined 
sub-ethnic groups of Tajiks. Describing the security dilemma, Posen notes that “what 
one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one 
less secure.”3 Posen continues: 
Where central authority has recently collapsed, the groups emerging from an old empire 
must calculate their power relative to each other at the time of collapse and make a 
guess about their relative power in the future. Such calculations must account for a 
variety of factors. Objectively, only one side can be better off. However, the complexity 
of these situations makes it possible for many competing groups to believe that their 
prospects in a war would be better earlier, rather than later.4 
 
The implementation of a security dilemma can in some cases be a conscious choice by a 
group leader seeking to boost his own power by use of provocations or exaggerated 
threat assessments, or it can be part of mass-led violence with little leadership, as noted 
by Stuart Kaufman.5 Both of these are particularly relevant to Tajikistan, with both 
elite- and mass-led security dilemmas present during different phases of the conflict. 
Concerning groups’ historical relations and enmities, David Lake and Donald 
Rothchild, while not completely dismissing the history of inter-group relations, argue 
against the factor of “ancient hatreds” in the likelihood of group conflict: 
Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, "ancient hatreds" and 
centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy. Nor were 
ethnic passions, long bottled up by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by 
the end of the Cold War. 
 
We argue instead that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of 
the future. As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve 
strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. 
As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the security dilemma 
take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more 
likely.6       
 
                                                                                                                                               
2
 Posen describes the security dilemma at the state level: “Realist theory contends that the condition of 
anarchy makes security the first concern of states. It can be otherwise only if these political organizations 
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competing entities have amassed more power than needed for security and, thus, consequently begin to 
threaten others. Those threatened will respond in turn.” See: ibid., 28.  
3
 Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, 28.  
4
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5
 Stuart J. Kaufman, ‘An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War’, Review of International Studies, 
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Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
6
 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Autumn, 1996) 41-2.  
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Lake and Rothchild go on to argue that competition for resources is usually “at the heart 
of ethnic conflict.”7 If the state controls access to resources such as property rights, jobs, 
government patronage, education admissions and language rights, the group 
competition for control over the resources can lead to conflict. However, Lake and 
Rothchild note that competition over resources is not sufficient on its own to result in 
violent conflict. As violent conflict will be costly for all sides, actors usually attempt to 
negotiate a settlement. Violent conflict can erupt despite this when ‘information 
failures’ take hold in society and groups start to represent themselves as stronger than 
they are in order to secure the highest level of resources in the bargaining process. The 
other side may attempt the same tactic and soon the opposing sides may start to “assume 
the worst.”8 This process can lead to a polarised social and political atmosphere where 
the security dilemma is severe: 
 
When incentives to use force preemptively are strong, the security dilemma takes hold 
and works its pernicious effects. Fearful that the other might preempt, a group has an 
incentive to strike first and negotiate later. In ethnic relations, as in international 
relations, when there are significant advantages to preemption, a cycle of violence can 
seize previously peaceful groups even as they seek nothing more than their own safety. 
By the same logic, previously satisfied groups can be driven to become aggressors, 
destroying ethnic harmony in the search for group security.9 
 
 Paul Roe adds to this violence-centric definition by adding the term ‘intersocietal’ to 
‘security dilemma.’10 Roe argues that “threats to societal security may come from other 
sectors of security apart from just the societal [i.e., identity issues] one; from the 
political, economic, and military sectors especially.”11 
 With a focus on Tajikistan, the use of the security dilemma has a limited 
timeframe where it is useful as it is focused on perceptions of insecurity. Roe writes: 
 
Once violent acts have taken place, the situation thus changes from being one of an 
apparent threat to one of a real threat. In this way, the tragedy has already occurred: 
because of the security dilemma two sides have started to fight each other (albeit 
perhaps only locally).12 
 
For the continuation and escalation of violence in Tajikistan, this dissertation will go 
beyond the security dilemma and use another analytical tool: ‘the credible commitment 
problem.’ 
                                                 
7
 Lake and Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, 44-5. 
8
 Lake and Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, 46-8. 
9
 Lake and Rothchild, ‘Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict’, 53. 
10
 Paul Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy?'’, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 36, No.2 (1999) 194, 194 n. 17.  
11
 Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy?'’, 194 n. 17. Brackets mine.  
12
 Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy?'’, 191.  
 19 
The Credible Commitment Problem 
 The concept of the ‘credible commitment problem’ will be used to not just 
explain the outbreak of conflict, but more so to explain why neither side believed there 
was a realistic possibility of ending the violence once it started. Like the security 
dilemma, a concept used mainly for ethnic conflict and will be applied broadly to the 
varied conflicts in Tajikistan. 
  Lake and Rothchild note that “Ethnic conflicts also arise because groups cannot 
credibly commit themselves to uphold mutually beneficial agreements they might 
reach.”13 This ‘credible commitment problem’ arises in the absence of mechanisms such 
as laws, formal and informal power sharing agreements and/or institutions that 
guarantee group rights.14 According to James Fearon, a commitment problem occurs 
when two groups do not have a third party that can effectively guarantee agreements 
between the groups, a problem that is especially apparent when the two groups are 
acting in an environment of political anarchy.15  If one of the groups believes that the 
other side can not or will not credibly commit to keep its promises, with or without a 
third party to guarantee the agreements, that group will prefer to fight, or continue 
fighting, rather than chance that it will be in a position of vulnerability in the future and 
be unable to protect itself.16  Applied to an ethnic conflict, this could mean that a 
minority group would consider it preferable to fight the state or opposing group 
immediately, especially when the state is weak, instead of accepting the promises of 
their opponents when there is no guarantee that the majority group or state will not 
renege in the future. However, Fearon does warn that these groups should not be 
considered “unitary actors” when the group’s decisions are actually the result of 
complex internal politics.17 Erin Jenne expands on this theory and connects the credible 
commitment argument to the issue of external support for an ethnic minority group. She 
argues that an ethnic minority will “radicalize” its demands if it believes it has external 
support for its cause, even if the ethnic minority believes that the state or dominant 
group will commit to its agreements. Jenne argues that minority demands and actions 
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are not just a result of ethnic fear but are also a rational choice based on the amount of 
support they perceive that they will gain if they enter into conflict.18   
 In Tajikistan the credible commitment problem appeared at a time when 
government institutions were failing, security forces were scattering, the economy was 
crashing, and when no outside power was willing to intervene. The violence continued 
to increase in intensity despite efforts by powerless government leaders, irrelevant 
envoys and self-declared community leaders to end the fighting. Neither side, despite 
their announced intentions to seek peace, felt secure enough to commit to any cease-fire 
or peace agreement in the absence of any power or institution that could guarantee that 
peace.  
 Having now covered the security dilemma and the credible commitment 
problem, it is necessary to introduce an analytical framework that will help accurately 
describe the process of mobilisation by the participants in the conflict.  
 
 
Mobilising Structures and Framing 
 
In analysing the networks and organisations that fought for power in Tajikistan, 
I will use a concept referred to as ‘mobilising structures’ in social movement theory – 
sociology theory that attempts to explain the success or failure of social movements. 
Mobilising structures can include family networks, voluntary associations, work units, 
and even parts of the state structure from which mobilisation can be generated.19 The 
definition can include all formal and informal organisations that facilitate collective 
action.20  While certain structures are designed with a specific purpose and goal, others 
are “pre-existing” structures that meet the everyday needs of its constituents. Of course, 
the strength of these mobilising structures has an effect on the end result of a group’s 
goals. 21  Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper harshly criticise the theoretical use of 
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mobilising structures, labelling the concept “tautological” and “trivial.”22 This is a fair 
point, as every social movement is composed of networks and/or organisations. 
Despite the drawbacks of using mobilising structures as an analytical tool to 
describe processes of success or failure in social mobilisation, it is useful for analysing 
the myriad networks, organisations and structures that individuals and group leaders 
attempted to use for social, political and military mobilisation during the late Soviet to 
early independence era in Tajikistan. Important mobilising structures in Tajikistan 
included government patronage networks dominated by geographically-defined sub-
ethnic groups, collective farms, state security structures, political parties, underground 
religious networks, criminal and business relations, extended family and friend 
networks, etc. Of course, the analytical concept of mobilising structures will be used 
with the caveat that a mobilising structure is seldom a monolithic unit with a clearly 
defined membership and strategic direction, and is actually composed of multiple 
components with varying goals. With these factors considered, this dissertation will 
demonstrate how the pre-existing structures of regional sub-ethnic patronage networks 
(a legacy of the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras, and Tajikistan’s cultural geography) 
undermined all attempts to use not only the state structures, but also the relatively new 
secular and religious political parties to mobilise for power, resulting in sub-ethnic 
solidarity eventually providing the dominant structural base for the groups that fought 
for control of the state and its resources.  
 When describing the actions of actors within the networks and structures in 
Tajikistan, it is important to describe how they frame their motivations and common 
goals to potential supporters. So included with the analysis on mobilising structures and 
networks will be a discussion of ‘framing,’ or ‘frames.’ In describing collective action, 
Robert Benford and David Snow note that, along with journalists and government 
leaders, “movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the 
production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or 
observers.”23 They argue that  
 
Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to 
organize experience and guide action. Collective action frames also perform this 
interpretive function by simplifying and condensing aspects of the “world out there,” 
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but in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner 
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists.”24 
 
Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a 
shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need 
of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative 
set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change. […] Simply put, 
the former fosters or facilitates agreement whereas the latter fosters action, moving 
people from the balcony to the barricades.25 
 
Framing can clearly be seen in the rhetoric of movement actors in Tajikistan. However, 
these ‘frames’ can most easily be analysed at the national level in the capital of 
Dushanbe. This leads to a methodological problem, which is especially acute in regards 
to secondary sources: ‘urban bias.’ Stathis Kalyvas writes that most narratives of civil 
wars are written by “urban intellectuals who rely on a set of explicitly or implicitly 
“urban” information and assumptions, even though most civil conflicts are rural 
wars,...”26 This problem applies quite well – with some qualification – to accounts of 
Tajikistan’s Civil War. This will be remedied by analysing the framing seen within the 
agendas of both national- and local-level actors, institutions and networks. 
 
 
Local Agendas and Cleavages  
 
 
Stathis Kaylvas, as part of his study on violence in civil wars, analyses how 
‘cleavages’ in society – invoked in the “national-level discourse” – connect with 
seemingly unrelated conflicts at the local level. Kalyvas makes a point that easily 
applies to Tajikistan’s civil war: 
 
….conflicts and violence “on the ground” often seem more related to local issues rather 
than the “master cleavage” that drives the civil war at the national level. This is the case 
despite the fact that local cleavages are usually framed in the discursive terminology of 
the master cleavage.27 
 
Because of the analytical dominance of national-level cleavages, grassroots dynamics 
are often perceived merely as their local manifestation. Likewise, local actors are seen 
only as local replicas of central actors. As a result, local dynamics and actors tend to be 
dismissed. However, on-the-ground descriptions of civil wars typically convey a 
perplexing and confusing world, entailing a mix of all sorts of motives that makes it 
difficult to neatly link the forces driving violence on the ground to the war’s stated 
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motives and goals. Such descriptions suggest that a real disjunction between issues, 
identities, and motives at the local and national levels often exists.28 
 
Kalyvas’ wide-ranging work on violence in civil wars demonstrates that local 
individuals and communities use the outbreak of civil war – and the resulting break-
down in state control – to pursue their own local agendas. These local conflicts, that 
usually pre-date the outbreak of war, are kept under control (i.e., they remain non-
violent) until the opportunity arises to connect these local conflicts to the national-level 
conflict. Kalyvas argues convincingly that local violence in all of its multiple 
manifestations should not be dismissed as unrelated to the political conflict at the 
national level. Instead, he argues that “the fusion and interaction between dynamics at 
the center and the periphery are fundamental rather than incidental to civil war, a matter 
of essence rather than noise.”29 Kalyvas clearly states the theoretical implications: 
 
This book proposes, as an implication of the theory of selective violence, an alternative 
basis for the linkage between elite and ground dynamics: alliance. Alliance entails a 
transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the latter 
with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive local advantage; in exchange, 
supralocal actors recruit and motivate supporters at the local level. Viewed from this 
perspective, violence is a key selective benefit that produces collective action and 
support on the ground.30 
 
Kalyvas provides numerous anecdotes from a diverse geographical, cultural and 
temporal selection of civil wars to back-up his assertions.31 However, he does offer the 
caveat that “Local cleavages may be preexisting or war-induced; they may align neatly 
with central cleavages or subvert them; and they may be consistent over time or more 
fluid and random.”32  
Particularly relevant to Tajikistan is Kalyvas’ assertion that “nonmodernized 
states never penetrated their periphery effectively, thus failing to reduce the salience of 
local cleavages”33 This phenomenon is most prominently analysed in Joel Migdal’s 
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work on ‘Strong Societies and Weak States.’34 Even though Migdal’s work is focused 
on the ‘Third World,’ its theoretical core can be easily applied to Tajikistan and the 
Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. When assessing the strength of a state, Migdal refers to 
the capabilities of states to achieve the kinds of changes in society that their leaders 
have sought through state planning, policies, and actions. Capabilities include the 
capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and 
appropriate or use resources in determined ways.35 
  
This does require some qualification, as the process of state penetration in Tajikistan 
during the Soviet era did indeed result in the ‘penetration’ of local society by state 
structures. However, the process was only partially successful. The government had no 
choice at times but to accommodate local strongmen and traditional patterns of social 
organisation, religious belief, identities and loyalties.36 The result at the level of centre-
periphery relations was the central (Soviet Union) and republic-level (Tajik SSR) 
governments’ use of local cleavages as a power-balancing and patronage tool – thereby 
sustaining the cleavages, even if in a transformed state. The alliance of local networks 
and actors with the central government gave regional actors a stake in the success or 
failure of the political arrangements in the national government – thereby tying highly 
localised issues to national political issues. Concerning the outbreak and continuation of 
violence in Tajikistan, I will argue that Kalyvas’ analytical use of ‘alliance’ to connect 
the national level cleavages to those cleavages at the local levels fits quite well.37  
 
 
Indiscriminate Violence 
 
 
Recent analysis on violence against civilians is mostly focused on ethnic wars. 
For example, Stefan Wolff, referring to the killing of civilians during ethnic conflicts, 
notes that by the start of this century over 90% of the victims of war were civilians. He 
states uncontroversially that the deliberate killing of civilians serves to “exact revenge, 
intimidate their opponents, and displace or destroy whole enemy populations defined on 
the basis of ethnic criteria.”38 Joan Esteban, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner 
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provide an analysis of motivations that best match the worst incidents of large-scale 
violence during the initial round of the conflict in Tajikistan:  
 
One distinctive feature is that mass killings are designed to kill, i.e. to reduce the size of 
the opponent groups, while other forms of conflict are about winning some prize and 
the fatalities they entail are merely a by-product of appropriation.39 
 
The objective of a civil war is to impose a new social arrangement or new social 
contract, as desired by the ethnic group that rebels. […] In civil wars, reducing the 
population size of the opponent group - by extermination and/or exile - allows for a 
larger viable share in the new social arrangement.40 
 
Deliberate violence against civilians is a common aspect of war zones – but not just 
those limited to ethnic conflicts. Kalyvas, analysing the use of indiscriminate violence 
in civil wars, goes beyond ethnicity and offers a theory for why this often 
counterproductive tactic is employed: 
 
I argue that indiscriminate violence emerges, when it does, because it is much cheaper 
than its selective counterpart. Yet, any “gain” must be counterbalanced by its 
consequences. Thus, indiscriminate violence is more likely either under a steep 
imbalance of power between the two actors or where and when resources and 
information are low. In the absence of a resolution of the conflict, even indiscriminate 
actors are likely to switch to more selective violence. 
 
Like other forms of violence, indiscriminate violence may be used to achieve a variety 
of goals, such as exterminating particular groups, displacing people, plundering goods, 
or demonstrating a group’s power and ability to hurt another group. Consistent with this 
book’s scope conditions, my focus in this chapter is on the use of indiscriminate 
violence to control a population rather than simply to loot, displace, or eliminate it.41 
 
The main reason that indiscriminate violence is employed at the expense of discriminate 
violence is as a result of a shortage of information. Unable to target the fighters or 
political actors of the opposing sides, an armed group settles for collectively punishing 
the civilian population that is associated, even vaguely, with the opposing side. The 
logic here is that the opposing side will change its ‘behavior’ in favour of its enemy out 
of consideration for the civilian population they have amity for. Also, the hope is that 
the civilian population will be scared into collaborating with the side inflicting the 
punishment out of a fear of future reprisals.42  
In regards to indiscriminate violence being counterproductive, Kalyvas cites the 
well-known view that indiscriminate violence by the ‘incumbent’ (i.e., the dominant 
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side) is welcomed by the insurgents because these reprisals can bring new recruits.43 
Kalyvas goes beyond just the ‘revenge’ factor44  in noting that there are numerous 
reasons why violence against civilians can be a counter-productive tactic.45 Yet despite 
the acknowledged downside to the use of indiscriminate violence, it has persisted as a 
common feature of war zones – even considering that some selective violence has been 
mistakenly classified as indiscriminate due to the ignorance of outside observers.46 
Kalyvas argues that this may be due to several reasons, including some leaders’ 
ignorance of the counterproductive nature of indiscriminate violence, the relative cost 
savings over the resource intensive selective violence, and distorted military institutions 
that do not provide the resources or incentives for selective violence.47 
Kalyvas offers a hypothesis to explain the use or avoidance of indiscriminate 
violence during war. Positing that “Political actors are likely to gradually move from 
indiscriminate to selective violence,”48 Kalyvas writes: 
 
Assume a setting where incumbents choose whether to use indiscriminate or selective 
violence, insurgents have the option of protecting civilians from incumbent 
indiscriminate violence, and civilians collaborate with the political actor who best 
guarantees their security. In such a setting, civilians will be likely to collaborate with 
the incumbents if the insurgents fail to protect them, whether incumbents are 
indiscriminate or selective; they will be likely to side with the insurgents when they are 
protected by them against indiscriminate incumbents; and the outcome is indeterminate 
when insurgents protect civilians and incumbents are selective. 
 
In short, indiscriminate violence is likely to be effective when there is a steep imbalance 
of power between the two actors. Given reasonably strong insurgents, it should be 
unsustainable, as its counterproductive nature becomes clear. We would, therefore, 
expect rational incumbents who may initiate indiscriminate violence to muster 
additional resources and subject whatever institutional distortions they suffer from to 
the imperatives of their long-term interest. As a conflict waxes on, we should observe a 
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shift toward selective violence, especially among incumbents, the ones likely to initiate 
indiscriminate violence.49   
 
While not everything mentioned above by Kalyvas is applicable to the civil war in 
Tajikistan, the move from indiscriminate to selective violence with the passage of time 
matches perfectly with the pattern of violence during the Tajik Civil War. His theory 
will be applied with some modifications and qualifications.  
  
 
Summary 
 
 
The theoretical tools selected in this chapter will be used to analyse the outbreak 
and spread of conflict, the characteristics of the warring parties, and the change in 
tactics used in the course of the first year of war in Tajikistan. The ‘security dilemma’ 
and ‘credible commitment problem’ will be used as tools to analyse the logic behind the 
outbreak and continuation of conflict in Tajikistan. To investigate the distinct regional 
and ethnic characteristics of the opposing armed groups I will demonstrate how the 
‘mobilising structures’ were limited, or even captured, by the pre-existing networks and 
politically and economically relevant regional and ethnic identities in Tajikistan. The 
process whereby national-level political wrangling was intimately attached to local 
conflicts – resulting in the rapid spread of violence in rural areas – will be illustrated by 
the use of the concept of ‘alliance’, a process whereby seemingly unrelated local 
agendas quickly attach to broader cleavages at the national level. And finally, in an 
attempt to explain why indiscriminate violence was used against civilian populations 
and why it was eventually abandoned as a tactic, I will borrow from the theory of 
‘indiscriminate violence.’ 
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Historical Background and Social Context 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic the central authorities, as in other areas 
throughout the USSR, attempted to shape new national identities while suppressing pre-
existing identities and loyalties. Over nearly seven decades, identities and traditional 
authority structures were indeed transformed, albeit not necessarily in a way that Soviet 
planners had anticipated. The new power structures and identities included much in the 
way of traditional authority patterns and identities, while adapting to the restraints and 
incentives that were present in the Soviet system. There is still much contemporary 
debate as to the social relevance of national identities (e.g., Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, 
etc…) that were shaped and promoted by the authorities when weighted against other 
categories of identity and loyalty that cross-cut these ethnicities. This dissertation will 
analyse, as one of the variables, the relevance of the various identities and loyalties in 
times of crisis. When the power struggles in Dushanbe led to civil unrest and violent 
conflict, national-level elites and local power brokers mobilised support from the local 
level, drawing on and appealing to ties of identity and shared economic concerns. 
Language, ethnicity, sub-ethnic identity, religious sect, region of origin, collective farm 
affiliation, family ties, professional relationships, political party membership, employer-
employee ties and government patron-client networks have all been cited as factors in 
determining individual and group participation or non-participation in the conflict. Each 
one of these categories played a role in determining behaviour during the civil war—of 
course some of them to a far lesser degree than others. Therefore, an analysis of identity 
in Tajikistan can not include only Soviet nationality policies, nor can it completely be 
confined to the rather restricted territory of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. 
Examples from the wider region, particularly Uzbekistan, will also be included while 
historical patterns of identity will be analysed. This chapter will start with the policies 
and efforts of the Soviets and the successor states at the broadest level promoted by 
these states: ethnicity.  
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Part 1: Identity in Southern Tajikistan 
 
 
Ethnicity in Central Asia 
 
After the Second World War there was a reversal in primary ideological 
emphasis in the Soviet Union from class to ethnicity. Previously nationalism was 
officially viewed as stage in the evolution towards a class-based socialist society.1 In 
Yuri Slezkine’s words, nationalism became, with the full support of Soviet authorities, a 
“sacred principle of marxism-leninism.”2 As a result, according to Valery Tishkov’s 
analysis of Soviet social sciences, the view of ethnicity became politicised and 
primordialistic (the equivalent is easily found in Western scholarship). There was a 
heavy emphasis on ethnogenesis, with social scientists providing writings to trace a 
group origin as far back as the upper-Palaeolithic era, identify cultural heroes, and 
demonstrate the existence of a people with “their ‘own’ territories and their ‘own’ 
states.” 3  Victor Shnirelman provides a very similar critique, 4  and notes that this 
“invention of the past” is used to raise self-esteem, usually in relation to neighbouring 
groups, and to demand “special rights and privileges with respect to others who lack 
their glorious past.”5 According to Alisher Ilkhamov, in response to the perception of 
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 Yuri Slezkine, ‘The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic 
Particularism’, Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1994). Slezkine writes that as part of this process 
“linguists and ethnographers expected—and tried to bring about—the fusion and consequent 
disappearance of linguistic and ethnic communities.” Ibid, 137. See also: Yuri Slezkine, ‘The Fall of 
Soviet Ethnography, 1928-38’, Current Anthropology, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Aug.-Oct., 1991), 476-484. 
According to Adeeb Khalid it was in the mid-1930s that “official Soviet discourse came to accept—
indeed, to assert—that national and ethnic identities were real and permanent, but it still did not 
compromise on the basic universalism of historical progress. See: Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: 
Religion and Politics in Central Asia, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 65, also 94-8.     
2
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3
 Valery A. Tishkov, ‘Inventions and Manifestations of ethno-Nationalism in and after the Soviet Union’, 
in Ethnicity and Conflict in a Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. 
Edited by Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga Vorkunova (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 42. 
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approaches and opinions differing from the publicly accepted unilateral position may be proclaimed as 
‘subversive’, as being expressed by ‘enemies of the nation’ and ‘agents of the Kremlin.’ The prevailing 
themes of the writings of these scholars are: elaborating lists of grievances against others, justifications 
for state, territorial, political, and cultural rights of titular nationalities, and a search for external enemies 
(mainly in Moscow or in neighbouring republics) as responsible for ethnic conflicts. Historical in-group 
descriptions, without serious interest in the significance of ethnic interactions, within and outside the 
region, remain the most striking features of this Soviet ‘peripheral’ anthropology.” Ibid., 43-4. 
4
 Victor A. Shnirelman, Who Gets The Past? Competition for Ancestors Among Non-Russian Intellectuals 
in Russia, (Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 1-12, 58-61. Shnirelman notes the 
importance of autochthonism (i.e., a certain groups has always inhabited its current location) and 
particularism (de-emphasising common roots and stressing differences), ibid, 12.  
5
 Shnirelman, Who gets The Past?, 2.  
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growing nationalism—particularly in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic—the central 
Communist Party initiated a parallel process whereby they “gave the green light to 
ethnographic investigations that would raise doubts about the homogeneous nature of 
the modern Uzbek nation and question the reasons for the inclusions of certain ethnic 
groups…”6 As a result it is possible to find clearly separate discourses on nationalism, 
identity and ethnic origins in the Soviet-era scholarship.  
The search for a ‘glorious past’ is not an irrelevant, isolated intellectual pursuit. 
While academics may provide the basic material, it is those “amateurs in the field” such 
as popular writers, journalists, educators, and artists who play a significant role, and 
often in a manner that is “less restrained” and “highly selective.”7 Shnirelman notes that 
as part of this search for a past, “an ethnic group may encroach upon or even 
appropriate the past and cultural legacy of another group, leading to misunderstandings, 
arguments and tensions.”8 These types of claims are not without their material logic, as 
the ‘special rights and privileges’ part of Shnirelman’s explanation demonstrates. Kirill 
Nourzhanov notes the use of historiography by the state:  
All governments use historical symbols and historiography to cultivate patriotism, 
explain and justify policies, and secure the acquiescence and cooperation of the people 
in times of crises. Symbolic encapsulation of the themes of regime legitimacy, common 
identity, and cultural revival through historical references is particularly crucial for 
emerging nations. The newly independent Central Asian countries present no exception 
from this pattern.9 
 
Alisher Ilkhamov, in the context of modern Uzbekistan and addressing issues of power, 
provides similar reasons: 
Here it is important to mention that according to the logic of imperial national-
patriotism, the more ancient and magnificent the history of a people is, the stronger is 
its national consciousness. The latter is important primarily for the ruling elites, who 
appropriate the right to speak on behalf of the national symbols and historical past of a 
people. The more substantial this symbolic capital is, the more legitimate is the power 
controlling it. The power ultimately personifies the symbolic capital, which it creates 
together with its associate academic and cultural elites.10  
 
In more positive terms, President Karimov of Uzbekistan explains his position: 
                                                 
6
 A. Ilkhamov, ‘Archeology of Uzbek Identity’, Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia, Vol. 44, No. 4 
(Spring 2006), 27. 
7
 Shnirelman, Who gets The Past?, 58-9. Similarly, as Schoeberlein notes about debates in Central Asia, 
“the debate amongst those who promote or oppose Uzbek nationalist claims, the debate is built more on 
emotion than on history.” See: John Schoeberlein-Engel, ‘The Prospects for Uzbek National Identity’, 
Central Asia Monitor, No. 2 (1996) 13; Schoeberlein-Engel, John. 1994.  Identity in Central Asia: 
Construction and Contention in the Conceptions of “Uzbek,” “Tajik,” “Muslim,” “Samarqandi” and 
other Groups. PhD Dissertation, Harvard University (1994), 66, 72.  
8
 Shnirelman, Who gets The Past?, 2, 60-1. Shnirelman notes that this is especially true when the 
encroachment involves claims on other’s territory. 
9
 Kirill Nourzhanov, ‘The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Samanids’, Harvard Asia 
Quarterly, 5:1 (2001), n.p.  
10
 Ilkhamov, ‘Archeology of Uzbek Identity’, 29. 
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Historical memory, the restoration of an objective and truthful history of the nation and 
its territory is given an extremely important place in the revival and growth of national 
self-consciousness and national pride. History can be a genuine tutor of the nation. The 
deeds and feats of great ancestors enliven historical memory, shape a new civil 
consciousness, and become a source of moral education and imitation.11    
 
The official Uzbek SSR version promoted after the 1950s – unmentioned in 
earlier official government histories – claims that the ‘ethnogenesis’ of the Uzbeks was 
completed by the 11th-12th centuries during Karakhanid rule. 12  The Tajik official 
histories, for their part, traced the completion of their ‘ethnogenesis’ to the Samanid era 
(9-10th centuries).13 Shirin Akiner claims, in an assertion that can only be safely applied 
to nationalist intellectuals and select politicians, that “Historiography is to Tajiks an 
intensely emotive, fiercely contested political issue.”14 Contemporary Tajik nationalists 
stress not only their Persian (Western Iranian) heritage, but also their Soghdian (Eastern 
Iranian) heritage in order to counteract the claim of “their Turkic neighbours” (i.e., 
Uzbek nationalists in Uzbekistan) that Turkic peoples are the original inhabitants of 
Central Asia and that the Tajiks are latecomers.15 An excellent example of this is in a 
recent article by Shamsiddin Kamoliddin, a researcher at the Institute of History in 
Uzbekistan, wherein he makes the uncited claim that modern-day Uzbeks are descended 
                                                 
11
 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century: Challenges to Stability and 
Progress, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 86-7. Shoshana Keller explains how this works in the 
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1st millennium BC and even earlier.” See Schoeberlein-Engel, ‘The Prospects for Uzbek National 
Identity’, 13.  
13
 B. Gh. Ghafurov, Tojikon: Ta’rikhi Qadimtarin, Qadim va Asri Miyona, Volume 1 (Dushanbe: Irfon, 
1983) 494-501; Nourzhanov, ‘The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the Samanids’, n.p.; 
Tadzhikskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika (Dushanbe: AN TadzSSR, 1974), 88, as cited in 
Subtelny, ‘The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik’, 53; Marlene Laruelle, ‘The Return of the Aryan Myth: 
Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized National Ideology’, Nationalities Papers, 35(1) (2007). 
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 Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 2001) 10. This is clearly not a new phenomenon, as demonstrated by Guissou Jahangiri in her 
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Trials of Independence. Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Frederic Grare and Shirin Akiner (editors). (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1997).  
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 Muriel Atkin, ‘Tajikistan’s Relations with Iran and Afghanistan’, in The New Politics of Central Asia 
and Its Borderlands. Edited by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), 97-8.  
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from sedentarised “proto-Turks” who were the indigenous population of Central Asia 
before the arrival of Indo-European peoples. He further claims (again uncited) that these 
Turks had inhabited the region (and specifically not as nomads) since the second 
millennia B.C.E., only to be forced out by “Aryan invaders.” 16  As a reply, Tajik 
nationalists can easily point to the claim made by the prominent Tajik academic 
Bobojon Ghafurov that the “Iranian eastern populations did not come to Central Asia 
out of nowhere but constituted themselves there, on the ground.”17  
This dissertation acknowledges the importance of historiography and the 
nationalist intellectual discourse18 for the Central Asian governments’ past and current 
attempts at state-/nation-building and for the shaping of identities. 19  However, the 
argument presented here will be that the intellectual battles of this type have limited 
relevance in peoples’ lives and are not strongly related to the localised sub-national 
conflict that will be analysed in this dissertation.20 Nevertheless, this dissertation will 
provide an analysis of ethnogenesis and historiography as part of the analysis of 
ethnicity in order to show the broader intellectual and national-level context before 
analysing the lower-level collective identities and loyalties.  
 
Tajiks 
 
Attempting to determine the origin of the term ‘Tajik’ and its social use 
throughout history is an exercise in speculation. Folk etymologies, single historical 
references, scholarly guessing, various shifting social usages and highly politicised 
attempts to find ancient origins all must be navigated when attempting to find the origin 
and historical usage of ‘Tajik.’21  Contemporary usage of ‘Tajik’ generally narrows 
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 Shamsiddin Kamoliddin, ‘The Notion of Ethnogenesis in the Ethnic Atlas of Uzbekistan’, Archeology 
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137-42, 144; C.E. Bosworth and B.G. Fragner, ‘Tādjīk’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited 
by P. Bearman , Th. Bianquis , C.E. Bosworth , E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2009. Brill 
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down members to sedentary, Persian-speaking Sunni Muslims in Central Asia and 
Afghanistan (with some exceptions such as Dari-speakers who claim Pashtun lineage). 
However, as stressed by Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont and echoed by other 
scholars, this “common term” refers to Persian-speakers of diverse origins.22 Similarly, 
John Schoeberlein cautions that a “biological” group can very quickly shift its language, 
therefore making it “very problematic” to refer to the various Iranian peoples as both a 
“linguistic and biological-racial group.”23 The fluidity of identity in the region is noted 
by Sergei Abashin, who states that historically in Central Asia  
Cultural or linguistic distinguishing features were not permanent, but fluid, and a person 
could easily move from one category to another. In this period, such ‘transparency’ in 
relation to cultural and social boundaries was a necessity of life. Otherwise, a small 
group, insulated by strict self-consciousness, would have been unable to survive. It 
needed to have the capacity to absorb new members from outside, as well as the ability 
to join a new stronger grouping.24 
 
When discussing the language of the Tajiks – variously referred to as Persian, 
Farsi, Dari or Tajiki – the historical linguistic changes in Central Asia within the Iranian 
languages family should be noted. The Eastern Iranian languages in Central Asia were 
superseded by a mutually unintelligible Western Iranian language (Persian25) several 
hundred years after the Arab conquests in a process that began well before the Arabs 
                                                                                                                                               
‘Aryan’ (meaning ‘noble, highborn’). From the viewpoint of modern Tajik language the word ‘Tajik’ is 
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entered the region.26 According to Ghafurov, the appeal and power of religious, cultural, 
political and economic factors all contributed to the spread of western Iranian.27 
As mentioned above, Tajik official and nationalist histories trace the completion 
of their ‘ethnogenesis’ and the beginning of their ‘statehood’ to the Samanid era (9-10th 
centuries).28 The works of Sadriddin Ayni and Bobojon Ghafurov, for example, were 
written with the goal of shaping national identity and tracing its origins.29 Ghafurov, an 
historian who was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan from 1946-
1956 and thereafter (until his death 20 years later) the director of the Moscow-based 
Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, writes of 
the Tajiks as a clearly defined group from the Samanid era.30 Ghafurov, commenting on 
the “process of consolidation of the Tajik people,” uses contradictory language: 
“Although the formation of the Tajik people had already been completed by the 9th-10th 
centuries, in the following centuries it [i.e., Tajik identity] did not remain unchanged.”31 
This phrasing allows Tajiks to claim all populations that preceded this era to be included 
as ancestors of Tajiks and all cultural, linguistic and population changes after this era as 
not lessening the importance of the final ‘consolidation’ of Tajik identity. The Tajik 
archaeologist and historian N. N. Negmatov makes a similar claim of Tajik antiquity, 
albeit in somewhat more neutral terms when he identifies all the Iranian-speaking 
populations of Central Asia during and before the Samanid era and argues that  
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All these people were ethnically related and spoke languages and dialects of the Middle 
Iranian and New Persian language groups; they were the basis for the emergence and 
gradual consolidation of what became an Eastern Persian-Tajik ethnic identity.32    
 
Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, while extolling Ghafurov’s works in the most 
flattering terms, dispenses with any academic caution and writes 
…I have had to stress again and again that it would be wrong to think that the first page 
in the history of Tajik statehood was written with the founding of the Samanid state. 
Long before the Samanid epoch, the Tajiks had already established a number of states. 
Little wonder that the Tajiks are recognised as one of the oldest peoples of Central Asia 
who laid down the very foundations of civilisation in these ancient lands. […] The 
Tajiks have a history stretching back many thousand years. 
 
[…]…how could we, the Tajiks and legitimate successors to the Kayonids, betray the 
memories of our forefathers and let them sink into oblivion?33 
 
As for the social and political relevance of Tajik historiography and 
ethnogenesis, in particular their relation to post-Soviet state/nation-building, recent 
articles by Kirill Nourzhanov34 and Marlene Laruelle35 illustrate the importance that the 
government of Tajikistan and the various Tajik intellectuals attach to these issues, with 
a particular stress on the Samanids – all-important due to their status as the last ‘Iranian’ 
dynasty before the domination of Turkic dynasties. While these issues are clearly 
important for the continuing shaping of identity in modern Central Asian states, my 
focus on local mobilisation dynamics in the Tajik civil war focuses on more mundane 
aspects of identity and loyalty to which I will dedicate most of my focus.   
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Uzbeks 
 
Official Uzbekistan government versions, unmentioned in earlier official 
government histories, claim that the ‘ethnogenesis’ of the Uzbeks was completed by the 
11th-12th centuries during Karakhanid rule and that the name Uzbek was given to a pre-
existing ethnic group. 36  According to Alisher Ilkhamov, the contemporary version 
popular in Uzbekistan’s academic community cites the appearance of Qarluq Turks in 
Central Asia during the 10th-11th centuries as the most important event in Uzbek history. 
Meanwhile, he cites 1924 and the national delimitation that created the Uzbek SSR as 
the most important event in Uzbek history. 37  Ilkhamov, clearly influenced by 
contemporary theories of nationalism, looks to more recent processes: 
It would be naive to imagine the formation of Uzbek nation only as an “objective” 
natural-historical process. Indeed, the process of forming modern Uzbek identity should 
be considered in close relation with the formation of the Uzbek SSR as well as the result 
of united efforts of ruling and cultural elites.38 
 
The creation of the Uzbek national state, allotment of special territory, ensuring an 
Uzbek majority was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the formation of the 
new Uzbek identity. To complete the process, it was necessary to create the 
corresponding national consciousness. Before the creation of the Uzbek SSR, only a 
minority of urban dwellers, mostly local intelligentsia, merchants, and clergy, possessed 
a degree of national consciousness. The Soviet government, however, was very 
suspicious and even hostile to these social groups. That is why it was necessary to 
introduce the idea of the Uzbek nation with it own culture, language, history, and 
national heroes for the larger population. It became possible through codification of the 
Uzbek language, development of national symbols, and their spread through the 
republic. This required total literacy.39  
  
Of course, it is not just the antiquity of the Uzbeks that is up for debate, it is also 
the composition of the Uzbeks. A 1941 article by the Soviet historian A. Yakubovskii 
claimed that the “Uzbek people” were already formed by the time the Shaybanid 
Uzbeks arrived in Central Asia. Rather than being the most significant event in the 
“formation process of the Uzbek people,” this population influx just completed the 
process.40 One official Uzbek SSR publication, History of the Uzbek SSR, denies any 
nomadic component to the modern Uzbeks and stresses the local origins of the modern 
Uzbeks, claiming descent from the sedentary inhabitants of historical areas that coincide 
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with the territory of modern day Uzbekistan.41 The official Uzbek SSR government 
version of the Uzbek ethnogenesis based Uzbek origins on a sedentary population 
within the territory of Uzbekistan, while deemphasising any nomadic roots to stress the 
“cultured” nature of Uzbek history and rejecting the connection to Shaybanid Uzbeks 
who came from outside the territory of modern day Uzbekistan. 42  However, the 
anthropologist Belkis Karmysheva contradicts the official version and notes the 
significant nomadic influence.43 The Uzbek historian Karim Shaniiazov and the Kazakh 
historian Tursun Sultanov also contradict the official histories. They both argue that 
steppe nomads, including Shaybanid Uzbeks, contributed significantly to the present-
day Uzbek population.44 
An official Union-wide Soviet (i.e., not Uzbek SSR) publication titled 
Uzbekistan (1967) describes Uzbekistan’s ethnic Uzbek population in three parts: a 
long-settled population, a semi-nomadic and Turkic population that gradually 
sedentarised, and Turkic Shaybanid clans that arrived in the 15th-16th centuries. The 
book notes the differences between the groups but then claims that a unified Uzbek 
nation was formed out of the disparate groups during the Soviet era as “they gradually 
converged in way of life, culture and language and eventually became indivisible parts 
of the Uzbek nation.”45 Ilkhamov is of the same opinion. He suggests  
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…that three main sources constitute the original ethnic components from which modern 
Uzbeks were formed as an ethnos and as a nation. These are Dasht-i Kipchak nomad 
Uzbeks, most of whom migrated to Central Asia in the early 16th century; local Turkic 
tribes and clans (Chagatay and Oguz); and the Sarts, settled Turkic-speaking, who lost 
their tribal roots (if they had them in remote past) by the nineteenth century.46 
 
Schoeberlein notes the mixing and assimilation of the various migrations of Turks who 
migrated into Central Asia and compares the arrival of the Shaybanids as more of 
political consequence than ethnic. The term did not have the modern connotation of a 
national identity. He notes that historically ‘Uzbek’ referred to a ruling dynasty and its 
subjects. From the 16th century Shaybanid conquests through to the various Uzbek 
Khanates that controlled Central Asia, the term ‘Uzbek’ referred to the rulers and, “by 
extension,” to those people ruled by them.47 Schoeberlein describes a pre-Shaybanid 
population south of the steppes who, unlike the Shaybanids who “reckoned themselves 
to be of Uzbek descent,” were either (a) Turkic-speaking nomadic peoples whose 
descent-based identities were not connected with Uzbek lineages or (b) a sedentary 
population who spoke either a Turkic or Persian language (or both) and had no tribal 
identity.48 
 
Uzbeks in Southern Tajikistan  
 
The Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan did not go through the same Soviet-era 
process of assimilating many groups of Turkic and Uzbek peoples into a single Uzbek 
nationality as did those inside Uzbekistan. So while the Uzbeks of Uzbekistan are not 
completely homogeneous, the Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan are even less so. 49 
However, in the same way that Soviet ethnographers included all Persian-speaking 
groups in the Tajik group, they also placed many Uzbek dialect-speaking Turkic groups 
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in Tajikistan into the Uzbek group.50 Most importantly for communal relations, despite 
all the diversity in the Uzbek and Uzbek-speaking Turkic population, Tajiks have come 
to consider all these peoples as one Uzbek group, despite their differences.51 As an 
example of these differences, ethnic Uzbeks in the south, such as those in Hisor and 
Qurghonteppa, are much more isolated from the Tajiks than the Uzbeks in the north, 
and as a result the southern Uzbeks are less familiar with the Tajik language.52  
 
Loqay 
 
Unlike the Turkmen, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, the Tajiks and Uzbeks do not have a 
social structure based on kinship lineages. However, one of the Uzbek exceptions would 
be the Loqay,53 who can be included in the category of those Uzbeks who were nomadic 
in recent history and who have kept their tribal structures.54 This group has preserved its 
communal identity and has its own mono-ethnic collective farms. According to Olivier 
Roy, the Loqay will identify the tribe as their primary identity. This is in contrast to 
other southern Uzbek groups, such as the Kungrat, Qarluq, Durman and Barlos, who 
will give their tribal identity only if pressured to do so. Their Uzbek ethnic identity is 
more relevant than their tribal identity, which is no longer based on any real social 
structures.55 Akiner and Rubin make very similar points about the Loqays, with Akiner 
noting that they maintain a “strong sense of communal identity”56  and with Rubin 
stating that the Loqays in Qurghonteppa maintain distinct identities and dialects.57  
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Matteo Fumagalli notes the continuing controversy over the status of Loqays (i.e., are 
they Uzbek or not?). In particular, their inclusion as a unique ethnicity in the 2002 
census at the expense of a larger count for Uzbeks is disputed.58 
 
Blurred Tajik-Uzbek Boundaries 
 
Like Sergei Abashin,59 Schoeberlein notes that Tajiks have had a close historical 
relationship with the Turkic peoples. He argues that in Central Asia there is a “broadly 
unified culture” and that it is impossible to categorize a distinct Tajik or Uzbek culture 
thanks to linguistic, cultural and genetic mixing.60 President Karimov of Uzbekistan is 
of the same opinion, speaking of the Uzbeks he notes: 
…we also have common cultural, historical and anthropological roots with the Tajik 
people, and this suggests that our culture is a unique synthesis of Turkic and Persian 
elements.61   
 
Uzbeks and Tajiks are the one nation which speaks the two languages.62 
 
Central Asia was populated by an Eastern Iranian-speaking population that, throughout 
history, had received influxes of various populations and cultures. Starting in the 5th 
century the region was subjected to the in-migration of nomadic Turkic-speakers. But 
despite the influx of Turkic languages, the long-settled areas retained many elements of 
Iranian/Persian culture.63 The historically close relations between Turkic and Iranian 
speakers did not have just political and socio-economic consequences, but ethnic and 
linguistic ones as well. The common phenomenon of bilingualism in Central Asia is 
mentioned in historical sources as early as the 11th century. Maria Eva Subtelny 
describes the ‘ethnolinguistic’ process in Central Asia: 
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Ethnic assimilation also worked both ways, depending on the particular region and 
circumstances. […] Ultimately,…the general ethnolinguistic trend was in the direction 
of Turkicization and in roughly a millennium the population of Central Asia was 
transformed from predominantly Iranian-speaking to Turkic speaking….The balance 
was decisively tipped by the Uzbek invasions of the late fifteenth and early 16th 
centuries.64 
 
Culturally, only language clearly demarcates the Tajik and Uzbek categories, 
and the prevalence of bilingualism lessens the importance of this division.65  Shirin 
Akiner notes that a “bilingual Turco-Iranian culture emerged in which both elements 
had equal status. Consequently, because of the symbiosis, the two languages did not 
serve as markers of ethnic identity in relation to each other.”66  In Samarkand and 
Bukhara there was, under the control of Turkic dynasties but with the domination of 
Persian language, a “mutual-influence and mutual-benefit between Tajik and Uzbek 
culture.”67 But these two political and cultural centres should not be taken as a rule for 
the entire region. Subtelny cautions that while usually the minority group became 
bilingual, there are others factors such as “prestige, function, and setting” that determine 
linguistic dominance. 68  For example, Tajiks from mountainous areas of eastern 
Tajikistan are much less likely to speak Uzbek as would a Tajik from northern 
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Tajikistan.69 In regards to Uzbeks in Tajikistan, one community in the Hisor Valley near 
the border with Uzbekistan is mono-lingual and completely segregated from Tajiks.70  
Phenotype stereotyping relying on physical characteristics is also of limited help 
in discerning distinct Uzbek and Tajik identities. As Roy notes, “An Uzbek is someone 
who speaks Uzbek and who calls himself Uzbek, and not someone who has ‘Turkic’ 
features.”71 Schoeberlein finds even Central Asians’ insistence that they can distinguish 
between Uzbeks and Tajiks based on physical appearance to be problematic. It is not 
possible to divide Uzbeks and Tajiks into separate categories. The stereotypes for the 
‘ideal’ appearance (while not completely reliable in determining identity) of Turkic 
peoples (including Uzbeks) and Iranian peoples (including Tajiks) are very different. 
However, the population of sedentary Central Asia has been intermixed for so long that 
it is impossible to accurately distinguish Tajiks from Uzbeks on physical appearance 
alone, particularly those who live on the plains and in the valleys.72 The lowlands Tajiks 
share more physical characteristics that are stereotyped as Turkic while mountain 
dwellers share fewer linguistic and physical features with Turkic peoples.73 A large part 
of the Uzbeks in Central Asia have Iranian ancestry while Tajiks who live outside of the 
isolated mountain communities have some Turkic ancestry. 74  In line with this 
description, it is noted that mixed marriages are common in Tajikistan,75  with the 
Ferghana Valley being the area where mixed marriages are most common.76  
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Sarts 
 
The designation and self-designation of the identity category ‘Sart’ has 
significance for the ‘formation’ of both Tajiks and Uzbeks as this term transferred 
through history from Persian-speakers to Turkic-speakers. 77  V.V. Barthold, among 
others, writes that ‘Sart’ was being used by the late 19th and early 20th century as both 
an ethnonym and an exonym for urban Turkic-speakers in Central Asia.78 However, the 
Tajik scholar Pulat Shozimov argues that by the 19th century the term ‘Sart’ transferred 
from the “Persian-Tajik population” to a self-designation by an “urban population for 
whom language and ethnic features were not of high importance,” hence de-stressing 
the Turkic character of Sarts.79 Alisher Ilkhamov describes the vague and somewhat 
confused categorisation of Sart identity at the beginning of the Soviet era: 
 
‘Sarts’ are a social rather than an ethnic category. In some cases those former Dashti-
Kipchak Uzbeks and Chaghatay Turks and Turko–Mongols who switched to a settled 
life-style and lost their nomadic identity are classified as ‘Sarts.’ In other instances, they 
are seen as turkified Tajiks. In any case, the notion ‘Sart’ combines both ethnic and 
class attributes. Sarts are, as a rule, urban inhabitants engaged in craftsmanship, trade 
and in middle level administrative and educational activity. The percentage of clergy, 
supervisors of cults and law enforcement officials is also relatively high among them. In 
addition, in rural areas they are involved in agriculture.80 
 
By the early 20th century in Central Asia, the most controversial contemporary political 
issue was whether to classify the Sarts, a bilingual, settled population (especially in the 
Ferghana Valley and Tashkent where they formed 50-60% of the population) as ‘Turk’ 
or ‘Uzbek.’ Sarts were classified as Uzbeks in the 1917 census and then completely 
‘disappeared’ into the official Uzbek category by 1924. Abashin notes that the current 
arguments between certain Tajik and Uzbek academics and politicians may give the 
misleading impression that there were historical controversies focused on the ‘Uzbek-
Tajik’ question. However, this controversy did not arise until the 1920s when the 
Soviets began to classify Central Asians by nationality.81 
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Soviet Nationalities Policies 
 
Muriel Atkin notes that in Central Asia before the Soviet nation-building process 
the “overwhelming majority of indigenous inhabitants considered themselves part of the 
Muslim community but also saw that community as subdivided into groups which were 
different and, not infrequently, mutually hostile.” 82  Atkin lists these divisions as 
ethnicity, religious ties, loyalty to dynasties or local tribal chiefs, tribal or clan 
affiliation, economic interests, geographic locations and political ideologies.83 Subtelny 
provides fewer identity categories, listing tribe, town or religion. 84  Sergei Abashin 
provides a more comprehensive list: 
The basic cultural frontiers in pre-Russian Central Asia were not shaped along ethnic or 
ethnic-national lines. The main divides used to differentiate ‘one of us’ from someone 
‘foreign’ were based on position in the social hierarchy, religious separation into Sunni, 
Shi’ite, or Ishmaelite, membership of different Sufi brotherhoods, economic-cultural 
categorization between settled, mountainous, nomadic or semi-nomadic groups, family 
or tribal distinctions, or by regional classification.85 
 
By the beginning of the Soviet era, in Abashin’s words, the many “cultural and 
social categories and ‘named groups’ that existed in Central Asia was artificially and 
administratively reduced to an extremely limited range of ‘nationalities’ or ‘national 
groups.’”86 The manipulation of identity categories began at an early date. One example 
is from the 1920 census where there was, in addition to difficulty in assigning ethnic 
identity to those within the Tajik-Uzbek categories, “deliberate misidentification for 
political purposes, particularly in the Tajik-Uzbek case.”87 Similarly, Atkin writes that 
many people  
 
…feared being forcibly relocated to ensure that a given nationality would be entirely 
contained within “its” own republic. Thus some of the self-designations as ‘Tajik’ and 
‘Uzbek’ did not reflect that individual’s ethnic consciousness but rather his estimate of 
which answer would enable him to remain in his home.”88 
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The Tajik historian Rahim Masov takes the above themes to a much higher level, 
dedicating much of his writing to demonstrate what he perceives to be the ethnic 
injustices inflicted upon Tajiks by both Uzbeks and fellow Tajiks. Masov convincingly 
demonstrates that many Tajiks outside of the present-day area of Tajikistan were forced 
into the ‘Uzbek’ category through discrimination, falsified census results, local 
bureaucratic subterfuge, and various other methods.89   
Soviet social scientists’ work was “closely tied into the official ideology and 
politics of ethno-nationalism dominant in the Soviet state – with ethnic groups forming 
pseudo-federal administrative units or Republics.”90 Their work was required because in 
1925, when national consolidation had just begun, Uzbek “national consciousness” did 
not, according to Donald Carlisle, exist “below.”91 In Soviet Central Asia, Uzbek and 
Tajik cultural histories were “redefined” on the basis of language and territory. 
However, many of those now determined to be Uzbeks and Tajiks had often shared the 
same territory, culture and languages throughout recent history, so the 
“compartmentalization of individual elements from this common background into 
‘Uzbek’ and ‘Tajik’ was bound to create confusion and overlap.” 92  Centlivres and 
Centlivres-Demont maintain that Soviet ethnographers took many diverse Persian 
speaking and Turkic speaking groups and gathered them into two categories, Tajiks and 
Uzbeks respectively, and “treated them as homogeneous entities.”93 However, this focus 
on the Soviet central government’s plans does not take into consideration the 
manipulative roles played by local allies of the Bolsheviks. As an example, Carlisle 
points especially to Fayzulla Khojaev, a Jadid (Muslim reformer) and Moscow’s 
“primary native ally.”94 Obiya Chika focuses entirely on Khojaev’s career and identity, 
noting that as his career progressed he “seemed to show a drastic change of self-
identity—from Bukharan to Uzbek,”95 and that ultimately he was the most active of any 
Central Asian leaders in the process of national delimitation.96 Masov is particularly 
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critical of the role played by Khojaev and other local leaders – both Uzbek and Tajik – 
in the process of manipulating the process whereby the population of Central Asia was 
divided ethnically into nationality categories and geographically into republics.97  
During the Brezhnev/Rashidov years in Uzbekistan (roughly, early 1960s to 
early 1980s), nation and nationality were, according to Donald Carlisle, “largely 
irrelevant, or better stated, not yet relevant, to much, if not most, of Uzbekistan’s native 
population.” 98  But Carlisle then goes on to claim that the concepts of nation and 
nationality were “meaningful” realities to the ruling elites, the intelligentsia, and the 
“state middle class.”99 Sergei Abashin describes the process: 
Over seven decades, Soviet power was responsible for huge changes in people’s self-
consciousness. Moscow mobilized all of the instruments and resources necessary to 
achieve this: a national state, a national culture, national language and literature, 
national education and national media (particularly television). Among the most 
powerful tools for introducing ethnic self-consciousness to the masses were internal 
passports and the census, which, in effect, was a survey of the population’s ethnic-
national allegiance. Every person had to be formally registered as a specific 
‘nationality’, which he/she could not change later, even if he/she wished to. Education 
also contributed to this socialization process. Thus, in the Soviet period, a citizen’s 
consciousness, the sense of belonging to the Uzbek or Tajik state, came increasingly to 
resemble ethnic self-consciousness, as in identifying with a certain culture, language 
and history.100 
   
Ilkhamov makes a similar argument for Uzbekistan: 
It must be admitted that decades-long efforts of ruling and cultural elites regarding 
Uzbek identity formation proved to be fruitful: today, the overwhelming majority of 
those registered as Uzbeks really feel that they belong to the Uzbek nation. […] Starting 
in the 1950s and continuing into the 1960-70s, most Uzbeks answered the question 
“Who are you?” by saying that they are first of all “Uzbeks” and then giving their 
region of residence.101 
 
However, William Fierman takes issue with the second part of the above anecdote. He 
suggests that the answers were dependent of the context: who was asking the question 
and who the interviewee believed the surveyor to be. He also adds that at this time both 
sides of this interaction were like to hear this question as “What is your passport 
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nationality?” and that the respondent is likely (more so than earlier generations) to 
understand the importance of nationality classification.102 This scepticism is displayed 
by other authors, but in a far less cautious manner. 
 
Scepticism of Effectiveness of Soviet Nationalities Policies 
 
Schoeberlein, while conceding that the Soviets did manage to dramatically 
transform identities in Central Asia, argues that the end result was not as intended. The 
Soviet authorities, while strongly attacking the traditional identity categories, offered 
only “weak alternatives.”103 Others, such as Akiner, give slightly more credit to the 
power of Soviet nation-building. She notes that after demarcation the government in 
Tajikistan introduced a standardised Tajik language based on the northern group of 
dialects, expanded the reach of the media and formed “national, political, cultural and 
educational institutions,” while intellectuals “gave shape and substance to the Tajik 
heritage.”104 Akiner concedes that while this process never completely overcame the 
significance of ‘regional divisions’ it did create a “palpable sense of shared national 
identity.”105 Writing with an emphasis on Tajikistan, Akiner outlines the superficial 
aspects of the Soviet modernisation attempts, conceding that while the Soviet system 
quickly transformed the “public face of society,” it was limited in its success in 
transforming the “private domain.”106 These limitations are seen most acutely in rural 
society, as demonstrated polemically by Sergei Poliakov’s study of the ‘traditional’ 
lives of Central Asians.107 In regards again to identity categories, the local, pre-existing 
identities were often ‘incorporated’ into the larger nationality categories. As a result, 
these pre-existing identities continued to survive ‘unofficially’ below the level of nation 
and nationality. Akiner notes that because these older sub-national identities are “More 
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fluid and negotiable than the formal identities, these informal identities could either lay 
dormant, or be activated and manipulated, according to the requirements of the 
situation,”108 as will be further illustrated in the following sections. 
 
Sub-Ethnic Identity in Central Asia 
 
…as one observes the lives of “Uzbeks” and “Tajiks,” it becomes apparent that these 
identities are superseded by other terms of identity which bear much greater 
significance.109   
 
At the time of the 16th century Shaybanid invasions, people in Central Asia 
identified with tribal or other lineages or locality, the categories that were important for 
the navigation of their social existence. 110  This assertion was still relevant at the 
beginning of the Soviet era. For example, in Tajikistan during the 1920s, aside from the 
small number of intellectuals who stressed their Persian heritage, the people of this 
mostly rural country identified by family, communal and regional categories. 111 
Meanwhile, at the same time in the Uzbek SSR, the political manoeuvring at the elite 
and non-elite level indicated strongly that the previously established loyalties and 
localised identities were still very relevant. Concerning the late Soviet era in 
Uzbekistan, Carlisle (1991) wrote that “…in dealing with native politics and loyalties, 
the label ‘Uzbek’ or other designations are no more helpful – and ordinarily less useful 
– than place or location as the grounds for patriotism.”112 Akiner argues that in the late 
Soviet period in Central Asia there were three levels of identity: state (Soviet), national 
group (nationality) and sub-national (kin groups, regional networks, etc...). She argues 
that “These layers were not contradictory, but complimentary” and that they were 
subject to “hierarchical weighting” depending on the context. 113  These ‘informal 
identities’ were maintained by genealogical knowledge, rites of passage that brought 
extended families together, mutual assistance based on kinship, and loyalty to place of 
origin. These groupings were important in politics, work and occasionally in the 
criminal underworld. 114  And despite the abovementioned Soviet efforts, Kilavuz 
concludes that identity in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is still primarily based on “local 
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units, regions and subregions.”115 Carlisle adds to this view, noting that the surviving 
sub-national loyalties, where the “real loyalties” were directed, created allegiances that 
could at time alternately complement or undercut the Uzbek and Tajik identities.116 In 
regards to Central Asia as a whole—and specifically Tajikistan—Olivier Roy concludes 
that “Sovietism did little to disturb the basic cores” of kinship-based identities.117 
Writing specifically on Tajikistan, Navruz Nekbakhtshoev states that, contrary to the 
assumptions of modernization theory which predicts the inevitable end of local sub-
national/ethnic identities in the face of nationalizing states, the “mechanisms of 
modernisation” in Tajikistan may have actually strengthened these identities.118 
 
Islamic Unity? 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Barthold wrote that a Central Asian “feels 
he is first a Muslim and second a resident of a specific town or location.”119 But while 
identifying as a Muslim may be important for some when interacting with a non-
Muslim, does an Islamic identity have much relevancy in Central Asia when locals 
interact with each other? Muriel Atkin stresses that while there is some “strength” in the 
Islamic identity for Central Asians, it does not mean that the identity is accompanied by 
some “supranational” Islamic unity as embodied in the idea of the umma, the idealised 
concept of a unified community of all Muslims.120 As for Central Asians’ interactions 
with the broader Muslim world community, while Central Asians may see Russian 
models as unsuitable, they are also not interested in replicating the Muslim societies of 
their neighbours. Schoeberlein argues that greater exposure to the outside Muslim world 
since the mid-1980s has, for Central Asians, confirmed to them a “sense if its being 
alien to them.”121 This viewpoint is echoed by Nazif Shahrani, an Afghan-American 
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anthropologist. However, instead of blaming increased awareness, he points to 
ignorance. He found during his fieldwork in Central Asia that 
In general the peoples of former Soviet Central Asia are very poorly informed, 
especially about the Muslim countries to the south and west. What the post-Soviet 
Central Asians say about these areas is often negative and demeaning and always 
accompanied by an exaggerated sense of their own progress and modernity.122 
 
According to these viewpoints, Central Asians do not feel any strong sense of unity with 
the outside Muslim world. For a quantitative example, a survey of Uzbeks and Kazakhs 
in 1993 asked respondents to name the countries that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan should 
keep the greatest distance from. While Israel was listed at number four, the top three 
answers were Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.123  
Additionally, there is no Islamic unity between Central Asians themselves (even 
discounting sectarian divides such as Sunni vs. Ismaili) when measured against other 
categories of identity. Talib Saidbaev argues that secular social categories often prevail 
over religious categories. He stresses that economic interests are a more important 
factor than religious ones. Issues of agricultural resource access, employment and other 
material interests are assigned more importance than the ideal of Islamic unity. A sign 
of the primacy of non-religious factors is the fact that it is common for the different 
ethnic groups in the towns of Central Asia to have their own Muslim clergy and their 
own mosque.124 Sergei Poliakov gave a similar description of separate communities 
within a larger rural community having their separate mosques. However, he notes that 
it was the mahalla (neighbourhood/quarter) that had its own mosque, rather than ethnic 
groups (this would also be a de facto ethnic segregation if the mahalla is mono-
ethnic).125 Roy also noted the primacy of kinship over Islam in the collective farms 
where kinship groups that feel marginalised start a secondary ‘oppositional’ mosque. 
According to Roy, these marginalised kin-based groups “thus tend to identify with 
Islam as one way of consolidating their opposition to others—although of course 
everyone would claim to be Muslim.”126 In a case study undertaken in an Uzbek village 
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in Tajikistan, Sergei Abashin found that the contestation between competing religious 
authorities was referred to by the locals in “terms of kinship.”127  This is just one 
anecdote Abashin provides in his article, wherein he argues that at the local (rural) level 
“religious conflicts are often submerged within the dynamics of local political, kinship 
and economic relations, with each Muslim community containing its own interest 
groups and means of legitimacy.”128   
At a higher level, Abduvakhitov expressed his doubts in late 1991 about the 
possibility of Islam as a politically unifying factor:  
[During perestroika] Islamic activists in the Muslim community began their social 
activity with an appeal to the Muslim umma. Their appeal excluded the growing sense 
of nationalism. Pan-Islam, as practised in the Muslim world, was not a power that could 
unite millions […] In the Central Asia republics, where people have for many years 
been united by the Muslim community, the national identity of the different peoples has 
limited this factor of pan-Islam. The activist movement, which includes Uzbeks, Tajiks, 
Turkmen, Kyrghyz, and others, must preserve itself from a growing nationalism. 
Tribalism and regionalism also remain strong in Central Asia. Thus it is difficult to see 
how pan-Islam can be a uniting factor in the political life of Central Asia.129  
 
Nancy Lubin, remarking on the results of the abovementioned survey, concluded that 
there are “schisms as much within Central Asian and Muslim communities as between 
them and others” and that “divisions among nationality groups in Central Asia run 
deep.”130 
 
Region, Kinship, Communities and Identity 
 
Much of the population of Tajikistan self-identifies not by ethnicity, but by 
locale. Amongst Tajiks, individuals identify themselves by town or region of origin. 
The use of ‘Tajik’ is used only for identifying oneself to outsiders.131 Kilavuz states that 
the regional identities were not created during the Soviet era, but had in fact already 
been important at both the elite and non-elite level. However, she goes on to note that 
Soviet policies gave these identities the “meaning and structure” that they currently 
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have by politicising regional identities, giving them a relevance at both elite and non-
elite levels.132 
Akiner lists the cultural “markers” of the various sub-Tajik identities as 
including “group histories, social structures, customs, music, folklore, and material 
culture (e.g., traditional styles of clothing and ornamental designs).”133 Kilavuz provides 
a very similar list of markers when she writes that significant differences, especially 
cultural, are given for those from the different regions or Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The 
people themselves cite regional differences amongst the same ethnic group that 
manifests in “dialect, physical appearance, traditions and customs.” 134 She also notes 
that in both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan people cite the significance of regional dialects 
which are used to determine a person’s region of origin.135 As for the relevance of 
language, Muriel Atkin notes that while members of the Tajik elite can speak literary 
Tajik (and Russian); most people speak various Tajik dialects, divided most broadly 
between north and south dialects, with “several further subdivisions.” 136  Kilavuz 
cautions that while the regions may have their own characteristic dialects, with 
differences even within the region; many people have the ability to speak in different 
dialects, including the standard literary form promoted by the government. She then 
goes on to cite the primacy of ancestry over dialect in determining identity.137 Akiner 
adds ‘psychological stereotyping’ as a significant factor in marking group boundaries 
amongst Tajiks. The examples of stereotypes she provides are: Qaroteginis are “flexible 
and adaptable”; Kulobis are “conservative and obstinate, reluctant to compromise,” and 
“northerners like consensus and continuity, are good at manipulating people.”138 Akiner 
also argues for the importance of geographical influences, particularly the mountain-
plains dichotomy, on the distinct sub-Tajik identities, citing these regions of Tajikistan 
– having distinct “economic, political and cultural environments” – traditionally having 
a low level of interaction with each other in relation to the Soviet era.139 The small size 
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and relative isolation of mountain settlements created “tight-knit communities with 
strong local identities.”140  
Aziz Niyazi sets a contrast when describing Tajiks in southern Tajikistan, noting 
that they are more isolated and “self-contained.” He posits that they (Kulobi and Gharmi 
Tajiks) are, in comparison to valley Tajiks (e.g., Ferghana Valley Tajiks), subjected to 
more fragmented local subcultures.141 The term ‘Gharmi Tajiks,’ (hereafter ‘Gharmis’) 
refers to Tajiks from the Province of Gharm – a usage that began after the large-scale 
transfer of Tajiks from the Gharm province to the lowland of the Vakhsh Valley. 
However, the term ‘Qaroteginis’ is also used, as Gharm Province includes the Qarotegin 
Valley, as well as the smaller Darvoz and Vakhyo Valleys. Qarotegin and Darvoz, as 
well as province such as Kulob, roughly match pre-Soviet areas that were ruled as semi-
independent beks in the Bukharan Emirate. The name for the Gharm province is taken 
from the small city of Gharm, which was the pre-Soviet capital of the Qarotegin bek.142  
By the end of the Soviet era, the majority of Tajiks lived in rural areas and over 
80 percent of the rural population still lived in their place of birth, in one of over 3000 
villages. Rural social life in Tajikistan, the least urbanised of the Soviet republics, was 
still “comparatively isolated and inward focused.”143  At this time many villages in 
Tajikistan were mono-ethnic, and where they were multi-ethnic they may in fact be 
divided into mono-ethnic neighbourhoods. In addition, Tajik villagers are, according to 
several Soviet era researchers, “highly endogamous.” 144  However, Muriel Atkin 
cautions that these conclusions should be viewed with caution due to the “imprecision” 
of the Uzbek and Tajik nationality categories.145  
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Map No. 3 – Original Provinces of Tajikistan 1924-1929.146 
 
 
 “Which region are you from?” is, according to Kilavuz, a standard inquiry in 
both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, in Tajikistan informants reported to Kilavuz 
that the question became more sensitive after the civil war. She notes that individuals 
may cite the wider region of their origin or a town within it, depending on the situation. 
Based on her extensive research in Tashkent, Dushanbe and, most relevantly to this 
dissertation, in Qurghonteppa, Kilavuz finds that people identified with their region of 
origin, even after being three generations removed. People identify with their paternal 
grandfather’s place of birth and in order to identify with that region, according to 
popular belief, an individual’s ancestors must have been there for a minimum of three 
generations.147 
In Tajikistan, regional identity can be seen as a factor in not just group conflict 
and competition, but in many types of other social behaviour such as marriage 
preferences for co-regionals and university socialisation patterns where there are reports 
of students from the same region eating, drinking and living together, with the 
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occasional fights between groups of youths from different regions.148 Locally based 
identities, whether at the regional, village or mahalla level, can be significant when a 
person leaves their home. In their new location their origin is frequently employed to 
seek assistance from co-regionals. 149  “Regionalism,” according to Khudonazarov, 
manifested itself even in the spatial distribution of Dushanbe where people of the same 
region often lived clustered together.150 However, despite the importance of regional 
identity, it should not be mistaken for an all-determining factor for social and political 
behaviour. As an example, Kilavuz argues strongly for the case that, at the elite level, 
there are divergent interests and divisions within the “regionally-based elite networks” 
and links between elites from different regions with mutual interests.151 Kilavuz writes 
that “…regional identities and loyalties, while important, are not the only factor in the 
formation of elite networks.”152 Akiner concurs, stating that regional identities, despite 
their importance, should not be overstated. They are often “crosscut” by other 
considerations.153 
 
 
 
Part 2: Power and Governance in Southern Tajikistan  
 
 The role of government and of local patterns of loyalty, identity and authority in 
the conflict – and the changing nature of these structures throughout recent history – 
will be analysed throughout the next two sections. For the changing nature of 
governance, an historical survey of governance, especially of the Soviet era, is required 
in order to illustrate the structure of society that provided incentives for groups and 
individuals to seek protection and benefits through affiliation with a certain faction, 
group or traditional solidarity structure. In particular, this section will provide the social 
context and historical background for the outbreak of civil unrest and political turmoil 
in February 1990 (and the resulting civil war that began in the first half of 1992), with a 
particular emphasis on the Qurghonteppa region (especially the Vakhsh Valley) of 
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southern Tajikistan. And since the focus of this dissertation is on the Vakhsh Valley – 
an area that underwent drastic demographic changes starting in the 1930s – the patterns 
of migration and local governance here, as well as the interaction in this area of groups 
of people who identified with various sub-ethnic categories and patron-client networks, 
will be shown to have had a strong effect on social mobilisation when state authority 
broke down and civil unrest ensued. 
The Qurghonteppa region (roughly, the Vakhsh Valley and some surrounding 
areas) is extremely complex, with a history of power struggles, social upheaval, quick-
paced economic development and massive in-migration. The Qurghonteppa region 
went, in a very short period, from being on the semi-autonomous periphery of the 
Bukharan Emirate to being at the centre of Soviet social and economic engineering. The 
Soviet authorities, as in other areas throughout the USSR, attempted to shape new 
national identities, suppress the pre-existing power structures, industrialise the economy 
and change the demographics to suit their development plans. Identities and power 
structures were indeed transformed, albeit not necessarily in a way that the Soviet 
planners had anticipated. The new power structures and identities included much in the 
way of traditional authority patterns and identities, while adapting to the restraints and 
incentives that were present in the Soviet system.  
For decades before the outbreak of civil war, elite-level patronage networks 
competed for power, access and resources at the national (Tajik SSR) level while 
locally-based solidarity groups competed for resources distributed from the centre and 
for resources obtained at the local level. There were many connections and mutually 
beneficial relations between these two levels. In 1992 when the power struggles in 
Dushanbe led to civil unrest and violent conflict, national level elites and local power 
brokers mobilised support from the local level, drawing on and appealing to ties of 
identity and shared economic concerns. Language, ethnicity, sub-ethnic identity, 
religious sect, region of origin, political party membership, collective farm affiliation, 
family ties, professional relationships, employer-employee ties and patron-client 
networks have all been cited as factors in determining individual and group participation 
or non-participation in the conflict. All these factors, and the historical and social 
transformations that frame them, are complex enough that they need to be analysed 
independently and in combination in the pre-conflict context.   
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Pre-Bukharan and Bukharan Era 
 
The area of modern day southern Tajikistan (the Qurghonteppa/Vakhsh River 
region and Kulob) was, throughout all historical periods, the isolated periphery of 
empires or under the control of various autonomous local powers, but never home to 
any strong entity that could project power elsewhere. 154  After the collapse of the 
Timurids, the region was under fluctuating levels of influence by the Shaybanid, Janid 
and Manghit Uzbek dynasties. In the first half of the 18th century, as the Bukhara 
Emirate started to lose authority in the area, the Yuz Uzbeks took control of Vakhsh 
Valley and Qabodiyon from their base in Hisor. And at times during the 18th century the 
Vakhsh would come under the control of Kunduz to the south, or Kulob and Baljovon 
in the east.155 
In 1870 the Bukharan Emirate, now under a certain level of Tsarist control for 
two years, expanded its control over Qurghonteppa and Qabodiyon with Russian 
assistance. Qurghonteppa, along with other eastern areas, became a sub-province of 
Hisor and the wider region of modern-day southern Tajikistan came to be referred to as 
Eastern Bukhara.156 The Bukharan Emirate, allowed to keep its bureaucratic structures 
and Emir by the Russians, attempted to create a bureaucratic structure that would 
incorporate local political, financial, judicial and religious structures at three levels of 
government, from top to bottom.157 This is in line with the Tsarist enactment in 1867 of 
an administrative and territorial reorganisation whereby civil and military powers were 
exclusively the domain of the military administration while “all local affairs were 
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relinquished to the traditional hierarchies.”158 However, the reality of Bukharan power 
was not quite so orderly. Hélène Carrère D’Encausse describes a state where many 
regions were “living in a situation of almost total independence or constant 
rebellion.”159 According to Anita Sengupta, the Bukharan Emirate had little semblance 
of territorial integrity. Geographic factors of distance, isolation and mountainous terrain 
gave the Eastern Bukharan lands a high level of autonomy. Sengupta notes that 
“complete control almost entirely eluded the Emirs and people preserved their family 
community structures.”160 She goes on to note the lack of stability, with “a constant 
process of flux where assimilation of certain parts was constantly accompanied by the 
threat of secession by others.”161 B. I. Iskandarov similarly argues that Bukhara’s failure 
to unite its eastern domains under centralised rule allowed small autonomous local 
social units to prosper.162 Especially relevant to Tajiks from the mountainous regions, 
mountain dwellers were able, thanks to their geographic location, to sidestep the 
Manghit Emirs’ attempts at centralised rule. Olimova and Olimov state that “hill valleys 
and their inhabitants with small pieces of cultivated land and no hope for irrigation 
came together in small groups and preserved their self-sufficient complex and 
independence from the central government.” 163  Nourzhanov notes that in Eastern 
Bukhara “In the eyes of the traditional communities and their leaders, any centralising 
agent constituted a potential menace” and that “non-Uzbek peasants and beks treated the 
Emir as an alien ruler and oppressor.”164 
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Early Soviet Era (pre-WWII) 
National Delimitation 
 
While it may be true that Tajikistan is “the most artificial and flawed of all the 
Soviet territorial creations,” as argued by Shirin Akiner,165  was this ‘artificiality’ a 
deliberate strategy of ‘divide and rule’ on the part of the Soviets? This assessment is 
shared by many scholars and appears time and time again in the literature on Central 
Asia.166 Some make short references to the strategy. Muriel Atkin, for example, refers to 
national delimitation as “divide et impera” (divide and rule).167 Other examples can be 
provided: 
 
…Moscow-imposed governments that were favorably disposed to the Stalinist system 
and assigned arbitrary borders to the republics and autonomous territories. In Central 
Asia, as elsewhere in the USSR, state boundaries and ethnic composition thus lacked 
correspondence. This was part of a deliberate strategy to weaken peripheral 
resistance.168 
 
Partition also serves one final principle: it ensures that none of the new republics is 
really viable on its own, and thus capable of independence. […] The frontiers of the 
various countries of Central Asia have no rationality, whether geographic, economic or 
ethnic. […] The ethnic groups were so extensively intermingled that no frontier could 
have ever been entirely rational. But even in this area the Soviets amused themselves by 
making things more complicated.169 
 
In fact, these republics were created primarily to accommodate the Bolsheviks’ political 
agenda, rather than some ‘ethnographic’ reality.170  
 
However, two of the scholars quoted above qualify their remarks. Schoeberlein notes 
that the “conventional wisdom” that portrays national delimitation as part of a “divide 
and conquer” strategy has not been “adequately documented,”171  while Olivier Roy 
questions whether national delimitation was a “Machiavellian calculation,” 
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“bureaucratic incompetence,” or “the power interests of local factions at work.”172 In 
regards to English-language literature on the subject, an alternate view was presented as 
early as 1995 when Isabelle Kreindler argued that the apparently “illogical” Central 
Asian administrative divisions are a result of the “complexity of the task – intermingled, 
illiterate populations, unstudied dialects – rather than a deliberate policy to weaken 
Muslim peoples.”173 When more significant attempts to adequately document national 
delimitation based on primary sources were eventually made (in English), it became 
clear that the ‘divide and rule’ theory is quite weak, most prominently as illustrated by 
Francine Hirsch.174 Olimov and Olimova argue that the borders of Tajikistan were not 
created on the basis of “ethnic lines,” which were “never a reality,” but on the 
‘administrative realities’ of geography, land usage, economics and communication.175 
At the same time, writing in Russian and specifically about Tajikistan, Rahim Masov 
noted that national delimitation was a complex process where native Central Asian 
cadres presented different proposals and argued their cases before the Soviet 
authorities.176 And in Masov’s view, the main villains of national delimitation are not 
the Soviet central authorities, but rather the Uzbek leaders allied to the Bolsheviks who 
manipulated the process of national delimitation to create an unfairly large Uzbek SSR 
at the expense of ethnic Tajik-dominated areas.177  
 
Basmachi Era in Eastern Bukhara 
 
The Soviet government consolidated control over the area of present day 
Tajikistan by 1931 when they defeated the last significant Basmachi revolt, a series of 
uprisings that began in 1918 in response to the Soviet offensive and then later against 
Bolshevik reforms.178 Sengupta argues that the Basmachi were a broad movement that 
consisted of actors with numerous motivations: some fought for the restoration of the 
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Bukharan emirate, some fought for the autonomy of local authority structures and 
leaders, and some fought for the creation of a “Turkestan-wide federative union.”179 
Beatrice Penati argues that, unlike the Basmachi in Ferghana, the Basmachi in Eastern 
Bukhara were focused on the restoration of the Bukharan Emirate and were “probably 
sensitive to pan-Islamist rhetoric.” 180  However, Nourzhanov provides a different 
description of the Basmachi, particularly for Eastern Bukhara, where he focuses his 
study. He dismisses the notion that the Basmachi were fighting for Turkic national 
liberation as “romanticised” and “displaced.” 181  He also argues that describing the 
Basmachi as waging a popular jihad or defending Islam is “difficult to accept” 
considering the native population’s indifference to the message of jihad, the cooperation 
of many locals with the Bolsheviks and the rejection by many local religious leaders of 
the jihadi message. 182  Nourzhanov also qualifies the idea that the Basmachi were 
attempting to restore the Bukharan Emirate: 
The sympathy and legitimacy that the Emir himself enjoyed is mostly the stuff of 
fiction. His name did not carry any weight in Ferghana or Khiva. The situation in 
Eastern Bukhara was somewhat different: Ibrahim Bek and a few other Uzbek tribal 
chiefs who enjoyed power and privilege in Alim Khan’s state rallied to his cause, but 
the majority Tajik population was rather ambivalent.183        
 
In Eastern Bukhara, Ibrahim Bek and other Basmachi leaders relied upon the remnants 
of the Bukharan government as well as local kinship and patronage networks.184 The 
Soviet military campaign in the late 1920s in Eastern Bukhara was aimed at defeating 
the Basmachi and establishing Soviet control over the area. During this campaign the 
influx of civil authorities, the use of village self-defence units and irregular troops, some 
of whom were former Basmachi, resulted in the disruption of local power networks.185 
Another factor disrupting local powers structures was the Soviet and Basmachi use of 
famine relief as a tool in their respective struggles, with the Soviets distributing food 
“according to political criteria” and the Basmachi also using the redistribution of food 
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as a reward for communities that were loyal to them.186 In the struggle between the 
Basmachi and the Soviets in Eastern Bukhara, “the population’s allegiance depended on 
the ability of different actors in satisfying its most basic needs.”187 
 
Governance  
 
The Soviet authorities in Eastern Bukhara, due to the absence of educated locals 
to recruit as cadres, had to exercise central rule through a small number of “poorly-
supervised local agents.” 188 And some of the ‘new’ local Soviet officials were in fact 
the same old local authority figures. Schoeberlein notes that some of the local leaders 
joined the Bolshevik side as they saw an opportunity to use the Soviet “power 
structures” as a vehicle to promote their own interests.189 Penati notes that the Central 
Commission for Struggle against the Basmachi complained that as of the late 1920s the 
local power structures were mostly untouched and that the local Soviet bureaucracy was 
“colonized” by former bureaucrats of the Bukharan Emirate. 190  Another aspect of 
‘colonisation’ concerned not former bureaucrats of the Bukharan Emirate, but powerful 
local figures. In Tajikistan, wealthy local elites were able, assisted by their local 
patronage networks, to get elected to serve in Soviet institutions, especially at the rural 
district level. This even led to factional fighting, power struggles and abuse of power by 
those in positions of authority. The Soviets noticed this problem and worried that 
“clans” would successfully integrate themselves within the Soviet bureaucracy.191 In the 
former Bukharan Emirate the Kremlin encountered particular difficulty transforming the 
local power structures into Soviet institutions, unlike elsewhere where the 
transformation was from Tsarist to Soviet.192 Moscow finally found the educated class 
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needed as bureaucrats in Tajikistan with the 1929 addition of the northern urban centre 
of Khujand to the Tajik SSR.193 
 
Later Soviet Era 
State Effectiveness 
 
Shirin Akiner characterises “Soviet modernisation” as being “highly 
authoritarian” and being implemented within a “totalitarian system.”194  Olivier Roy 
seems to go even further, stating that “the Soviet Union constituted a totalitarian system 
in which the state was the alpha, beta and omega of all socio-political existence.”195 
However, Akiner and Roy, both of whom have written extensively on Tajikistan, 
contradict and/or qualify these statements throughout their writing. Roy dedicates much 
of his work to the description of how social networks were recreated within the 
structures of the Soviet system, especially in Tajikistan, despite resistance from the 
authorities. He also argues that parts of Tajikistan were “under-administered” by the 
Soviets.196  Many others have, in their work on Tajikistan, presented an analysis of 
Soviet state effectiveness that is much different in comparison to these quotes above.197 
After WWII, with the fight against the Basmachi long finished and the worst of the 
purges being over, a picture of a Soviet and a Tajik state with mixed effectiveness 
emerges. For example, the local branches of the KGB were staffed by high-ranking 
ethnic European officers who could not speak local languages and were often rotated to 
new areas, and by local officers who were enmeshed in the local community and 
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“tended to keep troubles 'inside the family.'”198 Other factors show a Soviet state that is 
far from totalitarian. For example, the Loqay Uzbeks were at times confrontational with 
the state as late as the 1960s. While Olimov and Olimova write that the government 
defeated the last large Loqay “uprising” in the 1960s by both the use of force, they also 
note that the government – uncharacteristically of an effective totalitarian state – offered 
concessions to the Loqay community.199  
Until the late 1960s the Soviet central government intervened regularly in local 
affairs in Central Asia, redistributing power, balancing factions and appointing new 
leaders. But starting in the 1970s, Brezhnev ceased this strategy and allowed leaders to 
hold their position for lengthy periods.200 During this era the Tajik state was able to 
successfully carry out the basic tasks of governance, as illustrated by Kirill Nourzhanov: 
 
The process of decision-making in Tajikistan, perhaps more than elsewhere in the 
USSR, was concealed from public view – it was essentially cryptopolitics, concentrated 
largely within the limits of the CPT Central Committee and it apparatus. Under 
Brezhnev the governing elite in Tajikistan transformed itself into a self-stabilising 
oligarchy which could retain its status without resorting to blatant coercion. The overall 
sum of authority enjoyed by the Communist state was impressive; it effectively coped 
with the problems of legitimation, compliance and distribution.201 
   
However, this ‘stability of the cadres’ under Brezhnev allowed for the expansion of 
patron-client relationships – often formed on kinship bases – and corruption. In the late 
Soviet era the government unsuccessfully attempted to reduce the prevalence of local 
patron-client relations and “clan loyalties,”202 a failure that served to undermine state 
effectiveness. Later, perestroika policies implemented by the government of the Tajik 
SSR were meant to increase the centre’s power of oversight. However, these reforms 
were not successful in increasing the centre’s power over the periphery. Markowitz 
argues that Tajikistan, as early as the 1960s and especially in the early 1970s, exercised 
much weaker central authority than Uzbekistan. He cites as examples the 
“accommodations” that the central government made with provincial elites in Kulob 
and Qurghonteppa.203 
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The corruption that grew during the ‘stability of the cadres’ under Brezhnev 
eventually reduced the effectiveness of the state. According to Akiner, the level of 
corruption undermined the “legitimacy” and “integrity” of the state.204 Akiner notes that 
a parallel economy and, along with that, parallel power structures, operated independent 
of the state. She describes a “façade of national unity” behind which lay these parallel, 
“semi-invisible” structures.205 But the ‘independence’ of the parallel structures needs to 
be qualified with the fact that many of the power brokers who operated outside the law 
were often holding positions of authority within the Tajik SSR’s official structures.206 
Corruption in the Tajik SSR was pervasive and prosecution rare. The penalties received 
were often “mild,” while being a member of the nomenklatura or a patronage network 
offered protection from prosecution.207 In one serious development, towards the end of 
the 1980s crime increased dramatically in Leninobod, Kulob and Qurghonteppa.208 For 
example, local mafias operated in the black market with some official protection in 
Qurghonteppa during the 1980s.209 Fraud, theft of state property, falsification of cotton 
production and other forms of organised crime and embezzlement all contributed to 
weakening state capacity. In response, First Secretary Qahhor Mahkamov – forced by a 
Second Secretary appointed by Moscow210 – led a campaign against corruption between 
1986 and 1991, resulting in a large turnover of the political and economic elites.211 
Mahkamov’s campaign included law enforcement investigations into areas that were 
previously under the protection of local party officials. Of course, the turnover was 
implemented in a manner which would keep Leninobodis/Khujandis in a dominant 
position. But still, Pamiris and Tajiks from Qarotegin were appointed to national level 
positions for the first time since the 1940s. In reaction to Mahkamov’s policies, the 
elites in Kulob no longer saw a mutually beneficial patronage relationship with the 
central government. They soon started embezzling agricultural profits while taking over 
local law enforcement and judicial agencies as a way to protect their scheme. By the end 
of the Soviet period, farm bosses and regional politicians in Kulob exercised 
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“significant influence” over law enforcement agencies and the courts while increasingly 
relying on illegal income.212 
 
“Underground” Islam 
 
Another example of the Soviet’s lack of “total control”, as argued by Anderson, 
would be the emergence of politicised underground Muslim organisations in the 
1970s.213 However, ‘underground’ Islamic education started as soon as the traditional 
institutions of Islamic education were closed by the Soviets in the 1920s.214 The use of 
‘underground’ also needs to be qualified. Abduvakhitov’s description of Islamic groups 
that emerged during the “Islamic revitalization” of the 1970s notes the lack of success – 
and lack of interest – the government of the Uzbek SSR had in countering them.215 
Parviz Mullojonov’s description of Tajikistan’s “underground Islamic circles,” that 
gained momentum in the 1970s, echoes Abduvakhitov’s narrative of Uzbekistan’s 
experience: 
..it is doubtful that, in the general conditions of the USSR, such underground religious 
circles could have escaped the KGB’s gaze for more than 15 years. In fact the KGB’s 
national departments, which used to employ a broad network of agents among the 
Muslim clergy, knew from the very beginning about the existence of these Islamist 
circles. Probably the Soviet security organs did not tamper with the young mullahs’ 
activities: it rather aimed at using them for reducing the authority of the conventional 
clergy, which in the 1970s and early 1980s was considered by the Soviet power as the 
main evil.216  
 
If Mullojonov is right and the security services considered the official Soviet-sponsored 
clergy to be more of a threat, then this speaks even more about the Soviet Union’s 
inability to control society. Their tactic of using the two groups against each other, is 
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that was actually the case, shows the further ineffectiveness of the state’s repressive 
measures. An effectively repressive state would just simply eliminate both groups. 
However, by the mid-1980s the Soviet security services did begin to arrest and “harass” 
Tajik Islamists.217 
As for the private lives of Central Asians and their leaders, life-cycle rituals such 
as birth, death, marriage and others continued to retain their “Islamic” characteristics 
throughout the Soviet era.218 Poliakov’s description of the rural areas shows exactly 
how little Soviet rhetoric and policies mattered to the people here. The unofficial 
Islamic institutions had a great deal of relevance. For example, while counting 
unregistered mosques in northern Tajikistan, Poliakov found that every village had at a 
minimum one mosque with some villages having multiple mosques divided by 
mahalla.219 As for the people that operated these unregistered mosques, Poliakov writes 
that the activities of the “unofficial clergy are neither controlled nor administered.”220 
Olivier Roy gives nearly the same description, noting that each village and kolkhoz 
during the Soviet era had a mullah, who was usually registered as a worker.221  
 
Persistence of Traditional Authority and Solidarity 
 
Whether rod, avlod, klan or urugh, located in the mahalla, qishloq, or kolkhoz, 
fundamentally these terms represent variations on a theme, embodying the qualities of 
kin-based identity networks.222 
 
According to Roy, anthropologists view “traditional collective identities” as the 
primary means for resisting the “encroachments of the state.”223 The ‘resistance’ in the 
case of Tajikistan took the form of social networks being recreated within the structures 
of the Soviet system.224 Akiner notes the importance of informal institutions, both in the 
Soviet and pre-Soviet period. The informal institutions she cites, beyond the mahalla 
(roughly, a neighbourhood or quarter), are the avlod (extended family), the jamoat 
(mosque congregation), the guzar (roughly the same as the mahalla), the kucha (street), 
and, during the Soviet era, the apartment block. According to Akiner, the residents in 
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these “informal institutions” were often of the same ethnic group and usually related to 
each other.225 Membership in one of these institutions included the obligation of mutual 
assistance, sometimes in the form of community work projects (hashar). Within these 
institutions there was a certain level of autonomy from the state. And, in Akiner’s 
words, these informal institutions “served as an important bonding mechanisms, 
fostering communal identity and solidarity; they also reinforced social values and 
‘civilised’ norms of behaviour, acting as both moral mentor and moral censor.”226 
Another informal institution that created links of solidarity and assistance is the gap or 
gashtak (lit., chat, talk, conversation). These are essentially groups of (usually) men 
who meet over dinner and drink. Membership in a gap/gashtak entailed the exchange of 
information, the expectation of mutual assistance and group-supported mobilisation. 
Akiner claims that the links created within these groups were passed on to the next 
generation with the expectation that members would regard each other and each other’s 
children as kin.227 
 
Mahalla  
“We were all born in a mahalla.” 
- Uzbekistan President Karimov.228 
 
In the pre-Soviet era the mahalla was an often walled and gated neighbourhood 
within a town or city. In pre-Tsarist Tashkent, for an example of the larger cities, there 
were 149 mahallas. 229  While there were extended families within a mahalla, the 
neighbourhoods included many people who were unrelated to each other. New members 
could be accepted through the purchase of residencies with the mahalla. However, the 
consent of the mahalla leaders was required. In both rural and urban areas the leaders of 
the mahallas were referred to as aqsaqals (i.e., muysafeds) or arbobs. These leaders, 
according to Paul Georg Geiss, ascended to a leadership position by virtue of their 
reputation and wealth, with an election during which assistance from the imam was 
often required. The mahalla leader, with the assistance of advisors, administered 
community affairs and was the representative to the next higher level of authority in the 
area.  Within the community the mahalla leadership decided on what communal labour 
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projects to carry out, enforced religious duties along with the imam, resolved disputes 
within the mahalla and collected taxes.230 In a contemporary study on both Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, Sabine Freizer notes that mahallas, which ‘formed’ in the pre-Soviet era, 
regulated and assisted with many aspects of a person’s life. The mahalla was essentially 
a “forum where local values, rules of behaviour and common needs were defined.”231 
Certain elders within the community mediated disputes, helped organise communal life-
cycle celebrations, and facilitated (mutual) assistance.232 Such was its importance that, 
beyond being an administrative entity, the mahalla was, as argued by Donald Carlisle, a 
source of identity in Soviet era Uzbekistan.233 However, in villages in Tajikistan the 
mahalla takes on an extra meaning. Here the mahalla can be used to refer to the entire 
community, and even to the community leader, the rais.234  Akiner gives a similar 
meaning for mahalla in Tajikistan, translating it as “local community” (and noting that 
this ‘traditional body’ provides “more effective governance” than the official local 
government).235 Other scholars write that the guzars and mahallas that pre-existed the 
Soviet Union in Central Asia were integrated into Soviet power structures and 
functioned as a unit of the state.236 Olivier Roy cites the mahalla as a relevant entity 
before, during and after the Soviet era in Tajikistan. He argues, in line with his analysis 
of other identity categories and institutions, that the mahalla survived collectivisation 
and population transfers and was “reincarnated” in the collective farm.237 
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Navruz Nekbakhtshoev provides an example of the use of mahalla for 
interaction between Tajiks, noting the typical question between Tajiks who have just 
met each other: “shumo az kadom mahalla?” (“which mahalla are you from?). 
Nekbakhtshoev notes that it is a general “where are you from?” question that may 
require further inquiry once place of origin is determined. The next even more localised 
identity question, if locality is insufficient for the interaction, is given as “shumo az 
kadom awlod?” Literally, “which avlod are you from?”238 
 
Avlod 
Avlod, a word of Arabic origins,239 is term used in Tajikistan to describe an 
extended patriarchal family that serves as an informal mutual support structure.240 
Olimov refers to the avlod as a smaller unit within the mahallas and qishloqs (villages) 
of the pre-Russian period that formed a “microstate” for Tajiks.241 Similarly, Kamoludin 
Abdullaev refers to the avlod as “the basic unit of sedentary Tajik society and dominant 
institution of power,” while noting that the “avlod system provided survival, autonomy, 
and adaptability to its members, serving traditionalism and sustainability of the 
society.”242 Abdullaev notes that while the Soviet system “eroded” the avlod, it still 
continued to exist as a “parallel system of power.”243 Nekbakhtshoev also argues that 
the Soviet structures and programs indirectly altered the avlod, as well as pushing it out 
of the “legitimate public space.” However, he notes that despite these changes the avlod 
is still an important concept in Tajikistan, as noted by the above “which avlod are you 
from?” question.244 The answer to this question would include a recitation of ancestry 
because of the importance of the exchange of “genealogical information” in determining 
“identity” and “difference,” as kinship differences are not visible.245 For the Uzbeks 
who no longer have “tribal divisions,” the social structure is based on the avlod, though 
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significantly less than for Tajiks. Olimov and Olimova found in their studies that the 
avlod structure “encompasses” approximately 46% of the detribalised Uzbeks as 
compared to 82% of certain Tajik ‘subgroups.’ 246  They do not name the Tajik 
‘subgroups,’ but Akiner claims that the avlod is most noticeable among the resettled 
groups from Darvoz and Qarotegin (Gharm), who resisted assimilation most 
noticeably.247  
 
Patronage and Solidarity Networks 
 
Olivier Roy argues that solidarity networks based on kinship and/or patronage 
allow a population to resist the interference of an authoritarian state, or to “compensate 
for the weakness or corruption of the state.”248 However, Schoeberlein notes the role of 
patronage/kin networks in the “corruption”: 
 
Since virtually all property and resources are state-controlled, connections are essential 
in order to negotiate the extra-legal and unofficial mechanisms that regulate access to 
the resources necessary for any kind of economic activity: permission to sell goods on 
the market, provision of raw materials, access to vehicles or buildings—even simply 
freedom from the legal or illegal interference of “law enforcement” authorities. All this 
requires an elaborate and effective network of mutual back-scratching relationships, 
which is most readily develop within the family framework. […] However, as each 
person seeks to maximize the breadth and effectiveness of her network, it is often 
expedient to draw on criteria of connections that extend beyond the family to a larger 
community.249 
 
This creates a tautological problem of ‘circular cause and consequence’: did state 
corruption force people into what is often termed as ‘clan behaviour’? Or did pre-
existing ‘clan behaviour’ create the corruption and the weakness of the state? It can be 
at least argued that the two are mutually reinforcing. Nekbakhtshoev points out the 
mutually reinforcing nature of the cycle, blaming it for the proliferation of “clan 
behaviours.”250 He argues that the corrupt behaviour by “members of clan networks” 
creates shortages in the economy for others and therefore creates a situation where those 
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outside of the dominant network replicate the behaviour of that dominant group and 
engage in the same “clan behaviours” to compensate for the shortages that were 
created.251 Rafis Abazov, for his part, sees the patronage networks of the Soviet era in 
Tajikistan as not a completely new phenomenon, but rather as a continuation of the 
“tribal and communal (i.e., mahallagaroi) affiliations.”252  
The ‘stability of the cadres’ during the Brezhnev era, when local officials 
remained in their regional positions, allowed patronage networks to flourish. Regional 
elites, serving long careers in the same locality, were able to strengthen their power 
bases and further strengthen personal allegiances and “localism” (in Russian: 
mestnichestvo, in Tajik: mahallagaroi)253 At the height of Soviet rule in the Tajik SSR, 
patronage networks, as well as other forms of “semi-legal and illegal exchange,” were 
commonplace. 254  The characteristics of the centre-periphery relations in the Soviet 
Union allowed patronage to flourish. If local authorities could meet, or appear to meet, 
the goals of the prescribed economic plans, the violations on the ground would be 
ignored. 255  Political patronage networks thus “diverted, undermined and used state 
power for their own end – facilitating benefits for the group…”256 An important aspect 
of this patronage was regional affiliations. During the Soviet era these affiliations 
became a source of economic and political power for the elites and a source of political 
and economic resources for the masses. At the republic level this patronage relationship 
united the elites and their regional constituencies in the competition for the resources 
controlled by the state. 257  And at the provincial (oblast or viloyat) level the first 
secretaries of the local party committees (obkom) formed local patronage networks with 
the help of their powers to distribute resources and appoint people to official positions 
within the province.258 Beyond enriching themselves, regional leaders used their powers 
of economic distribution and appointment to benefit their families, friends or persons 
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who could provide some “reciprocal benefit.”259 In Pauline Jones Luong’s view, this 
system ensured that the people and the elites both had strong incentives to be loyal to 
their “regions.”260  
Akiner disputes the idea that there were monolithic regional blocs competing 
against each other. She concedes that the social patronage networks, often identified as 
regional ‘clans,’ did have a geographical aspect, but that self-interest was the prime 
determinant in the formation of networks. The national-level elites usually had 
experience working not just in the capital, but also in various regions throughout 
Tajikistan, as well as outside of the republic. During their career they would form 
relationships with various regional elites, some of them even facilitated by marriage 
across regional and ethnic lines.261 Idil Kilavuz agrees about “self-interest,” remarking 
that “Common interest is an important driving force of elite networks.”262 She goes on 
to say that 
 
Self-interest, career, work, and education experiences all seem important in the 
formation of networks. There are neither “clans” based on kinship, nor purely regional 
allegiances. The main element is not the pure “traditionalism,” nor continuation of 
traditional kinship-base relations as argued by some scholars. The mere factor of place 
of birth does not explain the elite networks. There were rivalries among people from the 
same region and alliances among people from different regions.263 
 
Regional identity is just one factor in the formation of political power networks. Kilavuz 
argues that these networks, while they may have a regional base, should not be 
considered “unitary actors”, as “People from the same region can be rivals, while people 
from different regions can be allies.”264 She notes the existence of “sub-factions” within 
a region that can both “ally with each other against a common competitor” and “clash” 
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with each other.265 The elites in a single region may have divergent interests, making it 
difficult to accurately predict political behaviour based on region of origin. And as the 
political environment changes, the nature of these regional bases may also change. 
Kilavuz notes that the regionally-based power networks are not “permanent and fixed 
categories.” 266  Kilavuz argues that regional loyalty is not a “definite or reliable 
criterion” as some politicians will cooperate with whoever has the strongest network 
and switch their allegiances when it is in their own private interest to do so.267 She notes 
that a client will be loyal to his patron (e.g., a kolkhoz boss or an obkom secretary) as 
long as the patron continually provides the benefits and resources (“providing 
employment, promotions, assistance, welfare, permits, access to important goods and 
services, land, etc.”).268 Kilavuz takes issue with those studies that portray regional 
identities or origin as the sole factor determining the composition and formation of ‘elite 
networks.’269 She notes the importance of government policies in the formation of these 
“political networks with regional bases.”270 Lawrence Markowitz also rejects the notion 
of unitary regional political blocs in Tajikistan. He instead stresses the political 
contestations within these “blocs” as well as the individual cross-cutting ties between 
the blocs.271 Matteo Fumagalli makes a similar point about the internal competition 
within the “regions,” a concept that he considers reification.272  
In regards to the discussion of national level elite networks and localised 
networks, as well as kin-based networks, some confusion arises in that at both the 
national and local level these groups are often referred to as ‘clans,’ both in the 
literature on Tajikistan and in common use within the country. Kilavuz argues that 
‘clan’ is, in both cases, used within Tajikistan in the “pejorative sense” of networks that 
are seeking self-enrichment for members: at the elite national level and in the local 
context, referring to “prominent extended families.”273  Kilavuz is quite right to point 
out that the use of ‘clan’ (usually given via Russian as klan) in the literature is an 
incorrect anthropological use, as ‘clan’ is defined as “unilineal descent groups which 
unite a series of lineages descended from a theoretical common ancestor, the 
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genealogical links to whom are often either not remembered or who may be purely 
mythological.”274 Kilavuz’s argument against the use of the term ‘clan’ is that if the 
regionally-based solidarity networks are ‘clans,’ then any patronage network could be 
termed a ‘clan.’ The elite power networks include non-kin as well as individuals from 
outside the region. While some scholars refer to the political power networks in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as ‘clans,’ Kilavuz notes that they are more like patron-client 
networks and they “may or may not involve family ties among members of the 
network.”275  
 
These groups which are mistakenly called “clans” are political power networks which 
aim to control political and economic power within the republic, and gain assets and 
privileges resulting from this control. They maintain their position and power through 
the distribution of the assets under their control. They are definitely not kinship groups, 
nor is regional origin their sole determinant. They are power networks organized for the 
control of administrative and economic assets. These political power networks are not 
coherent units. Membership is not permanent; people from the same region or people 
who were within the same group do not take on the side of their group permanently. 
The main factor is its utility in providing power and control over resources and assets to 
the actor. Relations can be established with people from other regional groups, and 
people can change sides. When common interests change and clash, these elite 
coalitions can change.276 
 
Jonathan Zartman makes the very same qualification about ‘clans,’ though he is more 
comfortable with the term. He refers to ‘clan’ as a “shorthand term” for the networks he 
calls “regional solidarity networks.”277 He, like Kilavuz, notes that allegiances can go 
beyond kinship ties. Since ‘clan’ is in both popular usage and in the literature in 
Tajikistan I will not ban its use here. However, when it is used I will qualify it in 
context to avoid confusion.  
Kinship, in the context one of several factors, has been noted by numerous 
scholars. Sabin Freizer argues that “Distrust reigned supreme outside networks based on 
family, proximity and religion. Relations that did not follow these lines were held 
suspect.”278 And the “overlap” of kinship with several other factors in the formation of 
networks in Tajikistan was noted by Kirill Nourzhanov who remarked that “informal 
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political, parochial, kinship and criminal networks often overlapped and were 
inseparable from one another.”279 Nourzhanov demonstrates the importance of kinship: 
 
As a rule, patron-client webs in Tajikistan bear an imprint of kinship solidarity and are 
characterized by (a) less pronounced inequality and asymmetry in interaction amongst 
those involved; (b) life-long endurance; (c) more diffused spheres of penetration – far 
beyond strictly professional activities; (d) relative closeness. These hierarchical 
structures could be referred to as clans, for they have consonance with the attributes of a 
classic clan:  
• common ancestry of the nucleus of the entity; 
• territorial unity (the clan coincides with the local group); 
• social integration inside the clan, in particular, the coopting of new 
members through marriage.280 
 
Almost every locality in Tajikistan can boast one or more patronage networks. They 
may take the form of a purely clientilistic dyad, as in Abdumalik Abdullojonov’s case, 
or that of clans – kinship structures with primarily horizontal links and blurred 
obligations. They can run to the national level and beyond, but they can also be 
confined to a certain village or district. The point is that all these informal organizations 
have always played an important role in regulating life and channelling resources within 
the community in Tajikistan.281  
 
The importance and authority of the patriarchal authority figure within the 
‘clans,’ or rather extended families, is reflected in the fact that many of the “clan 
divisions” are named after them.282 And far from being a new phenomenon, some of the 
rural elite families have been so since before the Soviet era,283 an example being the 
Arabovs of northern Tajikistan.284  Rural elites, in particular, engage in strategically 
sending younger members to the urban areas to expand their network and its ability to 
access resources.  D. V. Mikulsky argues that the urban Tajik is not an “isolated entity,” 
but rather in fact still a part of the rural networks. He/she has many connections to the 
“extended family or clan” that is based in the village or region of origin. Family elders 
push an individual member towards a certain profession and expect that the city dweller 
will provide benefits and resources to family members back in the village. And 
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reciprocally, the city dweller often seeks resources such as agricultural products from 
the extended rural family. 285  Schoeberlein gives the same description of the urban 
family member providing resources from the cities to the rural relatives. However, he 
specifically names the “rural elite” as engaging in this strategic behaviour of sending 
their children to the city for a university or technical education. He notes that many of 
them will return, but others will remain in the city in order for the extended family to 
access “scarce” resources.286 
 
Regional Elite Competition 
 
As the ratio of the titular nationality serving in positions of power within the 
governments of the Uzbek and Tajik SSRs increased, it lessened the importance of 
cleavages between the titular nationality and non-titular groups such as the Russians and 
increased the importance of cleavages within the titular nationalities, therefore 
increasing the significance of “regionalism.”287 Khujandis from Leninobod dominated 
the Tajik Communist Party and the government, but they did not hold positions of 
power exclusively as the central Soviet government attempted to maintain a balance 
between the regions for elite appointments.288 According to Davlat Khudonazar, from 
1956-61 First Secretary Tursunboy Uljaboev, an ethnic Uzbek from Leninobod, 
“balance[d] the representation of the regions” and distributed resources equally before 
being removed on the pretext of falsifying cotton production figures, a very common 
practice at the time.289 The argument that Leninobod politically dominated Tajikistan is 
qualified by Shirin Akiner. She notes the much larger population, higher levels of 
education and political awareness, as well as the industrialized economy of Leninobod 
and argues that it would be natural that this area would produce the elite of the state.290 
Matteo Fumagalli makes a similar argument, crediting the Leninobodi elite’s dominance 
in the Tajik SSR to “economic, socio-cultural and geographic factors.”291 He notes that 
the location of the Leninobod region in the fertile and industrialised Ferghana Valley 
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region, and its economic integration with the Uzbek SSR, provided Leninobod with its 
economic dominance. 292    
At the republic level the Soviet government divided the state apparatus among 
the various factions, which produced competition for power and resources among the 
different region-based factions. 293  The Leninobod/Khujand-based faction came to 
dominate the Tajik government after World War II.294 The Khujandi elite maintained 
their dominant position by constantly changing the administrative status of the other 
regions. The elite from other regions were not able to develop a region-wide patronage 
network as they lost their province (oblast, viloyat) status and found their networks 
disrupted.295 However, there was a level of power sharing involving the Kulobi elites in 
a patronage relationship starting in the 1970s.296 The various reasons given are that it 
was a response to the Leninobodi elite being challenged by local competitors or even, 
according to Stephane Dudoignon, as a result of economic exchanges between the two 
involving cotton.297 As for the other groups, Akiner stresses that the power held by 
Leninobodis (mostly from Khujand) was not exclusive. The power structures of the 
higher levels of the Tajik government were often held by Russians, Pamiris and 
Gharmis as part of the power balancing of the elite.298 And during this time the Tajik 
SSR’s large Uzbek minority in the north had an informally protected status thanks to the 
Tajik Communist Party’s close links to Uzbekistan and the political domination of the 
Leninobodi faction that secured benefits for the north’s population, including the 
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Uzbeks.299 The exception, according to Shirin Akiner, was the Kulobis, who despite 
holding many high ranking positions in the security forces and having started a 
patronage network relationship with the Leninobodis in the 1970s, were generally 
marginalised at the national level in comparison to Gharmis and Leninobodis. Akiner 
offers an alternative explanation for the exclusion of Kulobi elites from the national 
level: lack of interest in pursuing positions outside of Kulob. Within Kulob the local 
elites had autonomy and development projects that were directly funded by the central 
Soviet government, as well as enjoying “status, wealth (often illegally acquired) and a 
social environment in which they were at ease.”300 As a result, there was not a need to 
pursue appointment at the Tajik SSR level. For the Gharmi elite, the position of 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan was “reserved” for Gharmis. However, 
for almost the entire Soviet era it was a position of little power and influence that made 
no significant economic or bureaucratic decision-making authority. 301  As a result, 
Gharmis had “relatively little stake” in national-level power structures and a greater one 
in the “emergent market economy” and in the national academy of sciences, which 
Barnett Rubin calls the “principle institution of national cultural identity.” 302  The 
exclusion from government and economic institutions meant that Gharmis could not 
create any patronage networks on the scale that the Leninobodis and Kulobis could. 
Even within Qurghonteppa Province they were excluded from positions of power.303  
Markowitz notes that the party positions at district (raikom) and province level 
(obkom) became the focus of local power struggles. From these positions one could 
access resources from the centre and even work towards higher level postings. As these 
positions were “aggressively sought after,” local political manoeuvring became 
“perhaps the most fluid and uncertain venue of political contestation within the Soviet 
state structure.”304 In southern Tajikistan, districts (rayons, nohiyas) were subordinate 
directly to the republican administration in Dushanbe. This ruled out the possibility of 
any southerners controlling any institution higher than district level that could be used 
for mobilising against the Leninobodis. Only later were the provinces of Kulob and 
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Qurghonteppa reinstated.305 In Qurghonteppa the Leninobodi elite installed their own 
people (Leninobodis, those of Leninobodi descent or ethnic Uzbeks) as collective farm 
chairs and district raikom secretaries in order to control the region’s wealth producing 
bases while Kulob, with its relatively modest economic base, was of much less interest 
to the Leninobodi elite. The stability of the cadres under Brezhnev took away a tool for 
the Leninobodis to control southern Tajikistan: the removal of local politicians. As a 
result the Leninobodis used their national level positions to distribute patronage and 
manage networks based on resources distributed from the national level. Using 
resources derived from their patronage relationships with the centre, local elites in 
Kulob and Qurghonteppa were able to maintain local patronage networks. By the late 
Soviet era the local elites in Qurghonteppa and Kulob were using the “informal 
economy” as a power base, but still needed their relationships with the Leninobodi-
dominated centre to protect this base from scrutiny.306 By the late 1980s Gharmi Tajiks, 
Kulobi Tajiks and Uzbeks were fighting over administrative positions in 
Qurghonteppa.307  The 1988 consolidation of Kulob and Qurghonteppa into Khatlon 
Province was aimed at reducing the power of Kulobi elites. But in 1990 Khatlon was 
eliminated and Kulob was reinstated. At this time the locals were able to take back 
control over the local government apparatuses. But while the attacks on local elites had 
now ended, the Kulobis were still excluded from national level positions while Pamiris 
and Qarotegini (Gharmi) Tajiks were being appointed to national level positions. This 
led to an even further disaffection between the Kulobi elite and the centre as the Kulobi 
elite no longer saw any beneficial relationship to be had with the centre.308 
 
The Kolkhoz 
 
During the communist era the Soviets maintained control at a national level over 
the distribution of resources and the promotion of cadres. However, in the rural areas 
the Soviet security apparatus and central government representatives had much less of a 
presence as in the cities. In the rural areas the government allowed local leaders to be 
the middlemen between the people and the state. This allowed local leaders to maintain 
their own power bases, leaders who Olivier Roy calls the “new beys and khans.”309 The 
government did not destroy the pre-existing solidarity groups (qawm, avlod, mahalla, or 
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other types of solidarity groups). Instead it often formed collective farms (kolkhozes) 
from some of these groups, allowing their structure to remain intact throughout the 
Soviet era. Within the kolkhoz the qawm and mahalla were often duplicated/transported 
wholesale into the work brigades and uchatska (housing estates). In Olivier Roy’s 
words the kolkhozes “became the new tribes of Central Asia.” 310  The Russian 
anthropologist Sergei Polyakov makes a similar argument. He describes land 
administration in rural Central Asia as having been changed “in name, but not in 
substance”311 by collectivisation, with local patterns of authority being transferred into 
the collective farms and the “customary way of life unaffected.”312  And like Roy, 
Polyakov also notes that collective farms and work brigades in rural Central Asia were 
formed on the basis of traditional communal solidarity groups. He provides as an 
example 13 avlods in a town in northern Tajikistan being established as 13 kolkhozes. 
And later, after these 13 farms were united into a single kolkhoz, these avlods became 
discrete work brigades.313   
There was an attempt by the Soviets to break apart these traditional solidarity 
groupings, starting in the mid-1950s, when the state restructured the kolkhoz. At this 
time the government started to appoint the head of the kolkhoz and to consolidate 
multiple kolkhozes into one sovkhoz (state farm).314 These changes, however, did not 
destroy the solidarity groups, which often remained intact. Sometimes, the kolkhoz itself 
became a new solidarity group. In either case, according to Roy, relatively autonomous 
communities persisted. Eventually the Communist Party settled on a policy of 
manipulating existing regional factions against each other instead of trying to 
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reconfigure them.315 Collectivization placed considerable resources under the control of 
collective farm bosses. However, the patterns of farm boss strength and patronage 
varied considerably through out the Soviet Union, and within Central Asia. Though 
generally speaking, the Soviet state relied on farm bosses for mobilisation of rural 
labour, resource distribution, effective use of technical resources, and fulfilment of 
agricultural plans. The collective farms became “critical instruments of social 
control.” 316  The kolkhoz leadership, thanks to its monopoly on the distribution of 
resources within the community, as well as the option of physical force, was able to 
control the inhabitants of the kolkhoz. The kolkhoz was also able to assist members who 
had left the community. Kolkhozniks who moved to cities were able to rely on a network 
of former members of their kolkhoz as well as the kolkhoz leadership’s connections in 
the Communist Party bureaucracy.317 
State control over collective farms was inadvertently weakened during 
Khrushchev’s time in office and even further during Brezhnev’s tenure. By this time 
collective farm chairs “emerged as Soviet style local strongmen.”318 Farm chairs and 
factory bosses were engaged with regional politicians in patronage networks in which 
the exchange was protection and access for resources for the bosses in return for illicit 
income for the politicians. For example, in Qurghonteppa the Leninobodi elite installed 
their own people (Leninobodis, those of Leninobodi descent or ethnic Uzbeks) as 
collective farm chairs and district raikom secretaries in order to control the region’s 
wealth producing bases while Kulob, with its relatively modest economic base, was of 
much less interest to the Leninobodi elite. In Kulob, local authority figures were 
embezzling agricultural profits while taking over local law enforcement and judicial 
agencies as a way to protect their scheme. By the end of the Soviet period, farm bosses 
and regional politicians in Kulob exercised “significant influence” over law 
enforcement agencies and the courts while increasingly relying on illegal income.319 As 
for the Gharmi Tajiks in Qurghonteppa, they were, towards the end of the Soviet era, 
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more focused on ‘free enterprise’ and positioned themselves in opposition to the 
collective farm directors who were often Uzbeks or Kulobis.320 
 
Power, Community and Population Dynamics  
  
 The previous sections have illustrated how traditional authority and state power 
interacted under changing, even volatile, political conditions. The competition at the 
local and national level by elite-level patronage groups and their local clients was also 
described. However, a very significant factor was omitted: the changing population 
dynamics of southern Tajikistan, specifically the Vakhsh Valley. The population in this 
area was in flux before the Soviet era. And in the Soviet era massive population 
transfers to the area were carried out, causing serious disruptions in lifestyle and in 
inter-communal relations as discrete groups from different regions and “ecological 
niches” were moved into the area. The complexity of the population and social 
dynamics in southern Tajikistan will be the focus of the next section.      
 
 
 
Part 3: Population Dynamics in Southern Tajikistan 
 
 
Pre-Russian 
 
Pierre Centlivres and Micheline Centlivres-Demont describe the same pattern of 
Turkic migration into southern Tajikistan that they find for northeastern Afghanistan: 
early pre-Shaybanid Turkic groups such as Qarluq, Moghol and Barlos, and then 
Shaybanid Uzbeks in the 16th century.321 As a result there are, in addition to Tajiks, 
certain Turkic and/or Uzbek groups present on both sides of this modern border322 
thanks to the historically non-existent boundaries that allowed for population movement 
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back and forth across the Amu Darya.323 Specific to southern Tajikistan, the Vakhsh 
Valley was for centuries occupied by Turkic Loqay, Qungrat, Qataghan, Durmen, Yuz 
and other tribes.324 In a broader description, covering the entire territory of Tajikistan, 
M. A. Olimov and Saodat Olimova categorize the Uzbeks of Tajikistan as being in two 
distinct groups: 
 
The first group, living in the compact settlements of Uzbeks who have lost their tribal 
affiliation, are found mainly in the regions adjacent to Uzbekistan, on the low reaches of 
the rivers and also dispersed in the Leninabad region. The second group, consisting of 
only recently nomadic Uzbek and Turkic tribes - such as Lakai [Loqay], Marka, Yuz, 
Karluk, Karshilik, Kungrat, Moghol, Barlos, Kipchak and others - live in settlements 
mainly in the Khatlon Region and in central Tajikistan, as well as a few locations in the 
Leninabad Region.325 
 
Shirin Akiner gives a similar description of Uzbeks in Tajikistan. She states that the 
Uzbeks in the north comprise a uniform, homogeneous group. Akiner then identifies 
three origins for the Uzbek/Turkic population in the south. The first is located mostly in 
the southwest and is descended from the earliest Turkic migrations into the area. They 
have long been sedentarised and many speak Tajik as a first language. The second 
group is from the pre-thirteenth century wave of Turkic migration through the area. This 
group lives in the center-west and was semi-nomadic in recent history. The third group, 
which includes the Loqay, was part of the 15-16th century Turkic migration into the 
area. The Turkic peoples in the third group have at times maintained a level of 
independence and have a strong communal identity.326 
According to Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont, the “geo-ecological 
distribution” of Tajiks and Uzbeks in southern Tajikistan is “to some extent similar to 
that in northeastern Afghanistan.”327 Olimov and Olimova describe the same ‘ecological 
niches’ for Uzbeks/Turkic peoples and Tajiks that others have given for northern 
Afghanistan: 
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Before the Russian domination began in the 19th century……In a sense, it was possible 
to trace ethnic distinctions by a community’s natural geographical zones, the altitude of 
their home above sea level and certain economic and cultural lifestyles. The percentage 
of Tajiks increased as one moved from the west to the east and from the south to the 
north—in other words, from the lowlands to the mountains. The percentage of Uzbek 
and other Turkic populations was greater in the other areas. The semi-nomadic Turkic-
peoples occupied the steppes and foothills, suitable for livestock breeding. The land-
tilling Tajiks and Badakhshanis settled along the rivers, in the irrigated foothills and in 
the highlands.328  
 
Russian/Later Bukharan era 
 
 Valentin Bushkov notes that the population dynamics north of the Amu Darya 
stabilised after the 1860s when Russia took control of the Bukharan Emirate. Then, 
decades later, a further constraint on population movements was the official closure of 
the Amu Darya boundary in 1895.329 Concerning specifically the Qurghonteppa/Vakhsh 
region, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries the population, estimated at only about 
10-20,000, was very unstable with few communities having “deep roots” in the area.330 
During the Tsarist era the first documented attempts at estimating the population of the 
Qurghonteppa region occurred. The Qurghonteppa Viloyat, the pre-revolutionary 
province of the Bukharan Emirate, counted 55% of the population as Uzbek and only 
18% as Tajik.331 A later attempt at the beginning of the 20th century specifically counts 
the immediate Qurghonteppa area in addition to the region as a whole. According to this 
survey the Uzbeks and other Turkic groups accounted for 96% of Qurghonteppa.332  
 The total population figures in the Eastern Bukhara population census of 1917 
by the Bukharan government are reduced by 40-45% from 1913. Bergne, without 
elaborating further, assigns this to the assumption that much of the population died.333 
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Beyond the obvious debate that could be made on the accuracies of this census, and the 
one that preceded it, are qualified explanations for the loss of population such as war, 
disease, famine and “population movements.”334 Soon after, the Russian Civil War and 
the Bolshevik campaigns and policies in the region contributed to a mass migration to 
Afghanistan and East Turkistan (Xinjiang). Valentin Bushkov cites the differing 
estimates of between 44,000 households and 200,000-480,000 for those that fled.335   
 
Early Soviet/ Basmachi period 
 
The Basmachi-Soviet conflict, exacerbated by a poor harvest in 1925, resulted in 
an estimated 26% of the population of Tajikistan, mostly from the south, fleeing to 
Afghanistan. Although some of these returned, the result was the loss of half of 
cultivated land, livestock and the destruction or decay of irrigation systems.336  The 
official data shows a 60% decline in the population of Hisor, Kulob, Qabodiyon and 
Qurghonteppa, with Eastern Bukhara as a total having its population reduced by 
42.5%.337 According to official Soviet documents, in the late 1920s there was still an 
estimated 700,000338 Central Asian refugees still living in Afghanistan, most of whom 
were ethnic Uzbeks. The Party therefore decided to set up an Uzbek center in southern 
Tajikistan to “act as a pole of attraction” to encourage refugees to return and to “counter 
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anti-Soviet propaganda emanating from Northern Afghanistan.”339 And by 1925 there 
started a large refugee return. In the south, according to a source cited by Bushkov, the 
number of returnees from Afghanistan numbered 25,000.340 The promise of government 
assistance and free irrigated land induced refugees to return from Afghanistan.341 But 
while there may have been refugees returning in 1925, there continued to be refugee 
flows after this date.342 However, the situation eventually stabilised and, by the end of 
the 1920s, 60,000 of the estimated 250,000 refugees who had fled to Afghanistan from 
Tajikistan had been repatriated.343 
The new Soviet government institutions formulated plans to assist and attract 
returnees, with efforts focused in Qurghonteppa. However, the local administrators did 
not always receive the necessary resources from the central government, itself short of 
resources. Government inefficiency and lack of proper resources caused severe 
hardships for both the settlers and the returning refugees, both of whom did not receive 
the resources that they were promised. Furthermore, it was the Qurghonteppa District 
that had to accommodate the majority of returning refugees. This redistribution of 
populations in Tajikistan led to not just material hardship, but some interethnic tensions 
as well, such as when Tajik returnees found Uzbeks occupying their lands, and vice 
versa.344  
 
Cotton agriculture population transfers 
 
Starting in the mid-1920s the Soviets began to forcibly resettle inhabitants to the 
south of Tajikistan, primarily to facilitate the construction of irrigation works and the 
production of cotton. The Soviet resettlement policies in Qurghonteppa were clearly 
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part of its strategy to boost agriculture, particularly cotton.345 The Hisor and Vakhsh 
Valleys offered the best potential for growing cotton, most of which was to be exported 
to Russia.346 The result in the Qurghonteppa region was the construction of thousands of 
kilometers of irrigation canals as part of the Vakhsh Valley irrigation system that started 
in 1931. After this time numerous groups and individuals arrived in the region to work 
on the construction of the canals and in the cultivation of cotton.347 However, as noted 
by Aziz Niyazi, the resettlement policies were not guided by a strategy as simple as 
merely boosting cotton production: 
 
The active internal migration of the local population in Tajikistan began in the mid-
1920s. This was connected mainly with the accelerated industrialization of the republic 
both in agriculture and industry. The revolutionary goal was promoted to make an 
industrial and agricultural proletariat out of the traditional peasantry, which had 
constituted the majority of the population. 
 
The settlement policy was aimed at increasing the number of towns in valleys and large 
settlement at the expense of small and middle-sized qishlaqs (villages) in the 
mountains. Development of the mountainous territories was considered to have no 
future.348 
 
The first Soviet forced migration ‘wave’ in the mid-1920s to the Vakhsh Valley 
lowlands of Qurghonteppa consisted of thousands of Gharmi Tajik households from the 
                                                 
345
 Bushkov, ‘Population Migration in Tajikistan’, 149; Penati, ‘The Reconquest of East Bukhara’, 529; 
Menon, Rajan and Hendrik Spruyt. (1998) ‘Possibilities for Conflict resolution in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia’, in Barnett R Rubin and Jack Snyder (editors) Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State 
Building. London: Routledge, 134; Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 74; Foroughi, ‘Tajikistan: 
Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-economic Disparities’, 49; Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan, 
72, 88-9, 107; V. I. Bushkov and D. V. Mikul’sky,(Tadzhikskoe obshchestvo na rubezhe tysyacheletii – 
etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v nachale 1990x godov. Moscow, 1992), especially 8-15 and 33-8, cited in 
Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia, 177; Thomas Loy, ‘From the mountains to the 
lowlands - the Soviet policy of "inner-Tajik" resettlement’, Internet-Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften, 
No. 16 (August 2006), 13.2. Issues of Internal and External Migration in Post-Soviet Central Asia.  
Online: http://www.inst.at/trans/16Nr/13_2/loy16.htm  
346
 Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, 54-5.  
347
 Akiner, Tajikistan, 22; Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 74; Olivier Roy, ‘Inter-regional 
dynamics of war’, in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Issue 10: ‘Politics of 
Compromise: the Tajikistan Peace Process’, Kamoludin Abdullaev and Catherine Barnes (editors). 
(London: Conciliation Resources, 2001). In regards to the construction of the canal systems, one source, 
an American administered anti-Soviet research institute in Munich, claimed that forced laborers, kulaks 
from Siberia and the Caucasus, were used in the construction of the Vakhsh Valley irrigation system. 
They claim that nearly 60,000 were sent to Qurghonteppa for this work project, but that all eventually 
died of disease and neglect. See Boris Iakovlev. 1955. Kontsentratsionnye lageri SSSR. Institut po 
Izucheniiu Istorii I Kul’tury SSSR, Issledovaniia I Materialy, ser. 1, no. 23. Munich: Institut po 
Izucheniiu Istorii I Kul’tury SSSR, 140-1. Cited in Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in 
Central Asia, 118-9, n. 36. For a description of the institute, see: Anatol Shmelev, ‘Russian Émigrés in 
Western Europe and the Formation of Radio Liberty,’ in  Migrations in Society, Culture and the Library. 
Edited by Thomas D. Kilton and Ceres Birkhead. (Chicago: Association of College & Research Libraries, 
2005), 36.  
348
 Aziz Niyazi, ‘Migration, Demography and Socio-Ecological Processes in Tajikistan’, JCAS 
Symposium Series, No. 9 (2000), 169.  
 89 
mountainous regions of Qarotegin and Darvoz.349 The immigrants were organised into 
collective farms, some mono-ethnic, others mixed and extended family groupings were 
usually not split up, but larger communities were.350 These population movements to the 
south were mainly a process of forced migration,351 particularly in regards to mountain 
dwellers that were expelled from their homes in the mountains and sent to the valleys.352 
While force was clearly used to move many Kulobi and Gharmi Tajiks to the Vakhsh 
Valley, some migrants later reported that incentives such as free land were offered and 
they had chosen to go voluntarily as they expected a better life in the valley.353  
This first phase of force population transfers that started in 1925 lasted until 
1932 was mostly unsuccessful as only 30% of the 56,000 resettled households 
throughout Tajikistan – including those who were resettled to facilitate the production 
of cotton – stayed in their new locations.354 However, the campaign continued and 
throughout the 1930s Tajiks from the Gharm and Kulob Provinces, as well as Pamiris 
from Gorno Badakhshon, were transferred to Qurghonteppa and the wider region of the 
Vakhsh Valley. Here they were organised into kolkhozes in an area that had previously 
been populated by semi-nomadic Turkic speakers, many of whom had fled the 
Basmachi conflict to Afghanistan.355 The Soviet authorities, in Olivier Roy’s words, 
“sedentarized” the remaining Uzbeks and Loqays of the Vakhsh Valley on the foothills 
where they were previously living by forming “relatively homogeneous kolkhozes.”356 
For the Gharmi Tajiks from the mountainous region of Qarotegin, resettlement was not 
initially successful. The forced migrants had no skill in the new type of agricultural 
work they were expected to do and the government, for its part, provided little in the 
                                                 
349
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 74; Olivier Roy, ‘Inter-regional dynamics of war’; 
Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, 57. Additionally, wealthy Uzbek farmers 
from the Ferghana Valley were declared to be ‘kulaks’ and where deported to Qurghonteppa Province 
while workers from other Central Asian republics and Russia also arrived in the region. 
350
 Akiner, Tajikistan, 22; Foroughi, ‘Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-economic 
Disparities’, 49; Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, 33; Bergne, The Birth of 
Tajikistan, 72, 88-9, 107. Later during World War II Germans were deported to the Vakhsh Valley in the 
area of Kuybyshev. The vast majority of these Germans left in the 1990s. See Akiner, Tajikistan: 
Disintegration or Reconciliation?, 23. 
351
 Niyazi, ‘Migration, Demography and Socio-Ecological Processes in Tajikistan’, 169.  
352
 Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, 33. Harmstone notes that some of 
these mountain Tajiks were later able to return to their home regions. For an in-depth case study of the 
forced resettlement of the non-Tajik Yaghnobis from their mountainous homes to the cotton farming 
valleys, see: Leslie Donovan, Causes and Consequences of the Forced Migration of Yaghnobis in the 
Tajik SSR. Unpublished MA thesis (2007), California State University, Dominguez Hills.  
353
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 74-5. Kilavuz lists one of the incentives as two free hectares 
of land. She also notes that some chose relocation as an alternative to some unspecified judicial 
punishment.  
354
 Bushkov, ‘Population Migration in Tajikistan’, 149. See also: Loy, ‘From the mountains to the 
lowlands’, n.p.  
355
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 74; Olivier Roy, ‘Inter-regional dynamics of war’; Menon 
and Spruyt, ‘Possibilities for Conflict resolution in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, 134. 
356
 Roy, ‘Is the Conflict in Tajikistan a Model for Conflicts Throughout Central Asia?’, 139. 
 90 
way of assistance and disease was common.357 Border issues may also have played a 
role in population transfers, as between 1933 and 1941 almost 27,000 households in 
southern Tajikistan were moved by the state to the Afghan-Tajik SSR border regions.358 
In the broader context, from 1925-1941, 48,700 households were transferred into the 
Vakhsh Valley. For the republic as a whole, in the period before the start of the Second 
World War the state had forcibly resettled 400,000 people, or 30% of the population of 
Tajikistan.359 During the war forced relocations to cotton growing regions continued. 
For example, the government moved 20,000 households from mountainous areas to the 
Vakhsh Valley between 1943 and 1947. In 1947 the government decided to move 7,800 
households in the form of entire kolkhozes from mountainous areas to more arable areas 
of Tajikistan. The Vakhsh Valley was one of these areas. 360  In Roy’s words, 
Qurghonteppa was “colonized” during the 1950s by settlers from Gharm and Kulob 
who arrived early in the decade as part of large Soviet population transfers.361 The 
population transfer to the south from 1947-1960 again included Tajiks from 
mountainous areas, as well as Pamiris. Also, Kulobis in the south were moved from the 
foothills to the valleys.362 During the 1950s the state resettled over 100,000 people to 
arable valleys, Vakhsh included. Bushkov notes that the resettlement process after the 
1950s became less regular. He only mentions the resettlement of 14,000 people in 1968-
1970.363 According to Kilavuz, the Soviet policies of forced migration from Gharm, 
Kulob and the Pamirs into Qurghonteppa continued until 1960,364 while Roy points to 
large population transfers as late as 1968.365 
Unfortunately for the settlers, the authorities did not provide a sufficient social 
support structure in the south. The livings conditions endured in the first few years for 
forcibly resettled populations were quite bad. There was a lack of infrastructure, water, 
sanitation, and proper housing, as well as other issues related to problems in adjusting to 
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the southern valley climate. New diseases such as malaria were encountered, medical 
assistance was “minimal,” the summer weather was much more extreme than what the 
mountain dwellers were accustomed to, while the new type of work was very different 
from their traditional lifestyle.366  
The policies of resettlement into the valleys, which comprise only 7% of the 
territory of Tajikistan, resulted in the density of the population exceeding the capacity of 
the land to support them. According to Niyazi, in the 1920s approximately 70% of the 
population of Tajikistan was living in the foothills and mountains. The contemporary 
situation has been reversed and now 70% of the population lives in the lowlands. Niyazi 
goes on to describe the development of Tajikistan and how economic growth did not 
keep pace with population growth while the valleys were overpopulated, resulting in 
ecological degradation – including the destructive monoculture of cotton.367  Niyazi 
offers a critical appraisal of the effects of resettlement policies:  
 
Industrialization and intensification of agriculture with the priority given to the 
development of the cultivation of cotton destroyed economic structure, which had 
remained unchanged for ages. Hundreds of thousands of peasants and craftsmen had to 
abandon the way of life to which they were accustomed and were forced into a quite 
different and even alien cultural environment. Many of them – unable to bear the abrupt 
changes of climate and exhausting work, and lacking new qualifications – became 
hostages of the state’s migration policy. […] Accelerated and mindless industrialization 
of this agrarian country, irrational and wasteful use of natural resources, and violence 
against peasant culture led to destructive results both for the environment and the 
society. The industrial assault on this essentially traditional society resulted in 
degradation in all spheres of life.368  
 
Nature of settlements and social patterns 
 
The change in population ratios due to the influx of Tajiks and Pamiris from the 
1950s is difficult to determine since the published Soviet population data on the area is 
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vague.369 But what is clear is that by the 1980s Qurghonteppa was demographically 
dominated by people who were transferred to the area or who were born to families that 
were. In the upper Vakhsh Valley about 90% of the population could be classified this 
way (Tajiks from Qarotegin, the Yovon Valley and Khovaling, Uzbeks from the 
Ferghana Valley and other parts of Uzbekistan, as well as Russians). The remaining 
population consisted of indigenous Loqay and Kungrat Uzbeks.370 Kilavuz describes the 
pattern of ethnic and regional composition in the new settlements: 
 
Many villages were composed mainly of people coming from the same region, with 
only a small minority of people from another region. For example, where a majority of 
the village was from Garm, there was usually a minority from Kulyab, and vice versa. 
People in Qurghonteppa lived in homogenous villages. If the great majority in one 
village was from Garm, the majority in another village was from Kulyab. There were 
also entirely Uzbek villages. The majority of villages in Qurghonteppa were ethnically 
and regionally homogenous. Some villages were heterogeneous in terms of the regional 
origin of their inhabitants. In these mixed villages the population composition was 
roughly 50 percent from Garm and 50 percent from Kulyab or others. But these cases 
were very few. Only approximately 20 percent of all villages in the region were like 
this.371   
 
According to interviews conducted by Kilavuz (obviously of later settlers to 
Qurghonteppa), those who were resettled in villages of their co-regionals said that was 
partly their choice. The settlers, who preferred living with family, relatives and 
“countrymen,” chose to settle in this pattern for obvious reasons of living near people 
who could be trusted and relied upon for support. People even relocated from one 
resettlement to another in order to be with people they were familiar with. However, in 
the towns and cities the populations were mixed in terms of ethnicity and region of 
origin.372  
 
Effects of transfers  
 
According to Shirin Akiner, the process of forced population transfers 
“increased social and ethnic segmentation” while the “atomization of traditional 
communities enhanced micro-ethnicities and, perhaps more especially, micro-loyalties 
and micro-allegiances.”373 Whole communities that were transferred often ended up in 
the same collective farm. For those mixed collective farms the different groups usually 
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worked in their own brigades and lived in their own settlements. Olivier Roy suggests 
that this resulted in the groups keeping their distinct identities.374 Roy notes further: 
 
Population transfers reduce the oppositions between lineages and consolidate essentially 
geographical identities (one’s place of origin) as primary identities. Paradoxically, 
transfer reinforces territorial identity. […] The term “Gharmi” develops in Tajikistan 
among transferred populations in the province of Kurgan-Teppe.375 
 
Those people who settled in Qurghonteppa kept their regional identities, even after 
decades in the valley had passed. Kilavuz cites people in the region identifying 
themselves by the region their grandparents came from. They even know the exact 
village that their ancestors were from, and can provide it when pressed on their exact 
origins. In addition to knowing where their ancestors came from, they also know where 
other people’s ancestors migrated from. 376  Akbarzadeh argues that the “minimum-
contact kolkhoz system” resulted in the various groups keeping their cultural practices 
from their homes regions. 377  For example, in the Vakhsh Valley there are Uzbek 
collective farms that, in Akbarzadeh’s words, “have very little to do with their 
neighbouring, say Gharmi, kolkhozy.”378 The immigrants to Qurghonteppa adjusted in 
different ways. For example, some adjusted well to Qurghonteppa while others such as 
those from Qarotegin and Darvoz “resisted assimilation” and “maintained a strong sense 
of separate identity.”379 
Tajiks resettled from the mountainous areas, especially Gharm, found their 
interests in conflict with those populations already there.380 Forced population transfers 
and sedentarisation soon put Uzbek Loqay, Kungrat and Durman in competition for 
resources with Tajiks in Qurghonteppa.381 For those who did not immediately enter into 
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problematic relations, relations worsened later. According to Akiner, the original 
inhabitants of the Vakhsh Valley came to resent the eventual success of the immigrants 
to the region.382 A later example in Qurghonteppa is from the 1960s when Gharmis and 
Uzbeks were involved in disputes over land and water.383 Population and demographics 
and a shortage of resources in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in further increased 
competition for resources among the groups in the Vakhsh Valley.384 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
The Interaction of Identity, Power and Demographic Changes 
 
  
This chapter has illustrated the high level of complexity that must be navigated 
when attempting to put in context the pre-conflict dynamics of Tajikistan, particularly 
the Vakhsh Valley and the Qurghonteppa Province. Cataclysmic changes in governance 
structures, social controls and demographics occurred concurrently with the intentional 
and unintentional reshaping of identities and loyalties. And this all happened before the 
disruption of social order and government authority at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Despite having had decades of relative stability leading up to the late 1980s, the social 
and political dynamics became no easier to analyse. With the breakdown of central and 
local state control and the turnover of elites in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, the 
numerous layers of loyalty, identity and political and economic ties were once again 
tested, reshaped and realigned. As civil unrest spread and violent conflict started, the 
situation became in many ways much more complicated and, in other ways, much 
simpler. As the situation deteriorated, national level elites and local power brokers 
mobilised support from the local level, drawing on and appealing to ties of identity and 
shared economic concerns. Language, ethnicity, sub-ethnic identity, religious sect, 
political party membership, region of origin, collective farm affiliation, family ties, 
professional relationships, employer-employee ties and government patron-client 
networks have all been cited as factors in determining individual and group participation 
or non-participation in the conflict. Each one of these factors played a role in 
determining behaviour during the civil war—of course some of them to a far lesser 
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degree than others. The next chapter will fully explore these variables as part of the 
mobilisation process during the era of political competition that transitioned to violent 
conflict.  
 Chapter 3 
 
Transition from Political Competition to Violent Conflict 
 
  
 
 
“I thought we needed to be wise and careful. We had become a nation but we didn’t 
know what “nation” was. In the Soviet time we said “people” – the Tajik or Uzbek 
people of the Soviet Union – not “nation”. We had never lived in a nation state. 
Suddenly we needed to understand the idea of “nation”. We needed to have a “national 
interest.” National interest? We didn’t know what that was! People knew just their own 
interests, or the interests of their family or their village.” 
     
   - Muhammadjon Shukurov on Tajikistan’s independence.1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The relatively open social and political environment during the Glasnost era in 
the Tajik SSR (late 1980s to 1991) allowed for increased freedom of expression and for 
the emergence of many new civil society groups, including political parties. At the same 
time that political parties and various independent social groups were forming, the state 
bureaucracy was being restructured. Gorbachev’s Union-wide efforts at Perestroika 
reforms included attacks on and removals of ‘conservative’ apparatchiks in favour of 
‘reformist’ cadres who would assist rather than obstruct the implementation of reforms. 
In Tajikistan this created an intersection of interests whereby pro-Perestroika reformists 
in the state bureaucracy were supported by, and in turn supported, the anti-incumbent 
agendas of the newly emerging political parties. Another agenda that must be factored 
into this political environment is that of the regional elites and their local patronage 
networks. Local elites in the north, Hisor, Kulob, and to a certain extent in 
Qurghonteppa, 2  worked to maintain their positions in the face of the Perestroika 
bureaucratic reforms. On the other side, regional elites from the Pamirs and Gharm 
(including Gharmis in Dushanbe and Qurghonteppa Province) increasingly began to use 
the political parties and the Gorbachev reforms as a vehicle to make political gains as 
the government appointed mostly Pamiri and Gharmi reformists to the newly vacated 
positions. Soon, region of origin became associated with support for, or opposition to, 
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the Perestroika reforms – both in the bureaucracy in Dushanbe and in the rural areas 
where local elites (e.g., collective farm bosses and provincial/district leaders) had much 
to gain or lose from the reforms. In Qurghonteppa, the competition between Gharmi and 
Kulobi administrators for local government positions and control of collective farms 
was especially intense. 
 The competition for state resources and positions of influence continued into the 
post-Soviet era. At the same time political parties mobilised in opposition to the 
incumbent leaders, who also sought to mobilise their own supporters. The combination 
of an election failure on the part of the opposition, the increased use of large street 
demonstrations on the capital, plus the reckless rhetoric and actions on both sides led to 
an increasingly dangerous political and social atmosphere. The overwhelming belief on 
the part of both sides – in the face of the mutual security dilemmas – of the need to arm 
themselves soon turned to escalating violence and eventually open military combat. 
 
 
 
Part 1: Political Competition and Regionalism 
   
  
Glasnost-era opposition activities 
 
Freizer argues that the activities of civil society organizations during the early 
Glasnost period in Tajikistan “attracted mainly the urban middle classes – scientists, 
professors, teachers and students – and bypassed many rural communities.”3 Olimova 
describes a similar constituency for the first early social movements, noting that their 
support at the end of the 1980s came firstly from the “western-oriented national 
intelligentsia.”4  Mavlon Mahkamov, referring to the political parties that formed in 
1989 and 1990, wrote that their gestation was an urban process and that “rural society 
mostly stayed out of the process of politicization of social life.”5 Whatever the exact 
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composition of the opposition groups, it was clear that while they were growing, they 
still had relatively limited numbers and their active members made up only a very small 
percentage of the total population of Tajikistan.6 
Concerning the goals of these new groups, Freizer stresses that while some 
individuals wanted massive changes in the system of government, generally the civil 
society groups of the 1980s did not oppose the state and focused mostly on local issues.7 
In the opinion of Mahkamov, most active civil society groups had a very low level of 
influence. 8  While Freizer’s and Mahkamov’s assessments may work for a narrow 
definition of civil society, it does not describe the late-Glasnost political opposition 
movements very well. Atkin writes that “by the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 
1990s, a growing number of people advocated more substantial change than the 
republic-level leadership was willing to allow.” 9  However, the government 
implemented some of the changes demanded by the early opposition movements – 
possibly with strategic motives. For example, while the communist government had 
previously criticised nationalism and the influence of religion, it eventually co-opted 
some of the opposition’s platform. Starting in 1989 the government started to 
implement elements of the nationalist agenda, including the passage of a language law 
favouring Tajik.10  
Dudoignon provides an explanation for why the Soviet government allowed 
these non-state actors to form: 
The alternative political organisations and parties in Tajikistan were initially tolerated 
because they were thought to provide so many necessary and convenient outlets for the 
frustrations of the country’s urban population, and ensure that these did not escalate into 
inter-communal violence.11 
 
Niyazi has a similar, but more cynical explanation for the emergence of certain groups 
in the late Glasnost period: 
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The authorities try to counteract the opposition by using ‘nonformula’ organisations 
such as social-political clubs like ‘The Workers' Perestroika’ of the Dushanbe Railway 
District Committee of the CPSU, ‘Ru ba Ru’ (face to face) of the Komsomol Central 
Committee, and ‘Tajdid’ (renewal or renaissance) of the Vakhsh Komsomol District 
Committee. They were all set up and continue to be controlled by the authorities. It is 
quite evident, however, that they are unable to give any really effective support to the 
regime.12 
 
As for Islam, the Soviet government loosened its restrictions, allowing the Qoziyot (the 
official Islamic governing body) and others to open new Islamic schools and mosques in 
Tajikistan, as well as to renovate mazars (shrines) and organise hajj to Mecca. 13 
However, as noted by Kilavuz, there were additional issues on the agenda in the late 
1980s beyond just nationalist and religious ones, evidenced by critical newspaper 
articles regarding the economy, health and the environment.14  
 
 
Perestroika-era political competition 
 
Within Tajikistan, there were major changes in the power structures starting in 
the mid-1980s. Gorbachev’s removal of Tajik First Secretary Rahmon Nabiev is the 
most prominent example. Then, from early 1987 to the end of 1989 the First Secretary 
of the Communist Party Qahhor Mahkamov – using what Markowitz terms “attacks,” 
“reforms” and an “anti-corruption campaign” – attempted to dismantle the patronage 
networks within the Communist Party.15 These included actions against the elites of 
patronage networks in Kulob, Qurghonteppa and Mahkamov’s home province of 
Leninobod. Mahkamov removed many regional elites from their administrative 
positions and appointed “reformist politicians” – often Pamiris and Gharmis/Qaroteginis 
– to their positions.16 This portrayal of Mahkamov as a motivated reformer needs to be 
qualified. In particular, the reforms he carried out need to be placed in the context of the 
Soviet Union, in particular Moscow’s relationship with and control over the republics. 
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Karim Abdulov, the chief of staff for President Nabiev (1991-1992), writes 
disparagingly of Mahkamov as an “inept” and “slow-witted” leader who was dictated to 
by Moscow desantniks (literally, ‘paratroopers’; figuratively, outsiders who arrive 
suddenly and without invitation).  
Chief among these outsiders, in Abdulov’s opinion, was the Second Secretary 
(1986-1989) and true power in Tajikistan, Petr Luchinsky – better known nowadays as 
Petru Lucinschi, the president of Moldova from 1997-2001. Abdulov is quite open in 
his bias against the “chauvinist” Luchinsky, who he blames for using and exacerbating 
regionalism (mahalgaroy) in his placement and removal of cadres in Tajikistan. 17 
Abdulov maintains that Luchinsky’s tactics worsened the regional divides in Tajikistan 
and lead the country towards war. 18  Abdulov is adamant about the effect of the 
Mahkamov-Luchinsky reforms, especially the increased level of regionalism. He points 
to the period from 1985-1990 as a time when the people of Tajikistan “became slaves of 
the centre,” and when “Everyone became concerned with only themselves, their own 
families, and their own relatives.” 19  While other analysts are less concerned with 
assigning blame, they do agree on the increased importance of region of origin as a 
result of how the reforms of the late 1980s were implemented.20  
According to Olimova, Pamiri and Gharmi/Qarotegini elites had accumulated 
some economic strength by the late Soviet period. Elements within these two groups 
then decided to use the new Glasnost-era opposition movements as a vehicle to gain a 
greater share of the political power. As a result, “regional origin exerted a major 
influence on the choice of behavioral strategy of the new elites” while support or 
opposition to the “Soviet imperial centre” was “determined by regional affiliation.”21 
The reforms of the late 1980s “emboldened many of the informal groups” in the 
republic while the “elites” of the Communist Party “had not yet regrouped from the 
attacks on their patronage bases.”22 Towards the end of 1990 Mahkamov had been 
unable to reconcile the “increasingly radicalized reformist movements and a 
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"reactionary" wing of the Communist Party.”23 With Mahkamov becoming increasingly 
weak, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the Islamic Revival Party become the 
strongest supporters of further reforms. The opposition supporters placed themselves in 
a position of conflict with the conservative elements of the Communist Party with their 
demands for further reforms in Kulob, Qurghonteppa and Leninobod. 24  Markowitz 
writes that as part of this process the collective farm bosses began to lose the protection 
of the “conservative political elites” who they were tied to through mutual “regional 
interests,” resulting in “ideological divisions in the centre [becoming] increasingly tied 
to regional interests.”25 This strategy placed the opposition movement in conflict with 
the incumbent elites in these regions as Gharmi and Pamiri elites started to also use the 
new opposition movements as a tool to mobilise against their rivals.26  
 
Post Independence  
 
 
After independence the leaders of most Central Asian states were able to 
maintain the system of regional patronage networks. However, due to the weakness of 
the system in Tajikistan (e.g., the purges of cadres mention above), previously less 
privileged regions successfully challenged the dominant Leninobod faction for an 
increased share of power and resources.27 Before independence, starting in 1990, the 
capabilities and power of the government in Tajikistan rapidly deteriorated, 28  with 
different parts of the state apparatus divided between the different regional factions.29 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the central government in Tajikistan became even 
weaker, deprived of the perception of control and order in the eyes of its population. 
Furthermore, the state was now facing political opposition from various groups.30 Atkin 
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argues that the Khujandi/Leninobodi elite – and their Kulobi allies as junior partners – 
wished to preserve the system, not for reasons of ideology, but to keep the monopoly of 
power and the control of resources that they enjoyed during the Soviet era.31 Despite the 
government’s efforts, by spring 1992 the country was divided among various regional 
factions and the central government was completely ineffective.32  
 
Competition in Qurghonteppa and Kulob 
 
 
A clear pattern of ‘alliance,’ in Kalyvas’ terminology, was seen at an early point 
before the outbreak of violent conflict. Contentious local issues in rural areas 
increasingly became attached to national level politics in an environment of weakening 
central control. While Roy pointed to the relative personal wealth of Gharmis in 
Qurghonteppa,33 it was the control of collective farms that was the most contentious 
issue in the competition between Gharmi and Kulobi elites, as well as between the 
memberships of their respective networks. The collective and state farms of 
Qurghonteppa’s Vakhsh river valley accounted for 40% of the value of Tajikistan’s 
agricultural production, resulting in the competition for influence and control here being 
“one of the greatest sources of inter-regional tension in the republic.”34 Administrators 
in Qurghonteppa Province, as elsewhere in Central Asia, had very long tenures, the 
powerful chairmen of collective farms in particular. For example, in a sampling of 15 
Qurghonteppa farm bosses from the late 1930s to the mid-1980s, Markowitz finds that 
the mean number of years in office was over 23 years. However, starting in the early 
1980s there was significant turnover of political and economic leaders in Qurghonteppa. 
The purges of the second half of the 1980s included the replacement of the purged 
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leaders with Russians, Pamiris and Gharmis. The very brief tenure of District First 
Secretaries in Qurghonteppa Province, as opposed to the long tenure of their 
predecessors, illustrated this trend. Despite these actions, the reforms in Qurghonteppa 
were not successful in asserting control over the local power structures, even as the old 
elites’ patronage networks were dismantled. Established patterns of political and 
economic power were not easy to displace. 35  Markowitz describes the situation in 
Qurghonteppa leading up to independence: 
…the provincial elite was divided from 1988 onwards, splitting districts and even 
collective farms with some tied to reformist cadres (who primarily originated from the 
Karategin Valley [Gharmis] and GBAO [Pamiris]) and others tied to the old guard (who 
had close ties to Leninabad and Kuliab) being appointed to posts in the region following 
Makhkamov’s resignation in August 1991.36 
 
Mahkamov’s bureaucratic changes had allowed Gharmis to secure important positions 
in the Qurghonteppa regional government. But the situation changed by late 1991 when 
President Nabiev’s counter-reforms allowed Kulobis to gain “unprecedented access” to 
power positions in Qurghonteppa.37 This was part of an effort on the part of Kulobi 
elites that Schoeberlein terms an attempt to “dominate and even annex” 
Qurghonteppa.38 However, not as many old elites were able to retake their positions as 
those in Kulob had done.39 
Stephane Dudoignon describes an intensified competition during 1990-91 at the 
elite level in Qurghonteppa between the Brezhnev-era elite on one side and Gharmi and 
Pamiri elites on the other. The Pamiri and Gharmi elites continued to push for political 
and economic reforms that would bolster their decreasing power and influence.40 In 
competition with the Gharmi and Pamiri elites were many apparatchiks from Kulob who 
were – since autumn 1991 during the lead-up to elections – working as part of an 
alliance with Nabiev.41 However, Matveeva notes that there was an earlier relationship. 
As early as the 1970s more personnel from Hisor and Kulob were brought into the 
“ruling establishment.”42 
By early 1992 in Qurghonteppa the competing Gharmi elites – some tied to 
“patrons in the Karategin valley” – on one side and elites tied to Kulob and Leninobod 
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on the other side “increasingly viewed their interests as under attack from the other” as 
each side made “repeated efforts [to] gain ground over the other” in the competition for 
control over state-controlled resources.43 Markowitz argues that “Tension and barely 
concealed hostility within the provincial elite left the region primed for the outbreak of 
conflict.” 44  The situation worsened once President Nabiev agreed to form a 
‘Government of National Reconciliation’ in May 1992. The emboldened opposition 
leaders then attempted to remove select leaders in the Qurghonteppa regional 
administration, many of whom had been appointed in late 1991 when Nabiev returned 
to the top leadership position. Markowitz argues that these administrators appointed by 
Nabiev “had come to represent a foreign occupying force among those with patronage 
ties to the Karategin Valley.”45 Under pressure, Nabiev allowed his new appointee to 
the top administrative position in Qurghonteppa to remove several politicians and 
attempt to remove others with ties to Kulob. However, the new appointee, Nurali 
Kurbonov, did not have the power to remove the strongest local politicians and 
economic actors. The action further polarized the two sides in Qurghonteppa.46  
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2: Political Parties and Opposition Movements 
 
 
General Overview 
 
The political competition immediately after independence in 1991 pitted the 
opposition, which included the Democratic Party, the Pamiri party La’li Badakhshon, 
the Tajik nationalist party Rastokhez, and the heavily Gharmi Tajik ‘Islamic Revival 
Party’ against the Khujandi-dominated faction in power.47 Opposition leaders, allied 
with the leaders of “solidarity networks in disenfranchised regions, appealed to regional 
loyalties in officials of various agencies of state control.”48 Olimova assessed the results 
of this strategy: 
Gradually, the proportion of members belonging to a specific Tajik ethno-regional 
group grew in all these organizations, and under cover of an all-national purpose, 
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regional interests became distinct….The regional elites turned to the parties as 
instruments of political mobilization and political struggle.49  
 
Specifically, the Gharmi/Qarotegini and Pamiri “regional elites, having achieved 
economic clout, sought to change the balance of forces in their own interest and used 
the newly emerging opposition movements to this end.”50 In regards to Kulobis, Nabiev 
had chosen to enter into an alliance with the Kulobi faction in the fall of 1991. The 
reasoning for this strategy, according to Parviz Mullojonov, is that they seemed to be 
the weakest in the republic.51 Other reasons could include the obvious – the Kulobi 
elites were not using opposition movements to rally against the incumbent government, 
or that they were the only partner with any mobilisation capabilities available in the 
vicinity of the capital. Another option could be that the Kulobis were not strangers to 
alliances with the dominant Leninobodi elite group in power.  Starting in the early 
1970s there was a level of power sharing involving the Kulobi elites in a patronage 
relationship with the dominant elites of the central government.52 One example of this 
arrangement was the composition of the Interior Ministry during the 1980s. The ranks 
were dominated by Kulobis until the Pamiri Mamadayoz Navjuvonov was appointed 
Minister of the Interior. After this point a process began where Kulobis were pushed out 
in favour of Pamiri police officers.53 
The patterns of what Kalyvas terms ‘alliance’ became increasingly clear at the 
time that mutual dilemmas arose along regional lines. Dudoignon writes that at this time 
the “two newly shaped sides” were settled: northern “Khujand Communists” and the 
southern Kulobis on one side versus the Pamiri party La’li Badakhshon, the DPT, and 
the Gharmi-dominated IRP on the other side. Dudoignon writes further that “Both 
[sides] were almost ready for an armed conflict and would prepare themselves for it 
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during winter 1991-92. [By] February 1992, […] everybody would have chosen his side 
once and for all.”54 
There were numerous exceptions to the rule of region of origin determining 
political loyalty. Atkin and Kilavuz both note prominent exceptions at the elite level, 
both on the opposition and pro-government side. Some prominent Pamiris and Gharmis 
supported Nabiev 55  while certain prominent Kulobis and Khujandis/Leninododis 
supported the opposition parties. 56  As for pro-government politicians from regions 
whose elites trended towards the opposition, Atkin remarks that those who benefitted 
personally under “the old order” were likely to work towards preserving that system. 
This resulted in “veteran politicians” from Gharm and Badakhshon who had previously 
benefitted from the existing system of power distribution working on the pro-
government side in an effort to preserve it, along with their positions of power.57 
 
 
Rastokhez, the DPT, and the Nationalist Intelligentsia 
 
Rastokhez 
 
The political organization Rastokhez, led by the academic Tohir Abdujabbor, 
was founded on 14 September 1989. The government officially recognized the party as 
a legal entity on 21 June 1991.58 Niyazi assesses Rastokhez at an early point in its 
history, noting that it had enough ambiguity in its charter that it did not specifically 
condemn communism, nor did it prohibit members from holding Communist Party 
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membership or even high level positions in the Communist Party. Niyazi stresses that 
Rastokhez was more like “coordinating centre” in that at an early point it did not openly 
oppose the Communist Party and preferred instead to lobby the government.59 In terms 
of membership, Rastokhez was dominated by secular urban intellectuals,60  a group 
which enthusiastically joined reform movements and political parties.61  This was a 
problem politically as these urban intellectuals were isolated from the broader Tajik 
society and their networks did not extended outside of their small circles.62 Rastokhez’s 
nationalist political agenda consisted of advocating for the “revival of the Tajik 
language and its recognition as the state language, the development of Tajik culture and 
nationalist historiography, and republic sovereignty.” 63  However, despite being a 
monoethnic nationalist political party, the party platform did insert moderate language 
calling for democracy, human rights, equality for all citizens of Tajikistan regardless of 
ethnicity or religion.64 Other issues were more regional in nature, such as Rastokhez’s 
demands for a disproportionate redistribution of seats in the Supreme Soviet away from 
population-based distribution of seats towards one that would disproportionately favour 
the city of Dushanbe (where Rastokhez was strongest), a move that would hurt the 
Leninobod province.65  
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The preoccupation with Uzbekistan amongst the membership of “Dushanbe’s 
reform movements” 66  is noted by many. Grievances over the Tajik-Uzbek border 
delimitation, the historically ethnic Tajik cities of Samarqand and Bukhara in 
Uzbekistan, and the Tajik minority in Uzbekistan were prominent themes in these 
movements,67 with rhetoric among certain members occasionally being quite fanciful. 
This included identifying Uzbekistan as a threat to Tajikistan and arguing for the 
formation of a “Greater Iran” that would include Samarqand and Bukhara – a view that 
obviously aggravated the government of Uzbekistan.68 As for the attitude of Rastokhez 
members towards ethnic Uzbeks, Schoeberlein disagrees with Naby’s assessment of 
Rastokhez as being hostile to Uzbeks, noting that these views were rejected by most of 
the leadership and members of Rastokhez.69  
The decline of Rastokhez is most fully analysed by Lawrence Markowitz. He 
argues that Rastokhez continued to use the theme of a Tajik nationalism and cultural 
revival as its main mobilising strategy at a time when the people and government of 
Tajikistan had more tangible concerns – particularly the increasingly regionalised nature 
of power. In response to its declining support, Rastokhez allied with the IRP and DPT – 
both of which were able to ‘usurp’ the Rastokhez program – leaving it redundant as 
early as late 1990.70 Niyazi adds further to the discussion of Rastokhez’s decline. He 
argues that their credibility was harmed when the group became involved in the political 
manoeuvring surrounding the February 1990 riots and the attempt to force the 
leadership of the Tajik SSR to resign. Niyazi’s harsh assessment is that  
The February events showed that Rastokhez failed when put to the democratic test. 
Many of its leaders were drawn into 'palace intrigues'. They became members of the 
Vahdat committee and joined forces with influential functionaries. Then they sought 
power on the wave of the riots and were ready to accept any top positions in the party 
and government that happened to become vacant. They did not threaten the pyramid 
                                                                                                                                               
deputies to the new parliament. Ironically, one-fourth of the republic's population lived in Leninabad, 
while Rostokhez’s supporters were to elect 50 deputies. In Dushanbe, where Rostokhez was expected to 
win the elections, 100 deputies were to be elected." In Rostokhez's eyes this reshuffling of electoral seats 
would have rectified the "wrongs" of the past.” Citing Rostokhez, N:2. July 1990. 
66
 Dudoignon’s terminology here allows the inclusion of the DPT with Rastokhez.  
67
 Dudoignon, ‘Political Parties and Forces in Tajikistan, 1989-1993’, 69. 
68
 Dudoignon, ‘Political Parties and Forces in Tajikistan, 1989-1993’, 60, 69; Rubin, ‘Russian Hegemony 
and State Breakdown in the Periphery’, 142. 
69
 Schoeberlein-Engel, ‘Conflict in Tajikistan and Central Asia’, 6, referring to E. Naby, ‘Tajik Political 
Legitimacy and Political Parties’, Central Asia Monitor, Vol. 1, No. 5 (1992). [Note: Schoeberlein 
provided the incorrect volume/number. Correct version used here.]  
70
 Lawrence Markowitz, ‘How master frames mislead: the division and eclipse of nationalist movements 
in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 32, No. 4 (May 2009) esp. 717-8, 721, 
728-30. Dudoignon gives an earlier date, arguing that Rastokhez had been replaced by the DPT and the 
IRP as early as summer 1990. See: Dudoignon, ‘Communal Solidarity and Social Conflicts in Late 20th 
Century Central Asia’, 10. 
 109 
power structure. Only its summit and the blocks immediately supporting it did not suit 
them.71  
 
Niyazi stresses that the Tajik media’s biased coverage of the February 1990 events 
further contributed to damaging Rastokhez’s reputation. These attacks resulted in 
Rastokhez changing its tactic to “tough defence” and “open confrontation with the 
government,” whereas previously Rastokhez had been more focused on lobbying the 
government and seeking cooperation.72 
 
The DPT 
 
The Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) was founded on 10 August 1990 as a 
faction led by the philosopher Shodmon Yusuf, who had left Rastokhez along with 
many others. The DPT claimed a membership of 7,000, of which about 85% were 
ethnic Tajiks. The leadership, including a few ethnic Russians, were similar to Yusuf, 
coming almost entirely from academia and the intelligentsia.73 Similar to Rastokhez, the 
DPT advocated for the abolishment of one-party communist rule and for the promotion 
of democracy, sovereignty, religious freedom and civil rights while condemning the 
ideology of Marxism-Leninism.74 Starting in September 1991 and continuing through 
the winter of 1991-2 the DPT was preoccupied with condemning the Communist Party 
elites’ strategy of creating joint ventures that would be out of reach of any future 
election winner’s attempts to take over Communist Party-controlled economic assets. In 
particular, DPT-aligned journalists attacked Kulobi apparatchiks in print and wrote 
about “illegal capital transfers from Dushanbe to Khujand.” 75  In terms of election 
success, the DPT was only successful in securing votes from Dushanbe’s “radical 
youth” and “intellectual circles” – and in a few limited cases in special circumstances 
outside of Dushanbe in the small centres of Ura-Teppa (Istaravshon), Kofarnihon and 
Fayzabad.76  
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The failure of the intelligentsia 
 
The people who dominated the base of support for Rastokhez and the DPT were 
at times a dysfunctional group. Aziz Niyazi, himself a Tajik academic and son of a 
prominent intellectual,77 clearly has a high level of disdain for some of his peers: 
It was mainly among social scientists that the Soil Movement developed and continues 
to develop. It has a strong tendency to focus on ethnic, nostalgic and pseudo-rationalist 
ideas and has weak links with reality. It has a lot in common with the Russian ‘patriotic 
bloc’, and in the same way does considerable harm to the movement for national and 
cultural renaissance. It prefers to use feelings of hurt national pride and ignorance. By 
encouraging Russophobia and Turkophobia, the ideologists of the Tajik Soil Movement 
transfer the evil of the system to the peoples. They seem to believe that national 
consciousness can be cemented by hatred towards other nations.78 
 
As for ‘Turkophobia,’ Uzbek-themed insults were used amongst rival intellectuals with 
some of the newer generation (native-born and usually from the mountains or the 
migrant communities in the Vakhsh Valley) accusing the older generation (intellectuals 
from Khujand and Samarqand) of secretly being foreign Uzbeks who arrived to 
Dushanbe in the late 1930s after the Cheka secret police allegedly killed off the “true” 
Tajik intelligentsia.79 These fights were even found in television production studios in 
the 1970s.80  Naby remarked on the generational difference, noting that older Tajik 
intellectuals were equally at ease in Uzbek and Tajik, plus Russian, while younger 
intellectuals were mostly limited to Tajik and Russian.81 The divide mentioned above is 
further described by Dudoignon, a specialist on the history of intellectuals in Tajikistan, 
who notes that the older Tajik intelligentsia changed their strategy and stopped 
advocating for reforms when it became clear that the reforms could threaten their 
careers. This led to a rift with the younger generation, which had no such privileged 
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Gharm's valley, and fatherland of the popular poet Bazar Sobir, spokesman of the radical intelligentsia 
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positions and much less to lose.82 Additionally, Dudoignon writes of a rift between the 
“young radical students” and the older intellectuals of the DPT that occurred when the 
urban youth supporters of the DPT became dissatisfied with the “liberal intelligentsia’s” 
level of verbal attacks on the CP “conservatives.” 83  And as noted above by 
Dudoignon,84 members of the newer generation of intellectuals were usually from the 
mountains or from the migrant communities of the Vakhsh Valley (i.e., Gharmis). 
Dudoignon, using the term “Kuhistanian”85 in place of Gharmi or Qarotegini below, 
notes how aspiring Gharmi students were pushed into powerless social niches:  
Kuhistanian intellectual elites were victims of the division of work created since the 
mid-1970’s inside Tajik higher education and professional distribution system. 
Increasing numbers of students from Kuhistan and muhajir communities of central and 
southern Tajikistan were oriented, during two decades, toward "literary" faculties and 
deprived of real possibilities of acquiring "interesting" technical abilities (in such fields 
as law or economics).86 
 
As mentioned above, political party networks that relied on urban intellectuals lacked a 
network that extended into broader parts of society. And the intellectuals that were most 
prominent – the academics and scientists – did not hold any positions of influence in 
government, a fact admitted at the 1990 annual session of the Tajik Academy of 
Sciences.87 The intelligentsia, deprived of influence in the politics of the republic, were 
quite vulnerable. Dudoignon offers a harsh assessment:   
The fondness felt by many Tajik intellectuals of the apparatus for the institutions and 
political sphere handed down by the USSR can be explained in part by their awareness 
that radical political reform would fell the branch on which they were comfortably 
perched: the intellectual mediocrity prevalent in Dushanbe, as in all the Soviet 
provincial capitals, precluded any hope of the intelligentsia’s survival…88 
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The ‘liberal intelligentsia,’ who were often “official writers and technocrats closer to the 
Communist party” became worried about preserving their careers and turned 
increasingly uncomfortable with the alliance with the “Islamists.”89 In Tajikistan, as 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the “technocrats initially allied with elements of the 
intelligentsia to support perestroika against an entrenched party apparat.”90 However, 
the violence of the February 1990 riots and the increasingly radicalised nationalism of 
the DPT and the “Islamic politics” of the IRP “pushed the old intelligentsia and the 
technocrats back into an alliance with the apparat.”91 The lack of any broad support that 
could be mobilised in any forceful manner was fatal in 1992 when the DPT “apparatus 
would be submitted to hard pressure from the power [sic] and many of its members 
would more or less rapidly return to the bosom of the Communist party.”92 One DPT 
leader even conceded that the weakness of the party was in its lack of “armed 
supporters.”93  
 
Table No. 1 – Support (%) in Tajikistan in November 1991 (bottom) and June 199294 
 
 
 IRP DPT Rastokhez Communists No party 
Students 4.7     
Government officials 1.1   21.5  
Professionals95 10.9 10.9  21.7  
Agricultural experts96 5.3   48.7  
Farmers 5.9   57.7  
Industrial engineers 
and technicians 
16.8 27.7  9.2  
Industrial workers 3.9   28.4  
      
Survey totals 6 10 3 40 39 
November 1991 totals 6 21 6 36  
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Independent Opposition Figures 
 
 
Khudonazarov 
 
Davlat Khudonazarov, who was to become the single presidential candidate 
representative for the opposition parties in Tajikistan, had a non-political career 
trajectory up until 1989. Khudonazarov was born to a Pamiri family in the Gorno-
Badakhshon Autonomous Province. Although his family included prominent 
Communist Party members, Khudonazarov chose a career as a cinematographer. He 
was eventually elected as Chair of the Tajik Cinematographers Union in 1986 and then 
the Soviet Union-wide Cinematographers Union in 1990. In 1989 he held his first 
explicitly political office when he was elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet as a deputy. 
And just one year later he was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. Khudonazarov declined to join any opposition party in Tajikistan, 
but he did agree to serve as the unified opposition presidential candidate.97 He received 
30% of the vote (to Nabiev’s 56%) in an election which the opposition claimed was 
fraudulent, arguing that he had actually received 40% of the vote. Khudonazarov then 
mostly receded from prominence in Tajik politics.98 Despite Khudonazarov’s apparent 
position of power and influence in the opposition, it was actually a religious leader who 
had united the opposition and persuaded the various parties to support a single 
candidate. This man, Qozi Akbar Turajonzoda, was the top official religious leader in 
Tajikistan.99 Unlike Khudonazarov, Turajonzoda did not disappear from the political 
arena. 
 
Turajonzoda  
 
“…our hopes can come true when there is a veritable democratic, rule-of-law and, 
however strange one may find it, secular state. As Muslim leader, I certainly dream of 
living in a state governed by the laws of Islam, but, if one is realistic, one should realize 
that our society is not yet ready for this.” 
 
  - Qozi Turajonzoda, September 1992100  
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Akbar Turajonzoda was born Akbar Qaharov in 1954 near Kofarnihon (Vahdat) 
in the village of Turkobod, about 30 kilometres from Dushanbe. Turajonzoda traces his 
prominent Sufi family lineage seven generations back to Samarqand. His grandfather, 
Sufi Abdukarim, was a Sufi leader exiled to Siberia in the 1930s while his father, Ishon 
Turajon, was a Sufi ishon (leader) who possibly had as many as 1000 murids 
(committed followers). At age 18, Turajonzoda was sent to study at the Mir-i Arab 
madrassa in Bukhara. Afterwards he went on to study in the Islamic Institute in 
Tashkent before going to Jordan to study Islamic law at Amman University as one of a 
few officially-approved students from the Soviet Union. After returning he worked for 
the Department of International Relations of the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia 
and Kazakhstan (SADUM101). Soon he was appointed as the Qozi Kalon (highest rank 
of Islamic judge/administrator in the Qoziyot102) of Tajikistan in 1988 at the age of only 
34. In 1990 he took on the additional position of a deputy in the Supreme Soviet of 
Tajikistan.103 At this time the leaders of the officially-endorsed Islamic bodies were 
supportive of the government as they were dependent on it for their careers. This was 
reinforced in September 1990 with a Qoziyot decree/treaty agreement with the imam 
khotibs (top imams) of local mosques forbidding participation in politics, with a specific 
prohibition against membership in any political party – likely a response to the recent 
appeal by the Union-wide Islamic Revival Party for the ulema to become involved in 
politics.104  
For a short period of time Turajonzoda had been a student of Muhammadjon 
Hindustani105 and had, in 1983 or 1984, met Sayid Abdullo Nuri – the eventual leader of 
the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRP). When Nuri was released from jail in 1988 
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Turajonzoda hired him as the editor for the official newspaper of the Qoziyot – Minbar-i 
Islom (‘Tribune of Islam’).106 Despite whatever relationship Turajonzoda may have had 
with Nuri, he was disinclined to endorse the IRP as it “advocated a different path to 
Muslim revival” and was a threat to his power as Qozi Kalon as it was a political party 
that advertised itself as the ‘vehicle of revival’ rather than the Qoziyot.107  Kilavuz 
qualifies this competition:   
A dispute emerged between the traditionalists and the IRP over the latter’s status as an 
Islamic party, which the traditionalists saw as contrary to Islam. They did not object to 
existing relations between state and religion, or approve of the direct involvement of 
religion in politics. Accordingly, they accused the IRP of disrespecting or betraying 
Sunni Hanafi tradition. The Qazi had good relations both with the IRP and the 
traditionalists, who were composed mostly of Naqshbandi and Qadiri Ishans. Although 
these groups were suspicious of each other, in September 1991 Turajonzoda was able to 
convince them to unite against the government. His intervention helped prevent a 
possible clash between the “official” imams of the mosques, and the “unofficial” 
mullahs and the political wing of Islam represented by the IRP. He was a figure who 
could be accepted by both sides, and who had relationships with all relevant groups.108 
 
Initially, Turajonzoda maintained a distance from the IRP and the opposition parties and 
continued instead to work from within the government as a deputy and as the Qozi 
Kalon. The turning point, according to Kilavuz, was when his proposals in the Supreme 
Soviet – regarding religious holidays, observance of Friday as a non-working day, halal 
regulations in abattoirs and land tax breaks for mosques – all failed.109 In late 1991, 
Turajonzoda and the IRP had a “rapprochement and then alliance” as the Qozi kalon 
announced his support for the opposition demands. 110  According to Kilavuz, 
Turajonzoda’s political skill and charisma played a key role in persuading the 
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opposition parties to present a united front for the elections and support Khudonazarov. 
Instead of joining a single party, Turajonzoda remained independent and worked to 
‘mediate’ between the parties, particularly the nationalists and the Islamists.111 Whitlock 
and Kilavuz both note that Turajonzoda had both formal and informal influence at this 
time, in addition to being witty, confident and a skilled orator – traits which enabled 
him the play the role of a powerful political broker.112  
 
 
 
 
 
Political Islam, the IRP and Qozi Turajonzoda 
 
Islam in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
In the mid-1980s the Soviet government conducted a sociology survey on 
religious practices in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union: 
 
Its findings showed a ‘comparatively extensive practice of [Islamic] traditions, festivals 
and rites among all socio-demographic groups of the population, including the young, 
which indicates not only a relative stabilization of the level of religiosity, but also…a 
mass basis for Islam’s continued existence in the USSR. The results of the survey 
refuted the widely held opinion that Islam was becoming ‘increasingly ritualistic’ 
(obriadovyi) and demonstrated that the ‘preservation and reproduction’ 
(vosproizvodstvo) or religiosity were ‘ensured by the existence of a still fairly 
significant number of believers characterized by a uniformity of religious consciousness 
and religious conduct.’113 
 
The survey revealed the importance of an Islamic-mandated morality in family life, as 
well as a high level of observance amongst those with high school and university 
education.114 In regards to the ‘survival’ of Islam in the Soviet Union, others have 
remarked on the importance of the large ‘network’ of unsanctioned mullahs who, 
despite the existence of the officially endorsed clerics of SADUM, “established Qur’an 
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schools, preserved shrines, presided at burials, weddings and other rituals and, in the 
urban Muslim settings at least, monitored the observation of ‘traditions’…[i.e., in the 
mahallah]” during the Soviet era.115  
At independence the number of registered mosques surged. However, many of 
the ‘new’ mosques were not newly built, but rather pre-existing unofficial mosques that 
were officially registered for the first time. 116  As for the political significance of 
religiosity in Tajikistan, Grigorii Kosach maintains that the “Soviet experience showed 
quite clearly that youthful dissidence more often than not gave way to career 
considerations and adaptation to ideological and political realities.”117 Nevertheless, in 
the 1970s and 1980s “underground and semi-underground” Islamic groups were 
operating in southern Tajikistan. 118  Early Islamists from the 1970s onwards were 
strongest in Qurghonteppa Province among those resettled from Qarotegin/Gharm.119 
Mullojonov believes that the Soviet authorities were obviously aware of the young 
mullahs’ activities, but decided to leave them alone and let them weaken the “authority 
of the conventional clergy, which in the 1970s and early 1980s was considered by the 
Soviet power as the main evil.”120 Concerning the lower level leadership (provincial, 
city, farm and factory officials) in the Vakhsh Valley, the leader of an underground 
network of Islamic teachers stressed that  
Although they were Communist Party members, in secret they maintained their original 
faith since they were the children of Muslims. Their connection to Islam was strong. As 
a result of this, even though they still did not help us, they deliberately overlooked and 
ignored our connection to this work [i.e., unofficial Islamic schooling]. Through this 
behaviour they facilitated the dissemination of progressive ideas and the spirit of 
striving for freedom in the Vakhsh Valley.121 
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However, by the mid-1980s the authorities began to see the unofficial mullahs and 
underground Islam as a bigger threat and began to use the official clergy against the 
unofficial mullahs.122 
 
Nuri and the early IRP 
 
The origin of the Islamic Renaissance/Rebirth/Renewal/Revival Party 
(henceforth IRP) of Tajikistan was a group led by Sayid Abdullo Nuri that formed an 
underground organisation or network in 1973. This group, which eventually took the 
name Nahzati Javononi Islomii Tojikiston (Revival of the Islamic Youth of Tajikistan), 
operated mainly in Qurghonteppa and the wider area of the Vakhsh Valley.123 Adeeb 
Khalid describes this group as not just an “organization,” but also as an “underground 
network” which, according to Khalid, “represented hujra students who rejected the 
political caution of their teachers and advocated a social, if not political status for a 
purified Islam.”124  
Nuri was born Abdullo Saidov in 1947. His place of birth is Tavildara, in the 
now defunct Gharm province.125 In 1953 the government sent his family to the lower 
Vakhsh Valley as part of its agriculture resettlement programs. Specifically, Nuri’s 
family lived in the ‘Turkmeniston’ sovkhoz (state farm), located in the Vakhsh District 
of Qurghonteppa Province. His father, Nureddin Saidov, was a sovkhoz director and a 
member of the Communist Party while his brother held a position of some importance 
in the local Party apparatus. Nuri’s education was at a technical school and he worked 
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as a driver and government land surveyor. 126  According to Roy, Nuri was given 
religious lessons at home by his father and by an unnamed “unofficial cleric” before 
studying under Muhammadjon Hindustani. 127  In an interview Nuri named this 
“unofficial cleric” as domullo128 Siyomuddin, stressing that “89%” of his studies were 
completed under this teacher. Nuri stated that after studying under Siyomuddin he 
moved on to become a student of Mavlavi129 Hindustoni, a well-known Islamic scholar, 
for two to three years.130 
Nuri commented on the activities of his group, which he mostly mainly refers to 
as a sozmon (which can be translated as an ‘organisation’ or a ‘society’), but also as a 
junbish or harakat (both translate to ‘movement’). In his recollection, preparations for 
the formation of this group began in 1971. Nuri stresses that this process was quickened 
by a February 1973 KGB raid in the Hippodrome mahalla of Dushanbe that resulted in 
the arrest of 30 students in Nuri’s network. This raid, which narrowly missed catching 
Hindustoni, gave a sense of urgency to Nuri and his associates. On 20 April 1973 Nuri 
met with four senior scholars,131 including Hindustoni, and was selected to lead an 
underground Islamic movement which later gained many members from Nuri’s 
generation (as opposed to the four senior scholars who selected Nuri), including the 
IRP’s first official leader Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda and deputy leader Davlat 
Usmon.132 For the first one or two years, Nuri’s group operated without a name until 
one was agreed upon: Nahzati Javononi Islomii Tojikiston133 – referred to by members 
as Nahzat (revival) or Jamiyat (society). Nuri is clear on the goals of Nahzat:  
With the creation of our own organisation, we did not have any goals of anti-state 
activities; we only wanted to disseminate the beliefs of Islam amongst the youth. In 
essence, our organisation or movement in the beginning was a movement for Islamic 
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social reforms, not a political movement.  The main goal was to invite [those Muslims 
who had strayed] back to Islam, as well as the education of Muslim children.134 
 
Nuri’s Nahzat had several departments: (1) proselytising (davat), (2) security (from 
KGB efforts to ascertain their activities135), (3) finances, and (4) education. Nuri argues 
that this structure borrows nothing that is foreign, which he used to bolster his argument 
for Nahzat’s indigenous nature – an organisation that he stressed needed nothing and 
received no influences from outside local society.136 During the mid-1980s Nuri was 
operating an underground Islamic school in Qurghonteppa.137  His work did not go 
unnoticed. Conciliation Resources maintains that the Soviet authorities warned Nuri to 
desist with his religious activities in 1983. 138  Khalid writes that Nuri, while not 
providing exact details of his plans for the form of the planned future state structure, 
was “arguing in public, usually at well-attended feasts marking life-cycle events, for the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Tajikistan.”139 
Whitlock writes of the effect of the Soviet-Afghan War on Nuri and his network: 
…Nuri and his circle had been critical of the war in Afghanistan from the start. “It was 
an act of aggression against a fellow Muslim country. We said nothing in public, but of 
course we were dissidents,” said one of the study group who met at Hindustani’s house. 
Hindustani had listened to all the news he could from Afghanistan, but made no 
comment except that to say that what was happening was absolutely dreadful. Some of 
his younger students were less reserved. Contemporaries remember that Nuri and others 
toured the villages, praying and giving homilies against the war in people’s houses. 
Nuri won an audience among families who had lost their sons for reasons they did not 
understand in a country only a couple of hours’ drive away.140 
 
Roy writes that on 8 March 1987 Afghan mujahideen attacked Soviet territory at the 
Tajik river-border town of Panj. He then claims that in the same month (not clear if 
before or after the 8th) there was a demonstration “in favour” of the mujahideen “a few 
dozen km” from Panj (presumably in Qurghonteppa).141 Roy further claims that Nuri 
was arrested and jailed for being one of the leaders of this demonstration.142 Regarding 
this incident, the rocket attacks into Soviet territory in March 1987 are acknowledged by 
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many other sources.143 However, Nuri could not have been arrested for leading a pro-
mujahideen demonstration as he was at this time imprisoned in Siberia. It was a year 
earlier, in 1986, that Nuri was finally arrested for producing and distributing religious 
materials.144 On 24 June 1986 the KGB raided the homes of approximately 40 men in 
Qurghonteppa in an unsuccessful search for subversive religious literature. Nuri, also 
working as a surveyor, was on his way to Yovon that morning on business for the 
building unit he worked for. He was arrested on the road and taken into custody. Nuri’s 
friends and kin, apparently concerned that Nuri would disappear in custody, held a 
demonstration in Qurghonteppa city, which Whitlock refers to as “the first unsanctioned 
demonstration of any size held in Tajikistan.”145 Whitlock frames the incident as an 
accidental boost to Nuri’s profile: 
The Afghan war was still going on, and a young teacher who was there said he saw the 
demonstration dove-tailing with other worries. “Four coffins had just arrived from 
Afghanistan. […] All dead were local boys. Maybe a hundred or a hundred and twenty 
people came, mainly relatives, and held a mourning meeting. Then a thousand more 
people came and wrote a petition, demanding that their sons be brought home from 
Afghanistan. Because Nuri was against the war, it looked like a demonstration for him, 
and he grew stronger then because people did not trust the authorities any more.”146 
 
Nuri was sentenced for his subversive activities147 to 18 months at a prison camp in 
Siberia, the only prominent religious teacher among his contemporaries to be given this 
punishment. Whitlock maintains that this incident gave Nuri a higher level of popularity 
than other young clerics. One supporter remarked: “The Soviet Union was getting 
weaker, we could feel it. People wanted a mulla to follow, they looked around, and they 
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found Nuri.”148  Nuri, after his release from jail in 1988, was given a job by Qozi 
Turajonzoda as editor of Minbar-i Islom – the official publication of the Qoziyot.149 He 
even went on hajj with the official Tajikistan delegation in 1990.150 Around the time of 
his release, Nuri “became aligned” with other politically active men who would go on to 
form the Tajik branch of the IRP.151 Nuri soon became a high-ranking leader in the 
Tajik IRP, but still behind others such as the top leader Muhammad Sharif Himmatzoda 
and his deputy Davlat Usmon.152 Nuri would eventually eclipse these men and become 
the top leader once the IRP was exiled. 
 
 
Formal Beginning of the IRP of Tajikistan 
 
The IRP of Tajikistan was officially established on 6 October 1990 as a branch 
of the Soviet Union-wide IRP which was formed three months earlier in Russia.153 
Dudoignon speculates that in 1990 the Tajik IRP was given some support by the 
Kremlin leadership. The reason for this is that the Kremlin leadership saw the IRP as a 
force that could take support away from nationalists and others in the opposition side 
while also pushing against the recalcitrant segment of the Communist Party in 
Tajikistan that was giving the Kremlin problems.154 Whatever the case, in November 
1990 the Tajik government formally banned the IRP. The ban was temporarily lifted in 
September 1991 during the brief administration of interim President Qadriddin Aslonov 
before being reinstated when Aslonov was ousted. Legal recognition finally came at the 
end of 1991.155 On 26 October of 1991 the IRP had held its first congress in a former 
Communist Party centre with 657 delegates, 310 guests and 50 journalists attending. 
The congress, which was opened by Dushanbe mayor Maqsud Ikramov, elected 
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Muhammad Sharif Himmatzoda as leader and Davlat Usmon as the first deputy 
leader.156  
The Tajikistan branch of the IRP soon broke relations with the wider IRP. Not 
only was the existence of an official clergy an obstacle to the Soviet-wide IRP, the 
nationalist cleavages within the organisation hurt coordination while the ambitions of 
the overall leadership conflicted with those of the Tajik IRP. The IRP federal 
leadership, which had supported the continuation of the Soviet Union, endorsed the 
Communist candidate Rahmon Nabiev in October 1991 for the upcoming elections 
while condemning the Tajik IRP for allying with nationalists, with whom the Tajik IRP 
had earlier criticized. This ended the relations between the Tajik IRP and the federal 
organisation.157 Dudoignon also mentions the coalition between the ‘Islamists’ and the 
secular parties, but focuses more on the influence of Turajonzoda:  
This great turn of October 1991 explains for a great part the specificity of the Tajik case 
in the matter of relations between Islamists, radical intelligentsia and specialists of the 
ministry of security. As elsewhere in Central Asia, one could observe the emergence of 
a semi-official neo-fundamentalist party, which took, quite soon, a "national" 
coloration. Here [….] the Islamists made alliances with radical intellectuals against the 
communist apparatus. At the same time, the increasing influence of qaziyat and its 
leader Hajji Akbar Turajanzada among the opposition favored the phenomenon of 
"deradicalization" of the Islamist party itself. 158 
 
By mid to late 1992 the IRP leadership was claiming a membership of 30,000, making it 
the second “strongest” in terms of numbers behind only the Communist Party.159 
 
 
IRP Influences 
 
Muhammadjon Hindustoni 
 
“I am glad that people honoured him at last. I am also glad that he did not see the 
wickedness that came after.” 
                                                  
                                       - Hindustoni’s grandson, commenting on his 1989 funeral.160 
                                                 
156
 Kudryavtsev and Niyazi, ‘Politicheskiy islam, nachalo 90-kh’, 117.  Sayid Ibrahim Hadoev was 
elected as second deputy leader.  
157
 Roy, The New Central Asia, 155-6; Dudoignon, ‘Political Parties and Forces in Tajikistan, 1989-
1993’, 65; Dudoignon, ‘Communal Solidarity and Social Conflicts in Late 20th Century Central Asia’, 16. 
As an example of nationalist cleavages in the federal IRP, Roy notes that the “Moscow IRP was also split, 
between Tatars and Caucasians: the former wanted to impose Tatar as the preaching language in Moscow 
mosques, while the latter wanted to keep Russian. In fact, the IRP was imploding on all sides, along 
ethnic lines of cleavage.” See: Roy, The New Central Asia, 155-6. In regards to the IRP’s alliance with 
other opposition parties, Roy writes that secularists and even atheists joined into an alliance with the 
Islamists. See: Roy, ‘Is the Conflict in Tajikistan a Model for Conflicts Throughout Central Asia’, 135. 
158
 Dudoignon, ‘Communal Solidarity and Social Conflicts in Late 20th Century Central Asia’, 16.  
159
 Henry Dunant Centre, ‘Humanitarian engagement with armed groups: The Central Asian Islamic 
opposition movements’, Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2003) 12-3. 
 124 
 
Muhammadjon Rustamov (born 1892), better known as ‘Hindustoni’ for his 
time spent in India (Hinduston in Tajik), studied Islam near his place of birth in Kokand 
(now in Uzbekistan) and then in Bukhara. During the Bolshevik Revolution he left to 
Afghanistan and studied in Mazar-i Sharif before returning to Bukhara with his Afghan 
teacher. He soon accompanied his teacher, Muhammad Ghawth (also ‘Ghaus’), to the 
eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad where Ghawth was appointed as the qozi. From 
Jalalabad, Hindustoni went to India where he studied at the Usmania madrassa in Ajmer 
for 8 years, completing his studies. He returned home and settled in Kokand in 1929. 
During the anti-religious Communist attacks of the 1930s Hindustoni served two jail 
terms, including 3 years in Siberia. In 1940 he took up employment in a Kokand factory 
before being drafted into the military in 1943. He was badly wounded on the eastern 
front in Belarus and spent the next three years in hospital. After a year at home he 
moved to Dushanbe where SADUM officials eventually appointed him as imom-khotib 
of a local mosque. After almost a year in Tajikistan he was denounced and served over 
4 years in prison. In 1953, after Stalin’s death, Hindustoni was rehabilitated and 
appointed to a post in Tajikistan’s Academy of Sciences where he spent most of his 
time translating Arabic texts and teaching Urdu. From the early 1960s Hindustoni 
developed a full Islamic curriculum that he taught in secret.161 
Hindustoni went on to become a teacher of both Nuri and Himmatzoda (the 
initial leader of the IRP). Hindustoni’s “clandestine” madrassa in Dushanbe was closed 
by the KGB in 1973. But students and teachers “came out of it safely, thanks to family 
connections and corruption.”162 Khalid summarises Hindustoni’s beliefs: 
In his teaching and his writing, he took consistently conservative positions rooted in the 
local Hanafi tradition. He had little use for modernist reform. [...] Two aspects of his 
conservatism are worth noting: he defended local customs and traditions against attacks 
from all directions, and he took a resolutely quietist stance on questions of politics. 
Soviet rule was a test for believers, in which success lay in reliance on God (tavakkul) 
and patience (sabr) rather than in political or military struggle.163 
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Khalid goes on to describe how Hindustoni’s students rebelled against him and his 
“conservatism and his quietism” in particular.164 Before the disagreements expanded 
into a larger dispute about broader issues within the “milieu of underground Islamic 
learning (hujra),”165 the hostilities started with Hindustoni’s students adopting Hanbali 
rituals as opposed to the dominant Hanafi forms practiced in Central Asia. The students’ 
view was that the Hanbali school was more closely associated with Arab countries and 
therefore purer and “uncontaminated by local traditions.”166 Furthermore, Hindustoni 
did not approve of the way some of his former students were mixing religion and 
politics. Whitlock hints that it was his long view of human ambitions and failings that 
made him conservative on this issue.167 Hindustoni felt that some of his former students 
in the Ferghana Valley were advocating a confrontation with the Soviet state that would 
be disastrous for Muslims, especially considering the recent gains in freedoms they had 
made. The arguments at the time (mid-1970s to mid-1980s) became quite heated, as can 
be seen in excerpts – both defensive168 and offensive169 in nature – from Hindustoni’s 
open reply to those who accused him of apostasy and of being beholden to an atheist 
state. Nor did Hindustoni approve of the theological views of his former students.170 
Khalid writes: 
The students called themselves the mujaddidiya, the renovators, while calling their 
opponents mushriklar, polytheists. Hindustoniy, for his part, argued that local customs 
were based on a long tradition of Hanafi jurisprudence, which in itself was based on the 
Qur’an and the example of the Prophet, and that by forswearing accepted Hanafi 
dogma, his critics had placed themselves beyond the bounds of the Sunni community of 
Central Asia and had become “Wahhabis.” Hindustoniy’s use of this term owed a lot to 
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his time in India, where such debates over ritual purity were common and where 
opponents of the purists had long dubbed them Wahhabis. Thus, the term Wahhabi 
entered religious debate in Central Asia, from where it was to spread throughout the 
lands of the former Soviet Union.171 
 
 
 
Wahhabism 
 
Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, who lived during the 18th century in Najd 
province of Arabia, preached a “strictly puritanical doctrine,” gaining momentum when 
he made an alliance with what was to become the Saudi royal lineage.172 ‘Wahhabi’ 
doctrine, according to Adeeb Khalid, had little influence in the Muslim world until “the 
late 20th century, during which its fortunes have been tied intimately to those of the 
Saudi state and its geopolitical requirements.” 173  Khalid stresses that the term 
‘Wahhabism’ was used mostly as a “polemic foil in sectarian arguments among 
Muslims,” including in British India as both colonial authorities and locals used the 
label ‘Wahhabism’ to denounce reformists and “troublesome Muslim opponents.”174 
Khalid further notes that in the former Soviet Union ‘Wahhabism’ has “come into 
indiscriminate use to denote any and all expressions of nontraditional Islam.”175  In 
Tajikistan, the use of the term ‘Wahhabi’ as a pejorative for the Islamist opposition was 
used even by the mullahs who supported the government. They juxtaposed the alleged 
Wahhabism of a Saudi origin with a local Sufi-influenced “national and traditional 
Islam.”176 However, scholars use the term as well – in a somewhat more neutral manner. 
Dudoignon cites the “wahhabite origins” of the IRP177 while Matveeva notes the claims 
of local analysts that foreign Wahhabi groups had been “penetrating” Tajikistan – 
especially amongst Gharmis in Qurghonteppa and in the Ferghana valley – as early as 
16 years before the civil war.178 Niyazi acknowledges that a “very tiny section” of the 
religious community in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan started to refer to themselves as 
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Wahhabis, in particular after leaders of these groups returned from the hajj in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. However, he completely rejects any possibility of Wahhabi 
influences amongst the Gharmi Tajiks (i.e., from where the IRP draws most of its 
support). He blames a 1990 article written in Tajikistan by the head of the Committee 
for Religious Affairs for popularising “Wahhabi” as a term of abuse locally.179 Niyazi 
notes the use of the slang term ‘Vovchik’ (diminutive for the name Vladimir, but here 
used for ‘Wahhabi’) as an epithet against the “Islamic opposition.”180 While Niyazi’s 
article cited above is mainly a tract in praise of Naqshbandi Sufism, he instead cites the 
survival of pre-Islamic nature worship and elements of Zoroastrianism (both abhorrent 
to ‘Wahhabis’) in Gharm to refute the idea that Wahhabi Islam has made inroads here, 
rather than pointing to any presence of Sufi Islam in the region.181   
 The debate over Wahhabism in Tajikistan during the late Soviet era suffers from 
lack of a clear definition. Neither Matveeva nor Dudoignon make an effort to define 
Wahhabism for the brief use in their articles cited above. A more well-defined 
discussion of Wahhabism is found the work of Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Muzaffar 
Kamilov, which focuses on Hindustoni’s defence of traditional Hanafi doctrine and his 
arguments with certain reformist ulema in the Ferghana Valley (particularly in Kokand). 
They do note that Abd al-Wahhab’s work was available – but very rarely acquired – in 
Central Asia as early as 1979, whether acquired on hajj or directly from the SADUM 
libraries (which held Arabic works by Wahhabi writers). However, despite the 
similarities between the reforms that many of the mujaddidiya ulema were asking for 
and Wahhabi doctrine, they find the use of the label ‘Wahhabi’ to be inaccurate.182 
Unfortunately, Babadjanov and Kamilov’s work does not include an analysis of those 
who would go on to form the core of the IRP in Tajikistan.  
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Other ‘Foreign’ Islamic Influences 
 
Dudoignon notes Iranian influences in the IRP, but not religious ones. 
Obviously, the Shia Islamist ideology of the Iranian rulers would have limited 
applicability to a Sunni party like the IRP.183  Foreign Sunni ideological influences 
would seem to be more likely sources of ideological influence. The Deobandi school of 
Islam that began in India gets an occasional mention as an influence on Islam in 
Tajikistan. Niyazi writes that some mullahs travelled to the Ferghana Valley and to 
Termez in Uzbekistan to visit teachers. In Termez some sayyids kept Deobandi 
teachings alive during the Soviet era. 184  However, the only possible link between 
Deobandism and the IRP is the very weak connection between IRP leaders Himmatzoda 
and Nuri on one hand, and their one-time teacher Hindustoni on the other hand. 
Hindustoni’s students and Turajonzoda claim that Hindustoni studied at Deoband 
during his time in India – even though Hindustoni makes no mention of Deoband.185 
Another South Asia influence may be the writings of Abu Ala Maududi – a Pakistani 
Islamist writer and founder of Jamaat-e-Islami – which circulated in the network that 
was to become the IRP.186 
 
Muslim Brotherhood 
 
Ideological influences from the Muslim Brotherhood seem somewhat more 
likely. Like Wahhabi works, some Muslim Brotherhood writings were circulating in 
secret as early as 1979 in the Ferghana valley.187 Kudryavtsev and Niyazi note that 
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among the literature seized from Nuri’s underground circle in 1985-1987 were works by 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Qutb.188 
Nuri was clearly familiar with at least one Muslim Brotherhood figure, which was 
demonstrated when he quoted from and referred to the group’s founder Hassan al-Banna 
in reverential terms at a 2003 Islamic conference in Iran.189 Both Roy and Olimova 
stress the influence of the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood in the ideology of the 
IRP. Roy explicitly classifies the ideology of the IRP and of Nuri and Himmatzoda in 
particular as that of the Muslim Brotherhood while Olimova instead just notes the 
influence of Muslim Brotherhood writings in the IRP’s platform.190  
 
 
Academia 
 
When the all-Union IRP was formed in July 1990 in Astrakhan, it was heavily 
influenced by Islamist intellectuals rather than by the ulema.191 As for the Tajikistan 
branch of the IRP and the movement for political Islam in general, Mullojonov notes the 
support from and membership of Tajikistan’s “university intellectuals.”192 Niyazi notes 
that academics often had better levels of knowledge of Arabic and Islamic sources and 
thought than did mullahs and ishons.193 Niyazi himself, while not explicitly endorsing 
the IRP in his publications, actually provides a good example of an intellectual who 
favorably views the role of Islam in society. He writes:  
The ideals of an Islamic state concerning justice, equality, and brotherhood in our 
opinion are completely compatible with the commonly accepted contemporary 
understanding of civil society. … The idea of a state ruled by law took root in the East 
on the basis of the universally accepted sharia law, which in theory eliminated estate, 
racial, and class privileges for the observers of the law, thus making the rights of the 
rank-and-file Muslim and the ruler equal.194 
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Niyazi goes on to note that the “Islamic opposition” did become radicalised right before 
the outbreak of conflict, but that this was as a response to the government’s counter-
opposition tactics. He stresses that “Before the start of the bloodshed, supporters of 
“pure Islam” in Tajikistan were a wholly moderate movement…”195 
 
 
Sufism 
 
Mavlon Mahkamov notes the prominent role that the Naqshbandi and Qadiri 
Sufi Muslim orders played during the pre-Soviet era in the religious life of the people 
living in the areas of what is now Tajikistan. However, it is his opinion that the Soviet 
government destroyed these orders during the 1920s and 1930s – evidenced by the 
“overwhelming majority” of Muslims in Tajikistan who are ignorant of these Sufi 
orders.196 But Mahkamov does stress that while the orders – particularly the leading 
theologians and Sufi leaders who had an authoritative understanding of Sufism – may 
have been destroyed, Sufi pirs continued their work in a leaderless fashion:  
…the institution of pir (spiritual and religious mentors), though somewhat transformed, 
has survived in Tajikistan, particularly in the rural areas. Pirs were not officially 
registered, but they directed all ceremonial rites in the rural area. Pirs are regarded with 
greater reverence than ulama, representing official Islam. Some pirs have disciples and 
adherents (murids), and this fact is not concealed. They function openly, though not 
very actively.197  
 
The role of Naqshbandi Sufism in society as protectors of the powerless against 
rapacious rulers is appraised glowingly by Niyazi: 
In spring 1992, as government authorities continued to ignore the interests of a 
desperate peasantry, authoritative ishans from the southeast of the country rose to their 
defense. The naqshabandi tradition of intervention on behalf of land-workers and 
craftsmen was reborn.”198  
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However, the Sufi notables of Tajikistan also “rose to [the] defense” of other interests. 
The result was that Sufi pirs, ishons and their murids supported various factions in the 
conflict.199 This view is reinforced by Roy, who argues that “Sufi affiliations do not 
necessarily correspond to political affiliations.”200  
 
 
IRP Platform 
 
The Soviet Union-wide federal IRP was formed in July 1990 in Astrakhan, 
Russia. The ideology of this organisation was based on adherence to the statutes of the 
Koran and Sunna. The IRP, as spelled out in its charter, saw itself up against not just 
certain non-Muslim forces, but also against a Muslim community that was acting 
against “universal morality and the Sharia”, and which was “divided, ignorant, 
downtrodden, and infected with the nationalist and democratic ideas.”201 The attack on 
‘democratic ideas’ is likely a reference to the ‘Western-style’ democrats of the Soviet 
Union/CIS, as the IRP advocated for its goals to be achieved through democratic means. 
In its publications the IRP attacked the official Muslim clergy, the leadership of the 
Muslim republics of the CIS, the “national-democratic movements” in those republics, 
the use of Islam by those movements, the history of Russian and Soviet oppression of 
Muslims, and the “state of ignorance, superstition, disunity and individualism prevailing 
among ordinary Muslims.”202 The IRP advocated for a federation of Muslim states that 
would include the Muslim-dominated areas of the CIS and some neighbouring Muslim 
regions. This federation would have a system of elected Muslim leaders in a system that 
would implement a new era of the ‘Righteous Caliphs.’203 The IRP provided some 
specific examples of what the new political and social order would entail. These 
included zakat (Islamic tax) and sadaqa (Islamic charity), the introduction of Sharia-
compliant banking, as well as dhimmi status204 for Christians and Jews.205 Dudoignon 
notes that the IRP was “classically neo-fundamentalist” in its tenets such as 
proselytising, resisting the official clergy and advocating the Islamic taxes of zakat and 
sadaqa. However, he also notes the organisation’s attempt to reassure the broader public 
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of its moderate character through the use of “fairly well-known” rhetoric (e.g., Islam is 
“humanist,” “pacifist” and “progressive”).206  
In Tajikistan, the Union-wide IRP held a regional conference in Chortut, in the 
Lenin District near Dushanbe in October 1990.207 But for the Tajikistan branch of the 
IRP in 1990 there was little coherence in organisation, platform and public message.208 
What the early Tajik IRP lacked in organisation, it compensated for in enthusiasm. 
Niyazi, writing in late 1990,209 assesses the IRP’s motivations in a very favourable 
manner: 
 
Now [IRP] fundamentalist activities are primarily aimed at strengthening religion. 
These people are united in their desire to free religious life from ubiquitous state 
supervision and to restore society's morals in accordance with Islamic ethics contained 
in the fikh. They want to restore and build new mosques, promote religious education, 
and urge Moslems to fulfill properly the prescribed rites and ceremonies. Many are 
demanding permission for women to attend sermons in mosques. They are appealing to 
their coreligionists to live modestly, to be humble and to refrain from wasting money on 
sumptuous parties at the expense of family well-being. It is having an effect. In many 
regions people are spending less on weddings, funerals, rituals of circumcision and so 
on. The consumption of alcohol in rural areas has decreased and Moslems in the towns 
have also become more moderate in their drinking. 
 
In other words the fundamentalists have succeeded where the state has failed. A specific 
example is important here. In the field of politics the Tajik IRP is against any party 
having a monopoly of power. It seeks to establish a legal state with normal 
parliamentary activity based on equal rights for all political forces in the republic. It is 
willing to cooperate with all reasonable political forces, including the communists. The 
leadership of the party undertakes to act in accordance with international and Union 
laws and condemns nationalism in all its forms.210 
 
 The official charter and platform of the IRP of Tajikistan was adopted at its 
October 1991 congress. The published IRP platform 211  included references to the 
importance of cultural, 212  social, 213  “moral,” and political factors in Tajikistan and 
advocates for national independence, free elections and a multiparty democracy, a 
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“decent life” for all citizens regardless of religion214 or ethnicity, and education of the 
people in Islamic principles. The platform reaches beyond religious and moral 
advocacy, and included full sections on the economy, science and culture, ideology, 
health, and environmental protection. The call for democratic independence is clearly 
stressed:  
 
The IRP stands for a multiparty system and free competition for the party. The IRP 
maintains links with all the democratic forces of the Republic and with all the 
democratic and Islamic movements from foreign countries. 
 
The IRP calls for the unity of all parties and movements in order to cooperate for the 
sake of independence and national freedom in the name of liquidating all vestiges of 
colonial dependence.215 
 
However, Islam is mentioned first, last and most often – even beyond the affirmations 
of some of the basic tenets of Islam. The program opens with these two lines: 
 
IRP develops its program based on pure Islamic religion. Islam for us is a law and a 
guide for all political issues.  
 
The overriding purpose of IRP is the implementation of education of the people on the 
principles of Muslim religion.216 
 
The most important point is inserted as a main point in the section on ‘ideology,’ 
wherein the IRP states that it “recognises no law that contradicts the sharia.” 217 
However, the IRP does not publicly state in its program what exactly they believe 
‘contradicts the sharia.’ As for how the IRP would restructure the state and society, 
Kudryavtsev and Niyazi stress that the leaders of the Tajik IRP “made no secret that 
their ultimate goal - adoption of an independent Islamic republic of Tajikistan.”218 As 
late as 1991-1992 the IRP’s goal was the creation – but not immediately – of an Islamic 
state. This was to be achieved, according to the IRP, through an election victory and 
then a referendum. However, this desired end-state was modified when the IRP realized 
that this goal was not supported by many people in Tajikistan.219 During the lead-up to 
the civil war, representatives of the IRP, as well as Turajonzoda, stated to audiences 
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both foreign and domestic (including addressing supporters) that an Islamic state, 
however desirable in the long-term, could not be a model for Tajikistan in the near term 
as the people were not ready, nor did they want it.220 Khalid argues that at this time the 
focus of the IRP leadership was “on breaking the hold of the incumbent elites on 
power—rather than on imposing Islamic law or Islamic norms on society.” 221  The 
Henry Dunant Centre notes that in official party statements the IRP stressed that it 
would take 50 to 60 years to accomplish their goal of educating “the people in the 
Islamic spirit,” but that “many had the impression that the opposition was not going to 
wait that long.”222  Similarly, Atkin writes that in response to the IRP’s attempt to 
portray itself as a moderate organisation willing to work in cooperation with other 
political forces, the incumbent political elites and their supporters framed the post-
independence political struggle as one of “modern, secular democracy against radical 
Islamicizers, who secular coalition partners were mere window dressing.”223 A decade 
later Davlat Usmon, who earlier had been the IRP deputy leader, was still ambiguous 
regarding the goals of the IRP at the time when he remarked that “The mistake of the 
Islamic opposition was that at the beginning it expressed its opinions too clearly. It 
frightened Russia and neighbouring Uzbekistan…”224 Within Tajikistan the rejection of 
an Islamic state is shown clearly in two polls conducted in late 1991 and mid-1992.225 
The key findings from the respondents in Tajikistan: 
 
• In 1991/1992 “Islamicization in Tajikistan” was supported by only 5/6% while 
74/77% of respondents wanted to “preserve the secular state.” 
 
• In 1992, 18.6% of respondents in the Qurghonteppa Province and 14.7% in 
Dushanbe “supported the idea of establishing an Islamic republic in Tajikistan. 
However, this idea was almost fully rejected in Leninabad and Kulab oblasts, as 
well as in Gissar [Hisor] and Tursunzade.”226 
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The increase in support for an Islamic state in Dushanbe and Qurghonteppa over the 
national average shown in the above statistics also returns a level of support for the IRP 
voiced by respondents of 17.5% in Qurghonteppa Province and 18.4% in Dushanbe.227 
 
 
Base of Support 
 
Since the late 1970s the network of “non-official ulema” that would go on to 
form the IRP was active mainly in the mountainous areas of Qarotegin/Gharm and the 
lower Vakhsh Valley,228 with Qurghonteppa city as its original base.229 In late 1990 
Niyazi described the IRP as having a rural base of support and being “headed mostly by 
young unregistered spiritual teachers.” 230  However, Tajikistan was not an easy 
recruiting ground for an Islamist organisation, aside from the obvious restrictions of the 
Soviet era on independent political and religious activity. Dudoignon argues that the 
rural nature of Tajikistan made it difficult for Islamists to recruit, as their successes have 
usually been in urban areas. He goes on to note the history of “problematic relations” 
between the IRP leadership and the “traditional religious elites” in rural Tajikistan, 
especially those affiliated with the official Qoziyot who also had a following among 
Gharmi Tajiks.231 This may have hindered the IRP in its recruitment. Its original support 
base had a significant number of teachers and students who were educated in the city, 
yet who had a rural background.232 Other sources point instead to unofficial mullahs 
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recruiting young men as more important.233 The IRP developed a base that was skewed 
towards one region. The IRP had a significant presence in Mastchoh in northern 
Tajikistan, Khovaling in the northern Kulob region, in the Gharm/Qarotegin region and 
among the Gharmi/Qarotegini migrants who were sent to the Vakhsh Valley. 234 
However, the broad consensus is that the IRP’s strongest support came from Gharmi 
Tajiks, both at home in the Gharm region and especially among the Gharmi migrants in 
the Vakhsh Valley, 235  leading the party to become a platform for the interests of 
Gharmis/Qaroteginis with the majority of that community supporting the IRP.236  
The simple explanation that Gharmis were more religious than the Kulobis – 
leading this community to rally to the IRP – is rejected by Roy, but with a weak 
supporting argument. 237  Niyazi, on the religiosity of the Gharmis, writes that 
“communal patriarchal relations and ties were strong, and age-old customs were held in 
high esteem. The local population was marked by a particular piety.”238 Nuri’s views 
are far closer to Niyazi’s outside assessment, demonstrated clearly by his answer to the 
question of why an Islamic movement appeared “solely” in the Vakhsh Valley. Nuri, as 
a clearly unabashedly patriotic Gharmi, mainly credits the Gharmi population’s 
religiosity with the group’s success in mobilising in the Vakhsh Valley: 
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This is a good question. As a matter of fact, at the time when our organisation or 
movement was coming into being, one is amazed as to why it originated in, or why it 
was established in, that place. I think that the main reason is this, that 60% of the 
inhabitants of the Vakhsh Valley are composed of people from the Qarotegin and 
Vakhyo Valleys [i.e., the former Gharm province], and from ancient times, compared 
with people of the other areas of Movarounnahr [Central Asia], they more so fell in 
love with Islam, were involved with Islam, and established the revealed religion of 
Islam – and amongst them were many scholars of sharia studies. On the other hand, 
these people had a boundless/incomparable desire, striving and love for the religion of 
Islam – their children more so took to Islamic studies and education. And in this way 
they continued. Another reason is that these people, as a result of ability and hard work, 
had become very well-off and wealthy and sent their children to the city of Dushanbe 
and other Islamic cultural centres. As a result, these students advanced and became 
skilled. From Dushanbe, where a majority of the young students of the Vakhsh Valley 
studied Islamic science and education, they returned to their places of birth. Amongst 
them were very many enlightened and freedom-loving people.239 
 
Others point instead to political and economic reasons for the Gharmi dominance in the 
IRP. Dudoignon argues that an important event occurred around mid-1990 when the 
government introduced export restrictions and price controls on farm products – 
changes that hurt the farming communities of the Vakhsh Valley. After this, “young 
radical activists” of the IRP (as well as of the DPT) began to “openly advocate” for the 
resettled population of the Vakhsh and for the mountain populations– both of which are 
predominantly Gharmi – against the “technocrats of the planned economy.”240 By late 
1991 
The Nahzat [IRP] changed quickly its social status during and after the November 1991 
presidential elections, transforming itself from a mass organization of urban youth in 
[sic] a party of sufi notables with a strong basis in the Dushanbe-Kafirnihan region and 
in Qarategin [Gharm].241 
 
However, Dudoignon does not say whether this was a simple IRP strategy to gain more 
support in this community or if it was a reflection of the IRP leadership’s region of 
origin. Niyazi certainly is of the opinion that many religious leaders had a Gharmi 
regional agenda, even if it was borne of the noblest intentions: 
…the political struggle of Islamic nonconformists was not conducted to establish the 
rule of the clergy, but in the first instance for a wider representation of the mountain-
dwellers in the structures of power and against the violence being done by the industry 
minded elite on traditional culture.242 
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More cynical political motivations on the part of Gharmi government elites from outside 
the IRP are cited by authors such as Olimova, who argues that the Gharmi/Qarotegini 
“regional elites, having achieved economic clout, sought to change the balance of forces 
in their own interest and used the newly emerging opposition movements to this 
end.”243  Regional elites from the Pamirs and Gharm increasingly began to use the 
political parties and the Gorbachev reforms as a vehicle to make political gains as the 
government appointed mostly Pamiri and Gharmi reformists to the newly vacated 
positions. Soon, according to Olimova, “regional origin exerted a major influence on the 
choice of behavioural strategy of the new elites” while support or opposition to the 
“Soviet imperial centre” was “determined by regional affiliation.”244 The strength of the 
IRP among Gharmis was matched by the dominance of Gharmis in the leadership of the 
IRP. For example, the three most powerful party leaders (Nuri, Himmatzoda and 
Usmon) were all Gharmi Tajiks.245 With many Gharmi elites being in the IRP and the 
base of support being largely Gharmi, the party soon became a vehicle for the interests 
of Gharmis. The ideology of the IRP mixed with regional political issues, leading 
members from other regions to withdraw from the party.246  
 
 
 
 
Part 3: Street Demonstrations – February 1990 to Spring 1992 
 
 
February 1990 Demonstration and Riots 
 
Shahidon (‘Martyrs’) square – which was to become an important location for 
the 1992 opposition rallies – was renamed in memory of the demonstrators/rioters killed 
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there and elsewhere in the city during the events of February 1990.247 On February 10-
11 up to 300 young demonstrators gathered in front of the Communist Party Central 
Committee building in Dushanbe and demanded an explanation from the government – 
and from First Secretary Qahhor Mahkamov in particular – in regards to the rumours 
that Armenian refugees from Baku would be given priority housing in Dushanbe amidst 
a housing crisis. As the government evaded answering, the crowd grew in size over the 
next few days until as many as 3,000 people were in the streets when violence started. 
Very quickly the Soviet military arrived to restore order amidst looting, vandalism and 
attacks on ethnic Russians and other non-Tajiks.248  Late in the day on February 13, 
demonstrators nominated a new group named the Provisional People’s Committee, also 
known as Vahdat (Unity), to negotiate. Niyazi describes this group: 
It comprised top state officials, leaders of the unofficial social-political organisation, 
Rastokhez, representatives of the intelligentsia, businessmen, one mullah and a worker. 
The Committee was headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and 
the Chairman of the Republic's Planning Board, [Buri] Karimov. […] The Vahdat 
representing the demonstrators put forward a number of demands including the 
resignation of the government. The committee warned that if this demand were not met 
there would be even worse violence.249 
 
The various demands of the protesters included the expulsion of Armenian refugees, the 
resignation of the government and the removal of the Communist Party, the closure of 
an aluminium smelter in western Tajikistan for environmental reasons, equitable 
distribution of profits from cotton production, and the release of 25 protesters taken into 
custody.250 The attempt to secure the resignation of the government of the Tajik SSR, 
whether planned well before the demonstration and riots or hastily planned as a 
response to the opportunity offered by the chaotic situation, was nearly successful. 
According to Niyazi, on the February 14 the First Secretary, the Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers “agreed to sign a protocol 
with the Vahdat on the resignation of the government.” 251  However, according to 
Niyazi, later in the same day a meeting of “Dushanbe party and economic functionaries 
including members of the Central Committee and the Bureau” declared the protocol 
invalid on the grounds that it contradicted the decisions of the 16th Plenary Meeting of 
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the Central Committee.252 At this time Soviet Interior Ministry troops were moving into 
the city, and by February 15 the police and military had Dushanbe under control. On 
February 15 and 16 the 17th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee was convened, 
where the members voted to reject the resignation of the First Secretary and gave their 
vote of confidence.253 
Reports on the number of deaths vary – with the official number being five and 
unofficial accounts listing from 16 to 22 deaths.254 Predictably, accounts differ with 
each side blaming the other for instigating the conflict. Zartman blames the government 
for the outbreak of violence, arguing that the “extremely small and short-lived protest 
gave way to large-scale riots without any political goals.”255 Schoeberlein blames the 
government for the escalation by its tactic of violent suppression256 while opposition 
member Gavhar Juraeva draws on Nazi analogies (“Reichstag fire” and, possibly, the 
“Armenian question”) to blame the government for instigating the demonstrations, 
which then backfired on them.257  The opposition’s talking points refer to those in 
positions of power: 
Unofficial explanations also accuse anti-perestroika forces but identify them as those in 
power. They are said to have provoked the turmoil in order to reinforce their own 
position, establish a dictatorship and suppress all opposition. There is also the 
suggestion that the events were the result of the destructive activities of some sinister 
all-Union centre initiating national and social riots in different areas of the USSR with 
the same intention. In general the opposition tends to highlight social, economic and 
political reasons for the riots including the intrigues and perfidy of the ruling clans. 258 
 
Niyazi, writing the most comprehensive account of the events, portrays both sides as 
reckless and violent. 259  For example, he singles out Rastokhez members and their 
incoherent tactics: 
Thus between 11 and 18 February many members of Rastokhez did their best to 
transform the stormy riots into a peaceful political dialogue, to dampen emotions and 
prevent violence. But at the same time a number of Rastokhez leaders, pursuing their 
personal and collective ambitions regardless of the consequences, inflamed the crowd 
with populist and chauvinistic slogans…260 
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In terms of the rioters and demonstrators, Schoeberlein and Kilavuz both note that many 
Dushanbe residents, both Russian and Central Asian, blamed out-of-town young men 
for the rioting and looting. 261  Residents claimed that unnamed persons transported 
young men to the city and gave them “money, drugs, and alcohol to encourage them to 
riot.”262 Yaacov Ro’i cites one rumour in which “bearded strangers”, some allegedly 
(and implausibly) ethnic Azeris, gave alcohol to school boys and paid them in order to 
incite the riot. At the same time the Tajik Komsomol press asked, in regards to the 
demonstrators/rioters: “Who could have doped them with drugs and nationalist 
slogans?”263 These views are completely in line with the varied narratives of blame for 
riots and demonstrations throughout Central Asia around this time. Ro’i finds many 
factors are included in the assignment of blame throughout the region, including: 
extremism, nationalism, criminal motivations, conniving local officials, foreign 
meddling, etc… However, in nearly every case there is cited by officials, the Soviet 
press or citizens – amongst the rumours, facts, accusations and poor reporting that 
circulated – the factor of the manipulative use of drugs and/or alcohol.264   
The official government explanation casts blame widely. On 16 February the 
17th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee expressed its confidence in the First 
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Secretary and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. It also issued a statement regarding 
the violence that 
blamed a conspiracy of anti-perestroika forces aimed at destabilising the situation, 
seizing leading positions and redistributing portfolios. The anti-perestroika forces were 
seen as comprising a group of apparatchiks (professional party men) craving power and 
acting in concert with criminal groups, members of the unofficial organisation 
Rastokhez and Islamic fundamentalists.265 
 
The government may have reached this conclusion partly based on the negotiating 
group mentioned above that formed to represent the demonstrators.  
While the blame for the violence is hard to place, the effects of the violence are 
clear. Atkin writes that 
this outburst of violence in the capital of the republic heightened political anxieties. 
Various elements of Tajikistani society, including Tajik reformers, supporters of the old 
Soviet order, and members of the Russian minority, saw the February events as a 
warning that their worst fears, ranging from the stifling of reform and perpetuation of 
repression to Islamic revolution and the persecution of non-Muslims.266 
 
Schoeberlein writes similarly in regards to ethnic Russians, noting that the violence 
“undermined the confidence of many Russians” and resulted in emigration from 
Tajikistan to Russia and elsewhere.267 Niyazi writes of the demonstration effect: 
The February events were the first blow against the stability of the ruling group. They 
showed its lack of competence and inability to negotiate with people or to act without 
recourse to the usual party methods. As the analysis of large mass movements in the 
non-Soviet Middle East shows, such blows are not necessarily recognized immediately. 
Their effects are 'stored'. The results of the riots are transferred to the political sphere 
and become really apparent only after the ruling regime considers the crisis to have 
ended. Here much depends on the personal qualities and political abilities of the ruling 
elite.268 
 
The effects on elite politics are even clearer, as the violence “had the effect of 
strengthening the existing leadership, by enabling it to eliminate opposition within the 
party.”269 Similarly, Niyazi notes the increased “authoritarian” style of administration 
after February 1990, including the merging of the First Secretary and Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet positions. When Qahhor Mahkamov was elected President on 30 
November 1990 he then held executive and legislative powers. His legislative authority 
was certainly helped by the outcome of the “closely supervised” Supreme Soviet 
elections of late February 1990 where the Communist Party won 94% of the seats.270 
Outside of the Communist Party, the government blamed opposition movements of the 
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nationalist or Islamist persuasion for the violence and restricted their freedom to operate 
even further. In particular, the IRP was not able to gain official recognition until the end 
of 1991. 271  Schoeberlein writes that between February 1990 and August 1991 the 
incumbents in the government strengthened their hold on government by introducing 
emergency measures that included “curfews and harassment of the opposition, as well 
as the usual censorship of the media and Communist party supervision of enterprises, 
universities and institutes.”272 
 
 
Independence to November 1991 elections 
 
President Mahkamov’s mishandling in Tajikistan of the August 1991 attempted 
coup against Gorbachev – when, according to both Markowitz and Schoeberlein, he 
supported the coup – led to protests that ended in his resignation.273 When asked by the 
opposition who he had sided with during the failed putsch against Gorbachev, 
Mahkamov claimed that he was not being informed about the unfolding events.274 
Kilavuz’s opinion is that Mahkamov’s actions around the time of the coup were neither 
in support nor rejection, but rather cautious non-involvement and then denial once it 
was clear that the coup had failed. Whatever the case, the opposition used this as an 
opportunity to accuse the government of supporting the coup. In response, the 
opposition held a large rally in Dushanbe’s Shahidon square and demanded 
Mahkamov’s resignation. On August 31 the Tajik Supreme Soviet passed a vote of no 
confidence, which culminated in the resignation of Mahkamov. Ten days later the 
government of Tajikistan declared independence.275  
On 31 August 1991 the Supreme Soviet elected the Gharmi Tajik Qadriddin 
Aslonov – its current Chairman – to serve as interim president until the November 24 
presidential elections. 276 However, instead of merely acting as a caretaker, Aslonov 
implemented major reforms – including banning the Communist Party and its activities 
while legalising the IRP – that “would destabilize the political situation, and polarize 
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different forces in the republic.”277  In banning the Communist Party, Aslonov was 
attacking the tool with which the Leninobodis distributed patronage. Previously, the 
removal of the Interior Minister and the purge of Kulobis in law enforcement and 
security bodies were also significant as these actions removed the Kulobis’ guarantee of 
law enforcement protection. Now their farm bosses and regional politicians were 
“vulnerable to future reforms.”278 Markowitz cites this vulnerability as the key in the 
shift from “disaffection” to defensive mobilisation.279  The beginnings of a security 
dilemma are clear in this situation. 
On 21 September, the IRP brought its supporters by bus from the Vakhsh Valley 
and from the mountain to the city where they camped.280 In response, on 22 September 
Aslonov “decided to accommodate the crowds by placing a ban on the activities of the 
Communist Party and by seizing all its property.”281 Soon after Aslonov’s decree the 
demonstrators cheered as the statue of Lenin was removed.282  The response of the 
overwhelming Communist majority (94%) in the Supreme Soviet to Aslonov’s reforms 
– reforms which were reached without any consensus among Communist leaders – was 
to force Aslonov out of office on September 23 during an emergency session of the 
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Supreme Soviet and to appoint Rahmon Nabiev, a previous First Secretary of the Tajik 
SSR, to the Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet and to the position of interim 
president. The Supreme Soviet immediately moved to reverse the Aslonov reforms – re-
banning the IRP while reinstating the Communist Party. In response, the opposition re-
started their demonstrations in Dushanbe, this time for three weeks.283   
After the resignation of Aslonov – starting on 23 September – a new round of 
opposition protests began in Dushanbe, with opposition supporters protesting the 
changes in leadership and demanding new elections.284 The state of emergency had no 
effect in Dushanbe as thousands moved into the city to join the protests. This failure on 
the part of the government is no surprise considering not only the Tajik government’s 
lack of effective security forces, but also considering that the Soviet military announced 
that it would not enforce the state of emergency. In response, deputies in the Supreme 
Soviet voted to end the state of emergency on 30 September 1991.285  Nabiev later 
attempted, beginning with a decree on 24 December 1991, to create the ‘Tajikistan 
National Guard’ in order to fill the desperate need for Tajik President-controlled 
security forces.286 
For the presidential election of 24 November 1991 the incumbent candidate 
Rahmon Nabiev was not unfamiliar with top-level leadership, as he had been First 
Secretary of the Tajik SSR from 1982 until 1985 when Gorbachev removed him due to 
his lack of enthusiasm for planned reforms.287 Whitlock assesses the then 59 year old 
unfavourably, stating that he had heart issues, a drinking problem and a poor work 
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ethic. 288  On the other side, the opposition united around the ethnic Pamiri 
cinematographer and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy Davlat Khudonazarov. Despite the 
united front and a boost in strength thanks to the endorsement and work of the well-
known mayor of St. Petersburg, the Russian independent reform politician Anatoly 
Sobchak,289 Khudonazarov received only 30% of the vote versus Nabiev’s 58%. The 
opposition immediately alleged electoral fraud, claiming that Khudonazarov had 
actually received 40%. Kilavuz states the obvious in her assessment that the elections 
and the accusations surrounding them “further polarized forces in the republic.”290 
Nabiev and the “old guard,” perceiving themselves as “powerful and unchallengeable 
[…] began a crackdown against the entire opposition.”291  Nabiev’s strategy was to 
initiate a broad attack against both his internal competition within the Communist Party 
and all the opposition parties at the same time. However, his purges pushed some 
government figures into the opposition while his attacks on opposition figures and 
parties served to help unite them against the political leadership of Tajikistan. The end 
result was a larger and more united opposition.292   
 
 
Spring 1992 Protests 
 
At the beginning of 1992 the government strengthened its campaign against the 
opposition parties. The government began legal proceedings against members of the 
DPT, Rastokhez and the IRP. In addition, the government passed new laws restricting 
press freedoms and the right to assemble in public. Freedom of expression was also 
curtailed, with government prosecutors charging various opposition leaders with 
insulting government leaders. 293  At the end of March 1992, Safarali Kenjaev – 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet – led televised investigations into the Interior Ministry, 
particularly its failure to act against anti-government demonstrators in September 1991. 
Kenjaev’s efforts were focused on the head of the Ministry, Navjuvonov – an ethnic 
                                                 
288
 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 153. 
289
 Zviagelskaya, The Tajik Conflict, n.p.  
290
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 149-50.  
291
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 125-6, also 9-10, 163. 
292
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 125-6, 150, 163-5, 205-6. As an example of purging, Nabiev 
removed Aslonov as Chair of the Supreme Soviet and replaced his with his own “client” – Safarali 
Kenjaev. See: ibid, 150. 
293
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 150. Kilavuz: “In particular, the law on the press adopted in 
spring 1992 made criticism of the government a crime. Mirbobo Mirrahim, one of the leaders of 
Rastokhez, was put on probation for allegedly insulting Kenjaev. Legal proceedings were brought against 
the leader of the DPT, Shadmon Yusuf, for insulting the honor and dignity of President Nabiev. The 
mayor of Dushanbe, Maqsud Ikromov, was arrested on March 6, 1992 on corruption charges, but 
according to many, the real reason was related to the removal of the Lenin statue.” 
 147 
Pamiri. The government attacks on Navjuvonov, including allegations of corruption, led 
several hundred Pamiri members of La’li Badakhshon294 – who viewed the firing of 
Navjuvonov as an “intolerable insult to their nationality”295 – to start demonstrating 
against the government.296 Navjuvonov also framed his case in regional-ethnic terms 
and “accused the Government of persecution towards the Badakhshani [Pamiri] 
people.”297 These demonstrators were soon joined by supporters of other opposition 
parties, including the DPT and the IRP.298 This began the next phase of the opposition 
alliance, the first being for the November 1991 presidential elections.299 The ability of 
the opposition to coordinate in a unified manner against the government – in addition to 
being a by-product of the government attacking all elements of the opposition at once300 
– was, in the opinion of Kilavuz, thanks to the mediating efforts of Qozi Turajonzoda 
“who established links between formerly unrelated opposition groups. In so doing, he 
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turned the opposition into a strong force, united against the government.”301 However, 
the IRP contributed the most to the demonstrations at Shahidon square, 302  as this 
organisation had a network extending into many rural areas, unlike their allies. The IRP 
leadership was able to mobilise support through mullahs at mosques and collective 
farms, with the Turkmeniston farm – the home base for then IRP third-in-charge Sayid 
Abdullo Nuri – being mentioned most prominently.303 While some demonstrators came 
to Shahidon willingly – and expressed their enthusiasm304  – IRP-affiliated mullahs 
coerced those less enthusiastic with threats of religious penalties.305   
The leaders of the political groups that developed during the 1980s were, 
according to Akiner, “inexperienced and prone to adopt extreme, uncompromising 
positions.”306 These tactics were employed by the opposition at Shahidon square. The 
opposition’s main demands included the firing of Kenjaev, the reinstatement of 
Navjuvonov and the dismantling of the Supreme Soviet. However, by mid-April the 
opposition began to make increasingly radical demands, including the resignation of 
Nabiev and the creation of a new constitution.307 Demonstrators were soon able to affect 
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government business in Dushanbe. In particular, the new session of the Tajik Supreme 
Soviet started on April 11 but immediately voted to suspend until the demonstration 
ended.308 By April 12, Nabiev – increasingly frustrated with the negotiating tactics of 
the opposition – remarked on radio that their demands “are increasing day-by-day.”309 
On April 19 Nabiev gave demonstrators an ultimatum to leave by the next morning or 
security forces would use “more drastic measures.”310 However, no ‘drastic measures’ 
materialised, either because security forces were unwilling or because Nabiev was 
bluffing. Whatever the case, Nabiev would likely have appeared increasingly ineffective 
and weak. 
On April 21 the Supreme Soviet passed a vote of confidence in Kenjaev 
(“against his resignation”). In response, unnamed members of the opposition took 
several deputies of Supreme Soviet hostage. Kenjaev, either as a response to the taking 
of hostages or as a result of his inability to control the capital, resigned. On the morning 
of April 22 the hostages were released311 and the opposition was granted many of their 
other demands,312  besides just the resignation of Kenjaev. While these concessions 
ended the opposition’s round of protests, they also initiated pro-government 
demonstrations which began on April 24 in Ozodi square, where protesters – many of 
them Kulobis mobilised by the Kulobi mullah Haydar Sharifzoda and the Kulobi 
underworld figure Sangak Safarov – demanded Kenjaev’s reinstatement, the removal of 
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Turajonzoda as Qozi of Tajikistan and the rescinding of concessions granted to the 
opposition.313  
As a response to the Ozodi square demonstrations, the government appointed 
Kenjaev to the chair of the National Security Committee (the KGB successor). 314 
Kenjaev replaced Anatoly Stroykin, who was blamed by Vice President Narzullo 
Dustov for not preventing the taking of Deputies as hostages.315 Kenjaev’s appointment 
resulted in the opposition restarting its demonstrations at Shahidon square. At this point 
there were now two sustained demonstrations in the capital making demands from the 
government in opposition to each other.316  By April 29, when the Supreme Soviet 
finally met – and postponed the session the same day due to lack of sufficient number of 
deputies317 – as many as 100,000 people were on the streets demonstrating. At the same 
time a third demonstration with about 7,000 people was initiated by a group of 
Dushanbe residents and tertiary students at Sadriddin Ayni Square demanding an end to 
the first two demonstrations.318   
 
Regional Nature of Political Competition and Protests 
 
Kalyvas’ ‘alliance’ is seen clearly in the rural and regional nature of the 
opposing protest groups. The counter-demonstrators, who set up close to the opposition 
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demonstrators, were brought in mainly from Kulob, Hisor and Leninobod. 319  Roy 
portrays the regional origins of the protesters in a more comprehensive manner: 
It was enough to look at the out-of-town numberplates and the names on the placards to 
see that this was a localist mobilisation. Shahidan Square brought together Gharmis 
from Karategin and Kurgan-Teppe, people from Ramit and Kafirnehan, Darwazis, 
Pamiris and people from Zarafshan (who came individually). To Liberty [Ozodi] 
Square, on the other hand, came people from Kulab, Leninabad, Hissar, Shahrinau, 
Tursunzade, Lenin and Varzab.320 
 
Numerous writers focus on the prominent role of Kulobis at the counter-opposition 
demonstrations, some in very explicit regional terms. Roy, for example, writes that the 
“Leninabadis then received back-up from the Kulabis”321 while Rubin notes that “Since 
the Khujandis had no forces in the south to counter the mobilization of Garmis and 
Pamiris by the DPT and IRP, they called on the Kulabis.”322 When, on May 1, Nabiev 
declared a state of emergency he relied on men from Kulob to man his newly formed 
‘Presidential Guard.’323 Atkin focuses on one particular Kulobi – stressing that Nabiev 
relied on Sangak Safarov to lead the counter-demonstration at Ozodi square.324 Parviz 
Mullojonov also emphasises the presence of Kulobis, noting that earlier in April 
thousands of counter-demonstrators arrived in Dushanbe from Kulob with the assistance 
of Sangak Safarov and the Kulobi mullah Haydar Sharifzoda.325 Kilavuz expands the 
geographical base of mobilisation and notes that Safarov was also able to bring 
demonstrators from the Qurghonteppa region as well. 326  While some express 
puzzlement at the alliance between the incumbents and these prominent Kulobis,327 this 
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arrangement with Kulobi power-brokers was likely a continuation from the political 
arrangements leading up to the November 1991, when Sangak Safarov and Akbar 
Mirzoev328 – a client of Nabiev and the Chairman of the Kulob Province Executive 
Committee – mobilised support for Nabiev’s election campaign.329  
Whitlock, among many others, mentions that the ‘pro-government’ side did not 
organise demonstrations to challenge the opposition’s presence in the street until very 
late. In contrast, she notes the early opposition success in mobilising Pamiris and 
Gharmis.330 This successful mobilisation showed resilience over time, and as late as 
April 30 large vehicle convoys bound for Shahidon were leaving Gharmi and Pamiri 
areas of eastern Tajikistan.331 These anti-government demonstrators had one particular 
reason for feeling safe in Dushanbe. Schoeberlein writes that because most of the police 
in Dushanbe were Pamiris, “many in the city believed that this would deter Nabiev and 
his predominantly Leninabadi government from staging a violent crackdown.” 332 
However, the security dilemma would soon be in full effect regardless. On May 2 
Nabiev circumvented the security forces and formed a ‘National Guard’ (AKA 
‘Presidential Guard’) by distributing weapons to the counter-demonstrators while 
unnamed persons also distributed weapons to the demonstrators at Shahidon. 333  
Schoeberlein portrays this action as Nabiev having “pushed the situation over the brink” 
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by using the emergency powers passed by parliament three days earlier. Schoeberlein 
explicitly labels the newly formed and armed National Guard as being composed of out-
of-town “Kulobi demonstrators.”334 After several days of clashes, with the state unable 
to control the violence, the counter-demonstrators retreated from Dushanbe. As a result, 
Nabiev wavered and entered into a power-sharing agreement with the opposition in the 
form of the ‘Government of National Reconciliation’ (GNR) that included many 
Gharmis and Pamiris.335  
Schoeberlein takes a dim view of the counter-demonstrators’ motivations and 
individual agency. He notes that previous pro-government demonstrations had been 
quite small, and had been composed mostly of Dushanbe-based students following 
orders from their institutions’ Communist Party organisations. Describing the Ozodi 
square demonstrators, Schoeberlein argues that the Kulobis who arrived by bus were 
“brought in on orders of their collective farm bosses and were paid for their time – were 
much more dangerous and ready to do the regime’s bidding.”336 He does not describe 
the pro-opposition demonstrators at Shahidon in this manner, but Kilavuz’s research in 
one Qurghonteppa farm shows that Gharmi Tajiks came to Shahidon both by persuasion 
and by force. 337  Roy’s description focuses on the merging of agendas; the central 
government incumbents – supported by Kulobi demonstrators – wanted to stay in power 
while the rural Gharmi demonstrators attempted to change the status quo. He mentions 
the local conflicts over resources in the south and argues that these “localist conflicts 
were exported to the capital. They [Kulobis and Gharmis] came up from the kolkhoz in 
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buses and tractors to support their various factions.”338 Whitlock writes that so many 
Gharmis came to Shahidon at the request of the IRP leaders that “people called it a 
'Gharmi' protest.”339  
Kilavuz cites ‘regionalism’ as a tool in this process to mobilise people for the 
demonstrations on both sides, arguing that “government and opposition leaders 
recruited people based on regional identities, loyalties, and networks.”340 She writes that 
government leaders mobilised Kulobis by persuading them that they were under threat 
as Kulobis from the Pamiris and Gharmis while opposition leaders used the same 
tactic. 341  Concerning security dilemmas, Rubin and Zartman also note that the 
likelihood of violence increased as the leaders turned to regional networks for 
support.342 
In regards to political parties and regional interests, one of the main criticisms of 
the political parties in Tajikistan is that they served the interests of regional elites. For 
example, Eden Naby argued that the political parties in contention had “regional origins 
with (hidden) regional agendas.” 343  Schoeberlein contradicts this, noting that the 
opposition parties sought support in all regions of Tajikistan and that their agenda was 
not a “regional agenda.”344 This may have been true at an early stage in the political 
competition, but eventually, according to Olimova, the “[Qarotegin/Gharm and] 
Badakhshon regional elites, having achieved economic clout, sought to change the 
balance of forces in their own interest and used the newly emerging opposition 
movements to this end.”345 Dudoignon argues that this occurred in mid- to late 1990 
when IRP and DPT activists, who were at the time supporting the policies of “anti-
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nomenklatura economic liberalism,” started to advocate for the “interests of muhajir 
communities and the Kuhistanian [mountain] people at large against the northern and 
southern technocrats of the planned economy.”346 
 
Protests transitioning to violence 
 
With a majority of the opposition-aligned deputies absent, the Supreme Soviet 
voted on April 30 to confer special presidential powers upon Nabiev for the next six 
months. These powers included: control over the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches, the right to “suspend” any political party or organization, and the right to end 
rallies and demonstrations.347 The opposition soon publicly restated its demand for the 
resignation of Nabiev at a May 2 press conference.348 
On May 3 the Supreme Soviet reappointed Kenjaev as its chair (a position he 
will hold in addition to remaining chair of the National Security Committee), scheduled 
new Qoziyot elections for May 14, and recommended that Turajonzoda be arrested. At 
the same time Nabiev decreed the creation of a “national guard corps,” (alternately 
‘President’s Guards’ or ‘National Guards within the Presidency’; hereafter ‘National 
Guards’) to be created within 2 weeks. In response, Ozodi square demonstrators, 
“Intoxicated with first major victory,” demanded the repeal of all earlier concessions 
given to opposition. 349  The timeline for the creation of the National Guards was 
shortened drastically when, on the same day, the government armed anywhere from 
400-3000 demonstrators at Ozodi square. This armed unit – dominated by Kulobis – 
was to presumably report directly to Nabiev and Kenjaev.350  
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Later in the day, on the night of May 3-4, the Shahidon demonstrators attempted 
to enter the presidential palace, but were stopped by security forces. The Ozodi 
demonstrators then tried to move on Shahidon square, but were also stopped by security 
forces and turned back.351  On May 5, a state of emergency signed by Nabiev was 
declared on radio. This included: a curfew from 9pm to 5am, demonstrations and strikes 
were prohibited, the activities of political parties, “popular movements” and “other 
social organizations” were banned, and the city of Dushanbe area of responsibility was 
to be put under the control of the military commissar of Tajikistan – Major General 
Mamadjonov.352  
At this time (midday on the 5th) there were 100,000 demonstrators in Dushanbe. 
It was on this same day (May 5) that the violent conflict started, but not in the city. 
Several people were killed in a shooting at a blockade outside the city at the Yovon 
district at the Lenin (Rudaki) district crossroads. Soon after, shooting started in the 
city. 353  Overnight the opposition took control of the TV building, the presidential 
palace, the railway station, the main roads and, briefly, the airport.354 By the morning of 
May 6, all main routes into the city were blocked by “opposition patrols” checking 
incoming and outgoing cars.355 On the same day some members of the Supreme Soviet 
attempted to flee the city while opposition supporters took four deputies hostage.356 As 
for Nabiev, he took refuge in the blockaded Supreme Soviet building.357 During the 
previous night “the power ministries – that is, those whose personnel had the right to 
carry arms – took sides.”358 At 10pm guardsmen at the Presidential Palace joined the 
demonstrators. At 2am “a large number of Interior Ministry men – the police force – 
came over to the opposition, bringing with them their arsenal. The Security Ministry, 
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still generally known as the KGB, stayed with the government.”359  According to a 
report by the HD Centre, the opposition forces rapidly gained momentum and resources: 
If the opposition’s arsenal was initially nothing more than a few hunting rifles and some 
Molotov cocktails, it quickly developed. For example, when they occupied the 
Presidential Palace, the opposition forces already had 250 automatic weapons and one 
tank. Also, on May 5, an entire OMON unit (Special Forces) of the Ministry of the 
Interior joined the opposition. This contributed 12 tanks, and 600 Kalashnikovs. Local 
police stations also quickly became a good source of weapon procurement.360 
 
On May 6, Major General Bahrom Rahmonov, an advisor to President Nabiev and the 
man picked to lead the National Guards, joined the opposition.361 The next day, the top 
two in the Interior Ministry also joined the opposition. This was especially significant in 
the capital as the deputy leader in the ministry was the commandant of Dushanbe.362 
According to Zartman, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) military 
officers forcefully persuaded the government and opposition to compromise. 363  In 
particular, Colonel Vyacheslav Zabolotnyy of the CIS 201st MRD forces – an ethnic 
Belorussian – demanded that the opposing sides meet and threatened the leaders of both 
sides with arrest if they did not reach an agreement.364 On the morning of May 7 the 
preliminary agreement was announced on the radio. The initial protocols on the 
‘Government of National Reconciliation’ (GNR), which were signed by all the main 
government leaders – including Nabiev and Kenjaev – and opposition leaders plus 
Khudonazarov, included: bilateral disarmament, dissolution of the National Guards, the 
halting of all ongoing investigations, the removal of blockades from all building and 
facilities, no prohibitions on parties and organisations, dissolution of the Presidium and 
Presidential Council, the placing of the Committee for National Security and the 
Committee for Defence under the control of the GNR, the banning of all further rallies, 
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including the ending of both demonstrations.365 Immediately after the signing of the 
GNR agreement many of the pro-government demonstrators started to leave Ozodi.366  
Later in the day Nabiev decreed the end of the state of emergency and 
announced a plan for the disarmament process.367 Meanwhile, opposition demonstrators 
remained at Shahidon square and demanded the resignation of Nabiev. By May 10 there 
were – with negotiations ongoing – still thousands of demonstrators at Shahidon, amid a 
“mood of irreconcilability.”368 The leaders of DPT, La’li Badakhshon and Rastokhez 
called for an end to the Shahidon square demonstrations. However, “radical activists”369 
of the IRP continued their protests at Shahidon, demanding the removal of Nabiev and 
his cabinet, the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and trials for the government leaders, 
demands which were not supported by IRP leader Himmatzoda.370 In fact, the entire 
opposition leadership rejected the demand for Nabiev’s immediate resignation for 
reasons of stability.371 
On May 11, after further negotiations mediated by Zabolotnyy, Nabiev signed a 
decree on the GNR coalition government, with 8 of 24 cabinet positions going to the 
opposition and Nabiev remaining in office. After the announcement an unstated number 
of the remaining protesters at Shahidon square began to leave. 372  However, some 
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demonstrators stayed on the square. On May 13, with negotiations ongoing, the 
opposition-controlled state TV channel urged demonstrators to stay in Shahidon square 
for the next few days. Finally, on May 14 the opposition demonstrators left Shahidon.373 
Both Kilavuz and Zartman make a note of the opposition receiving only one-third of 
cabinet positions, after remarking that the opposition had forcefully taken the capital. 
Both frame the concessions as the opposition failing to make significant gains. 374 
Nourzhanov is of the opposite position, writing that the GNR was “dominated by 
representatives of Gharm and Badakhshan. Its legitimacy was immediately rejected by 
Kulob and Leninobod.”375 In many spheres, most importantly security, the opposition 
did in fact dominate, or at least make significant gains. Examples include: 
 
• On May 12 the government announced that elections for the head Qozi were 
cancelled, keeping safe the position of Turajonzoda – a man the counter-
demonstrators had the most grievances with and who was arguably the most 
influential opposition member.376 
 
• On May 12, after negotiations, Nabiev decreed that a Majlis (national assembly) 
would be formed. This 80-person assembly, which was to be split evenly 
between the government and opposition, was supposed to have functioned until 
new elections on December 6.377  
                                                                                                                                               
and Minister of Education. According to Zabolotnyy, at the May 11 meeting he said to Nabiev, Mirzoev 
and opposition leaders: “Authorized as the garrison’s commander I will arrest all of you, and no one will 
leave this study until you finally resolve all the disputable questions among yourself.” He said the 
agreement on the GNR was the reached. He also stressed his unit’s continued neutrality. Zabolotnyy then, 
according to his version, noted that talks continued on May 12, this time without his presence. See: 
Postfactum 1703gmt (12 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) C1/3. 
373
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 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 152; Zartman, Political Transition in Central Asian 
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opposition in the new cabinet: 8 of 20 portfolios. See: Timur Kadyr, ‘Hot Spot: Powder keg under the 
roof of the world’, Megapolis-Express (16 September 1992) 20, in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 37 (14 October 1992). 
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 Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 111-2. 
Similarly, Kilavuz writes: “However, the local governments in Leninabad and Kulyab did not recognize 
Nabiev’s concessions, or the legitimacy of the new government.” See: Kilavuz, Understanding Violent 
Conflict, 152. 
376
 Interfax 1616gmt (12 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) C1/6. For example, see previous 
mentions of Turajonzoda in this section. For more extreme examples of anger against Turajonzoda, 
particularly a portrayal of him as the opposition mastermind, see: G. Khaidarov and M. Inomov, 
Tajikistan: tragedy and anguish of the nation (St. Petersburg: Linko, 1993). For a more accessible source, 
See: Gillian Tett, ‘Poverty brings Tajikistan's political tension to the fore’, Financial Times, 28 April 
1992, International Page 2. As an example of, Turajonzoda’s power and influence, see earlier references 
to his role as a power-broker and mediator within the opposition. Furthermore, by May 7 the opposition 
headquarters were stationed at the Qoziyot headquarters. See ITAR-TASS 0750gmt (7 May 1992) in 
SWB SU/1375 (8 May 1992) C1/6. 
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 ITAR-TASS 1756gmt (12 May 1992) and Tajik Radio 1635gmt (12 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 
May 1992) C1/1; Interfax (13 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) i; Postfactum 2043gmt (13 
May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) C1/2. One source puts the proposed number of Majlis 
deputies at 70 with a 35-35 split. See: Thomas Ginsberg, ‘Rival Muslim Groups Clash in South as 
Tajikistan Forms New Government’, The Associated Press (12 May 1992). 
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• On May 13 Davlat Usmon, the deputy leader of the IRP, gained the position of 
deputy premiere, as the deputy president position was abandoned. Usmon’s 
duties entailed him being required to “oversee” the National Security Committee 
(KGB), the Procuracy Office378  and the Defence Committee. In addition he 
“would be responsible for the law enforcement bodies.”379 
 
• On May 13, as part of the announcement of new cabinet positions, Navjuvonov 
regained the position of Interior Minister, with Kenjaev losing the position.380 
 
• The head of Rastokhez took over state TV and radio, allowing the opposition to 
control the airwaves.381  
 
• Rezo Tursunov, recently appointed Chair of the Committee for National 
Security, burned the top secret archives and then disappeared immediately after 
the GNR was announced.382 
 
• On May 13 the opposition announced that Kenjaev and the Vice-President 
Narzullo Dustov (a Kulobi) both fled the city after the GNR agreement.383 
 
• The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decided to appoint Akbarsho Iskandarov, 
an ethnic Pamiri, to what had been Kenjaev’s position – chair of the Supreme 
Soviet.384 
 
• Opposition forces captured the three main leaders of the counter-demonstrators, 
all of whom were Kulobis and at least one of whom was tortured for an extended 
period of time.385  
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• As noted above, Major General Bahrom Rahmonov – as well as many in the 
Interior Ministry – had joined the opposition. On May 11 Rahmonov announced 
at a press conference that the armed forces of Tajikistan consisted wholly of 
those present at Shahidon square.386 
 
• The armed (and unarmed) Kulobis at Ozodi square had left Dushanbe defeated 
while opposition supporters celebrated.387  
 
 
 
Incendiary Rhetoric and Security Dilemmas 
 
Throughout the protests both sides engaged in inflammatory rhetoric and the 
spreading of rumours.388  However, some accusations were based on leaders’ actual 
statements, which were often hastily retracted. DPT leader Yusuf was especially guilty 
of this, demonstrated by his veiled threats against non-Tajik ethnicities 389  and his 
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for their lives.” Oleg Panfilov, ‘Tajikistan’, Nezavisimaya gazeta (30 April 1992) in SWB SU/1371 (4 
May 1992) B/3; Bess Brown reported the rumour that President Nabiev was secretly an ethnic Uzbek. 
See: Brown, ‘Whither Tajikistan’, 4. 
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 Shodmon Yusuf said this in Russian on Tajik Radio: “… crude [Russian] interference in our affairs…”  
[…]  “I want again to warn the cold leaders of the CIS that there are a large number of Russian speakers 
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suggestion that Afghanistan may have a role to play in supporting the opposition.390 
Yusuf’s position on Afghanistan was briefly shared by General Rahmonov, who then 
also retracted his statements.391 The likely force behind the retractions and apologies of 
various opposition figures was Turajonzoda, who would usually contradict the more 
extreme positions in the opposition and attempt to reassure the public.392 The discourse 
on the role of Islam was also a destabilising factor in spring 1992. Statements on the 
opposition side concerning the establishment of an Islamic state had to be refuted, with 
Turajonzoda again having to get involved in moderating IRP statements.393 As part of 
the GNR the IRP “had to tone down its fundamentalist slogans” as it was now a partner 
with Rastokhez and the DPT. 394  The opposition also accused the pro-government 
demonstrators at Ozodi square of being against Islam – accusations that the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                               
Tajikistan in the previous three years, and 20,000 in the month of May 1992. He specifically blamed 
Shodmon Yusuf’s statement, which he/she interpreted as Yusuf saying that minorities “could well be used 
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in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) C1/4. 
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 Dudoignon, ‘Political Parties and Forces in Tajikistan, 1989-1993’, 67.  
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Soviet condemned as lies.395 Furthermore, both sides made threats of violence against 
the other.396 
As early as the first half of April this type of rhetoric did not escape the notice of 
President Nabiev, who said in a radio address:  
Today we have two alternatives. We can either listen to common sense or whip our 
horse of emotions. […] At the meetings slogans have appeared which are of a 
provocative nature. The more we had hindered them the louder these slogans would 
have sounded. Those slogans from which comes the scent of war and blood cannot 
under any circumstance be connected to democracy.397 
 
However, Nabiev’s warning was not heeded by either side to the increasingly rancorous 
political conflict in the capital. For example, RIA reported that “government supporters 
in Ozodi square had threatened to kill [Turajonzoda]…. And issued an ultimatum for the 
opposition to clear Shahidan square or they would empty it themselves.” 398  Also, 
Whitlock reported that “Some Azadi demonstrators shouted wildly that Turajanzada 
was a criminal, and should be put on trial.”399 One incident is credited as particularly 
reckless. This occurred when Mullah Qiyomiddin announced at Shahidon square that 
opposition demonstrators were armed with 27,000 weapons,400 a move that opposition 
member Gavhar Juraeva argues was “an attempt to forestall officially sanctioned 
violence against the opposition.”401 On April 24 the IRP chairman denied the rumours 
about 27,000 armed men, saying only “self-defence groups” had been formed.402 Sulton 
Hammad, a security adviser to the opposition, later said that “It was a bold rather than a 
realistic number. But his declaration ignited rumours that both sides were arming their 
people, which forced each side to think about the need to actually arm their people.”403 
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 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 161. 
400
 Henry Dunant Centre, ‘Humanitarian engagement with armed groups’, 13. Qiyomiddin was also 
known as Ishon Qiyomiddin, Qori Qiyomiddin Ghozi and Said Gaziev.  
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 Juraeva, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Tajikistan’, 266.  
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 RIA, 1229gmt (24 April 1992) in SWB SU/1365 (27 April 1992) B/4. He also denied that the IRP had 
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Zartman calls this a “classic security dilemma,” in that he believes the mullah was 
attempting to deter a forceful government response to the opposition demonstrators.404 
Davlat Usmon, at the time the IRP leader, later explained what happened: 
Before May 1992 we did not think of taking up arms. But, when on April 27–28 a 
rumour appeared that the government was preparing an armed militia we also started to 
act. We armed the first 40–50 people. All they had for weapons were one pistol, two 
grenades and 30–40 hunting rifles. We then started to prepare Molotov cocktails.405 
 
Soon after, on May 2, the demonstrators at Ozodi square matched the opposition 
rhetoric on weapons when Mullah Haydar Sharifzoda called for the Ozodi crowd to be 
given weapons to defend against opposition demonstrators.406 A while later the CIS 
garrison commander in Dushanbe had to deny Turajonzoda’s allegation that a CIS 
armoury in Kulob had lost its weapons.407 On May 3 the security dilemma was in full 
effect as, according to opposition member Juraeva, the government distributed 1,700 
weapons to pro-government demonstrators at Ozodi square.408 Over the next two days 
speculation over the threat that the other side posed continued to escalate.409 
 
 
Fighting in Dushanbe 
 
 
Both the police and military present in Dushanbe made claims of neutrality. Col. 
Vyacheslav Zabolotnyy, the head of Dushanbe garrison of the CIS 201st MRD said that 
his unit would only act on orders of the top CIS commander and that his unit – in which 
only officers and warrant officers were armed – was “adhering strictly to a policy of 
neutrality.”410 On the police side, a Slav commander in OMON – a special police unit 
within the Interior Ministry – announced on May 6 that OMON units would be 
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maintaining neutrality, only guarding their locations and patrolling the city. However, 
on the same day they did repel an attempt by the opposition to take over a local radio 
station. 411  And, as earlier mentioned by Whitlock, an OMON unit did join the 
opposition. 
As noted above – and aside from earlier minor incidents412 – fighting started on 
May 5 in the outskirts of Dushanbe (with alternate versions blaming either side413) and 
then spread overnight with shooting between armed opposition forces and National 
Guards. 414  The violence continued throughout the next day, including deaths at 
Ozodi.415 On the same day the security forces offered no resistance as the opposition 
demonstrators – now in possession of Interior Ministry weapons and armoured vehicles 
– took over the presidential palace and airport on May 6.416 Elsewhere in the now-
paralysed city, fighting at the state radio building left a CIS Lieutenant Colonel dead 
while a separate fire fight was underway at the now opposition-controlled TV centre.417  
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Postfactum 1539gmt (7 May 1992) in SWB SU/1376 (9 May 1992) C1/4; Russia’s Radio 0800gmt (7 
May 1992) in SWB SU/1376 (9 May 1992) C1/3. On May 7 Russia’s radio reported a growing number of 
killed and wounded in Dushanbe over the previous 24 hours with 14 people having sought treatment for 
gunshot wounds, entrances to city blocked, cars being searched, and the city generally being shut down 
(schools, enterprises, etc). See: Russia’s Radio 0800gmt (7 May 1992) in SWB SU/1376 (9 May 1992) 
C1/3. 
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As mentioned above, on May 6 Major General Bahrom Rahmonov joined the 
opposition. However, it soon became clear that Rahmonov had brought little to the 
opposition other than himself. Rahmonov – promoted to the Chair of the National 
Defence Committee – admitted as much at a press conference on May 11. While he 
spoke forcefully (e.g., “…we must raise the people to fight against all the filth which 
surrounds us”), when asked about manpower he gave an honest answer:  
Q: “…what forces do the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan have at its 
disposal at present and what do you have under your command at the moment?” 
 
A: “I can say unambiguously that at present the armed forces of the Republic of 
Tajikistan consist of all the people present here in the [Shahidon] square at the moment. 
I can’t say more than that just now.”418 
 
Rahmonov, while having had good relations with the opposition and local journalists,419 
unsurprisingly admitted that relations between Nabiev and himself were poor, and that 
if conflicts regarding his own authority arise in the future he would resign.420 
One media outlet reported that demonstrators at Ozodi started to leave the city 
on May 7 immediately after the announcement of the preliminary GNR agreement was 
announced. 421  However, Whitlock describes what sounds more like a negotiated 
military retreat:  
Strengthened by the windfall of the Interior Ministry guns and armoured personnel 
carriers, [opposition supporters] headed for Azadi Square where the parliament building 
stood. Leaders of the rival demonstrations struck a deal, allowing the Kulabis to leave 
the square and return home and giving them an escort until they were beyond the 
Dushanbe city boundary. As there was heavy shooting at Azadi in the meantime and 
several men were killed, the Kulabis kept their guns to cover their withdrawal.422 
 
While a “deal” may have been reached – in Whitlock’s version – it clearly did not apply 
to the Kulobi leaders at Ozodi, all of whom were imprisoned by the opposition.423 By 
late in the day on May 7 – with the pro-government forces at Ozodi square defeated and 
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 Tajik Radio 1850gmt (11 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) C1/5. 
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 An undetermined number of journalists applauded Rahmonov at press conference after one reporter 
used his/her question to thank him. A second questioner from TajikFilm then thanked him profusely. See: 
Tajik Radio 1850gmt (11 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 May 1992) C1/5. In their early enthusiasm, 
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 Postfactum 1136gmt (12 May 1992) and Russian TV 1900gmt (12 May 1992) in SWB SU/1380 (14 
May 1992) C1/5-6. 
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 Radio-1, Moscow 1500gmt (7 May 1992) in SWB SU/1376 (9 May 1992) C1/3. 
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 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 163. The military from a “local garrison” searched a column leaving 
for Kulob and confiscated weapons. See: Radio-1, Moscow 1500gmt (7 May 1992) in SWB SU/1376 (9 
May 1992) C1/3. Also, Interfax describes an armed government supporter at Ozodi shooting off what he 
called a “farewell salute” at the square before leaving while accurately predicting “we’ll be back.” See: 
Interfax 1316gmt (7 May 1992) in SWB SU/1376 (9 May 1992) C1/5. 
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 These three were Sangak Safarov, Mullah Sharifzoda and Rustam Abdurrahimov. The imprisonment 
lasted for five days and ended thanks to the intervention of Nabiev and/or Turajonzoda. See: Gretsky, 
‘Profile: Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda’, 22; Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish of the 
Nation, 33. For more information, see the section on Safarov in the next chapter. 
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having left the city – the only “centre of power” not controlled by the opposition was 
the National Security Committee building, where Nabiev and Kenjaev were being 
sheltered by the CIS 201st MRD.424 
By the night of May 8-9 the city was mostly calm, with APCs flying green flags 
driving through city and opposition supporters celebrating.425 However, violent conflict 
restarted on May 10 when opposition supporters surrounded the National Security 
Committee building – where President Nabiev was taking refuge. In the stand-off and 
resulting violence, as many as 10 people in the opposition crowd were killed.426 The 
opposing sides assigned blame in irreconcilable narratives, with each side the villain in 
the other’s version.427 After this incident – with as many as 74 deaths428 in Dushanbe 
over a period of five days – the demonstrators, in Kilavuz’s words, “returned to their 
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1992) in SWB SU/1378 (12 May 1992) C1/4. For earlier tallies, see: Radio-1, Moscow 1500gmt (7 May 
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hometowns, at which point fights began in these regions.”429 By mid-May the violence 
in the capital ceased.430 However, this was not to last for long. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the pattern of escalating political competition 
in Tajikistan became increasingly based on regional affiliation. The relatively open 
political and social environment allowed for groups and individuals to mobilise and 
demand changes to the structure of the state and society – whether through elections, 
bureaucratic appointments or through large demonstrations in the capital. Regional 
elites who were Gharmi and Pamiri were especially likely to back the Gorbachev 
reforms and, later, the Tajik opposition parties against the northern elites – and their 
secondary allies from Kulob and Hisor – who dominated the central government. At 
stake for regional elites were not just powerful positions in the capital, but local 
administrative and collective farm positions that involved the distribution and control 
over local economic resources. In Qurghonteppa this resulted in competition between 
Gharmi Tajiks who backed the opposition and Kulobi Tajiks who backed the 
government and worked against the reforms. 
 The use of mass demonstrations in the capital, and the accompanying threats of 
violence, brought the political competition into the streets and increasingly into the 
hands of reckless individuals who were prepared for the use of force. By the time the 
government weakened and violent conflict started in May 1992, the only willing and 
able factions were the Gharmi Tajik-dominated IRP and their Pamiri allies in the 
security forces on one side and the Kulobi and Hisor-based actors on the other. While at 
this time there were still numerous exceptions to the rule of region or origin determining 
political loyalty, it is clear that the factions had a strong regional base and composition, 
especially for those in leadership positions. This regional factor was to increase steadily 
as the levels of violence increased throughout southern Tajikistan in the summer and 
fall of 1992 as local conflicts attached to national level issues in a pattern of ‘alliance.’  
                                                 
429
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Chapter 4 
 
The Civil War of 1992 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In May of 1992 the political competition and street protests in Dushanbe 
transitioned into an extended period of violent conflict, with the worst of the violence 
occurring over the next 7-9 months. The central government – now an uneasy power 
sharing compromise – became largely irrelevant as killing, looting, and destruction of 
property spread throughout southern Tajikistan, driving people to flee to any location 
safer than their homes. At first much of the violence lacked coordination as no ready 
armed forces with acknowledged leadership existed at the outbreak of the civil war. The 
political leadership of the opposition and central government had very little control, if 
any, over the people apparently fighting in their name. As the conflict worsened, leaders 
of the militias emerged – very few of them familiar to those outside their home areas. 
Men of various backgrounds rose to prominence based on their ability to recruit, arm 
and lead men in the war. They would successfully use a variety of recruiting and 
mobilising techniques based on pre-existing structures, networks and loyalties. 
At the beginning of the conflict the issues of regional identities being politicised 
was readily apparent, with Kulobi Tajiks prominent in pro-government demonstrations 
and with Gharmi Tajiks over-represented in the religious wing of the opposition. The 
issue of ‘region of origin’ (e.g., Kulobi and Gharmi) would quickly become an issue of 
life or death as militias and even neighbours began to kill based on a person’s origin. 
This would apply also to ethnicity in the case of Uzbeks and Pamiris, who came to be 
identified with the pro-government and opposition sides, respectively. With the logic of 
mobilising for conflict based on these identities, the cleavages between Islamists, 
democrats, and incumbent ‘Communists’ became increasingly less valuable in terms of 
analytical value. 
 This chapter will provide a narrative for the first phase of violent conflict, 
roughly until early spring 1993. This includes an analysis of the increasing weakness of 
the central government and the spread of fighting through southern Tajikistan and, 
finally, the counter-opposition forces’ capture of Dushanbe at the end of the year. A full 
and detailed analysis of the motivations and actions of leaders and followers in the 
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armed conflict, including the increasing significance of ethnicity and region of origin, 
will follow in the next chapter.  
 
 
The Government of National Reconciliation 
 
“A political vacuum has worsened after the demotion of President Rahmon Nabiev to 
figurehead status, distrusted by his new coalition partners and branded a traitor by the 
once loyal stalwarts of the old Soviet system.”  
 
                                                  - The Independent, June 1992.1 
 
“Tajikistan is virtually divided right now. No-one knows who represents the real 
government. All you have is a bunch of senior officials speaking out their personal 
views on behalf of the government.” 
 
   - Foreign diplomat in Dushanbe, October 1992.2 
 
While the most devastating phase of the civil war in Tajikistan was fought in the 
rural south, the capital managed to escape the worst of the conflict. In Dushanbe an 
extremely weak and ineffective government attempted to carry out its duties. On 11 
May 1992 pro-opposition crowds started to leave Shahidon square after the Government 
of National Reconciliation (GNR) was announced and the opposition received a share of 
power.3 However, the coalition government was an overwhelming failure. Whitlock 
summarises the ineptitude of the GNR in Dushanbe and the enormous obstacles that it 
faced: 
The Tajik Government of National Reconciliation represented by far the most radical 
political experiment by any state of the former Soviet Union. It faced enormous odds. 
The men in charge of the country – which was only six months old – had no reason to 
trust one another, and had no experience of managing public affairs beyond the Soviet 
system or underground organisations. The president was befuddled by drink and had 
been shown to be powerless. The parliament, made up mainly of old communists, 
refused to meet. There was still no army. The 201st division, standing in place of an 
army, was commanded by the former colonial power. There was no calculable 
economy. The Tajik SSR had depended on Moscow for aid, and in 1990 – the last full 
year of the Soviet Union – had received 762 million roubles, which was reduced to only 
25 million devalued roubles in 1991; in 1992, subsidies ended. The allocation of a third 
                                                 
1
 Hugh Pope, ‘Rudderless republic heads for the rocks’, The Independent (27 June 1992) 14. Note: 
spelling of Rahmon’s name changed from original. 
2
 Elif Kaban, ‘Grim bloodletting gives Tajik government the shivers’, Reuters News (5 October 1992). 
Neither the diplomat’s identity nor nationality is provided in the report. 
3
 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 164. Kilavuz on the agreement: “…the majority of the newly 
established coalition government went to the ruling elite, with few positions going to the opposition. 
Among those few were Davlat Usmon (deputy chairman of IRP), who became deputy Prime Minister. 
Also Mirbobo Mirrahim of Rastokhez, and the deputy chair of the Tajik Language Foundation, became 
Chairman of the State Television and Radio Committee.”: Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 152. 
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of government positions only applied in the capital, leaving the opposition 
unrepresented in the countryside, not least in the southern and mountainous provinces in 
which it had real support. Worst of all, region had been set against region. Khujand 
declared at once that it would not take orders from the new government. Kulab followed 
suit. Dushanbe stood exposed as a rootless city with no tradition of government over the 
plains and valleys around it.4  
 
President Nabiev’s base rapidly eroded after the announcement of the GNR. He had 
neither the support of most Leninobodi elites, nor even of some Khujandi leaders in the 
capital, despite being a Khujandi himself.5 As for Nabiev’s former partners, despite the 
numerous references to anti-opposition fighters using variations on a ‘pro-Nabiev’ 
label,6 Kulob officials announced that the GNR is a violation of the constitution and 
many Kulobis renounced Nabiev.7 On May 15 the Kulob City Soviet “threatened to 
make the city independent.” 8  And on May 20 Kulob and Leninobod provincial 
authorities announced their refusal to recognize the new government. Deputies from 
Leninobod and Kulob Provinces in the Supreme Soviet (i.e., parliament) announced that 
they would not participate in the new government. Kulob provincial authorities called 
for a Constitutional Oversight Committee to review recent decrees and decisions by the 
new national government. At the same time, unnamed provincial authorities made 
threats, or bluffs, of separation. Leninobod authorities threatened to ask Uzbekistan to 
annex them while Kulob authorities “threatened to create an independent state.”9 In late 
June an agreement was reached between the leadership of the Leninobod province and 
the central government that included, on paper, Leninobodi recognition of the central 
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5
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Agence France-Presse (13 November 1992). 
8
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9
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government in exchange for devolution of powers to the northern province. 10  The 
districts of the Hisor Valley were in a situation similar to the provinces of Kulob and 
Leninobod in early summer 1992. The political leadership in all three areas had, beyond 
refusing to recognise the central government, taken control over state-run enterprises as 
well as halted the export of resources and products from their regions. And in terms of 
security, the local leadership subordinated the local police to their administrations. By 
mid-1992 Tajikistan’s state structures had degenerated into multiple “fiefdoms,” far 
from the control of the central government in Dushanbe.11 
Near the end of June, Muslim leaders in Kulob followed their secular counterparts 
and withdrew from the national Qoziyot. The Kulobi Muslim leaders announced the 
formation of an equivalent institution under the leadership of the Kulobi mullah Haydar 
Sharifzoda.12 The rhetoric from local leaders continued into autumn, as demonstrated by 
former Kulob Interior Ministry head J. Rizoev, the new Chair of the Kulob Province 
Executive Committee, who stated that there would be no compromise with the GNR and 
its “gambling” on an “Iranian pattern of state system.”13 
The national government in Dushanbe continued to exhibit severe dysfunction 
throughout the summer and early fall. Examples include: 
 
• In late June, Nabiev ordered all illegally held weapons confiscated and sent instructions 
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Committee for National Security, the Defence 
Committee and the Prokuratura (the republic’s top prosecutor) to form “combat groups 
for disarming illicit armed groups.” 14  No groups were formed and the attempt at 
disarmament is a total failure.15  
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August 1992) B/5. The estimate by Minister of Internal Affairs Navjuvanov for weapons held by the 
 173 
 
• One month later Nabiev admits that the government does not have the power to disarm 
the militias, even as he orders the creation of a new government department to focus on 
disarmament.16  
 
• By late July opposition parties and their supporters were demanding Nabiev’s 
resignation.17 
 
• On August 4 Nabiev fired career officer Col. Alijon Solibaev, the chair of the National 
Security Committee several days after firing General Bahrom Rahmonov from Chair of 
Defence Committee. Members of National Security Committee protested his dismissal 
and refused to recognise the new chair.18 
 
• Emergency session of the Supreme Soviet – previously postponed as deputies feared for 
their safety –  starts August 11. Opposition-controlled Tajik Radio claims that over two-
thirds of the Deputies were present. However, ITAR-TASS reports that the Deputies 
were lethargic, except when exchanging “accusations of parochialism” and engaging in 
“scholastic disputes.”19 
 
• On August 31 opposition supporters blockade the presidential palace and/or take 
hostages, depending on which account is relied upon. Presidential palace hostage takers 
wanted to trade hostages for General Rahim Nurollobekov (an ethnic Pamiri), who was 
being held by the National Security Committee (KGB) on suspicion of involvement in 
the murder of Nurullo Khuvaydulloev, the state Prokurator.20 
 
• On September 2 Interior Minister Navjuvonov resigned, saying that he could not “take 
part in fratricidal feuds.”21 
 
• On September 4, only 80 deputies show up to Supreme Soviet; 154 are needed for a 
quorum. None of the Deputies who attend are from Kulob or Leninobod.22 
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• By early September, President Nabiev was attempting to secretly hide in the Dushanbe 
garrison of the 201st. When asked why he was hiding in a telephone interview he 
answered: “My residence has been seized by armed men, I am not allowed to work in 
the Supreme Soviet. Where, in your opinion, should the president be?”23 
 
Dudoignon describes at length24 how ill-suited the members of the IRP, DPT 
and Rastokhez were to govern in 1992. First, they failed completely in their attempt to 
take control of the economic and industrial sector. Privatisation had reduced the amount 
of control that government had over the economy, leaving the opposition alliance with 
no significant government coffers.25 This was despite several poorly coordinated and 
violent attempts to take control of certain economic assets. Even the pro-opposition 
Pamiri allies of La’li Badakhshon kept the central government away from the GBAO’s 
economic assets; second, members of the opposition had insufficient skills to manage 
bureaucracies, government organs and economic assets. This was hardly surprising 
considering the human resources of the opposition: the IRP with its rural mullahs and 
the DPT with its academics from the humanities, mainly literature; third, the 
increasingly radical ideology espoused by the opposition was ill-suited to a society 
undergoing a perilous drop in the standard of living. For example, the nationalist 
rhetoric of Iranian-Persian-Tajik glory and Tajik irredentism 26  was a failure as a 
motivational tool to mobilise the people. The result of these short-comings was 
“disillusion and apathy” on the part of the population of Dushanbe, and a resignation to 
the likelihood that there would be a return to the old leadership.27 By early September 
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the support for the DPT was greatly diminished while Rastokhez support was almost 
non-existent, leaving the IRP as the main opposition force.28 
On the excesses of the opposition, Schoeberlein writes that even though the 
opposition only held one-third of ministries in the coalition government (and Nabiev 
held the presidency), the “chaos and abuses of the government during summer 1992 
were attributed to the opposition, and they lost much of their popularity thanks to their 
own failures...”29 Schoeberlein makes a related comment on the “armed supporters” of 
the opposition, noting that Gharmi and Pamiri forces gained a reputation for robbery 
and killing in Dushanbe in the second half of 1992.30 Meanwhile, Nourzhanov writes 
that the “GNR had no authority even among its own armed supporters, who took 
Cabinet members hostage and plundered the capital city at will.”31  
The continued opposition political attacks that were concentrated on Nabiev 
served, in Dudoignon words, as a “diversion manoeuvre” which gave political space for 
others on his side to maintain and even strengthen their positions.32  By September 
Nabiev had lost too much support. Parliament and the IRP both called for his 
resignation. On September 7, Nabiev attempted to return to Khujand and submit his 
resignation from his home region. However, at the airport opposition supporters 
surrounded the terminal and forced him to sign his resignation – possibly at gunpoint if 
Nabiev is to be believed. Later that night he went home to Khujand and never 
returned.33 Akbarsho Iskandarov, the successor to Kenjaev as speaker of the Supreme 
Soviet, became acting president after Nabiev resigned. Iskandarov, an ally of Nabiev 
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despite being Pamiri, had been supportive of the “old order,” as he had benefited from 
it.34  
Iskandarov did attempt some measures to stabilise Tajikistan. For example, on 
September 18, Iskandarov attempted to start a process of consolidating the security 
organs of the state. He decreed the formation of a new Ministry of Defence which 
would incorporate the Defence Committee, Military Commissariat and Civil Defence 
Headquarters of the Republic of Tajikistan. 35  And on September 23, Iskandarov 
appointed Mahmadmurod Saidmurodov as “commander of the National Guard.” 36 
However, on September 24, Jurabek Aminov, the Deputy Chairman of the National 
Security Committee (KGB), blamed the failure of the state to force the warring parties 
to comply with the disarmament process partly on Tajikistan’s lack of necessary 
military assets. Aminov complained that Russia had agreed to sell military hardware 
from the 201st to the government of Tajikistan for posting in the areas of armed conflict, 
but that Russia had reneged late in the process. For its part, the “assistant to 
commander” of the CIS forces in Tajikistan was willing to give military hardware to 
Tajik government forces, but only on the orders of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin37 
– a clear demonstration of Russian Federation authority over the CIS forces in 
Tajikistan. Later, on October 5, Turajonzoda gave his approval to a proposal for foreign 
peacekeepers, but only from Kyrgyzstan and explicitly not from Uzbekistan or Russia. 
He specifically blamed Russia for destabilising Tajikistan and asked why Russia had not 
supplied government forces, particularly the weaponless National Guard, with military 
hardware. Turajonzoda said that the “paralysis of the power structure is being sharply 
felt” and singled out the army, National Security Committee, and Interior Ministry as 
being totally “demoralized.”38 Iskandarov’s time in office lasted less than six weeks 
until a special session of the Supreme Soviet was held in Khujand to select a new head 
of state.39 
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The IRP, Turajonzoda and the GNR 
 
 
According to Sergei Gretsky, the foreign policy advisor to Turajonzoda in 1992 
and 1993, during the opposition protests of April and May the Qoziyot under 
Turajonzoda became the headquarters of the opposition with Turajonzoda providing the 
“overall leadership.”40 However, Gretsky notes that as soon as the agreement on the 
GNR was reached the opposition parties left the Qoziyot headquarters. Furthermore, 
once the conflict turned violent, Turajonzoda was able to exert no control at all over 
field commanders (despite claims to the contrary by some outside observers 41 ). 
Meanwhile, the Qoziyot under Turajonzoda lost many of its members and its activities 
in some areas ceased.42 Turajonzoda eventually fled Dushanbe in late October 1992 
right before Safarali Kenjaev attempted and failed to take the city. Unfortunately for 
Turajonzoda, during the summer and fall he was in a position where he had no control 
over the opposition forces, yet was being blamed for their actions.43 Turajonzoda as the 
main focus of anger is clear throughout the late spring, summer and fall of 1992.44 Even 
in the zone of violent conflict in the south where, as noted above, Turajonzoda had no 
operational control, some were blaming him for the violence. A man in the town of 
Vakhsh, identifying who he believed tortured and burned his 22-year-old son to death, 
simply stated “The gangs of the Qazi [Turajonzoda] did it.”45 Meanwhile in late August, 
far from the main zone of conflict in the northernmost part of Tajikistan, young men in 
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the hometown of state prokurator Khuvaydulloev called for burning down the village 
mosque (likely Qoziyot- or even IRP-affiliated), blaming Turajonzoda for the recent 
murder of the prokurator.46  
With so much attention focused on Turajonzoda, he was continually sought for 
his opinion, especially by reporters, until he left Tajikistan in late October. On the 
subject of the political role for Islam in Tajikistan, Turajonzoda was consistently 
cautious, stating that Tajikistan was unprepared for having Islam as a form of 
governance. The earliest timeline he gave for the implementation of an Islamic state was 
20 years, a timeline he gave during an August interview.47 In other interviews he gave a 
much longer timeline – 40 to 50 years, and stressed that opposition forces were fighting 
for a secular democracy.48 Beyond the lack of public enthusiasm for an Islamic state,49 
there were the issues of implementation. Turajonzoda stressed that the establishment on 
an Islamic form of governance was impractical:  
Let's assume, we would have seized power and proclaimed an Islamic republic. What 
next? Where would we get so many specialists needed to replace the secular officials – 
the machinery of state is, after all, a most intricate mechanism and cannot be run by the 
people of the street. What Islamic republic can possibly exist, if a mere 3 per cent of the 
population can read the namaz [prayers] the real way?50 
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Asal Azamova, the reporter who interviewed Turajonzoda for the above quote, was 
sceptical of Turajonzoda, stressing that she believed he was a skilled interviewee who 
did not always express his true views. She pressed him further on his goals for 
Tajikistan’s system of government: 
 
Q: What would you prefer Tajikistan to look like?  
 
A: A law-abiding, parliamentarian state in which people of different creeds and political 
principles would tolerate each other.  
 
Q: Kazi-Mullo, the Western and Moscow correspondents who happened to interview 
you, consider you a very interesting interlocutor. I believe that the secret is that you say 
whatever the listener wants to hear from you. For example, you constantly say that you 
are an advocate of a secular state. You abide by the norms of the shariat and believe that 
Islam is the solely correct faith, so wouldn't you like your people to live by the same 
norms and the shariat to become a state religion?  
 
A: Sometimes there is a big gap between a wish and reality. I dream that some time in 
the future if my people want it to be that way, there will be an Islamic state here. For the 
time being that is impossible. People have lost their faith during the 70 years of the 
Soviet regime. Now the republic needs peace more than anything else.51 
 
While he was consistent on his views about the establishment of an Islamic state, by 
autumn his rhetoric in other aspects became increasingly inflammatory and non-
conciliatory. After Nabiev’s resignation, Turajonzoda addressed a conference of 
“Islamic officials and scholars from Iran, Afghanistan and Europe” in Dushanbe and 
stated that the current conflict in Tajikistan could now be called a “jihad.”52 During the 
first week of October Turajonzoda stated, as noted previously, that there was no 
possibility of compromise as “too much blood has been spilled.”53 
Dudoignon argues that as a member of the GNR the IRP “had to tone down its 
fundamentalist slogans” as it was now a partner with Rastokhez and the DPT.54 On the 
role that Islam should play in the state, there was still the issue of general statements 
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that lacked specifics about law and governance. IRP leader Muhammadsharif 
Himmatzoda expressed his desire for a “pure” Islamic state in Tajikistan: “The pure, 
old, good and fundamental Islam of the Prophet (Mohammed) will be the foundation 
stone of our new state. […] There will be changes in virtually every sphere of life.”55 
However, he did not provide any specifics, beyond saying that this would be achieved 
through an election victory and a referendum on the issue. And, in a comment that could 
only help his critics, he said that the clerics in Iran had made too many compromises 
that have made the Islamic state there less “pure.” 56  Himmatzoda made similar 
comments to a reporter from the official publication of the Russian/CIS Defence 
Ministry, with the added belief that it was the dream of every Muslim in Tajikistan to 
live under the laws of Islam, and with a peaceful path to that destination.57 However, 
other religious leaders undermined the public messages of people like Turajonzoda and 
Himmatzoda. Outside the city of Qurghonteppa city one Reuters reporter filed a story in 
early October that began with an anecdote that illustrates how some opposition 
commanders were off-message from what the IRP wanted to publicly convey: 
 
The burly Tajik mullah waving a stick of dynamite declared: "This is a Jihad (holy war) 
against all communists, Russia and Commonwealth forces. In the name of God, we will 
fight to the end."  
 
"What good has 75 years of communism done us?" he asked with disgust. "We are 
Moslems and we need sharia (an Islamic state) [sic]."58  
 
Concerning the ongoing violence, Davlat Usmon, the deputy leader of the IRP, was 
speaking very forcefully by the beginning of October. He framed the conflict as a battle 
between “freedom-loving forces” and those who would help Russia colonise Tajikistan, 
as well as between Islam and unbelievers. He commented further: “If I may say it 
openly, it is a war between Russia and Tajikistan. The Russian army ought to be 
withdrawn from here. There is no other way out.”59 Earlier, starting in mid-May when 
he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Usmon had adopted a conciliatory approach 
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in an attempt to stop the fighting in the Qurghonteppa Province. This soft approach 
angered some unnamed IRP leaders and, as a result, throughout the summer rumours 
and accusations circulated in the IRP that Usmon was a KGB informer. Later that 
summer anti-opposition forces killed Usmon’s family members, including his father.60 
 
 
War Narrative  
 
“It was our mistake to keep Nabiev as president. This peace is just an interim period. 
Things will get worse.” 
 
                       - IRP leader Himmatzoda, 27 June 1992.61 
 
Several authors describe the outbreak of violence in Kulob and Qurghonteppa as 
a direct result of the protesters from both sides of the May 1992 demonstrations 
returning home and bringing the conflict with them.62 There were attempts to stop the 
violence. In June, President Nabiev had travelled to Kulob and tried unsuccessfully to 
persuade the armed groups there to disarm.63 Also in June, former presidential candidate 
Davlat Khudonazarov travelled to Danghara in Kulob for talks with “opposing groups” 
who promise to enter negotiations. Khudonazarov announced that “armed groups of 
political parties” released prisoners of war while removing roadblocks – and that flights 
to Kulob and Qurghonteppa could resume.64 However, the passage of time showed that 
the intensity and scale of conflict still increased after this point. There was even a 
Presidential decree in July that granted amnesty for all participants at Ozodi and 
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Shahidon squares that was “aimed at stabilizing [the] situation.”65 Other larger-scale 
initiatives aimed at stopping the violence were equally unsuccessful. Opposition and 
Kulobi leaders agreed to truces on 29 June in Qurghonteppa and on 27 July in Khorogh 
(GBAO). 66  However, these truces were immediately broken in both cases by 
“independent field commanders.”67 One good example would be Sangak Safarov, who 
declared the ceasefire reached on July 27-28 to be illegal, and that accordingly his men 
would not surrender their weapons.68  Similarly, reporter Alisher Khojaev stated the 
obvious: “The main reason for the failure to surrender weapons is the mistrust the 
warring sides have of each other. Each side is afraid that, left without weapons, it 
theoretically may be attacked by the other side.”69 The problem of credible commitment 
is clear in this situation. At the beginning of August, Davlat Usmon, Deputy Prime 
Minister and deputy leader of the IRP, announced the formation of a 1,000 man 
regiment set up to forcibly disarm the armed groups. However, he did admit that people 
were unwilling to part with their weapons as “some of them were purchased for 
purposes of self defence.”70 Little had changed by early September when Turajonzoda 
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spoke of Khudonazarov’s participation in the Khorogh agreements and his subsequent 
role as the head of a ‘State Council’ tasked with disarmament:  
He has been trying to reconcile the warring sides, calling for dialogue, sometimes at the 
peril of his life: on more than one occasion he came under fire during shootouts. His 
prestige runs very high. If Khudonazarov had several helicopters and armoured 
vehicles, plus 600-700 armed militants, he would be able -- either by persuasions or 
through the blockade of groupings -- to disarm them. Nobody will surrender arms 
voluntarily -- we have to be realistic about that!71 
 
There were additional attempts by individuals and groups to stop the violence. 72 
However, aside from a small success regarding the exchange of hostages,73 the various 
attempts from August through October were failures. 74  On 21 September 1992 
Akbarsho Iskandarov, the new president, issued a statement to leaders of armed groups 
stating that if they didn’t cease fighting by the 24th they would “be proclaimed traitors to 
the nation, force will be used against them, they will be forcibly disarmed and punished 
according to the law.”75  
The local leaders of armed groups continued to not respect the ceasefires 
reached at the political level. For example, on 15 October 1992 Kulobi forces broke a 
ceasefire after just hours when they seized a bridge over the Vakhsh in an attempt to end 
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the blockade of their region. 76  This trend was clear as early as September when, 
according to Nourzhanov, “it became clear that field commanders were no longer 
controlled by anyone.”77 By late September and early October the leadership on both 
sides of the conflict stated that there would be no peaceful resolution. On 22 September 
1992 Sangak Safarov stated in an interview that the only route to disarmament would be 
with the guarantee and presence of CIS peacekeeping forces. The need for a third party 
to provide a credible commitment is obvious in this situation. Safarov further remarked 
that “the time for peaceful negotiations between the opposing fighting groups has 
passed.”78 During the first week of October his rhetoric was matched by Turajonzoda 
who stated that there was no possibility of compromise as “too much blood has been 
spilled.”79  
However, there were still leaders desperately attempting new peace initiatives. 
The last major initiative was on November 5-6 when President Iskandarov announced 
plans for the formation of the ‘State Council of the Republic of Tajikistan’, a body 
tasked with finding a peaceful resolution. The State Council was to consist of 
Iskandarov at the head, and with Prime Minister Abdumalik Abdullojonov and 
Muhriddin Ashurov, commander of the 201st MRD, as vice-chairs. This proposal was to 
be approved at the upcoming session of the Supreme Soviet.80 Russian Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev flew to Qurghonteppa and Kulob in support of this initiative. However, 
Safarov and newly-installed Kulob Province Executive Committee Chairman, Emomali 
Rahmon, rejected Kozyrev’s attempt to convince them to support the proposed State 
Council. They insisted on an arrangement similar to the pre-GNR government.81   
The city of Khujand and the surrounding northern Sughd (Leninobod) region, 
with half of Tajikistan’s economy,82 was spared the military conflict of 1992-93. This 
was mostly thanks to its geographic isolation, with only one road fully within the 
country connecting Leninobod to the capital Dushanbe and the rest of Tajikistan over 
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the Anzob pass on the Zarafshon mountain range, a road that is only open for much of 
the year due to snow. The Khujandis further isolated themselves in May 1992 when 
they blockaded the Anzob pass.83 Also worth mentioning is that the government had not 
transferred Gharmis, Kulobis and Pamiris – groups heavily involved in the conflict – to 
the north as they did to the Vakhsh Valley. The battlegrounds were mainly in the 
province of Qurghonteppa, to a lesser extent in the province of Kulob, and to an even 
lesser extent in the lower Hisor valley west of Dushanbe. Towards the end of the 
conflict in 1992 – with the steady military gains of the counter-opposition – the focus 
switched to the capital city of Dushanbe.  
 
 
The Consolidation of Kulob Province 
 
 
After the pro-government demonstrators left Dushanbe, Kulobi law 
enforcement, criminal groups and local politicians cooperated in forcing anybody 
associated with the opposition (or suspected of being so) out of Kulob regardless of 
region of origin.84 However, there were some minor events before this time in Kulob 
Province. Opposition supporters in Kulob were being harassed and evicted as early as 
the end of April. One imam who led a mosque in Danghara was driven out of town and 
left on the side of the road with his family and belongings. Turajonzoda also claimed 
that at this time two Qoziyot-affiliated mosques in Kulob were under siege by armed 
men.85 By May 7 a rally was held in Kulob by locals demanding weapons from the local 
CIS forces.86 However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, commenting on the extended 
May 20 deadline to hand in weapons, stated that 1500 assault rifles had been handed out 
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at Ozodi square, and that most of these weapons made it out of Dushanbe.87 By May 11, 
according to ITAR-TASS, “local defense forces” were being formed in Kulob. 88 
Matveeva writes that harassment was enough to chase opposition supporters out of the 
Kulob region.89  
However, more violent means were soon being employed. On May 12 the first 
reports of fighting in Kulob emerged.90 From May 10-13 four people were killed in 
Kulob city and the surrounding area in an atmosphere of “mass disorder.”91 One local 
source stated that eight people had died and described the fighting as between two 
groups camped in opposing mosques in Kulob city which were alternately affiliated and 
opposed to the opposition.92 During the summer of 1992, Mullah Haydar Sharifzoda, 
the leader of the main Kulob Province mosque and a rival of Turajonzoda, started 
planning and coordinating attacks against the supporters of Turajonzoda and the 
opposition in Kulob Province as soon the counter-opposition forces returned defeated 
from Dushanbe. By late May there was the beginning of a “mass exodus” of opposition 
supporters from Kulob Province.93 In early June, the number of opposition supporters 
who feared attack by Mullah Sharifzoda or Sangak Safarov – whether they were IRP, 
DPT or Rastokhez supporters – fleeing Kulob Province increased drastically. 94 
However, in other cases the persecution was much less discriminating. For example, 
one woman in Kulob recounted how non-Kulobis were attacked:  
 
During the war they came to get my husband who fortunately wasn’t home at that time. 
They wanted to kill him because his roots are in another region that was against our 
city. He had never lived there and had no connections with that region. They recognised 
him by his face and his nose. Many people were executed like that.95  
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However, Kilavuz argues that opposition affiliation was the main criteria. She writes 
that as a first priority the counter-opposition under the leadership of Sangak Safarov 
violently attacked dissenters,96 including fellow Kulobis.97  
In one round of fighting between the two sides on June 7-8 in the outskirts of 
Kulob city 21 people were killed. In response the government ordered a detachment of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs to deploy to Kulob.98 In some cases there were non-
central government initiatives, such as in Kulob Province’s Sovietsky District (now 
Timurmalik) where police and Afgantsy (Soviet-Afghan war veterans) from Kulob 
attempted to reassure the local population that an attack on them was not being 
planned. 99  However, the assurances likely would not have helped as the violence 
steadily increased. In Mid-June “former president’s guardsmen” (i.e., the Kulobi 
counter-opposition) killed 50 opposition supporters in Kulob and refugees continued to 
flee to Dushanbe. 100  By the end of June the opposition presence was completely 
destroyed in Kulob.101  
 
 
The Struggle for Qurghonteppa  
 
“We used to watch the scenes from Afghanistan on television. We thought, 'How 
terrible! That could never happen here!' But it has.” 
 
   -Zabir, a pro-opposition commander in Qurghonteppa.102  
 
As mentioned previously, several authors describe the outbreak of violence in 
Kulob and Qurghonteppa Provinces as a direct result of the protesters from both sides of 
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the May 1992 demonstrations returning home and bringing the conflict with them.103 As 
described in Kalyvas’ concept of ‘alliance,’ local conflicts were easily attached to the 
national level fragmentation. In Qurghonteppa, Kulobi Tajiks and local Uzbeks were on 
the run in early summer 1992. At an early point, in mid to late May, one newspaper 
described a “mass exodus of Uzbeks and Russians” from Qurghonteppa Province due to 
“rumours of the imminent "Islamization" of the republic and punishment of those who 
resisted the opposition.” 104  Zartman describes the Gharmi attacks on Uzbeks and 
Kulobis in Qurghonteppa as being “revenge” attacks for the “bloody purge of 
democratic sympathizers” by Kulobi Popular Front Forces in Kulob.105 On June 21 at an 
emergency meeting the Supreme Soviet declared that the situation in Qurghonteppa 
Province had “sharply deteriorated” and that the “region is divided into influence 
spheres by armed groups” of both sides.106 Indeed, by this time at least one Russian 
news outlet was describing the confrontation in Qurghonteppa Province as having 
moved from political to military.107 Throughout June and July thousands of Kulobi 
Tajiks and Uzbeks fled Qurghonteppa to Kulob and Uzbekistan, and their houses were 
looted and destroyed. HRW cites a government number of 133,000 displaced Kulobis 
and Uzbeks during summer 1992.108 These numbers are similar in other sources as well. 
Nourzhanov cites 90,000 IDPs fleeing opposition-controlled areas for Kulob and 30,000 
Uzbeks from Qurghonteppa also fleeing, mostly for Hisor. Many of these IDPs joined 
militias or formed new ones.109 Even the opposition press acknowledged this refugee 
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flow in July, but along with an attempt to frame the displacement of people (the sources 
names a long list of various ethnicities) as due not to violence, but to the “general 
insecurity of daily life.”110 On June 23 the GNR and the opposition made attempts, 
ultimately futile, to gain more control over the deteriorating situation in Qurghonteppa 
Province. Opposition-controlled radio reported that the goal of the newly formed 
Committee for National Salvation – under the leadership of DPT head Shodmon Yusuf 
– is to organise ties with Qurghonteppa city and the districts of Qurghonteppa 
Province.111 On the same day there was a “presidential directive” appointing Nurali 
Qurbonov as acting chairman of the executive committee of Qurghonteppa Province.112 
The first major incident of violence on a large scale in Qurghonteppa Province 
was on June 27 at a collective farm in the Vakhsh district. At 5am two armed groups 
engaged each other, leaving at least 30 people dead,113 before an OMON (special police 
unit of the Interior Ministry) arrived from Dushanbe to separate the two sides by 
11am.114  One Russian source immediately blamed the “Islamic Opposition” for the 
attack,115 a claim that was also echoed by an unnamed source in the Interior Ministry 
who pointed at the IRP specifically.116 These accusations were immediately denied by 
the IRP.117 Akhmedov also writes about the incident, placing blame on the opposition in 
a much more specific manner, blaming local “Islamist” opposition forces of the 
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Headquarters for the Salvation of the Homeland (i.e., Najoti Vatan118) of attacking 
Kulobi kolkhozes and villages in the Vakhsh District and destroying their self-defence 
militias.119 The complete opposite is argued by Zartman, who blames Kulobis for the 
attack,120 citing an unnamed journalist interviewed by Human Rights Watch.121 The 
same unnamed source cited by Human Rights Watch, him/herself citing three 
“onlookers” also says that one “Russian” (i.e., CIS 201st MRD) tank and 3 “Russian” 
APCs of the same were used in the fighting. Other sources just mention the same 
amount of military vehicles, minus commentary of ownership and who was using 
them.122 AFP points to a source (a Russian TV channel) that places the blame for the 
attack and the ownership of the major weapons squarely on one side, reporting that the 
fighting happened at the Leningrad kolkhoz “where opposition forces massed more than 
1,500 submachine guns, three armoured vehicles and one tank, according to a television 
correspondent there.”123 However, assigning ownership for the heavy weapons to the 
opposition in this incident, or any other, 124  is extremely problematic, as is any 
assumption (e.g., Zartman’s125) that the “Russian” tank and APCs were being used at 
the behest of the Kulobis in this operation. During late spring and summer of 1992 the 
201st forces were not yet aligned and fighters on both sides reported using their services 
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and equipment for a price.126 Adding to the confusion, local forces built their own 
‘APCs’ and ‘tanks,’ by welding steel plates to heavy machinery such as bulldozers.127  
As for the exact identification of the fighters, some sources at the time use 
caution and reported that the identity of the two groups was unknown, as were their 
motivations.128 The unnamed IRP official who denied the involvement of his party in 
the fighting gave a slightly more specific version, citing the fighting in Vakhsh as “an 
ordinary clash between self-defence forces of villages of different orientations.”129 
Davlat Khudonazarov, the former presidential candidate and current member of the 
National Salvation Headquarters, said that the fighting here was a “local conflict” 
between Kulobis and Gharmis that was “born” 50 years previously with population 
transfers.130  One day after the fighting in Vakhsh, Deputy Prime Minister Jamshed 
Karimov declared to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet that “Civil war has begun in 
Tajikistan.”131 A few days later officials in Kulob Province reported that the number of 
refugees from Vakhsh Valley in Kulob – in homes, schools, mosques and clubs – was 
over 20,000. The leadership of Kulob region expressed their concern that the conflict, 
which they framed as being between Kulobi and Gharmi Tajiks, may become more 
severe. They stated that almost all of the Kulobi men who had evacuated their families 
from the Vakhsh Valley had returned to “take revenge on the offenders.”132 
For most of July little was reported from Qurghonteppa Province, aside from 
some fighting at the beginning of the month in Kalininobod (Sarband) and a negotiated 
exchange of hostages.133 On July 27 there was heavy fighting in the Bokhtar District, 
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leaving dozens dead.134 Fighting continued in Qurghonteppa Province, especially after 
mid-August.135 On August 20 President Nabiev travelled to Qurghonteppa Province to 
attend a “session of the republican headquarters on disarmament” where “The 
participants in the headquarters’ meeting agreed on one thing: things couldn’t get 
worse.”136 Obviously, things got worse. On August 24 the Oshkoro137 group demanded 
that the opposition leave Qurghonteppa Province within three days. And on August 27 
in Qurghonteppa counter-opposition forces attacked opposition members in the 
Qurghonteppa city administration, killing five members of the DPT in their offices and 
three La’li Badakhshon members in their homes.138 Immediately after the killings, more 
armed clashes leaving well over 100 dead occurred as Tajiks traveled from Kulob to 
join in the fighting.139 
After this round of fighting subsided Sangak Safarov traveled to Qurghonteppa 
city on September 2 and gave a speech wherein he demanded that the opposition end its 
occupation of the Presidential Palace in Dushanbe. However, about 1000 opposition 
supporters attended the impromptu speech and began to exercise their right to a 
                                                 
134
 Tajik Radio 1400gmt (28 July 1992) in SWB SU/1445 (29 July 1992) i, B/1. The opposition claims 
that Russian troops were involved. See: Oleg Panfilov, ‘Col. Gen. Nabiyev remains Tajikistan’s President 
– but he seeks support from Russian Federation’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (22 August 1992), 3, The Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 34 (23 September 1992). Major General Ashurov, 
commander of the CIS forces, denies that 201st troops were involved in fighting in Bokhtar district on 
behalf of either side on July 27. He says up to 1,700 “armed men” fought each other in Saripul, 
Kuybyshev and elsewhere in Bokhtar, and that the 201st arrived to separate the two sides. See: Tajik 
Radio 1700gmt (30 July 1992) in SWB SU/1448 (1 August 1992) B/7. The opposition continued to make 
accusations about the fighting in Bokhtar as the opposition “National Salvation Committee - Alliance of 
Popular Forces” accused “Russian troops” of having “slaughtered innocents” in Bokhtar. Tajik Radio 
1700gmt (4 August 1992) in SWB SU/1451 (5 August 1992) B/4. Ashurov threatened to make a criminal 
complaint against Shodmon Yusuf for his claim regarding Bokhtar. He rejects Yusuf’s wording of “the 
Russian troops” and “the foreign military contingent.” Ashurov stresses that 90% of 201st are soldiers and 
sergeants from Tajikistan, the majority of them being ethnic Tajik. See: ITAR-TASS 1629gmt (4 August 
1992) in SWB SU/1452 (6 August 1992) B/6. 
135
 Interfax (24 august 1992) in SWB SU/1468 (25 August 1992) i; Interfax 1854gmt (18 August 1992) in 
SWB SU/1466 (22 August 1992) B/2; RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 38 (25 September 1992) 78. 
There was even fighting on the 18th when Nabiev visited Qurghonteppa. See: Oleg Panfilov, ‘Col. Gen. 
Nabiyev remains Tajikistan’s President – but he seeks support from Russian Federation’, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta (22 August 1992), 3, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 34 (23 
September 1992). Another source gives the date for the visit as the 20th. See: Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 
Moscow 1400gmt (20 August 1992) in SWB SU/1466 (22 Aug 1992) B/1. 
136
 Ostankino Channel 1 TV 1400gmt (20 August 1992) in SWB SU/1466 (22 August 1992) B/1. 
137
 Oshkoro here is the Kulob-based political group under the leadership of Rustam Abdurahimov, a 
prominent Kulobi field commander. 
138
 RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 36 (11 September 1992) 80; ‘Communists kill 8 members of 
democratic opposition in Tajikistan’, Agence France-Presse (27 August 1992); Bess Brown, ‘Tajikistan: 
The Fall of Nabiev’, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 38 (25 September 1992) 16-7. The second 
source generically (and problematically) describes the perpetrators as “pro-communist supporters.” 
Brown describes the opposition members as being part of the “city government.,” with the DPT in 
particular controlling the administration. 
139
 Brown, ‘Tajikistan: The Fall of Nabiev’, 16; ‘Agreement on CIS intervention force as town attacked in 
south’, AFP (28 August 1992). Two witnesses cited in the second source guesstimate that about 1000 
fighter from Kulob were involved. As usual, unnamed opposition members accused CIS forces of fighting 
against the opposition. 
 193 
heckler’s veto. At about 5:30pm this fragmented rally turned violent as someone fired a 
first shot. Safarov and his partisans (including Langari Langariev) retreated to the 
nearby Urgut Uzbek mahalla. Here, according to an opposition commander and the 
deputy head of the local branch of the National Security Council (KGB), Safarov joined 
forces with Uzbek fighters in the fight against opposition gunmen.140 The end result was 
the defeat of the counter-opposition forces in the Urgut mahalla and the destruction of 
the neighbourhood by opposition forces. This battle produced thousands of refugees, 
specifically Urgut Uzbeks.141 Local opposition fighters deny that they were involved, 
instead claiming that Russians in disguise committed the killings in the Urgut mahalla, 
for reasons unspecified. 142  Over the next four days fighting continued 143  in 
Qurghonteppa city as Rustam Abdurahimov, the head of Oshkoro in Kulob, announced 
on local radio that weapons would be issued to those who want to fight in 
Qurghonteppa.144 By September 6 fighting in Qurghonteppa city included mortars and 
APCs. According to one report, the police were not operating and the dead were buried 
in “courtyards and gardens” as every neighbourhood had “been turned into a closed 
fortress where the residents defend their homes and families themselves.”145 By this 
time only 20,000 of an original 70-80,000 population remained.146 
Opposition gunmen maintained a hold over the city and the opposition 
maintained its headquarters in the city government building. As a result of this round of 
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fighting, an additional 5000 people fled the city of Qurghonteppa having to first exit 
through an opposition roadblock at the north of the city and then through one final 
opposition checkpoint and then two 201st checkpoints. 147  One IRP commander, 
Muhammadrasul Salamov, controlled the Qurghonteppa Province Regional Executive 
Committee Building and claimed a force of 1000 men, including members of the IRP, 
DPT, Rastokhez, as well as non-affiliated fighters.148 However, one reporter who visited 
Qurghonteppa at the time described all the opposition fighters he saw as “Islamic 
activists.”149 These opposition forces were able to make steady gains, and by September 
8 the powerful Kulobi commander Langari Langariev and his forces abandoned 
Qurghonteppa city150 while Safarov continued to lose ground.151 Over the next few days 
the levels of violence subsided as Kulobi forces continued to withdraw from 
Qurghonteppa.152 
 Continual efforts were made to separate the fighting forces or to broker a cease 
fire. 153  By mid-September a local cease-fire was agreed to, and complied with, in 
Qurghonteppa city, but with some small scale local fighting at the Kuybyshev state farm 
in Bokhtar District by armed men not under the command of the main commanders.154 
The continual fighting of the type on the Kuybyshev state farm, outside any sort of 
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‘chain of command,’ is worth analysing further. Bushkov and Mikulsky noted that by 
mid-September the fighting in Qurghonteppa Province was gradually acquiring 
increasingly non-political characteristics.155  Roy agrees on the non-ideological fault 
lines, and provides the Turkmeniston (now Haqiqat) collective farm in the Vakhsh 
district as an example of regional fault lines determining the pattern of conflict. This 
farm, which was established in 1953 with a Gharmi majority and Kulobi minority, 
became a self-contained battleground in summer 1992. In June the Gharmi Tajiks 
forced out the Kulobi Tajiks, who fled their mahalla (Maskinobod) to the nearby 
majority-Kulobi Moskva collective farm. From June to November these two farms 
became bases for Kulobi-Gharmi fighting.156 At the Kuybyshev state farm (pop. 25,000) 
in Bokhtar District, the fault lines followed the same pattern. Fighters in 
sections/divisions Number One and Two, dominated by Kulobis, clashed with 
opposition supporters (very likely Gharmis157) in Number Three and Four.158  
 On September 18 fighting was reported near Qurghonteppa, but also further to 
the east in the smaller city of Kalininobod. At the same time, local negotiations were 
ongoing. However, these talks were likely harmed when opposition forces attacked 
Kulobi forces on the Shar-Shar pass in northern Kulob Province.159 Four days later the 
fighting in Qurghonteppa Province was continuing to increase in intensity 160  as 
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representatives of both sides publicly stated that their goal was total victory. On 
September 22 Aleksandr Pelts reported that: 
The mutual distrust and, if we are to speak honestly, the mutually hostile feelings are so 
strong that even an attempt to merely sit down for peace negotiations is not possible. As 
stated by the representatives of the so-called opposition, they will fight until the last 
Kulobi is knocked out of the area. And the opposing side is just as firm and 
uncompromising. "Peace in our land will not be reached until the opposition, which 
illegally came to power, lays down its weapons" was the evaluation of the situation by 
the Kulobi warlords Rustam [Abdurahimov] and Langar [Langariev].161 
 
On September 23 two opposition mullah-commanders (very likely Mullah Abdullo and 
Mullah Amruddin162) abducted Nurali Qurbonov, the Chairman of the Qurghonteppa 
Province Executive Committee since June, as well as the local leader of the Ministry of 
the Interior and another high ranking security official, and held them hostage at the 
Kuybyshev state farm. The hostages were hastily released, reportedly due to threats 
from the Ministry of the Interior.163 However, it is also likely that opposition leaders 
would have seen this action as a terrible idea and persuaded the mullahs to release the 
men. Whatever the case may be, this incident is a good illustration of the deeply 
fragmented nature of power locally. At this time the local government bodies were still 
attempting to consolidate control over the security sector. Seven hours later the same 
source reported that Qurbonov announced the formation of a local headquarters whose 
purpose would be to “protect citizens” of Qurghonteppa Province and stated that “law 
enforcement bodies, parties and popular organizations joined the headquarters.”164 Later 
this was approved at a higher level when the new interim President Akbarsho 
Iskandarov decreed that a new “joint headquarters” would be set up in Qurghonteppa, 
encompassing “law enforcement bodies” with volunteers to be drawn from the 201st and 
the Ministry of the Interior. 165  However, subsequent events show that this new 
headquarters – whether it actually functioned or not – clearly had no positive affect 
whatsoever on the deteriorating security situation in Qurghonteppa Province. And on 
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October 8 the government replaced Chairman Qurbonov with the Gharmi Tajik and 
former interim President Qadriddin Aslonov.166 
 The renewed efforts by Kulobi forces did not deliver the results they had hoped 
for. On September 22 they showed their desperation by demanding from their foes, the 
“Islamists,” that they stop their offensive in Qurghonteppa Province or the Kulobis 
would destroy the large fertiliser factory, along with its explosive contents, as well as 
the Qurghonteppa railway station and the sewage system.167 This bluff had no affect on 
the opposition as heavy fighting continued throughout the next day.168 The opposition 
gains were reported jubilantly on opposition-controlled Tajik Radio. A Tajik Radio 
report on September 23 declared that the “mujahideen” of the “Qurghonteppa National 
Salvation Guard” had defeated the Kulobis (the “renegade gangs” of Rustam 
Abdurahimov, Langari Langariev and Fayzali Saidov*) and the “forces of darkness.”169 
 The opposition claimed military gains against the forces of Rustam 
Abdurahimov and Sangak Safarov as early as September 26 with the taking of the 
Kulobi-controlled units of Kuybyshev state farm in Bokhtar District and 
Lomonosovo,170 which houses the 191st garrison of the 201st, plus the capture of 100 
armed opponents.171  However, the capture of Lomonosovo is alternately described, 
depending on the source, as the defeat of Kulobi forces or the massacre of a refugee 
camp. Bushkov and Mikulsky, generally critical of both sides, refer to the attack 
(beginning on September 25) by “Islamists” on the Lomonosovo area, where the 
majority of the local refugees were staying, as a massacre.172 By September 15 as many 
as 16,000 refugees, mostly Uzbek but also including Slavs, were sheltering in 
Lomonosovo.173 However, at this time two Russian reporters had noted that most of 
those people sheltering in Lomonosovo had left towards Kulob, so the number of 
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refugees here is not clear. They also reported that armed men in cars were coming into 
Lomonosovo, which they describe as “not a fortress,” and abducting people. The armed 
forces of the191st Regiment were limited to 40 CIS 201st officers (enlisted men and 
NCOs were not issued weapons174) who were focused on guarding their equipment,175 
as well as their families.176 A Russian Ministry of Defence official was clear about the 
orders given to the 201st: “They were instructed resolutely to rebuff attempts to seize 
arms, ammunition and military equipment as well as illegal actions of the warring sides 
against the servicemen and their families.”177 
Sergey Dyshev, a reporter for the official publication of the Russian Ministry of 
Defence, offers a more detailed, if one-sided, 178  analysis of what happened at 
Lomonosovo at the end of September. He reconstructs events based on statements from 
the refugees at Lomonosovo and, presumably, from CIS forces. The refugees had fled to 
safety of the 191st Regiment’s compound and the Lomonosov neighbourhood at the 
beginning of September, where they were accommodated at School No. 7 (one source 
put their number at 5,000 in late September 179 ). Opposition fighters (“Vovchiks”) 
claimed that several dozen Kulobi fighters were also sheltering in Lomonosovo, a 
neighbourhood that include a section for the families of CIS officers. An agreement was 
reached – with the approval of 191st commander Lt. Col. Evgeny Merkulov – for the 
opposition forces to inspect Lomonosovo with the participation of representatives of the 
Ministry of the Interior, the National Security Committee (KGB) and the 201st.  
Opposition forces under the command of domullo Abdughafforov180 used this as 
an opportunity (“deception”) to attack into Lomonosovo and pushed aside the KGB 
officers. They immediately attacked a local “self-defence” detachment – men whose 
weapons included two or three hunting rifles, an athletic javelin and sticks. Dyshev 
refutes the official number of seven people killed. He writes that mass executions and 
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looting began right after this as people were brought out of the buildings. Specifically 
targeted were the principal and the head teacher of a school that was sheltering the 
refugees. Other men, about 60, were taken to the Executive Committee building where 
they were tortured and executed. Later, a Russian Major named Sergey Rebrov was 
kidnapped by the eventually victorious Kulobi forces and taken to the airport to ensure 
that he saw a Kamaz transport vehicle full of mutilated corpses – Tajik, Uzbek and 
Russian – left by the opposition fighters.181 As for Abdughafforov, he was evacuated 
from Qurghonteppa with CIS military forces providing a security guarantee for him – as 
part of a deal whereby he agrees to enter into peace talks.182  
The opposition claimed that Qurghonteppa on September 26 was “relatively 
calm.”183 However, by the next day heavy fighting began at Lomonosovo.184 This was 
the beginning of a Kulobi counter-attack – assisted by newly acquired armour from the 
191st Regiment at Lomonosovo – that would not be stopped. Some sources state that 
Kulobi forces were in control of, or close to controlling, Qurghonteppa city as early as 
September 27-28.185 The targets of the tank-assisted offensive by Safarov, Langariev 
and Abdurahimov included the National Security Committee building, the Kuybyshev 
state farm, and the bridge over the Vakhsh River at Qizilqala.186 Other sources state that 
while the Kulobi forces were dominant, there was still some ongoing fighting over the 
next week,187  leading to the outflow of thousands of additional refugees188  and the 
destruction of some buildings in town.189 The night of October 1 passed without any 
shooting and on the next day the Kulobi forces issued a security guarantee to the 
deputies and employees of the city and provincial government administrations and 
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urged them to return to work.190 Earlier, on September 28, the director of the city forces 
of the Ministry of the Interior was killed along with 12 of his police officers during the 
fighting.191 Nurali Qurbonov was quick to place the blame, saying that “pro-Nabiev 
forces from Kulob” killed the officers. 192  However, the overwhelming amount of 
attention was paid to the issue of the neutrality, or lack thereof, of the CIS 201st MRD 
garrison in Qurghonteppa. Numerous sources blamed the 201st MRD for the 
opposition’s defeat. A Central Asian (probably Tajik) journalist at a Russian paper 
sympathetic to the opposition later claimed that the 201st actually lead the offensive 
against the opposition in Qurghonteppa city starting on September 27.193 Others were 
less sure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Khudoberdi Kholiqnazarov, an opposition 
member,194 stated that the 201st forces are “unfortunately, acting one-sidedly, supporting 
mainly the Kulob units. [This information is] unconfirmed, but nevertheless it is 
circulating.”195 Meanwhile, interim President Iskandarov said that Kulobi forces seized 
tanks and APCs from “Russian troops” and sent a protest note to the Russian 
government of Boris Yeltsin over the incident.196 Nurali Qurbonov was more certain, 
and claimed that the 201st forces were supporting the offensive against the opposition 
forces in Qurghonteppa and demanded that the CIS forces withdraw from 
Qurghonteppa. Furthermore, he rejected any suggestion that the tanks and armoured 
vehicles had been stolen.197  Tajik Radio interviewed Qurbonov and he blamed the 
“interference” by “Russian forces.”198 He further stated that Kulobi leaders avoiding 
peace talks, and named the Kulobi commanders he held responsible: Sangak Safarov, 
Langari Langariev and Rustam Abdurahimov.199 Opposition-controlled Tajik Radio was 
very active in condemning the incident. They specified that “Russian soldiers” gave 
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four tanks and seven other vehicles to Langariev, while also blaming Safarov and 
Abdurahimov. Tajik Radio further reports that “Langariev’s criminals” and the “traitors 
of the nation” (the three as a group) are to be blamed for the destruction in 
Qurghonteppa. 200  One unnamed Qurghonteppa Province official blamed 201st 
commander Muhriddin Ashurov and Lt. Col. Evgeny Merkulov, the 191st Regiment 
commander, for “betrayals”, claiming that military equipment could only have been 
taken only with their permission.201 Ashurov stated that the three tanks and several 
armoured vehicles had been stolen, but that his forces were focused on protecting their 
equipment and their families and that they would “continue to observe strict neutrality 
and will not take any action that could have serious political consequences.”202 The 
Russian Ministry of Defence stated that three tanks and one APC had been stolen by 
local officers (i.e., ethnic Central Asians serving in the 201st) at 4am on September 27.  
However, the reporters relaying the comments of the Russian Ministry of 
Defence were sceptical that the tanks had been stolen. They wrote that the tanks and 
APCs were driven to Kalininobod, given to the Kulobi militias and used in the offensive 
a few hours later. 203  Anatoly Ladin, writing in the official publication of the 
CIS/Russian Ministry of Defence reported something similar, except that he specified a 
“Tajik” officer was responsible.204 This is correct in the sense that the officer was an 
indigenous local nationality. Ladin later reported that that the perpetrators were ethnic 
Tajik and Uzbek members of the 201st: four officers, one warrant officer and two 
soldiers.205 Others reported only that Uzbek officers were responsible for the theft.206 
Mahmud Khudoyberdiev, the officer that was likely the leader of the operation, was 
actually a local Loqay Uzbek whose exact ethnic mix is given numerous descriptions.207 
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At the time Khudoyberdiev was a young (early thirties according to Akiner208) captain 
in the 201st MRD who also served as the Deputy Military Commissioner of 
Qurghonteppa.209 Whitlock writes that he “joined the war simply by driving three or 
four tanks out of the Qurghan Teppa garrison with the help of a few friends.”210 
However, all of this information about Khudoyberdiev did not become widely known 
until later, as he was at the time an unknown figure and the focus remained on the 
Kulobi commanders after this incident. Khudoyberdiev would later become a powerful 
figure nationally.  
 The issue of stolen/borrowed/gifted armour soon turned to claims and reports 
that the CIS forces managed to destroy the tanks and other armoured vehicles that had 
fallen out of their hands. Ashurov claimed that his forces had destroyed the “stolen” 
armour, including two T-72 tanks.211 Elsewhere Ashurov is indirectly quoted as saying 
that the tanks taken by the Kulobi armed groups “have been neutralized.”212 On October 
1 Ladin reported that only one tank remained at large.213 And, on October 2, even a 
correspondent from opposition-controlled Tajik Radio reported that “the last tank has 
surrendered to the Russian forces.”214 However, on October 6 one foreign journalist 
voiced scepticism of CIS military claims that the tanks and APCs had been returned or 
destroyed, and noted that journalists visiting Qurghonteppa city outskirts “reported 
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hearing tanks in action.”215 Possessing tanks and or APCs was an obvious advantage in 
a war where the combatants were this poorly armed.216 
On October 6 Tajik Radio reported that a Ministry of Interior force was being 
deployed to Qurghonteppa to “reinforce” the “voluntary units.”217 Either they never 
arrived or they made no difference when they did. The same source reported two days 
later that shooting in Qurghonteppa city was continuing, and that the provincial 
government and law enforcement bodies had fled the city.218 During the first week of 
October, fighting continued in Qurghonteppa city and surrounding areas, but with the 
Kulobi fighters holding the best defensive positions and having captured more weapons, 
versus the comparatively poorly armed opposition fighters. 219  Refugees arriving in 
Dushanbe reported that the Kulobis controlled the city and blamed Safarov’s forces for 
the violence. 220  Estimates of the original 75-80,000 population remaining in 
Qurghonteppa city varied: 10,000 at the end of September221; “no one left” and only 
“defence units remain” at the end of September222 ; 16,000 after the first week of 
October223; 2-3% after mid-October224; half by mid-November.225 In late October one 
pro-opposition commander stated that “Only the young men have stayed, and they have 
stayed to fight.”226 The state of the city and the infrastructure in the surrounding area 
were also given grim assessments: hundreds of dead bodies on the roads, no electricity 
and “almost complete destruction of infrastructure in the Vakhsh Valley”227; 50% drop 
in crude cotton deliveries in the Vakhsh Valley228; and the destruction or damage of 
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many public building and other structures in the city.229 Later, by mid-November, the 
situation in Qurghonteppa city was reported as having settled and with activities in the 
city “returning to normal.”230 
 Throughout October the offensive expanded beyond Qurghonteppa city as the 
counter-opposition forces gained momentum. By October 4 the focus of fighting had 
shifted to the outskirts of Qurghonteppa city and the collective and state farms of 
Vakhsh and Bokhtar districts, where fighting was reported as late as October 12.231 
Opposition fighters further south had control of some strategic locations at the 
beginning of October, for example the bridge over the Vakhsh River west of 
Kolkhozobod (i.e., Jilikul).232 By October 11 Kulobi forces had surrounded the city of 
Kolkhozobod, 30km to the south of Qurghonteppa city, where the provincial officials 
had fled to.233 The next day heavy fighting was reported around Kolkhozobod.234 A 
week later fighting was still being reported and the situation in Kolkhozobod remained 
“extremely tense.”235  Whitlock writes that on October 15 the Popular Front seized 
Jilikul and Kolkhozobod.236 However, if Whitlock is right, the hold over Kolkhozobod 
must have been temporary, as Kulobi forces mounted an offensive towards 
Kolkhozobod on October 22, with the local flour mill as the priority target.237 At the end 
of October the counter-opposition forces attacked the Afghan river-border town of Panj, 
reported to be last key location for the opposition forces.238 The new (appointed October 
8) Chairman of the Qurghonteppa Province Executive Committee, Qadriddin Aslonov – 
the former interim president of Tajikistan and a Gharmi Tajik from the Vakhsh Valley – 
was kidnapped/arrested by an unnamed group of Uzbeks on about October 29/30 and 
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held near Panj before being taken to Kulob.239 In Kulob, Sangak Safarov ordered his 
execution.240 On 11 November the Popular Front took Qabodiyon and Shahrtuz, both of 
which were accommodating numerous Gharmi IDPs (internally displaced persons). In 
early December, Popular Front troops continued their campaign, which included 
extensive looting and burning of houses. Safarali Kenjaev, aligned with the counter-
opposition forces of Kulob and Qurghonteppa, is mentioned prominently in the 
operations in Qabodiyon and Shahrtuz.241  Around this time Qurghonteppa city had 
stabilised242 and the focus move elsewhere. Kenjaev, based west of Dushanbe in the 
Hisor Valley, was late to arrive to fight in the south. His first goal had been to take 
Dushanbe, and in late October he and several Kulobi commanders attempted to take the 
city. 
 
 
The Capture of Dushanbe 
 
In late September there were occasional fire-fights in Dushanbe.243 Bushkov and 
Mikulsky’s bleak assessment is that in late September in Dushanbe there was 
“continued criminal lawlessness, the looting of stores, and the theft of automobiles. The 
authorities were not able to control the situation. Industry had been virtually paralyzed 
and agriculture destroyed.”244 Meanwhile, the counter-opposition forces had advanced 
toward Dushanbe as far as the approach to Yovon by September 22 (60km from the 
capital). There were various and contradictory reports on the number of counter-
opposition troops and the extent of their arms. In anticipation of the counter-opposition 
advance, “self-defence units” were forming 10 km east from Dushanbe in the city of 
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Kofarnihon (Vahdat).245  In mid-October the instability continued in Dushanbe. The 
Kulobi and Popular Front gains of the first half of October “prompted angry anti-
Russian demonstrations,”246 and, in one dramatic episode, armed opposition supporters 
entered a school and held ethnic Russian school children and/or teachers hostage for one 
hour.247 After mid-October the security situation in Dushanbe continued to deteriorate, 
with nobody on the streets by early evening and occasional gunfire during the night.248 
On October 20 two journalists described Dushanbe as being “swamped by acts of 
terrorism.”249 Safarali Kenjaev, based in Hisor, had cut off the capital from the west. 
Dushanbe, its population increased with approximately 100,000 IDPs, experienced 
hardship with the routes to the west cut.250 By October 22 the counter-opposition forces, 
now organised and named the ‘Popular Front’, continued to advance towards Dushanbe. 
Sangak Safarov was now confident enough to promise an October Revolution military 
parade on November 7 in the capital.251 The roads to Dushanbe were now open and the 
Popular Front forces continued to make easy advances assisted by their tanks and APCs. 
As one opposition supporter said, “How are we supposed to fight tanks? With our bare 
hands?”252 On October 23 acting president Iskandarov, citing fighting in the south and 
rampant, uncontrollable criminal activities in Dushanbe, declared a state of emergency 
and instituted a curfew. Also likely a factor was the open secret of the planned imminent 
capture of Dushanbe by Popular Front forces.253 
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At approximately 6am on October 24, Popular Front forces (tanks, APCs and 
buses full of fighters) commanded by Safarali Kenjaev and Rustam Abdurahimov 
entered Dushanbe from the west.254 By 9am Popular Front forces captured the Supreme 
Soviet, the presidential palace, the Cabinet (Presidium) offices, the Qoziyot offices and 
the Radio and TV building.255 Meanwhile, on the same day, Popular Front forces from 
Kulob under the command of Sangak Safarov capture the strategically important city of 
Norak.256 A Popular Front group under Abdurahimov’s control seized the Radio and TV 
Centre with the intent to control the airwaves. However, there was a lack of available 
technicians to transmit over television, so only a radio address was issued. 
Abdurahimov announced an appeal for calm while also asking ethnic Russians not to 
flee. He also emphasized the goal of a secular state. But most importantly, he 
announced that Safarali Kenjaev was the new President of Tajikistan.257  
Pro-opposition forces resisted strongly and heavy fighting (including the use of 
tanks) was reported throughout the city on October 24.258 Battles were fought near the 
Putovsky street bridge, the Hotel Vakhsh, the Cinema Vatan and elsewhere throughout 
the city, leaving an estimated 100 dead on the first day.259 Later in the day, a “special 
unit” (probably OMON, 260  and very likely Pamiris) of the Interior Ministry 
unsuccessfully assaulted the Popular Front forces holding the Supreme Soviet 
building.261 By the next day, Interfax was reporting that and estimated 1,000 to 2,000 
opposition fighters were regrouping 20km to the east in the city of Kofarnihon 
(Vahdat).262 Further north from Dushanbe, journalists travelling through the Anzob pass 
reported opposition fighters destroying a “strategic” bridge, cutting off the northern part 
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of Tajikistan from access to the capital.263  On October 25 numerous sources were 
reporting the defeat and withdrawal of Popular Front forces, as well as the deaths of two 
important Kulobi commanders; Rustam Abdurahimov and Langari Langariev [sic].264 
Col. Alijon Solibaev, the head of the National Security Committee, stated that the 
Kulobis were fleeing and that over 150 were being held prisoner. Local TV reported 
that Popular Front forces, suffering from ammunition and food shortages, were 
withdrawing from the Presidential Palace and the Supreme Soviet.265 As Popular Front 
forces attempted to withdraw they were forced to break through roadblocks and 
opposition-controlled areas.266  
 Credit for the containment and/or defeat of Popular Front forces is spread 
widely. As mentioned above, Ministry of Interior forces were involved in fighting the 
Popular Front in Dushanbe.267 However, forces outside of the official state security 
structures were more involved. For example, in and near the Shah Mansur 
neighbourhood armed supporters of the opposition, formed on the basis of traditional 
local youth associations, were an important force in the fight against the Popular Front 
forces attempting to take the city on October 24-25. Other armed opposition supporters 
included the Youth of Dushanbe and those fighters headquartered in Depot No. 3, as 
well as in mosques in the Yuzhny, Ovul and Ispechak neighbourhoods.268 Col. Solibaev 
partially credited the victory to the arrival in Dushanbe of 500 “pro-government [i.e., 
pro-opposition] volunteers from the Pamir Mountains.”269 Similarly, opposition member 
Gavhar Juraeva credits “armed youths” from the Pamirs and “young people from 
Dushanbe” (i.e., Youth of Dushanbe) with defeating the Popular Front forces in the 
city.270 Steve LeVine was more specific about those in Dushanbe who fought the Kulobi 
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forces, noting that they were mostly Gharmi Tajiks.271 Levine later provided a more in-
depth analysis, and focused on Jumakhon (Buydokov) and his group, the Youth of 
Tajikistan. Jumakhon’s forces, possessing APCs and tanks, had earlier forced the 
resignation of President Nabiev. During the battles in Dushanbe that started on October 
24, the Youth of Tajikistan fighters participated in the military defeat of Popular Front 
forces in the city. After this victory, Jumakhon’s heavily armed forces controlled 
checkpoints around the city and he became one of “the most powerful men in 
Dushanbe.”272 
Some sources reported at the time that the withdrawal of Popular Front forces 
was a negotiated agreement between President Iskandarov and Kenjaev, both of whom 
had met in the 201st base in the city for talks. Reportedly, Iskandarov had agreed to hold 
an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet.273 Iskandarov states that Kenjaev agreed 
to talk only after Iskandarov called President Karimov of Uzbekistan and asked for his 
assistance. The agenda for the session was to be a proposal for the resignation of acting 
President Iskandarov and the government of Prime Minister Abdullojonov. Kenjaev and 
Iskandarov both provide different versions for the outcome. Iskandarov claims that 
Kenjaev was defeated and fled Dushanbe, while Kenjaev claims he left voluntarily after 
negotiations.274 Two days later, Kenjaev was reported to be in Tursunzoda, close to the 
order with Uzbekistan.275 Mirhuseyn Nazriev, Kenjaev’s successor in the leadership 
position of the Socialist Party of Tajikistan,276 portrays Kenjaev’s offensive as being 
successful in that the goal was to force the government to agree to hold a session of the 
Supreme Soviet in Khujand, a demand that was granted.277 
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Russian Military Involvement  
 
On the first day of the Popular Front’s attempt to take Dushanbe a Russian 
commander in Tajikistan, Col. Svyatoslav Nabzdorov, stated that Russian military 
forces were remaining neutral, but that they were securing vital points of infrastructure 
such as the airport, the railway station and the TV building.278 This was confirmed by 
independent sources who noted that these actions were taken at the request of 
Iskandarov. However, the Nabzdorov stated that his forces would not come between the 
two fighting sides.279 Steve LeVine provides a dissenting argument. Referring, as did 
many journalists in 1992, to the Popular Front and counter-opposition forces as 
“rebels,” LeVine writes: 
The CIS garrison in Dushanbe provided tacit support to the Tajik government during 
the coup attempt. Though taking no part in the battle, the 201st CIS Division took 
control of virtually all of the capital's strategic points. It blocked roads leading into 
Dushanbe, preventing the entry of rebel reinforcements, and defended the railway 
station, the television station and the airport.280 
 
Indeed, many figures in the GNR government stated their approval of how CIS/Russian 
forces responded during the two-day conflict in Dushanbe. Colonel Alijon Solibaev, the 
head of the National Security Council and a man who had the support of many in the 
opposition,281 publicly gave his thanks to the Russian/CIS forces for remaining neutral 
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over the two day battle.282 Davlat Khudonazarov, the former presidential candidate for 
the opposition and current adviser to acting President Iskandarov, stated that the 
Russian forces were ensuring the “total defence” of Dushanbe and helping to maintain 
security within the city.283 Iskandarov appeared on TV on the night of October 24 an 
appealed to CIS leaders to quickly deploy “peacekeeping forces” to stop the conflict.284 
Opposition member Gavhar Juraeva provided a different narrative for the actions of the 
201st when she later wrote that “Although the CIS forces in Tajikistan remained 
officially neutral, they effectively prevented the coalition government's supporters from 
coming to its defense.”285 
The role of Russia in the failed attempt to capture Dushanbe became somewhat 
clearer later, but only in regards to a prominent Russian military commander. In 
Kenjaev’s memoirs it was revealed that Russian Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev, the 
deputy commander of Russian land forces, had not only played a part in planning the 
Popular Front capture of Dushanbe, but had been a powerful enough figure in the 
planning group that he was able to veto the participation of Sangak Safarov in the 
operation. Kenjaev hosted a meeting in Tursunzoda on October 14 to discuss Popular 
Front plans to take Dushanbe. The prominent Kulobis at the meeting were Rustam 
Abdurahimov, Piri Huseynov (Interior Ministry Colonel), and Jonkhon Rizoev (Chair of 
the Kulob Province Executive Committee). All three, especially Rizoev, lobbied for 
Safarov’s participation. However, Vorobyev was adamant about Safarov. With the 
approval of other unnamed participants, Vorobyev brushed aside the views of Kenjaev 
and the three Kulobis. The initial plan for the operation to take place on October 17 was 
cancelled the day before due to a lack of preparedness and coordination, which Kenjaev 
blames on Rizoev (Kenjaev claims that all in the planning group agreed that Rizoev was 
irresponsible and careless in the planning for the cancelled October 17 operation). 
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Another meeting with the same group was held in Tursunzoda on October 19 and the 
operation was rescheduled to October 23, a date which was again pushed back another 
day. One last time Kenjaev argued for the participation of Safarov and once again 
Vorobyev was adamant that Safarov’s presence would lead to unacceptable levels of 
violence in Dushanbe.286 Despite the participation of Vorobyev in the planning, the 
201st remained neutral. Davlat Usmon argues that the 201st (which he argues was under 
the authority of Vorobyev) was a partner of Kenjaev in the fight for Dushanbe. He 
argues that the Russian military only backed out once it was clear that the operation was 
failing. 287   
 
Dushanbe after October 
 
 On November 4-5, amid rumours that Popular Front forces from Kulob would 
soon attempt another operation in Dushanbe, General Ashurov attempted to reassure the 
public that the newly-reinforced 201st would use force to stop any armed group from 
entering Dushanbe. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, visiting 
Dushanbe and preparing to visit Kulob, called for the formation of new, more inclusive, 
coalition government in an effort to end the conflict.288 Five days later, on November 
10, acting President Iskandarov, the government and the presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet submitted a group resignation. 289   Immediately after the resignation of 
Iskandarov and his government, an unnamed armed opposition group near Kofarnihon 
(Vahdat) launched an offensive against Kulobi forces through the Chermozak pass and 
into Norak, pushing the Kulobis past the Vakhsh River.290   Several days later the 
fighting restarted in Norak and even in Hisor, in violation of a ceasefire agreed to in the 
lead up to the emergency Supreme Soviet session.291  By late November 24-26 the 
population of Dushanbe and the 100,000 refugees that were living in the city were 
experiencing serious hardship after two months of blockade. There were food shortages, 
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no gas or hot water, schools and factories were closed, and public transport was mostly 
shut down.292 On November 26 a new ceasefire was reached by the commanders of the 
opposing sides. Popular Front forces opened the Qurghonteppa to Dushanbe road and a 
spokesman for the National Security Committee was optimistic that the road to 
Uzbekistan would be opened in a day or two. Meanwhile, the new session of the 
Supreme Soviet issued a pardon to the fighters of both sides.293 
 
Rise of Safarov 
 
One major change after the failed attempt to capture Dushanbe was the rise of 
Sangak Safarov, a powerful commander who had been excluded from the October 24-
26 offensive. As for the failure of the Popular Front in the attempt to capture Dushanbe 
in October, former IRP deputy leader and GNR member Davlat Usmon maintains that 
they would have succeeded if Kenjaev had cooperated with Safarov, and that he did not 
do so as he refused to recognize Safarov as “an influential figure.”294 His influence and 
power would continue to rise, partially thanks to the failure of his allies. LeVine points 
to the death of Abdurahimov and the incapacitation of Langariev as a boost to Safarov, 
as it left him as the most prominent field commander.295 By November 26, LeVine was 
describing Safarov as the “power behind the throne.”296 The military leaders invited to 
the Supreme Soviet session in Khujand starting on November 16 gave a good indication 
of who the most powerful remaining commanders were. Representing the Kulobi side 
was Safarov and his deputy Yaqub Salimov; on the opposing Dushanbe-based side were 
Jumakhon Buydokhov and Tohir Mirzoev, with Safarov and Buydokhov as the 
acknowledged leaders of each side. However, disarmament was not discussed as the 
military commanders met for two hours.297 Despite this important detail left unsettled, 
on November 25, at the conclusion of the emergency session of the Supreme Soviet in 
Khujand, Sangak Safarov and Jumakhon Buydokhov from Dushanbe were asked by the 
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new leader Emomali Rahmon to publicly embrace as a demonstration of peace.298 By 
the next day the two sides agreed to a ceasefire.299 This peace would be temporary.  
 
The New Government of Emomali Rahmon 
 
During the fall of 1992, the Kulobi leadership continued to state its various 
demands of the GNR, including the demand for the next session (the 16th) of the 
Supreme Soviet to be in the northern city of Khujand – a move that was granted.300 The 
meeting scheduled for mid-November, which was held partly due to pressure from the 
governments of Uzbekistan and Russia, was attended by representatives from both of 
those countries as well as by the leaders of the People’s Front (including Safarov) and 
its allies.301 The main purpose of the session in Khujand was to select a new speaker for 
the legislature – a position Whitlock called “President-in-waiting.”302 The position of 
president was eliminated, making the speaker of the legislature the de facto head of 
state.303 On November 19 the members of the Supreme Soviet – a legislative body with 
211 deputies304 – selected Emomali Rahmon, the leader of Kulob Province, on a vote of 
186 to 11. 305  Michael Hall remarks that Rahmon was viewed by Popular Front 
commanders as “someone they could easily control.”306 Zartman argues that Safarov put 
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Rahmon “in the office as his client because, as a career criminal who turned 65 in 1992, 
he could not have become speaker of the legislature himself.” 307  This explanation 
would require that Safarov was a strict adherent to constitutional law. Other possibilities 
include an acceptance on the part of Safarov that he had no political experience and no 
idea how to control a large bureaucracy, as well as the likelihood that he knew he was 
totally unacceptable as a candidate domestically and internationally. 
Despite the open warfare of 1992 and the accompanied political turmoil, 
including the resignation of Nabiev, the Khujandi elites never lost their 
(over)confidence. Kilavuz argues that this was due to the recent historical pattern of 
only ever facing rivals within their faction for the leadership of Tajikistan. The idea of a 
challenger from outside of the northern elite seemed outside the realm of possibility due 
to their lack of formal qualifications. And when the Khujandis lost out to Emomali 
Rahmon, a Kulobi, they thought that this would be only a temporary deviation until 
which time they would recover the top position.308 Atkin describes Rahmon’s quick 
rise: 
Rahmonov’s main qualification for leadership, at least at first, was his insignificance. 
Within a few months in 1992, this man who was not yet forty went from being director 
of the sovkhoz (state farm) where he grew up, to the speaker of Tajikistan’s Supreme 
Soviet, at the time, the highest office in the state.309 
 
The view of Rahmon as a weak player was apparently widespread. Hall argues that the 
field commanders of the Popular Front viewed Rahmon as weak political personality 
who could be managed, while the Leninobodi elites saw his position as only a 
“temporary aberration.”310 An unidentified man who rose to a position of power under 
Rahmon said that after Rahmon came to power at the Khujand meeting the perception 
was that “Those [Kulobi] farmboys won't be able to keep Dushanbe – they'll be out in 
six months!” 311  However, while being a ‘farmboy’ may result in a person being 
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unsophisticated and lacking in cosmopolitan traits, a war fought mainly in rural areas 
and mostly by small town men produces a different power structure whereby knowledge 
of and skill with navigating local and informal power structures is an asset. Whitlock 
explains:  
Rahmonov...As a kolkhoz man, he knew the bones of his country better than most 
members of the urban elite could. His relative youth and lack of political baggage was 
also in a sense an advantage. He gathered about him the men – mainly country people 
like himself – who had fought hardest in the war that had brought him to power.312 
 
The Kulobis were the clear victors in the political and military struggles of late 1992. 
Accordingly, many of the most important positions in the government went to 
Kulobis.313  A prominent example is Sangak Safarov’s deputy Yaqub Salimov, who 
became Minister of Interior.314 Additionally, the provinces of Kulob and Qurghonteppa 
were combined to create the Khatlon Province, a move widely interpreted as a victory 
for Kulobi forces.315 The new parliament voted to create a Council of War, and to 
directly subordinate the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Committee and the 
Ministry of Defence directly to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Emomali 
Rahmon.316 
 
Capture of Dushanbe 
 
On November 30 there were clashes on the outskirts of Dushanbe, reportedly 
involving a few tanks and APCs.317 On December 8, as artillery could be heard firing in 
the western approaches to Dushanbe, Reuters reported that “Islamic guerrillas” were 
setting up blockades in the city’s centre using fallen trees and vehicles. 318  These 
defenders would be on their own, as their former allies, the ethnic Pamiri fighters, had 
left Dushanbe in an orderly fashion before the Popular Front took Dushanbe, returning 
to the Pamirs where they fell apart as an organised group.319 Even with the subtraction 
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of Pamiri forces there was still not a coherent force defending Dushanbe for the 
opposition. Krasnaya zvezda noted on December 10 that the opposition forces in 
Dushanbe were by then identifying themselves as the People’s Democratic Front, but 
that there were three main factions – each with its own command structure and goals.320 
On December 10, Popular Front forces flying the flag of Tajikistan moved into 
Dushanbe with tanks, APCs and helicopters, seizing the main government buildings and 
industrial infrastructure.321 The forces of the 201st did not interfere, but they did move 
into a position that blocked any potential opposition counter-attack.322 Military forces 
from Uzbekistan were also involved in taking Dushanbe on December 10, as well as in 
suppressing opposition forces in Kofarnihon (Vahdat). 323   The opposition forces 
retreated to the south-eastern suburbs (e.g., Yuzhny) as fighting continued throughout 
the afternoon of December 10. By December 12 local media declared the Popular Front 
forces victorious, and Tajikistan’s new leader arrived in the capital, accompanied by PM 
Abdullojonov.324 However, small scale attacks by the opposition continued in the city 
throughout the day. And in the suburb of Ovul the opposition continued to resist 
strongly.325 By December 15 the city was calmer – despite some fighting in and around 
the neighbourhood of Zarafshon – as the Interior Ministry, the National Security 
Committee and the Popular Front forces patrolled the street.326 However, gunfire was 
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still heard throughout the city, contrasting with reports by local media – now under the 
effective control of the new government.327  
Soon the first reports of targeted killing began to emerge; Popular Front forces 
were targeting Pamiris and Gharmi/Qarotegini Tajiks,328 a phenomenon that is widely 
agreed upon.329 This was later revealed to be a tactic from the very beginning of the 
offensive in Dushanbe when the Popular Front had attacked the Qarotegini population 
and houses in the opposition-dominated neighbourhoods of Ispechak, Ovul and 
Kazikhon, where some of the opposition forces had been based.330 
By late December the sound of occasional gunfire was a nightly occurrence.331 
However, by February 1993 the worst of the conflict had subsided. But government 
forces were still focused on opposition forces in Gharm and Tavildara, as well as along 
the Afghan border areas of Kulob and Qurghonteppa.332 
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 Chapter 5 
 
Mobilisation, Islam, Ethnicity and the  
Regionalisation of Forces 
 
 
At the beginning of the civil war, leaders of armed groups quickly rose to 
prominence – many from positions of obscurity. How they recruited and armed their 
forces is a subject that is vital to understanding how pre-existing social structures played 
role in determining the characteristics of the armed formations. An analysis of the 
process of mobilisation requires an outline of the field commanders that led the 
combatants, as well as a discussion of the networks and structures that they utilised. The 
motivations of both leaders and followers will be analysed. Furthermore, the 
‘regionalisation’1 and ethnicisation of armed units and factions will be shown to be both 
a result of the structure of society in Tajikistan and a logical strategy – both on the part 
of elites and non-elites involved in the conflict due to the mutual security dilemmas 
present. As part of this, an analysis on how leaders, elites and journalists framed the 
conflict to the public will be included.  
 
Part 1: Recruitment and Mobilisation 
 
“Government forces are getting weaker and weaker whereas illegal armed forces are 
getting stronger. […] If the present government fails it will be impossible to form 
another government in Tajikistan and all these illegal military groups will do whatever 
they want.” 
 
  - Jurabek Aminov.2  
 
On October 5 Jurabek Aminov, the deputy leader of Tajikistan’s National 
Security Committee (KGB), estimated the size of the militias: 4,000 Kulobis; 7,000 on 
the “Islamic” opposition side; 3,000 Pamiris in Badakhshon; and 1,500 under the 
authority of the local government leaders in Khujand.3 As for the counter-opposition, 
Markowitz notes how quickly the forces that would go on to form the Popular Front had 
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mobilised. He argues that this rapid mobilisation among a diverse group of people 
(“from a wide range of professions and backgrounds”) has its basis in the “relationships 
that had formed during the final years of the Soviet Union.”4  Markowitz argues that the 
“Ties linking farm chairs, political elites, law enforcement officials, and organized 
crime, which crystallized on the eve of the breakup of the USSR, created ready pools of 
recruits for the local militias that would make up the Popular Front.”5 In regards to all 
sides in the conflict, Nourzhanov writes that as Tajikistan had no army, “powerbrokers 
in the regions had to rely on other sources to build systems of defence, protection and 
control. The most important among them were traditional solidarity institutions, the 
police and organised crime.”6 
 
 
Security forces 
 
During the protests of spring 1992 in Dushanbe the various sides to the conflict 
prepared for the possibility of violent conflict. On the opposition side Gharmi Tajiks 
and Pamiris within the military and police quickly mobilised to support the opposition 
and moved into Dushanbe at the same time Kulobis and Khujandis were arriving at the 
protests. 7  With the central government’s authority collapsing, the members of the 
security forces (military, police, KGB) were an obvious resource to be used. On May 5, 
Nabiev declared a state of emergency and a curfew. That night, in the words of BBC 
journalist Monica Whitlock, many members of the security ministries (the parts of the 
state structure whose members are armed) chose sides. At 10pm guardsmen at the 
Presidential Palace joined the opposition demonstrators. At 2am “a large number” of 
police from the Interior Ministry joined the opposition with their weapons. Whitlock 
notes that the National Security Council (KGB) stayed on the government side while 
mentioning that the senior members were not Tajik.8  Besides ethnicity (i.e., Pamiri 
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security force members joining the opposition), region of origin was also playing a part. 
Whitlock briefly profiled one anonymous Tajik Gharmi senior KGB officer – an 
exception to Whitlock’s rule regarding the KGB – who justified joining the opposition 
by saying “I had to side with my own people. I was threatened all the time because I 
was born in the mountains, and I had to protect my children.”9  
However, region of origin was no guarantee of loyalty. A valuable man for the 
opposition to have had on their side would be Colonel (later Major General) Muhriddin 
Ashurov, a Gharmi Tajik who was in charge of the CIS 201st MRD garrison in 
Dushanbe and who chose to remain a part of the CIS army (which later transitioned to 
Russian command). 10  Whitlock is uncharitable in her assessment of Ashurov, who 
remained neutral and even sheltered President Nabiev in his garrison starting in 
September. She writes that Ashurov “admitted privately to friends that he did not know 
what to do, and so did nothing.”11 Roy gives Ashurov more credit, arguing incorrectly12 
that while all other garrisons of the 201st immediately gave their support to the 
incumbent government, Ashurov remained neutral.13 However, remaining neutral is not 
always an act of indecision. He explicitly chose not to support the opposition, which had 
a large degree of support from his home region. This resulted in opposition fighters 
branding Ashurov as a traitor to Gharmi Tajiks.14 
Colonel Jurabek Aminov, the Deputy Chairman of the National Security Council 
(KGB) of Tajikistan, provides an example of a security sector professional who stayed 
in his position, yet was partial to one side in the conflict. Aminov’s name appears only 
briefly in western media reports and academic literature. In one case his opinion is used 
to refute the idea that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was a threat to Tajikistan, but was 
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rather just a tool used by the incumbents to appeal to Russian and western policy-
makers.15 Elsewhere he was described as a “senior politician who had tried to broker a 
peace between Islamic fundamentalists and pro-Communist forces.”16  In another article 
Aminov is named again as a “senior politician,” but one who “had good relations with 
the Muslim militants.”17  
LeVine wrote at the time that Aminov was one of Tajikistan’s “most articulate 
and effective leaders, [and] probably the most skilled military organiser for the anti-
Communist coalition of Islamists and secular moderates”18 While this assessment of his 
military role is an exaggeration,19 his importance is reflected in the selection of leaders 
the counter-opposition wanted out of government. The counter-opposition forces who 
rejected the GNR listed their conditions for a resolution to the conflict. One of the 
conditions was the removal of four individuals who, they believed, formed the core of 
the religious faction of the opposition. Two of the individuals are obvious choices: Qozi 
Turajonzoda and Davlat Usmon, with Mirbobo Mirrahim of Rastokhez also listed. 
However, the fourth person listed was not a man who had been directly involved in 
politics, but rather Jurabek Aminov.20 The counter-opposition eventually removed him 
by force. Unknown attackers armed with assault rifles and RPGs ambushed and killed 
Aminov in Dushanbe on November 19, just hours after the Supreme Soviet session in 
Khujand voted to elect Emomali Rahmon to Tajikistan’s highest leadership post.21  
Outside of the capital, members of the police, security forces and military made 
their decisions as the conflict worsened. Akiner describes the movement of Tajik 
conscripts out of the 201st as “mass desertion.”22 As for active duty soldiers, it was not 
just local members of the Tajikistan-based 201st. One example given by Whitlock is of 
‘Daler,’ a young Gharmi Tajik soldier from the ‘Rohi Lenin’ kolkhoz (a mixed kolkhoz). 
He had left for his Soviet army duty in the Russian SSR and found himself in the 
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Russian army when the Soviet Union dissolved. His father had sent for him on pretence 
as he felt his son was needed at home as the situation deteriorated. He arrived back in 
the Vakhsh Valley in June. Whitlock writes that  
There were constant rumours of friction between local Gharmis, Kulabis and Uzbeks, 
some of whom had been in Dushanbe at the rallies, and even talk of shootings – though 
it was impossible to judge which stories were true. Daler says that at one point, Kulabi 
men came and stole weapons from a local police station. ‘Our people were afraid. They 
took up spades and hunting guns. I had to protect my family. I knew how to handle a 
gun – I had been in the army. We crossed the river into Afghanistan with some carpets, 
some cows and some horses and swapped them for better guns, Kalashnikovs. Guns 
were very cheap there.’23 
 
These positive decisions to join a side or arm oneself were not confined to those at the 
bottom rungs of authority. One important officer to mention is the Popular Front ally 
Mahmud Khudoyberdiev,24 who was a Captain in the 191st Regiment of the 201st in 
Qurghonteppa when the conflict started. Beyond active duty soldiers there would be an 
obvious demand for anybody who had relevant military experience in the past. Former 
Soviet paratrooper Rizvon Sodirov, at one point the body guard for Turajonzoda and an 
opposition field commander later on, provides one good example.25 At a higher rank 
there was a former Soviet lieutenant-colonel who was training opposition recruits in 
Qurghonteppa city to fight against the Kulobis.26  
The police inevitably found themselves in a war, demonstrated clearly at the end 
of September when the Interior Ministry commander of Qurghonteppa was killed along 
with 12 of his men.27 Elsewhere the police had a better relationship with the counter-
opposition forces that would go on to become the Popular Front. For example, police 
Colonel Fayzullo Abdulloev, the Head of the Interior Department of the Hisor region, 
brought his entire unit to the local government (i.e., Popular Front) side.28 And, for 
Kulobi examples, Piri Huseynov (an Interior Ministry Colonel) and Jonkhon Rizoev 
(the Chair of the Kulob Province Executive Committee and top Interior Ministry 
commander in Kulob Province until the end of September 1992) both attended the 
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October 14 Kenjaev-Vorobyev meeting in Tursunzoda to plan the Popular Front capture 
of Dushanbe.29  
 
 
Government figures and structures 
 
Government figures outside of the security ministries also played a role in 
recruiting and mobilising for the conflict. Kilavuz analyses the relationships within the 
pro-government side and uses ‘network activation’ to define the elites’ crisis strategy of 
 
…calling upon and obtaining the support of others with whom they are connected in 
some way. While these networks have regional bases […], regional allegiance was not 
the only factor in their formation. Common interest, career contacts, and work 
experiences were also important. The networks included non-kin and people from other 
regions as well. The activation of such networks by the elites in Tajikistan was what 
ignited the violence there.30 
 
The most important of these on the anti-opposition side at an early point was Safarali 
Kenjaev, the former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet who recruited militias through his 
patronage networks, specifically in Hisor.31 In Kulob the government figures still in 
place locally32 set about recruiting fighters. For example, President Rahmon, during his 
time as a local official in Kulob, recruited and mobilised for the Popular Front under the 
authority of Sangak Safarov.33 The chairmen of collective farms had a great deal of 
authority locally and were deeply involved in the war effort. Markowitz writes that the 
leadership of collective farms and their “patrons” in the regional government 
“facilitated if not coordinated militias.”34 A report by the Small Arms Survey finds most 
fighters say that they decide of their own accord to join militias – while also mentioning 
the promise of benefits for recruits.  But the report then notes community pressures to 
join, plus the declarations by the local “authorities” in Hisor and Kulob to join the 
Popular Front. The Survey also notes the role of voenkomats – local military draft 
                                                 
29
 Kenjaev, Tabadduloti Tojikiston – Kitobi ceyum, 96-110. Note: Rizoev replaced Qurbonali Mirzoaliev 
in unknown circumstances. Mirzoaliev apparently resigned on September 28. See: ITAR-TASS (28 
September 1992) in SWB SU/1498 (29 September 1992) i. 
30
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 177. Kilavuz writes further: “I identify [network activation] 
as an important mechanism because it represented the first significant mobilization of regional networks, 
bringing people in from regions and significantly contributing to the eruption of civil war.” See ibid, 167. 
31
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 180. 
32
 Markowitz, while not speaking specifically to recruitment, argues that during this period the Kulobi 
local elites were able to operate efficiently as they had regained their positions after the reforms targeted 
at Kulob ended in 1990. See: Markowitz, Collapsed and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia, 112. 
33
 Zartman, Political Transition in Central Asian Republics, 112.  
34
 Markowitz, Collapsed and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia, 113. 
 225 
committees left over from the Soviet era – in the Popular Front recruiting efforts.35 The 
use of voenkomats was not the exclusive tool of the forces that were to eventually 
coalesce into the Popular Front. For example, in Qurghonteppa city armed opposition 
groups, calling themselves “national self-defence forces,” announced the call-up of 
nearly 1400 men through the “local military registration and enlistment offices” using 
their military service cards.36  Of course, as the transition to conflict included a rapid 
mobilisation by both sides, 37  the process included both volunteer and forced 
recruitment.38 
The armed phase of the conflict was fought, in Dudoignon’s words, by “local 
community leaders” who had aligned with one side or the other.39 Some of the leaders 
were incumbents in local government offices or were serving in some official 
government capacity. This was true even of the opposition side. Nourzhanov writes that 
the “newly established local power structures – usually called ‘headquarters’ – operated 
under the auspices of existing administrative bodies or at least comprised their 
representatives.”40 In the Jirghatol district, in the opposition stronghold of Gharm, the 
local branch of the opposition ‘Headquarters of Fatherland’s/Homeland’s Salvation’ 
was comprised of the following: 
• Deputy Chairman of the district Executive Committee (the overall leader) 
• Chief of police  
• Military Commissar (head of the voenkomat) 
• Director of the local agro-industrial association 
• A delegate from the Spiritual Directorate (Qoziyot) 
• An officer of the Committee of State Security (KGB)41 
 
However, the Headquarters was not confined to a leadership consisting only of 
incumbent administrators or government representatives. In this location the 
Headquarters’ leadership included a representative each from the DPT and the IRP, as 
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well as the editor of a local newspaper. On the opposite side, the ‘Headquarters of the 
National Guard’ in Kulob was organised via the offices of the Chairman of the Kulob 
Regional Soviet’s Executive Committee, Qurbonali Mirzoaliev.42 Markowitz also writes 
of the early involvement of local government figures in the formation of militias, 
particularly the Popular Front. He writes that “Local and regional politicians were 
involved to varying degrees – either by remaining “dangerously neutral,” providing 
informal support to particular armed groups, or directly funding and leading them.”43 
For example, in Qurghonteppa the Vakhsh District Chairman Fayzullo Kuvvatov acted 
early by calling a meeting in order to organise against the opposition’s growing strength 
in Qurghonteppa, a process that included the formation of armed units.44 Markowitz 
writes that “Other regions [in Qurghonteppa Province] quickly followed, concentrating 
their forces around local institutional bases. Districts and even collective farms, 
therefore, became openly split along patronage lines.”45  
However, Markowitz does not describe the pro-government (counter-opposition) 
side as all members of the state apparatus. He provides an example of one diverse group 
of men from Kulob who had, after the demonstrations in Dushanbe, felt as if they, or 
specifically their careers and/or livelihoods, were threatened by being Kulobi. These 
men went on to organise militias that eventually became the Kulobi element of the 
Popular Front:  
• Sangak Safarov  
• Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev, Deputy Chairman of Kulob Province Executive 
Committee 
• Rustam Abdurahimov, musician and head of Oshkoro 
• Mullah Haydar Sharifzoda 
• Langari Langariev, former Interior Ministry police officer 
• Qimat Rustamov, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.46 
 
Markowitz makes the point of noting that “patterns of mobilization on both sides tended 
to reflect which patronage group had occupied the district apparatus—and which had 
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not.”47 Districts in the south where Kulobi or Leninobodi clients controlled the local 
government (and used it to organise fighters) were the locations where opposition 
supporters had to use mosques or kolkhozes to mobilise.48  
 
 
Family networks and solidarity groups  
 
At the elite level, kin connections were important in some circumstances, 
including at the very top of the IRP where some in the leadership had family 
connections between each other.49 At a lower level, family and kin ties were another 
important factor in drawing young men into joining militias. The Small Arms Survey 
report noted, among several factors, the relevance of blood relations. One former fighter 
– whose affiliation was not mentioned – said it would be humiliating to not join the 
fighting as friends and relatives had. Speaking specifically of opposition fighters, the 
same report found that the young men spoke of their desire to defend their families and 
their property when joining the fight. But the report goes on to note that some fighters 
said they were forced by family networks (in addition to individual commanders) to 
join.50 Unsurprisingly, the survey found that fighters from the same village or the same 
extended family were placed in the same units.51 In regards to the opposition fighters, a 
report by the HD Centre finds that in the villages “Informal leaders recruited people 
they personally knew or who were family members.”52 There were divides between 
family members during the early political competition of 1992, mostly generational. 
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However, Bushkov and Mikulsky stress that differences of opinion in politics were 
mostly between in-laws, rather than between blood relations.53 
Concerning how loyalties were determined in the conflict, the Tajik scholar 
Kamoludin Abdullaev argued for the relevance of the avlod system, which he defines as 
the “basic unit of traditionally sedentary Tajik society and dominant institution of power 
[…] - an ascent patriarchal extended family that sometimes can be developed into a clan 
based on patrilineage.” 54  He speaks of political loyalties in a broad sense for the 
conflict: 
In the Soviet era (1917- 1991) the avlod system was considerably eroded, yet existed as 
a parallel - to a quasi-national government - system of power. Exactly this community- 
oriented identity and clan network determined political loyalty during the civil war in 
1992-1993 and later.55 
 
At a lower level, several scholars stress the importance of the avlod56 in the process of 
mobilising for conflict. Most prominent are the Tajik scholars Saodat Olimova and 
Muzaffar Olimov. Olimova’s assessment is that avlods have “enormous power over the 
behavior of individuals,” which is an important point since approximately 80% of the 
population in the Kulob and Qurghonteppa Provinces consider themselves to be a 
member of an avlod.57 Based on surveys of conflict participants, Olimov and Olimova 
note the importance of the avlod in the process of people joining in the violence, and 
state that avlod loyalties “dragged” people into the conflict – people that had no 
previous involvement in politics. Hence, people that had no strong political opinions 
were directed by highly trusted avlod leaders to fight. 58  Akiner acknowledges the 
importance of the avlod, but she adds some qualifications, notably that there were 
additional “cross-cutting” determinants that determined loyalties.59 The above analysis 
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makes clear that family ties were important in the process of mobilization, but not as the 
one guiding variable: people joined for family reasons, but as one of several 
determining factors. 
 
 
Criminal networks and the informal economy 
 
Many scholars discuss the importance of certain powerful members of the informal 
and criminal economy – and the networks they operated within. One aspect of their 
importance was in the funding for the conflict, at least at an early point.60 Another 
source points to their ability to pay bribes in order to secure the transfer of weapons.61 
However, their largest role by far was in mobilising for and participating in violent 
conflict. For example, Barnett Rubin mentions the collapse of state institutions of social 
control elevating the importance of alternate sources of power. He specifically cites how 
the Kulobi “underworld’s ability to mobilize violence became crucial.” 62  This 
assessment fits within Nourzhanov’s description that cites organised crime as one of the 
three most important sources of “defence, protection and control” for the 
“powerbrokers.” 63  The need to quickly set up a powerful military-political faction 
mixed criminal with government figures and led to some seemingly counterintuitive 
allied formations. For example, Kenjaev’s Popular Front – Hisor Faction (formally 
founded 8 September 1992) was composed of the following: 
• Safarali Kenjaev (former Chair of the Supreme Soviet, judge and prosecutor) 
• Izzatullo Bobokalonov (collective farm boss) 
• Rauf Soliev (criminal) 
• Ibod Boimatov (criminal) 
• Colonel Amirqul Azimov (criminal prosecutor in the State Prokuratura)64 
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While relationships between police and criminals may seem unlikely, elements of these 
two groups did conduct some business with each other in the USSR.65 
Kilavuz provides one of the most complete analyses of criminal actors in the 
conflict – men who she terms ‘violence specialists.’ She describes the criminal groups 
as “mafia-like groups who controlled the shadow sectors of the local economies, and 
who cultivated client-like relations with political figures in the state and party 
apparatus.”66 Unnamed high level government leaders had, especially since early 1987, 
blocked the attempts of law enforcement agencies to go after certain criminal groups.67 
According to Asal Azamova, a journalist highly critical of the counter-opposition, in 
spring 1992 “a number of hard-core criminals” were amnestied and went on to be active 
in Qurghonteppa.68 Azamova finds this to be part of a pattern whereby Nabiev turned to 
criminal groups to assist him.69 Kilavuz specifically points to Nabiev and Kenjaev as 
responsible for mobilising these types of groups to commit violence on behalf of their 
own their political aims. She is harsh in her assessment of the militias that formed, 
calling the leaders “criminals” and their followers “thugs, former inmates, and other 
criminals.”70 In particular, Kilavuz analyses the role of the leaders of ‘criminal groups’ 
in the outbreak of civil war. She points to militia leaders Sangak Safarov and Yaqubjon 
Salimov in particular, known as the ‘Kulobi mafia’ before the war, and their relations 
with Nabiev and Kenjaev. She describes the importance of the leaders of criminal 
groups: 
Their followers mainly consisted of thugs and former inmates (during the war they 
recruited people by liberating prisoners from jail), and were organized into region-based 
networks. Their role in the shadow economy involved things like offering protection to 
people doing illicit business, settling disputes when they arose, and collecting debts. In 
this way they accumulated economic and political power. They were well-connected, 
and enjoyed close relationships with local and republic-level political authorities (who 
often dealt in the shadow economy). During the civil war, politicians turned to such 
groups.71  
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Kilavuz discusses the role of criminal networks in recruiting for the conflict and the 
criminal motivations of participants: 
The motivations of combatants were complex. Many joined out of compulsion; some, 
out of a desire to revenge death of relatives killed in the war; others (often criminal 
elements) seem to have been primarily motivated by the opportunity to engage in 
robbery and looting. As noted above, in order to increase their ranks, the militias freed 
murderers and other criminals from jails, and made them soldiers. According to some 
accounts, the Kulyab militia freed around 40072 people from prisons in Qurghonteppa 
who are said to have joined them. Many people in Qurghonteppa also mentioned this 
act of freeing of prisoners during the interviews. Informants from Qurghonteppa claim 
that militias on both sides engaged in such practices, and that even front commanders 
included many ex-criminals: One informant said: “Murderers, criminals… they took 
these people out of jail and made them soldiers. In Qurghonteppa, both sides did this. 
Narcotic users and alcoholics became soldiers.”73  
 
Kilavuz’s analysis is focused on the role of the abovementioned men in the 
outbreak of conflict. However, she does not claim to be analysing the background of 
every commander on the Popular Front side. Erica Marat arrives at a somewhat different 
conclusion. Her argument is similar – that the imperative to recruit the maximum 
number of fighters led both sides in the conflict to recruit former criminals.74 And she 
notes the criminal backgrounds and activities of many commanders, particularly of the 
pro-government side. However, she refutes the idea that most civil war participants 
were criminals, even if both sides in the conflict recruited “criminals of the Soviet 
breed.”75 She stresses that most field commanders had “civilian backgrounds” and had 
no criminal associations before the war. 76  And in regards to the prisoners-turned-
soldiers, two serious qualifications are required. The first is that both sides in the 
conflict engaged in freeing and recruiting prisoners.77 And the second is that only a 
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Alexandr Pelts, ‘Tadzhikistan: nikto ne khochet razoruzhatsya pervym’, Krasnaya zvezda, No. 282 (10 
December 1992). 
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small fraction of those freed were dangerous and violent repeat offenders – with the 
additional caveat that these is no confirmation of what percentage of those freed 
prisoners actually joined a militia.78  
 
 
Collective farms 
 
Kolkhozes (collective farms) and sovkhozes79 (state farms) played a prominent 
role in mobilizing for the protests in Dushanbe. Kilavuz illustrates this through the 
examples of two kolkhozes. The first is that of the Turkmeniston kolkhoz, with a Gharmi 
majority and a Kulobi minority – at least until the Gharmis forced the Kulobis out. 
Located in the Vakhsh District of Qurghonteppa, this kolkhoz was home to the eventual 
IRP leader Abdullo Nuri and attracted many outside opposition supporters. This kolkhoz 
provided – through persuasion or force – many protestors for the opposition 
demonstration in Dushanbe.80 Meanwhile, further north in a Kulobi-majority kolkhoz 
that was home to a man – Fayzali Saidov – that would later become an important local 
player, similar activities were underway that led to many from this farm going to 
Dushanbe or assisting the pro-government protest effort. Government officials with 
connections in the kolkhoz asked for demonstrators to come to Dushanbe, as well as to 
provide food, supplies, transportation and money.81  
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Markowitz portrays the kolkhoz as a significant mobilising structure for the 
conflict. As mentioned previously, Markowitz writes that the kolkhoz leaders and “their 
patrons within the regional apparatus facilitated if not coordinated militias that 
spearheaded the conflict.”82 Roy’s work is also notable for focusing on the role of the 
kolkhoz in the conflict: 
 
…each kolkhoz represents the interests of a local population group (clans, ethnic groups, 
factions) and [took] sides at the national level according to local conflicts and systems 
of alliances. The kolkhozes are the new tribes, and as such play the leading part in 
political and armed mobilisation, through the creation of kolkhoz militias.83  
 
While Roy’s analysis focuses on kolkhozes as solidarity groups, he does extensively 
acknowledge that the conflict was often intra-kolkhoz. As an example he uses the 
Navruz sovkhoz of the Vakhsh District, which was until 1986 a unit of the 
Turkmeniston (now named Haqiqat) kolkhoz. The Turkmeniston kolkhoz was 
established in 1953 as a mixed Kulobi and Gharmi settlement, with the Gharmis in the 
majority. Roy labels the Navruz kolkhoz as an opposition “stronghold”, terms the 
Gharmi kolkhoz leaders and the Gharmi Tajiks here as Islamists, and notes that Nuri had 
a mosque located here.84  In June 1992, Gharmis of the Turkmeniston kolkhoz expelled 
the Kulobis from their mahalla, leaving them no choice but to take up residence in the 
nearby Moskva kolkhoz, which was majority Kulobi. The two sides in the Turkmenistan 
and Moskva kolkhozes, now firmly Gharmi and Kulobi, fought each other from June 
until November, when Kulobi forces arrived and defeated the Gharmis of the 
Turkmeniston kolkhoz. Roy writes that in 1993 all the managers of the Turkmenistan 
kolkhoz were Kulobis and that the remaining Gharmis who were not expelled by the 
new leaders became low-level agricultural workers.85 This incident is a clear example of 
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Kalyvas’ concept of ‘alliance’ at work – local agendas attached to national level politics 
during civil war.  
Kilavuz’s research in the Qurghonteppa region indicates that kolkhozes and 
villages that were mixed in a minority-majority region of origin pattern were more 
likely to be involved in the conflict and at an earlier point. In contrast, settlements that 
were evenly split stayed out of the conflict longer, with “one or two” managing to stay 
neutral for the entire conflict. Kilavuz’s informants note that when Gharmi forces came 
to a settlement with an even split the local Gharmis would dissuade them from 
aggressive action. Local Kulobis would also do the same when Kulobi forces 
approached.86 Another more cynical possibility here is that in an evenly split settlement 
both sides would perceive the cost of expelling the other side as high, while in a 
settlement with a small minority the task of expulsion would not be costly in terms of 
effort and loss of life for the majority side. 
 
 
Religious institutions, networks and leaders 
 
Most of the IRP-affiliated field commanders in the south were mullahs. The IRP 
was able to reach out to its network of local unofficial mullahs, each of whom could 
recruit their followers into militias.87 However, mullahs were not as a rule loyal to the 
IRP. Roy explains: 
 
The ‘ideological’ reading turns out to be still more limited because it is wrong to say 
that mullahs in general were on the side of the IRP while ‘apparatchiks’ supported the 
regime. Further more, in the civil war, kolkhoz presidents and mullahs from the same 
kolkhoz usually found themselves in the same camp: Islamic-democrat if they were 
Garmis’, conservatives if they were ‘Kulyabis’, […] The local mullahs usually 
followed, rather than led, the groups they belonged to. In a word, mullahs and collective 
farm presidents could end up together, to the extent that they joined not an ideological 
camp but a local faction. The mosque only opposed the Executive Committee of a 
Kolkhoz when the kolkhoz was divided ethnically, or into local factions, and one took a 
secular approach while the other adopted an Islamic orientation.88 
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As examples of notable religious notables who supported the incumbent side, Roy point 
to the Kulobi mullah Sharifzoda and the unrelated Fathullah Khan Sharifzoda – a 
Naqshbandi from Hisor and the eventual Mufti of Tajikistan. Roy notes that, aside from 
a few individuals, the mullahs of Kulob and Hisor supported the incumbent side.89  
 
 
Economic Motivations and Resource Mobilisation 
 
Schoeberlein asks where the two sides secured the resources necessary to arm 
and pay their supporters during the early phase of the civil war. He stresses the 
importance of local resources, especially on the “plundering of the economy,” which 
includes factories and other businesses (at a later point some faction leaders sought to 
generate resources by operating seized enterprises rather than looting them). 90 
Nourzhanov specifies the assets that combatants fought for: 
 
As the spiral of internal violence unfolded, guerrilla groups, self-defence units, bands of 
vigilantes, criminal gangs and other illegal armed formations multiplied. The war 
brought them forth and it was in their interest to protract it. […] Control over lucrative 
enterprises, such as cotton plantations, oil refineries and motor depots, was a major 
attraction to them.91 
  
Kilavuz also mentions the economic and power aspirations of some combatants as a 
motivating factor. 92  Markowitz provides a similar analysis, arguing that combat 
operations in Qurghonteppa did not start with large-scale killings of civilians, nor were 
the regional government structures a target. Rather, field commanders were focused on 
controlling economic assets, especially once the conflict turned into a low-intensity 
affair, in a bid to secure political power. His basic argument is that Qurghonteppa’s 
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economy, especially its agriculture sector, made it a highly valued prize for the two 
sides to fight over. However, Markowitz is focused mostly on national level 
competition. He argues that patronage networks from Leninobod, Kulob and the 
Qarotegin valley (Gharm) had “penetrated and divided” the Qurghonteppa region and 
that the competing networks can be seen in the actions of local elites.93 Markowitz 
posits that if patronage had “not been allocated in a manner that divided the provincial 
elite and the enterprise managers under them, it is unlikely that Kurgan-Teppe Province 
would not have been the center of the civil war.”94 Schoeberlein is more neutral and 
argues that whether or not the fight for control of resources was the cause of the civil 
war, the war quickly turned into a battle for resources that shaped the conflict from an 
early point and promoted the continuation of the conflict.95 However, not all fighting 
was focused on such lofty goals as controlling large enterprises and other economic 
assets. Kilavuz concedes that there were lesser economic goals, such as control of land, 
but that often people were killed for only “small gains,” in one anecdote even as little as 
the clothing a person was wearing.96 Concerning the fighting and looting, one man in 
Qurghonteppa confirmed the motivation to steal, while remarking “Of course, everyone 
needed money. How else could we live?”97 According to combatants, the opposing 
factions both had some involvement in criminal activity, resulting in overlap and 
blurring between political goals and mundane criminal activity such as looting and 
robbery.98  
 
 
Commanders 
 
An analysis of the civil war commanders prominent in 1992 will help to better 
illuminate the patterns of mobilisation during the first phase of the conflict. The field 
commanders of the Tajik civil war, whether referred to as ‘warlords,’ ‘strongmen’ or 
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‘commanders,’ enjoyed a certain level of legitimacy. Nourzhanov writes that they “tend 
to act in the interests of communities as well as for self-aggrandisement.”99 He supports 
this argument by noting that during the conflict “large segments of the population have 
had to depend on various strongmen as far as their livelihood, security and often very 
existence are concerned.” 100  Rashid Abdullo, noting their “strong and charismatic 
personalities”, argues that they “typically enjoyed the full loyalty of those who served 
with them, as well as the support of the population in the territories they controlled.”101 
Kamoludin Abdullaev mostly agrees, writing that they “succeeded to various degrees in 
securing popular support in respective areas.”102 Little information is available on the 
defeated opposition commanders active in 1992. In contrast, there is much more 
analysis on the commanders active in or allied to the Popular Front. The following 
sections will profile three of those commanders. 
 
Sangak Safarov 
 
 “In three months I have executed the leaders of two provinces.”  
 
                           - Safarov speaking to Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev.103 
 
 
Sangak Safarov, a Kulobi by birth,104 was for a short time, the most powerful 
commander in Tajikistan. Besides his regional affiliation, one of the first things 
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mentioned by authors when introducing Safarov is his criminal history.105 In particular, 
it is noted that by the age of 50 he had spent 23 years in prison and has as many as six 
convictions. Safarov’s convictions, while not known with absolute certainty, include: 
auto theft (1951); three year sentence for killing a pedestrian with his vehicle (1957); 
knifing to death a man in a fight at the Dushanbe restaurant where he was employed as a 
cook (1960 or 1964); an additional six to seven years added – most in solitary 
confinement – to his existing conviction for organising a prisoner uprising and 
committing acts of violence in a labour camp prison in the Sovietsky district of Kulob 
Province.106 After his final release in 1977 or 1978, Safarov’s ostensible profession 
leading up to independence was as a bar owner in Kulob, an occupation that was not 
only “extremely lucrative” according to Nourzhanov, but also allowed him to create a 
powerful network. 107  In regards to Safarov, Rubin notes that the categories of 
‘businessman’ and ‘criminal’ “overlapped considerably in Soviet Central Asia, as in any 
society where private enterprise fulfils social needs but is illegal.” 108  Dudoignon 
provides a colourful description for Safarov that highlights his relations with power 
figures, calling him a “pivot of the parallel economy and hatchet man of local 
communists.”109 But one local source describes the relationship between Safarov and 
powerful figures in government in a manner that makes clear Safarov was no mere 
‘hatchet man,’ but rather someone who was deeply respected by the most powerful men 
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in Kulob.110 On Safarov’s rank in the underworld, Nourzhanov writes that he “was not a 
‘thief-in-law’—the highest informal rank in the Soviet underworld,” but that “his 
authority amongst criminal figures not only in Tajikistan and Central Asia, but also 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union was exceptionally high.” 111  In Kulob, Safarov had 
cooperated closely with Akbar Mirzoev, the Chair of the Kulob Province Executive 
Committee and a “client” of Nabiev, to secure votes for Nabiev during the Presidential 
election of November 1991.112  
So how did Safarov, just one of among many powerful or influential men, 
become so important as the central government deteriorated? Nourzhanov describes his 
influence and networks: 
 
The phenomenon of Safarov underlined the complex nature of political exchange in 
modern Tajikistan, where traditional patterns of authority are complemented by 
netherworld activities and closely linked with official government organs by business, 
conjugal and patrimonial ties. Born in 1928, Safarov, because of his connections, age 
and life experience was the leader of a number of neighbourhood communities in the 
city of Kulob. He also claimed to be a sayyed, i.e. descendant of the Prophet 
Mohammad. Safarov headed a cluster of traditional male unions, or gashtaks, which 
provided him with human resources for political and military action. Across Kulob, 
Safarov was respectfully known as bobo Sangak, i.e. the ‘grandfather.’113 
 
Markowitz marks Safarov’s rise to national prominence as occurring during the spring 
1992 round of protests in Dushanbe, where he “emerged as a leader” for the anti-
opposition, pro-incumbent demonstration at Ozodi square. 114  Whitlock writes of 
Safarov’s role at the demonstration, focusing on Safarov’s Kulobi-centric rhetoric: 
“Safarov took the helm at Azadi. He worked the crowds skilfully, scratching at their 
rawest fears and supplying a flattering solution. ‘Fifty Kulabis’ could restore order to 
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Dushanbe, he boasted.”115 Nourzhanov also stresses Safarov’s Kulobi strategy, referring 
to him as a “fervent patriot of Kulob” and citing one source that notes that in April 1992 
Safarov called a meeting of Kulob’s “formal and informal” leadership, during which he 
said “We and you shall become one. . . . All leaders born in the Kulob Valley must unite 
in these days of hardship and do whatever it takes to help the people of Kulob.”116 
However, Safarov’s organising skills at Ozodi square were not enough to overcome the 
opposition momentum and this counter-protest failed. Gretsky writes that after violence 
broke out in May 1992 Turajonzoda saved the lives of Safarov, along with those of the 
Kulobi mullah Haydar Sharifzoda and Rustam Abdurahimov, the head of Oshkoro in 
Kulob.117 Authors more favourable to Safarov – and very hostile to Turajonzoda – write 
that he was captured by the opposition on 7 May along with other Kulobi leaders and 
was tortured for five days, and released only because of threats made by Nabiev’s 
people to his captors.118  A Russian journalist’s eyewitness account – as part of an 
unfavourable portrayal of Safarov – backs the claim of torture. 119  This period of 
detention, torture and humiliation hardened Safarov’s disposition towards the 
opposition even further.120 After his release he is quoted as saying “Fundamentalists 
don’t understand normal human language. Cruelty must be answered with cruelty.”121  
  Once returning home to Kulob, Safarov quickly became the leader of the forces 
that were to become the Popular Front. As noted in the section on the regionalisation of 
the conflict, Safarov assisted in purging the Kulob region of dissenters upon his return 
home. Kulobi law enforcement, criminal groups and local politicians cooperated in 
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forcing anybody associated with the opposition (or suspected of being so) out of Kulob 
regardless of region of origin. Safarov’s campaign was successful, totally destroying the 
opposition presence there by the end of June.122 The human resources of Safarov’s rise 
to power in his home region and beyond are described by Nourzhanov: 
 
The void left by the crumbling civil authority was quickly filled by the most powerful 
commanders. In Kulob, the consolidation of the HNGs, vigilante groups and various 
militias was achieved under the guidance of Sangak Safarov,….Safarov’s closest 
comrades-in-arms were of equally diverse background: popular avenger Faizali Saidov, 
racketeer Yaqubjon Salimov (Rauf Soliev’s top henchman in Dushanbe in the late 
1980s), convicted criminals Qurbon Cholov, Ghaffor Mirzoev, Langari Langariev and 
Khuja Karimov, police Colonel Sherali Sabzov, and Mahmud Khudoberdyev.123 
 
In June President Nabiev travelled to Kulob in an effort to persuade the local leaders to 
disarm. Markowitz argues that by this time the field commanders in Kulob were aided 
by the popular belief that the region’s interests were being threatened by the new 
coalition government. Safarov’s reply was that “the Kulyab volunteer guards will not 
hand in their weapons until law and order are restored in the republic.”124  
Many writers use ‘Popular Front’ or ‘People’s Front’ to describe Safarov’s 
forces from the very beginning. However, it wasn’t until 6 October 1992 when 
Safarov’s militia – under the name Headquarters of the National Guard – officially 
joined with Safarali Kenjaev’s ‘People’s Front of Tajikistan-Hisor’ to become the 
‘Popular Front,’ or ‘People’s Front.’125 However, Safarov’s militia was active outside of 
Kulob well before this. In June his forces arrived in Qurghonteppa – where Safarov did 
some local recruiting – and fought against opposition forces in the region, with combat 
peaking in August and September.126 
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As for Safarov’s local competitors, Nourzhanov writes that when J. Rizoev, the 
Chairman of the Kulob region, “refused to confer dictatorial power on the [Popular 
Front] in his region, he was shot by Safarov on 28 October 1992. The ascendance of 
warlords in the South and in the West of Tajikistan was complete.”127 Safarov’s ability 
to effect change at the national level became apparent when his client Emomali 
Rahmon128 became the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (before becoming president). 
Rahmon, at the time still known as Rahmonov, was described by Muriel Atkin as a 
“protégé” of Sangak Safarov,129 whose support likely played a key role in the rise of 
Rahmon.130 Rahmon, who was born in Danghara in the Kulob region, was raised in 
Safarov’s neighbourhood. Safarov, according to Nourzhanov, became Rahmon’s 
patron. 131  During the early conflict, Rahmon, at the time a director of a sovkhoz, 
organised Kulobi fighters for Safarov’s militia132 before becoming the Chairman of the 
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Executive Committee of the Kulob Province in early November 1992, after Safarov had 
killed the incumbent Rizoev.133  
At the Supreme Soviet session in Khujand it was clear that Safarov, while not 
seeking any official high position in government,134 was a very powerful player, and not 
just in Kulob. Two reporters described the reactions when he spoke at the session: 
The shocked Deputies heard Sangak’s fiery speech in dead silence, but it became clear 
to them who was calling the tune. […] As for the local authorities, there is no point in 
even talking about them. In the presence of the furious Sangak, they are quieter than 
water and lower than grass.135 
 
Other sources referred to Safarov as the “power behind the throne” 136  and “the 
backbone of the government.”137 As a man with so much de facto power, his opinions 
were sought quite often by reporters. Safarov’s views on what direction  Tajikistan’s 
government and society should go are available in his stated opinions and occasionally 
shouted quotes – most of which seem to have been uttered with little interest in a 
conciliatory public communication strategy. How he publicly portrayed his opponents is 
clear: 
 
This is a new popular revolution. We have chased the Islamists from the region (of 
Kurgan-Tyube) and are starting a new life. We shall drive the fundamentalists out of 
Tajikistan and hoist the Red Flag over the Pamir mountains.138 
 
This is not a resurgence of Communism, we just wanted to be free of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Those people wanted the place to be a colony of Iran. We are against 
excesses, but some people have committed too many crimes. As on the scene of battle, 
they should be shot.139 
 
The fundamentalists - it's hard to find a dirtier word - have blackened the name of 
Islam.140 
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His feelings for the people he labelled ‘Islamists’ or ‘fundamentalists’ did not carry over 
to his views on the role of Islam in society, as he stated that he supports “moderate 
Islamic rule” as part of a “refined democratic path of development.”141 However, in 
terms of democracy, he had a limited system in mind. At one press conference Safarov 
yelled that “We do not want to have political parties in Tajikistan!,” a statement that 
was quickly qualified by a government official: “He means the opposition must respect 
the constitution.”142 This hostility to political parties may have been just his views on 
the opposition alliance specifically or his views on a multi-party system in general. 
Safarov’s hostility was illustrated clearly while speaking as a guest at the Supreme 
Soviet session in Khujand where he declared “we will cleanse Tajikistan of democratic 
rubbish.”143  Later, in February he had slightly changed his rhetoric, now attacking 
people he labelled “pseudo-democrats.”144 Despite not being an ideological communist, 
Safarov did like to use symbols of the old system. For example, at a news conference he 
gave an answer – or rather a tirade against those he termed “pseudo-Islamists” – with a 
bust of Lenin behind him.145 
Safarov continued to be an enormously powerful figure in Tajikistan after the 
victory of the Popular Front. 146  Estimates on the number of fighters Safarov 
commanded varied from his own estimate of 8,000 to higher estimates of 20,000 to 
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35,000 for the Popular Front as a whole.147 Nourzhanov provides a particular example 
of the power Safarov wielded, as well as the regional terms in which Safarov viewed the 
power arrangements. On 7 January 1993 he travelled to Qurghonteppa to the regional 
legislature where he made the following remarks: 
The Kulobis are victors today. They have restored the state. . . . Do not hope that we 
will allow you to restore the status quo. Remember, the People’s Army is here to stay. 
We shall purify our land from those who want to continue with their filthy deeds. . . . If 
someone wants to be with us, to live in peace with us, then he is welcome. But if he 
does not—we shall not forgive him, he will be severely punished. There will be no 
mercy and forgiveness.148 
 
Earlier, at the end of the Supreme Soviet session in Khujand, a sheep was ritually 
slaughtered and Safarov announced: “May the blood of this animal be the last blood that 
is shed in our land.”149 Unfortunately for Safarov, this was not to be the case. Safarov 
was killed in late April 1993 during a meeting with Fayzali Saidov, one of his Popular 
Front allies. After this, the Popular Front officially ceased to exist.150  
 
Fayzali Saidov 
 
Concerning warlords, Nourzhanov cites the case of Fayzali Saidov as a typical 
case. In June 1992 Saidov led a small (10 person) self-defence unit in his collective 
farm near Qurghonteppa.151  When opposition forces arrested his father he took 40 
Gharmi Tajiks and held them in an attempt to negotiate for his father. He set the 
Gharmis free after being promised his father would be released. However, two days 
later he found the burnt and mutilated body of his father. Saidov immediately mobilised 
his male kin, former classmates and co-workers and went to Kulob where he secured 
weapons for his newly formed militia. Within his own community Saidov soon took on 
a hero status. Unsurprisingly, Saidov demonstrated a “pathological, unbound hatred of 
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Gharmis and Pamiris.”152 As for Saidov’s ethnicity, Roy writes that Saidov had an 
Uzbek mother;153 Erica Marat plainly describes him as an ethnic Uzbek;154 Gretsky 
labels him as a Lokay;155 while Kenjaev gives his ethnicity as Tajik.156 Rubin cautiously 
describes Saidov as having a Kulobi Tajik mother and a Loqay-Uzbek father from 
Qurghonteppa.157 Whatever his exact ethnic make-up, Saidov became a close ally of 
Sangak Safarov.158 However, these two allies soon entered into a violent disagreement 
that left both of them dead on the night of 29/30 March 1993.159  
 
Mahmud Khudoyberdiev 
 
Mahmud Khudoyberdiev was an ethnic Loqay Uzbek commander whose exact 
ethnic mix is given numerous descriptions.160 At the time when the civil war started 
Khudoyberdiev was a young (early thirties according to Akiner161) captain in the 201st 
MRD whose role was also as Deputy Military Commissioner of Qurghonteppa.162 
Nourzhanov writes that he “was the only warlord with solid military background.”163 
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When the conflict reached Qurghonteppa in 1992, Khudoyberdiev took several tanks 
from the CIS/Russian army garrison that was stationed in Qurghonteppa and formed a 
powerful Popular Front aligned militia to protect the ethnic Uzbeks who had been 
attacked by the opposition forces. 164  Or, as another version has it, Khudoyberdiev 
moved against the opposition forces after his house was burned and his relatives killed 
in punishment for his refusal to join the opposition.165 Regardless of motivations for 
joining the war, Khudoyberdiev gained a reputation as a protector of the local Uzbek 
community. 166  After a negotiated compromise, the government decreed the Uzbek 
population in the Qurghonteppa region and the city of Qurghonteppa to be under the 
command of the local Uzbek militia leaders.167 Whitlock says Khudoyberdiev spoke 
Tajik with a “heavy Uzbek accent” and surrounded himself with Uzbeks and Turkmens. 
But his focus was not just on protecting Uzbeks. Whitlock writes that in Qurghonteppa 
Khudoyberdiev was “much admired” for keeping such services here (e.g., clean water) 
functioning during the war while they failed elsewhere.168 
 
 
IRP 
 
The IRP, as the only political party to transition to a military force, deserves 
special attention. In autumn 1992 the IRP – along with the DPT, Rastokhez and La’li 
Badakhshon – formed Najoti Vatan (Salvation of the Homeland, AKA National 
Salvation Front), an attempt at forming a broader unified military-political 
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organisation.169 The leadership of Najoti Vatan attempted to form arrangements with 
government institutions,170 but the organisation was eventually, if not immediately, a 
failure.171 In mid-October the leadership optimistically declared that the organisation 
had successfully achieved its aims and could now be dissolved.172 In the Vakhsh Valley 
it was clear during the summer that one particular group in the opposition alliance was 
contributing more than the others. Dispensing with names of political parties and 
militias – and using explicit regional terms – Roy writes that Gharmi forces “expelled 
the Kulobis” from the Vakhsh Valley in June and July 1992, setting up their blockade of 
Kulob in July.173 However, the Gharmi forces did have non-Gharmi assistance. In July, 
the government sent the Pamiri-dominated Independent Battalion of the Interior 
Ministry to Qurghonteppa to separate the two fighting sides. They disregarded their 
orders and attacked the Kulobi forces.174  
As mentioned previously, most of the IRP-affiliated field commanders in the 
south were mullahs who had previously been linked to the IRP. These mullahs already 
had loyal followers whom they could recruit into militias.175 After surveying former IRP 
leaders and fighters the HD Centre concluded that: 
Local representatives of the Islamic Renaissance Party as well as some Islamic religious 
leaders played an important role in the formation of the armed units of the opposition. 
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Some mullahs, close to the IRP, preached about each Muslim’s duty to fight for the 
jihad. Later, when many people were forced to flee to Afghanistan or Russia, many 
refugees became fighters, not necessarily voluntarily. Many young people seemed to 
have no other choice. Had they refused they would have been shunned by their 
community.176 
 
However, not just mullahs or the occasional apparatchik served as commanders or 
organisers. For example, in Shahrtuz the IRP commander was ‘Ali,’ a man identified by 
locals as a “businessman or criminal,” depending on who is asked.177 Aside from a 
person’s pre-existing standing in the community – religious or otherwise – the 
distribution of weapons by an individual commander solidified that person’s importance 
at the beginning of the conflict.178 However, access to weapons was just one of many 
problematic issues for newly formed militias. The HD Centre concludes that “The 
Islamic opposition’s initial weakness and defeat of 1992 can be partially explained by 
its lack of a unified command structure, no central training facility and no experienced 
military personnel.”179 
 
 
Part 2: Patterns of Violent Conflict 
 
Inter- and Intra-Ethnic Conflict 
 
There is no description of the patterns of violent conflict that is applicable across 
all groups and individuals in Tajikistan. The civil war of 1992 was mainly between the 
Kulobis, southern Uzbeks (including Uzbek-speakers such as the Arabs, Qarluqs and 
Lokays) and Hisoris, organised later in the year as the Popular Front, and 
Gharmis/Qaroteginis and Ismaili Pamiris on the other side. Those from the northern 
province of Leninobod, both Uzbek and Tajik, avoided participating in the military 
conflict.180 However, the groups mentioned above were not monolithic in their actions, 
nor were the sides to the conflict hardened into their positions based on identity right 
from the beginning of the conflict. As the conflict progressed the parties to the conflict 
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went through a process of regionalisation (e.g., Kulobis versus Gharmis) and 
ethnicisation. The following sections will analyse the main lines of conflict, as well as 
some of the lesser prevalent patterns of conflict. 
 
 
Intra-Tajik violence: Kulobis vs. Gharmis 
 
“We saw war only on our television screens before. We never thought Tajiks would be 
fighting Tajiks one day.” 
 
- 70-year-old Tajik woman in Kuybushev.181 
 
During the course of the civil war approximately 500,000 - 700,000 people 
became refugees within Tajikistan, or ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs), and 63,000 
refugees fled to Afghanistan.182 The discussion of refugees and IDPs of the civil war is 
overwhelmingly focused on Gharmi Tajiks and Pamiris. Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
does note that the Popular Front’s offensive in the south – beginning in August 1992 
before there was a unified counter-opposition group – destroyed property, killed 
civilians and forced refugees to flee. However, HRW starts their analysis at an earlier 
point, and it is during this time that mostly Kulobi Tajiks and Uzbeks are the ones 
fleeing. The HRW report emphasizes that “During the course of the fighting, both sides 
committed atrocities, including murder, disappearances, hostage-taking, and burning 
and looting of homes.”183 In June and July thousands of Kulobi Tajiks and Uzbeks fled 
Qurghonteppa to Kulob and Uzbekistan, and their houses were looted and destroyed. 
HRW cites a government number of 133,000 displaced Kulobis and Uzbeks during 
summer 1992.184 One source puts the anti-Kulobi and anti-Uzbek actions month earlier 
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in May and June when Gharmis and Pamiris in Qurghonteppa Province worked to 
“appropriate lands” from the Kulobis and Uzbeks.185 These numbers are similar in other 
sources as well. Nourzhanov cites 90,000 IDPs fleeing opposition-controlled areas for 
Kulob and 30,000 Uzbeks from Qurghonteppa also fleeing, mostly for Hisor. Many of 
these IDPs joined militias or formed new ones.186 The high range of estimates comes 
from the Kulobi historian Gholib Ghoibov. His uncited claim is that by the end of June 
100,000 to 140,000 IDPs had fled to Kulob from just the Vakhsh District alone.187 Even 
the opposition press acknowledged this refugee flow in July, but along with an attempt 
to frame the displacement of people (the source names a long list of various ethnicities) 
as due not to violence, but euphemistically to the “general insecurity of daily life.”188  
Popular Front troops killed people based on regional origin or perceived 
religious convictions or membership in political parties.189  Refugees in Afghanistan 
stated that soldiers of the Popular Front were killing men, women and children “on the 
merest suspicion of IRP affiliation.”190 Numerous writers note that during the civil war 
armed forces killed many people based on their region of origin, and that the most 
significant conflict was between Tajik regional groups, namely Gharmis and Kulobis.191 
Rubin is one of many analysts who dismiss the ideological aspect and notes that “the 
victorious militias chose men to kill not by indications of their ideology, but by 
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indications of the region where they were born.”192 Akiner adds economic motivations 
as a factor in the violence, arguing that some locals, specifically Kulobi Tajiks, resented 
the relative wealth of the Qarotegini and Darvozi Tajiks (i.e., Gharmi Tajiks) who had 
been resettled in the Vakhsh Valley during the Soviet period. The economic resentment 
against the Gharmi Tajiks, combined with the “humiliation at the hands of the Islamists” 
during summer 1992 resulted in “an opportunity to take revenge.”193 
While the Popular Front forces’ targeted killings of Pamiris and Gharmis in 
Dushanbe after the Kulobi-dominated militia captured the city is significant,194  the 
worst of the conflict was in Qurghonteppa Province: in the Vakhsh Valley and nearby 
where the Kofarnihon River valley widens before reaching the Amu Darya. Most 
writers emphasize the attacks by Kulobi Popular Front forces against Pamiris and – 
especially – Gharmi Tajiks.195 These descriptions are typical:    
 
This was a savage war: massacres, rape, torture, looting and summary executions. The 
lower Vakhsh was the scene of Serb-style ethnic cleansing. The houses of Gharmis and 
Pamiris were systematically destroyed and the civilian populations fled towards the 
border with Afghanistan.196 
 
The pro-Communist forces which emerged from Kulob Province displayed shocking 
brutality, destroying dozens of villages, mainly in Qurghonteppa Province, for their 
alleged support of the coalition government. They also summarily executed many 
thousands of civilians suspected of anti-Communist loyalties on the grounds that they 
spoke a Tajik dialect or held documents from regions of Tajikistan other than 
Leninabod and Kulob.197  
 
The same muhajir communities [i.e., Gharmis] from lower Wakhsh [Vakhsh] and 
Qurghan-Teppa were also to be, in 1992, the main victim of the slaughters operated in 
the civil population by the “red” militias of the Kulabi warlord and leader of the pro-
Communist Popular Front, Sangak Safar.198 
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In December 1992 and January 1993, after the government instigated an intense 
crackdown against opposition sympathizers and Kulobi warlords mounted further 
attacks against Gharmis and Pamiris in Khatlon, another large wave of displacement 
took place, including the flight of at least 60,000 Tajiks to Afghanistan. Long after these 
incidents, the crumbling mud walls of roofless houses in many Gharmi and Pamiri 
villages formed a stark contrast to the untouched Kulobi neighbourhoods nearby and 
bore testimony to the selectivity of destruction and the exile of specific populations.199 
 
The violence that occurred is in line with the analysis of increased 
regionalisation as the conflict progressed. One example is given by Barnett Rubin, when 
reporting the statement of an Uzbek from Jilikul in the southern Vakhsh Valley who 
was asked why so many houses were destroyed: “When the Kulabis came, they 
destroyed all the houses of the Garmi Tajiks.”200 Rubin stresses that the Uzbek said 
nothing of democracy, Islamic fundamentalism, or communism. Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) writes that some of those fleeing were deeply involved with the opposition, and 
not just as supporters or organisers, but as fighters. HRW goes on to note that the pro-
government forces associated many people with the opposition merely by their 
ethnicity, meaning Pamiri and Gharmi.201 However, some refugees fled not from the 
pro-government forces, but from forced conscription by opposition forces.202 
While Safarov and his Kulobi militia get most of the blame, the Popular Front 
forces of Kenjaev from Hisor also get a mention for their offensive along the 
Kofarnihon River in far south-western Tajikistan. Kenjaev’s forces attacked Gharmi 
villages in the districts of Shahrtuz and Qabodiyon, forcing Gharmi civilians to flee or 
be killed, leaving the district to be demographically dominated by ethnic Uzbeks.203 
Whitlock interviewed one former IRP fighter who described the looting, raping and 
killing that occurred in Shahrtuz. He notes that locals were also involved in perpetrating 
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killings and not many attempted to assist neighbours. He also said that that “People 
claimed they were Uzbeks, Arabs – anything to stay alive.”204  
Those who fled the pro-government offensive had little choice in where to go. 
As the offensive divided the south, the refugees fled along whatever route was 
considered safest, meaning north to Dushanbe and the mountains (Gharm or GBAO) or 
south to Afghanistan.205 For many of those Tajiks and Pamiris fleeing to the north and 
east, this meant a return to their region of origin.206 The displacement of Gharmis and 
Pamiris sometime included entire villages fleeing. This would seem the case for some 
districts in the Vakhsh Valley. For example, the UNHCR’s numbers (likely including 
refugees/IDPs on all sides) show 90-95% of Bokhtar District fled, mostly to Gharm. A 
similar percentage also fled the Vakhsh District. Even the city of Qurghonteppa had a 
high number of displaced people (60%). The lower Kofarnihon was also affected; over 
40% of Shahrtuz District fled.207 As the Popular Front took control over the south, IDPs 
had no choice but to cross the river into Afghanistan as refugees. In early December 
tens of thousands crossed the river at Auvaj. At the end of December the Popular Front 
took the last opposition position in south near Panj and another 40,000 IDPs crossed the 
Amu.208  
The return of IDPs and refugees was both quick in time and high in percentage 
of returnees. By March 1993 70% had returned to their homes in the south. By 1995 
well over 90% had returned.209 The quality of life for many returnees should be noted as 
it was, for many, wretched.210 However, the numbers also need to be qualified. McLean 
and Greene note that in the Vakhsh district, for example, the percentages count only 
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those moving out and then those moving in, including newcomers from Kulob.211 
Bushkov also writes of newcomers replacing Tajiks who fled, in the case of Uzbeks 
from the Surkhan-Daryo region of Uzbekistan moving to southern Tajikistan to places 
from where Tajiks had fled.212 
 
Tajiks versus Pamiris 
 
As noted above, the Popular Front attacked not just Gharmi Tajiks, but also 
Pamiris, a fact mentioned in numerous sources.213 As will be discussed in the section on 
the regionalisation of the conflict, the Popular Front forces came to identify both 
Gharmis and Pamiris wholesale with the opposition and often killed them based on 
this.214 From the beginning of 1992 the pro-incumbent side identified Pamiris as being 
affiliated wholesale with Gharmis and the IRP, and therefore being enemies of Kulobis 
and Khujandis.215 Popular Front attacks on Pamiris occurred mainly during the counter-
offensive in the second half of 1992 in the south of Tajikistan and in Dushanbe that 
winter as part of the reprisals when the Popular Front took the city.216 The status of the 
Pamiris as being firmly associated with the opposition – via the exclusively Pamiri La’li 
Badakhshon Party and the Pamiri Interior Ministry troops that fought against the 
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counter-opposition – is clear, but other ethnic and regional groups beyond Pamiris, 
Gharmis and Kulobis were also involved. 
 
Uzbeks 
 
“They want to clear all Uzbeks out of the area. They just came in the morning and told 
us: "All you Uzbeks must go, just leave here straight away."” 
 
  - Ethnic Uzbek refugee in Khujand.217 
 
In the course of 1992 Gharmi Tajiks and Uzbeks fought each other in 
Qurghonteppa Province. During the civil war most Uzbeks throughout Tajikistan sided 
with the counter-opposition forces (‘Popular Front’ after early October).218 There were 
some exceptions to the trend of Uzbeks joining the counter-opposition, and not just by 
remaining neutral. Whitlock writes, possibly in regards to an early phase of the conflict, 
that in “some places Uzbeks, for instance, stood alongside Arabs for fear of Gharmis, 
while in others they were shoulder to shoulder with Gharmis to save their village from 
Kulabis, depending on the make-up of the kolkhoz.”219 However, the broad consensus is 
that the dominant trend was Uzbeks joining forces with the militias that would become 
the Popular Front – the Kulobi Tajik fighters of Qurghonteppa and Kulob Provinces, 
and the Hisori militia of Safarali Kenjaev.220 By late 1992 the joint offensive by Safarov 
and Kenjaev routed the opposition forces and attacked Gharmi civilians. At this time 
reports of ethnic Uzbeks in Qurghonteppa conducting “pogroms” against 
Gharmi/Qarotegini Tajiks emerged.221 As for the counter-opposition as a whole, their 
attacks against Gharmis in the latter half of 1992 were devastating, particularly when 
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analysing the destruction of property. The status of Uzbek property amongst the 
destruction is telling. For example, in late 1992 unnamed forces222 attacked the village 
of ‘Socialism’, one of four in the ‘Communism’ collective farm in the Qabodiyon 
district, and destroyed all but 2 of 750 Gharmi houses. The two left undestroyed 
belonged to mixed Uzbek-Gharmi families. 223  Some houses, such as in the 
‘Turkmeniston’ (now ‘Haqiqat’) farm, survived with “This is an Uzbek house, do not 
touch” written on them.224 In another example, a Gharmi settlement was looted and then 
destroyed by counter-opposition forces while two miles away a mixed settlement of 
Uzbeks and non-Gharmi Tajiks was untouched.225  
While the overwhelming support of Uzbeks for the Popular Front – or 
alternately their opposition to Gharmi Tajiks – is obvious, the reasons for this are less 
clear. Various hypotheses have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. 
 
A Response to Tajik Nationalist Rhetoric? 
 
Atkin argues that “Propaganda from Uzbekistan and from the anti-reformists 
sent the message that the Opposition posed a threat to the Uzbek minority.”226 However, 
other analysts have attempted to outline the ethnic Uzbek involvement as a response to 
threatening nationalist rhetoric employed by the opposition, not by outside propaganda. 
Zartman credits elements of Tajik nationalism in the opposition as a factor contributing 
to “the success of mobilizing Uzbeks on the side of the Popular Front.”227 Similarly, 
Irina Zviagelskaya explains the ethnic Uzbek anti-opposition stance as a response to the 
rhetoric of some opposition members who had attempted to “steer inter-Tajik discord 
into the channel of Tajik-Uzbek contradictions, thus enhancing the conflict’s inter-
ethnic dimension. This development was reminiscent of the notorious "search for the 
enemy".”228  
There are numerous examples of nationalist rhetoric against Uzbek and Turkic 
peoples. As an example, Zviagelskaya notes that in one televised incident the Rastokhez 
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representative Mirbobo Mirrahimov, who was appointed the television director under 
the Government of National Reconciliation, showed a group of men accused of crimes 
against the coalition government and emphasized their Uzbek identity.229 Other personal 
attacks were focused on a person’s alleged Uzbek heritage, as when unnamed 
opposition members accused President Nabiev of being an “Uzbek in disguise” in an 
attempt to “discredit” him.230 This tactic is very similar to the earlier intellectual battles 
wherein the younger generation of Gharmi Tajik intellectuals accused their rival 
Khujandi and Samarqandi intellectuals of secretly being ethnic Uzbeks of foreign 
origin.231 Whitlock notes that beyond intellectuals, even some imams were involved in 
similar rhetoric, such as in Dushanbe during early May – after the apparent opposition 
political successes – when “some imams taunted and insulted the Kulabi ‘losers’ and 
mocked the Uzbek minority at Friday prayers.”232 
The opposition parties and the affiliated forces in Tajikistan were clearly a force 
that was not welcoming of ethnic Uzbeks. Beyond the Gharmi Tajik-dominated Islamic 
Revival Party there were the Tajik nationalists of Rastokhez and the DPT. Shodmon 
Yusuf, the leader of the DPT was especially hostile to non-Tajiks. In an interview with 
reporter Igor Rotar he contrasted the spiritual superiority of the “purely” Persian-
speaking Tajiks with the “inhuman acts” of the Leninobodi and Kulobi Tajiks, blaming 
their cruelty on their racial mixing with Turkic and Mongol peoples. Rotar mentions 
that other opposition members voiced similar opinions.233  
 
Preservation of Soviet Era Benefits? 
 
Matteo Fumagalli also points to the fear of a Tajik nationalist opposition, but in 
combination with a strategy by Uzbeks to maintain the benefits they enjoyed during the 
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Soviet era as part of the Khujand faction.234 However, this would only be applicable in 
the north, an area almost entirely irrelevant to the military conflict.  
 
An Opposition Response to the Role of Uzbekistan? 
 
Roy notes the continued anti-Uzbek rhetoric of Tajik nationalists in exile (after 
winter 1992-3), notably from Rastokhez members who saw the civil war as an “Uzbek 
plot to crush Tajik nationalism”, 235  though this could be more anti-Uzbekistan 
government than anti-Uzbek. Regarding the role of Uzbekistan, Whitlock argues that 
the Uzbek government repeatedly denied supplying arms to combatants in Tajikistan, 
but that few people in Tajikistan believed it. Whitlock asserts, without supporting her 
argument, that as a result, inside Tajikistan the “local 'Tajik' Uzbeks paid the price, as 
their neighbours – understanding no difference between 'Uzbeks' and 'Uzbekistan' – 
blamed them for fueling the war.”236 Rowe notes a similar – but minority – opinion 
among his contacts after the end of the war. Referring to the Hisor Valley, informants 
told him that “the western end contained a substantial Uzbek population and they, with 
the silent backing of Uzbekistan, were an effective 5th column in the war trying to 
sabotage Tajikistan to ultimately pave the way for an Uzbek takeover.”237 The problem 
with many of the above arguments is that, as will be shown further below, Uzbeks were 
being attacked and fleeing the Vakhsh Valley far before Uzbekistan became involved in 
the conflict. The role of Uzbekistan may help explain why there were sustained 
grievances against locals Uzbeks, but it fails to explain both the outbreak of violence 
and the early trend of Uzbeks joining the counter-opposition.   
 
Influence of Kenjaev’s Recruiting Tactics? 
 
As for Uzbeks and Uzbek-speakers in Qurghonteppa and the Vakhsh Valley, it 
is possible that they were associated with the pro-government side at an early point in 
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part due to the recruiting tactics of Kenjaev. Early in the conflict Kenjaev, the former 
speaker of the legislature recruited heavily for the Popular Front among Uzbeks in 
Hisor, west of Dushanbe.238 Sergei Gretsky, an adviser to Qazi Turajonzoda, breaks 
down the Hisori grouping into the districts of Tursunzoda, Hisor and Shahrinav, and 
emphasizes their “substantial Uzbek population” as a reason for Popular Front support 
from these areas.239 Regarding Uzbeks in the capital, after Kenjaev’s failed October 
attempt to capture Dushanbe “the Uzbek population fled, fearing retribution”240 As with 
the previous hypothesis, this one also suffers from not matching chronologically. 
Kenjaev’s offensives occurred well after the violence of summer 1992. 
 
Strategies of Mobilisation? 
 
One explanation of ethnic Uzbek support for the Popular Front is provided by 
Schoeberlein, who argues that the “pro-Communist forces” in Qurghonteppa 
strategically “pitted” the Gharmis and Pamiris against the Uzbek-speaking Arabs, 
Loqays and Qarluqs.241 However, he does not elaborate or provide an explanation for 
the mechanisms of strategic manipulation used here.  Zartman focuses instead on the 
Uzbek community itself rather than on any possible external manipulation. He writes, 
unfortunately without further elaboration, that the “disproportionate role of Uzbeks on 
the government side represents the result of ethnic entrepreneurs exploiting solidarity 
networks in competition for resources in Qurghon-Teppe.” 242  The problem with 
Schoeberlein’s explanation is that if there was any ‘strategic pitting’ early in the 
conflict, it was done on the opposition side, as evidenced by the early conflict dynamics 
involving ethnic Uzbeks (see next section). Zartman’s explanation is more plausible, but 
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not at an early point in the conflict when Uzbek actions were overwhelmingly 
defensive. 
 
Defensive Actions by Uzbeks? 
 
Several analysts focus on local factors (especially violent ones) in the areas of 
conflict as part of a process that drew Uzbeks into supporting the Popular Front. 
Nourzhanov and Shepherd both argue that Uzbek support in the south for the Popular 
Front was for protection from attacks by Gharmi Tajiks.243  For example, Shepherd 
writes that during the civil war opposition forces in Qurghonteppa targeted ethnic 
Uzbek civilians – as well as anyone from the north – for rape, beatings, and even 
execution.244 Local Uzbeks were fleeing Qurghonteppa starting in late spring 1992. At 
an early point, in mid to late May, one newspaper described a “mass exodus of Uzbeks 
and Russians” from Qurghonteppa Province due to “rumours of the imminent 
"Islamization" of the republic and punishment of those who resisted the opposition.”245 
Zartman describes the Gharmi attacks on Uzbeks and Kulobis in Qurghonteppa as being 
“revenge” attacks for the “bloody purge of democratic sympathizers” by Kulobi Popular 
Front Forces in Kulob.246 Other motivations are also likely. In May and June, Gharmis 
and Pamiris in Qurghonteppa Province expropriated land from ethnic Uzbeks. 247 
Throughout June and July thousands of Uzbeks fled Qurghonteppa, and their houses 
were looted and destroyed. HRW cites a government number of 133,000 displaced 
Kulobis and Uzbeks during summer 1992.248 These numbers are similar in other sources 
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as well. Nourzhanov cites 90,000 IDPs fleeing opposition-controlled areas for Kulob 
and 30,000 Uzbeks from Qurghonteppa also fleeing, mostly for Hisor, but also to 
Khujand and Uzbekistan. Many of these IDPs joined militias or formed new ones.249  
One specific example of violence against Uzbeks comes from the city of 
Qurghonteppa where an Urguti Uzbek250 businessman was killed. Whitlock writes that 
in response fearful Urgutis formed a “self-defence force.”251  This had the effect of 
scaring Tajiks in a neighbouring district (Vakhsh or Bokhtar) into believing that the 
Urgutis were set on revenge and had a death list of Tajik families. These Tajiks then 
forced their Uzbek neighbours out of their village and looted their homes.252 Bushkov 
and Mikulsky also provide an analysis that highlights the attacks against Uzbeks. At the 
beginning of September when the opposition forces took the city of Qurghonteppa they 
followed their opponents into the Urgut Uzbek neighbourhood and massacred civilians 
there.253  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
to go – that is, who it was safest to be. Uzbeks made for Uzbek-populated areas – west to Hisar, north to 
Khujand, and across the border to Uzbekistan.” See: Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 168. Bushkov and 
Mikulsky give a similar number, 132,000. The timeframe they provide is for June and July. See: Bushkov 
and Mikulsky, Anatomiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane, 66. Opposition-controlled Tajik Radio 
reported that there were 150,000 IDPs in Kulob. See: Tajik Radio 1400gmt (25 September 1992) in SWB 
SU/1497 (28 September 1992) B/1. 
249
 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 167-8; Human Rights Watch, ‘Return to Tajikistan’, n.p; 
Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 116. Numbers used 
by Nourzhanov for Kulobis from Izvestiia (5 September 1992), for Uzbeks from Russkaia mysl (25 
September 1992). HRW notes that The Department of Refugee Affairs of the Ministry of Labor of 
Tajikistan estimated 133,000 Kulobis and Uzbeks fled, but does not break down the two categories. In 
regards to those Uzbeks fleeing to Uzbekistan, most of them had family roots there. The Uzbek 
government noted in mid-July that most of the Uzbek refugees are “settling with their relatives” in 
Ferghana and Tashkent. The Uzbek government did not provide a number for Uzbek refugees, instead 
noting that Uzbek and Russian-speaking refugees totalled about 5,000 people. See: Interfax 1320gmt (8 
July 1992) in SWB SU/1429 (10 July 1992) B/6. By late 1994 the UN High Commission on Refugees 
estimated that 30,000 Uzbeks had left for Uzbekistan. See: Rupert Colville, ‘Rebuilding Socialism’, 
Refugees Magazine, Issue 98 (1 Dec 1994), n.p. Online: http://www.unhcr.org/print/3b5421984.html See 
also: Bushkov, ‘Population Migration in Tajikistan’, 155. For a brief mention of Uzbeks and Tatars 
fleeing Qurghonteppa along with Russians in Spring 1992, see: Aleksandr Pilipchuk, ‘B Tupike stoit 
echelon s bezhentsami b Kurgan-Tyube’, Krasnaya zvezda, No. 249 (31 October 1992).  
250
 Urguti (Urgutlik) Uzbeks are from the Samarqand province in Uzbekistan. 
251
 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 168. 
252
 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 168. Whitlock reports that the Uzbek houses were then looted. See 
also: see Golos Tadzhikistana, 9/13/92, as cited in Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? 
Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 127.  
253
 Bushkov and Mikulsky, Anatomiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane, 67-8. Bushkov and Mikulsky 
write that Uzbeks and others had fled to Lomonosov to shelter in the local 201st garrison (the 191st). 
Local opposition fighters deny that they were involved, instead claiming that Russians in disguise 
committed the killings, for reasons unspecified. See: Vadim Belykh and Nikolai Burbyga, ‘Cartridges 
instead of Bread’, Izvestia (15 September 1992) 1, in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 
XLIV, No. 37 (14 October 1992). 
 263 
Pre-existing Gharmi-Uzbek Enmity 
 
Another possibility is that the breakdown of law and order after the May 
demonstrations allowed for pre-existing conflicts to turn violent. As mentioned in an 
earlier chapter, Tajiks resettled from the mountainous areas, especially Gharm, found 
their interests in conflict with those populations already there.254  Forced population 
transfers and sedentarisation in the early Soviet era put Uzbek Loqay, Kungrat and 
Durman in competition for resources with Tajiks in Qurghonteppa.255 For those who did 
not immediately enter into problematic relations, the situation worsened later. 
According to Akiner, the original inhabitants of the Vakhsh Valley came to resent the 
eventual success of the immigrants to the region.256 A later example in Qurghonteppa is 
from the 1960s when Gharmis and Uzbeks were involved in disputes over land and 
water.257 Population demographics and a shortage of resources in the 1970s and 1980s 
resulted in further increased competition for resources among the groups in the Vakhsh 
Valley.258 The likelihood of national level conflicts finding local cleavages to attach to 
was clearly present. These two levels of conflict quickly joined in an ‘alliance’ when the 
fighting began. 
 
The Loqays 
 
One prominent group in the Qurghonteppa region was the Loqays, often 
identified as Uzbeks.259  The Loqays’ primary concerns were the land disputes that 
brought them into conflict with the Gharmi Tajiks. Soon after independence the 
historically pastoral Loqays who had been deported from the Qurghonteppa region 
began to return and attempted to reclaim their historical land from the Tajiks who 
settled there. As a result, during the civil war the conflict in Qurghonteppa Province 
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included an interethnic element as Loqays and Gharmi Tajiks fought each other here,260 
partly over the land issue but also because many Loqays supported the Popular Front in 
the civil war, probably in the hope that they would be rewarded with autonomy and a 
share of the power.261 Whatever the motivations, in 1992 the Loqays in Qurghonteppa 
were “active supporters” of the Popular Front. 262  The opposition adviser Gretsky 
identifies the Popular Front as originally composed of Kulobis, Hisoris and Loqays,263 
giving the Loqays a prominent role. However, the two most well know Loqays are of 
mixed ethnicity. Abdulmajid Dostiev, the first man to serve as the deputy chair of the 
Supreme Soviet under Rahmon (1992-5), is Loqay paternally and Kulobi maternally264 
while Mahmud Khudoyberdiev was of a mixed background.265 
 
Other Ethnicities 
 
The reasons for the anti-opposition forces’ execution of a group of Kyrgyz are 
not clear.266 The reasons for other conflicts that fall on regional and ethnic lines are 
clearer. For example, a Tajik group known as the Ghazi Malek267 was involved in the 
conflict, but not on the far periphery like those Tajiks described by Tett who killed their 
Pamiri neighbours. The Ghazi Malek instead live between Qabodiyon and Jilikul where 
a Ghazi Malek militia became prominent by switching sides from being first allied with 
Gharmis and then later with the Kulobis. Roy argues that their contribution “made the 
difference locally” and that they were rewarded with some spoils of war.268 Moving 
away from Tajiks, the Central Asian Arabs of southern Tajikistan were also involved in 
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conflict with neighbours during the civil war, and not for the first time. On 31 July 1991 
there occurred a conflict between Arabs and Qaroteginis [Gharmis] in the Qabodiyon 
District of the Qurghonteppa Province, an area with a shortage of land. The Gharmi 
Tajiks who arrived to Qabodiyon from the 1930s to 1950s gradually entered into local 
positions of leadership. When, in 1991, taxes taken from all those living in Qabodiyon 
were used to build a new mosque, the local administration appointed a Gharmi Tajik as 
imam. Local non-muhajir269 Tajiks were angered by the decision and publicly protested. 
The non-muhajir Tajiks were joined by local Uzbek-speaking Arabs who were also 
upset with the appointment of a Gharmi Tajik, as the Arabs believed themselves to be 
descendents of the prophet Muhammad and endowed with special religious legitimacy, 
in addition to being the rightful owners of the local land. In the end, the Arabs, in their 
own collective farm brigade, left the kolkhoz administration that they were in, taking 
their land with them.270  During the civil war Arabs joined Kulobis and Uzbeks in 
attacking, forcing out and even massacring Gharmis.271  
Many ethnic groups did manage to avoid the conflict. Roy argues that Jews, 
Jugis (Gypsies), Germans, Koreans and Russians272 avoided the war thanks to the fact 
that “groups which have established themselves in economic niches where they do not 
compete with others are not the object of any vendetta.”273 Roy notes that despite the 
presence of ethnic German and Korean kolkhozes in the south, the Germans avoided the 
conflict completely by emigrating and the Koreans by being in “highly specialized 
economic roles” that didn’t compete with other locals.274 Also worth noting is that the 
above mentioned groups were not seeking a national level role either directly nor 
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through large scale support for an opposition or pro-government political party, nor did 
they initiate conflict as other groups did in order to make local gains.  
 
Russians and other Slavs 
 
Even before the war, in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, hundreds of 
thousands of the non-indigenous population (e.g., Slavs, Germans, Jews,275 etc…) left 
Tajikistan. Bushkov and Mikulsky demonstrate that the emigration of Russian-speakers 
(including Germans and Jews) increased after the violence of February 1990. When the 
civil war started in 1992 the emigration became an “avalanche.” 276  In regards to 
Russians, Whitlock briefly attempts to portray a society lacking in anti-Russian attitudes 
during the conflict277  while Rowe’s post-conflict research finds “no overt antipathy 
towards Russians whatsoever.”278 However, others describe a different attitude towards 
Slavs. Matveeva describes an environment in the lead up to civil war in which Russians 
were being harassed and growing uncomfortable with anti-Russian sentiments.279 Others 
made similar points about all Slavs in general (including Belorussians and Ukrainians), 
mixed Slav-Tajiks and Russophones, stating that they felt increasingly unwelcome and 
wanted to leave Tajikistan.280 Others stressed instead the economic hardships.281 As for 
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outside support, Russia, with military forces under its command based in Tajikistan, did 
not have a clear and coherent policy during the first phase of the civil war.282  
On May 10, DPT leader Shodmon Yusuf made a statement in Russian on Tajik 
Radio regarding “crude [Russian] interference in our affairs” that included this warning: 
“I want again to warn the cold leaders of the CIS that there are a large number of 
Russian speakers in the town. […] I would absolutely and utterly not want, in the wake 
of events, this […] to weigh on inter-ethnic relations in the town.”283 These comments 
on the radio were broadly interpreted as a threat against ethnic Russians.284 Russians’ 
fears were acknowledged by some opposition leaders, who attempted to remedy the 
situation. Turajonzoda met with representatives of Dushanbe’s Russian community to 
reassure them that nobody in the republic will be allowed to express “anti-Russian 
sentiments” or “perpetrate anti-Russian actions.”285 IRP leader Davlat Usmon, himself a 
leader in a party whose followers were four times more likely to be in favour of Slavic 
emigration from Tajikistan than was the Tajik average,286  travelled to Qurghonteppa to 
meet with ethnic Russians in an attempt to reassure them.287 Concerning specifics, some 
reports mention either acts of anti-Russian vandalism288  or the formation of ethnic 
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Russian “self-defense detachments.” 289  The government itself did little to reassure 
Russians by way of bureaucratic decisions and new laws. Examples include 
constitutional changes to ban dual citizenship and provisions to phase out the Russian 
language from “social and political life,” acts which even one unnamed opposition 
member blamed for exacerbating the ethnic situation and leading to emigration from 
Tajikistan. 290  In late August ethnic Russians appealed to Nabiev, complaining of 
“persecutions and threats” against some in the community, and calling for reinstatement 
of dual citizenship. The appeal also cited accusations that Russian refugees were 
stealing from Tajikistan by taking their belongings with them.291 Nabiev had earlier 
bemoaned the emigration – framing it as a loss of skilled workers and specialists – and 
blamed inflammatory statements by certain individuals and provocations by opposition-
controlled TV and publications, though without naming names.292   
 However, some Russians remained through the summer and into autumn as the 
violent conflict continued south of the capital. Viktor Dubovitsky, an historian and the 
Deputy Chairman of the ‘Russian Community in Tajikistan,’ was interviewed in 
October. He stressed that no European nation had the long history of interaction with 
the Muslim world as did Russia. He went on to argue that ethnic heterogeneity 
throughout the former Soviet Union would guarantee stability, but that any “mutual 
deportation or internment of representatives of a hostile nation” would adversely affect 
relations between Tajikistan and Russia. 293  He expressed his desire, with some 
trepidation, for Russians to stay (as dual citizens). He said that it would be easy enough 
for Russians to leave, but that they do not want to do so, providing himself as an 
example. Dubovitsky went on to stress that it was easy to live in harmony with 
Tajiks.294 Despite this generally positive assessment, the Russian embassy in Tajikistan 
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confirmed the fears and/or desires of most ethnic Russians when it revealed that 
between July and December, 164,000 of what was left of  Tajikistan’s 388,000 ethnic 
Russians (1989 figures) had left the country. 295  However, not all Russians fled or 
sheltered themselves. Occasionally, local Russians joined the counter-opposition 
units.296 
 
General rhetoric and discourse 
 
“Some people describe what is going on in Kurgan-Tyube as a war of Kulyab against 
Garm, while others think that the Reds are waging a war on Islam.”  
 
     - Reporter Asal Azamova.297 
 
 
“May the barbarous servants of God never again return to Qurghonteppa!” 
   
  -Sangak Safarov, toasting (with alcohol) to the “Islamic fundamentalists.”298 
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“My friend here comes from a farm, I am from the city so you could say that is a 
difference. [But] we are all united against the Kulyabi, who want Tajikistan to remain a 
colony of Russia.” 
 
     -Pro-opposition checkpoint guard in Qurghonteppa.299 
 
 “We’re for Islam, the communists are against that.” 
       -Pro-opposition fighter at Kuybyshev state farm.300 
 
 The four statements above are typical examples of how the opposing sides 
referred to each other when framing the conflict. Those who were pro-opposition often 
described their opponents as ‘Kulobis’301 and/or ‘communists,’302 and occasionally as 
‘infidels.’ 303   On the other side, the counter-opposition supporters described the 
opposition forces as Muslim extremists (using a broad range of terminology/epithets). 
Outsiders to the conflict (e.g., Western and Russian media outlets) often described, 
problematically, the counter-opposition as being ‘pro-Nabiev’ 304  (despite numerous 
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powerful Kulobis leaders renouncing Nabiev) and or ‘communist.’305 Meanwhile, they 
very rarely used ‘Gharmi’ to describe pro-opposition fighters.306 The impression that 
ideology played a significant role can in part be blamed on the language that some 
Tajiks307 and  even some scholars used (e.g., ‘neo-Soviet’ and ‘pro-Communist,’) to 
describe the Popular Front forces,308 a usage that crosses over into describing opposition 
supporters.309 Bess Brown is more careful in her terminology, writing that government 
supporters “have been described as pro-communist, but it is probably more accurate to 
describe them as anti-opposition.”310 An antidote to this terminology is John Anderson’s 
description of the rhetorical references to ideology. He notes that the incumbents were 
“concerned less with preserving Marxist-Leninist ideology against a new philosophy 
than with protecting positions and influence built up over decades.” 311  The more 
fundamental fault lines can be seen in the composition of the various refugee flows and 
in the selection of victims by the two sides, i.e., Kulobi Tajiks and Uzbeks on one side 
and Gharmi Tajiks and Pamiris on the other, as well as opposition political party 
affiliation. 
Kilavuz specifically discusses the discourses – based on Islam, ethnicity, 
regionalism and democracy – employed by both sides during the conflict to mobilize 
support, and which were used according to context and audience. Most importantly, she 
notes how mixed discourses were used: 
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People mixed together different discourses in their accounts. As one informant said: 
“There were many divisions: Leninabad and Kulyab versus Garm; Islam versus 
Communism; Wofchik versus Yurchik; Wahabis versus Communists. It was possible to 
hear all these divisions invoked as factors dividing the sides in the conflict.” The 
religious and regional discourses were mixed. Some informants, for example, asserted 
that “Garmis were religious fanatics. They were Wahabis.” In their accounts, the enemy 
was both Islamic fundamentalist and Garmi, while for others the enemy was both 
Kulyabi and Communist and unbeliever.312 
 
Each side represented itself as champions of democracy and the opposing side as either 
Islamists or Communists fighting against democracy.313 As for the discourse on Islam, 
the pro-government side branded opposition supporters as ‘Wahhabis’ (Islamists of an 
alleged Saudi influence) while the opposition replied with the disparaging epithet 
‘Yurchik’ (a diminutive of the Russian name Yuri). Of course, the government – 
attempting to portray itself as the defender of democracy and human rights – described 
its opponents as “Islamic fundamentalists” seeking a state ruled by sharia law, as well 
as radical nationalists seeking the expulsion of all non-Tajiks.314 Others were much less 
specific, such as a Kulobi commander at Kuybyshev who said “The opposition wants 
the victory of Islam. We cannot allow them to overthrow the elected president and we 
will fight.”315 The powerful commander Safarov was especially partial to invoking the 
threats of Islamic extremism, saying that if the “Islamic forces” were not defeated in 
Tajikistan they would spread their campaign to the rest of Central Asia.316  As for the 
opposition, Matveeva notes the increased use of “Islamic slogans” in the opposition at 
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the expense of “democratic” ones.317 And the discourse on the possibility of an Islamic 
state was used even by DPT leader Yusuf, if only as a bluff: “Today there is no basis for 
an Islamic state in Tajikistan. […] That would change immediately with Russian army 
intervention. What may be 40 years away could then come in two years.”318 
Beyond the negative branding of entire groups, there were verbal attacks and 
threats against individuals. A specific tactic that exacerbated regionalism was the series 
of personal attacks surrounding the firing of the ethnic Pamiri Mahmadayoz 
Navjuvanov. Kenjaev fired Navjuvanov from his position as Minister of the Interior in 
March 1992 for his refusal to move forcefully against anti-government demonstrators in 
September 1991. Navjuvanov in return accused Kenjaev of discriminating against 
Pamiris. The result was Pamiri supporters of Navjuvanov gathering in Shahidon square 
and calling for the resignation of Kenjaev.319 
The escalating rhetoric, both during and immediately after the protests, increased 
tensions and hostilities between the opposition and the pro-government sides. Gavhar 
Juraeva, an academic active in the opposition, blames the government for regionalising 
the protest cycle by switching from rhetoric of “national unity” and “reconciliation,” 
which it used during the February 1990 protests to the playing of a “regional card.”320 
She also points to the government’s branding of Turajonzoda as an “enemy of the 
people” as a significant turning point in that it “had the unintended consequence of 
increasing both his prestige and the role of the religious wing within the opposition.”321 
Threats of imprisonment and even death became common, Whitlock reports: 
Some Azadi demonstrators shouted wildly that Turajanzada was a criminal, and should 
be put on trial. One government man initially in sympathy with the Shahidan group 
froze in horror when someone there yelled ‘Burn the communists' houses and let them 
suffocate in the smoke!’ He was not alone in feeling that things had gone too far, and 
that people had begun to play dangerous parts.322 
 
Turajonzoda later returned the insult at a rally in September 1992 when he and 
Himmatzoda referred to the opposition forces as the “Army of God” while naming the 
Kulobi forces and the religious leaders who supported them as the “Army of Satan.”323 
One pro-government figure, Sangak Safarov, was one of the people at the 
protests already framing the situation in regional terms when he spoke of Kulobis being 
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able to restore order to the city.324 Some in the opposition saw the issue in terms of 
‘Kulobis’ as well. After the pro-government forces left Ozodi square the garbage-strewn 
area was shown on TV with a sign that read ‘Museum of Kulob’ and accompanied with 
a commentator who remarked “Look at how dirty these Kulabis made our city.”325 
Furthermore, according to Whitlock, TV reporters filmed a room in the basement of 
parliament filled with condoms and bottles while remarking “this is where the Kulabis 
took our girls and raped them.”326 Similar rumours circulated in Kulob, where some 
speculated that Gharmis’ goals were to seize power and then take Kulobis’ daughters. 
Later, in May, some imams at Friday prayers took to taunting Kulobis as “losers” while 
also mocking Uzbeks.327 Roy provides a similar analysis, noting that “from the first 
demonstrations, identity obtained over ideological denomination in both camps: in the 
sermons of the mullahs, ‘Kulabi’ was equivalent to ‘Kafir’ [infidel]…” 328  The 
opposition adviser Gretsky later acknowledged the mistake of rhetorically attacking all 
Kulobis. He argues that in May 1992 “some leaders of the opposition indulged in the 
vice of localism by stirring anti-Kulobi emotions that deeply offended Kulob 
sensibilities and made them more prone to fight the opposition to the end.”329 Some 
officials, such as the Qurghonteppa Province Executive Committee Chairman Nurali 
Qurbonov at the end of September, were conciliatory when referring to Kulobis as a 
whole.330 However, by this time it was too late.  
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Security Dilemmas 
 
“Both sides require their opponents to disarm. But no one wants to take the initiative 
and set an example.”  
 
  -Reporters’ paraphrase of a Russian Colonel’s assessment of negotiations.331 
 
 
Referring to the political contestation and protests in the capital, Zartman 
remarks that “In each of the three major periods of escalating confrontation, the conflict 
in Tajikistan illustrates the rational-instrumental model and especially the security 
dilemma”332 The dilemmas faced were not just those of physical violence. Markowitz 
provides a similar analysis, noting that the supporters of both sides “each intensified 
their efforts to advance a national agenda that undercut the power of the other. 
Mobilization responded to and drove these political maneuvers within the central 
leadership…” 333  Good examples are attacks on careers and assets. Kenjaev, once 
Nabiev appointed him to the Chair on National Security (the KGB successor) in early 
1992, began the use of “judicial and administrative harassment” against all those who 
opposed Nabiev, including DPT and Rastokhez members and the prominent Pamiri 
Navjuvonov. 334  The opposition considered Nabiev’s subsequent appointment of 
Kenjaev to speaker of parliament as a “virtual declaration of war.” 335  Under the 
Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) that formed in May 1992, opposition 
members went after the assets of the pro-government bases. First, they nationalised 
Communist Party assets. Then they attempted to expropriate “joint ventures” that were 
created by Khujandis and Kulobis during winter 1991-1992.336  Opposition IRP and 
DPT ministers also opened trials against former government figures, with the former 
Abdulmalik Abdullojonov of Khujand being the most notable.337 Kulobi elites were 
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under threat as they were, according to Dudoignon, from a region that has little industry 
and is “economically dependent, [and] are at once still closely tied to the practices of the 
parallel economy and viscerally attached to preserving the workings and symbols of the 
old regime…”338 Journalist Igor Rotar quotes the Kulobi Mullah Sharifzoda who said 
that the opposition “stands against the people of our province. […] Kuliabis were the 
first to go out on the square, and that is why the opposition considers them their main 
enemy.”339  Kulobi leaders, according to Markowitz, “had come to view themselves 
under attack as Kuliabis.”340 The early September murder in or near Dushanbe of S. 
Sangov,341 the Kulob Province Executive Committee Deputy Chairman, reinforced this 
belief.342 
The first instance of violent conflict happened on May 5 as a convoy of counter-
demonstrators were arriving in Dushanbe from Kulob. And, as in other incidents, there 
are two irreconcilable versions of ‘who shot first.’343 Zartman argues that the key event 
(the “classic security dilemma”) began with “demonstrating Mullahs attempting to deter 
a government attack through a false claim of ‘27,000’ guns, which gave Nabiev 
justification to hand out automatic weapons to his Kulobi supporters.”344 On 2 May 
1992 President Nabiev formed a “presidential guard” (or ‘National Guard’) by arming 
his supporters; an event that Kilavuz says “brought the country to civil war.”345 On 5 
May the National Guard attempted to break up the Shahidon protests and ‘dozens’ died. 
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Soon after, about 60 people died in street battles in the capital.346 Meanwhile, according 
to Markowitz, the conflict in the capital – followed by the power-sharing agreement 
under the GNR (immediately rejected by Kulobi elites) – turned “disaffection among 
Kuliab’s provincial elite into an overriding need to protect their interest through the use 
of force—through the formation of “self-defense” units.”347 Their worries were likely 
not assuaged when a very partisan figure, the deputy leader of the IRP Davlat Usmon, 
was made deputy PM and tasked as the person to command a security unit that would in 
the future be in charge of disarming both sides.348 The security dilemmas were soon in 
full force, in Markowitz’s words, “As the standoff between the two sides became more 
intense, each side was arming itself as quickly as possible”349 In an address to Cabinet 
on 28 May 1992 Premier Akbar Mirzoev stated that  
…peaceful [sic] political confrontation has been transformed into armed confrontation 
and has moved from Dushanbe to other regions, the Kulob and Qurghonteppa oblasts in 
particular. The opposition’s supporters and its adversaries have created illegal military 
formations which set up armed posts and patrols.350 
 
A good example of the perceived security dilemmas is provided by an accountant in 
southern Tajikistan who had no political affiliations. The man, probably a Gharmi Tajik, 
stated: 
 
I took up arms in September 1992, when I saw with my own eyes that the Uzbeks living 
in our area were arming themselves. […] If we hadn’t taken these weapons for 
ourselves they would have killed us like they have killed a lot of people in Garm 
[Gharm].351  
 
For those in the countryside, Whitlock portrays an environment suffering from an 
information vacuum. She writes that people had no access to news or telephones, and 
that roads were blocked. She quotes one young man in the Vakhsh Valley who 
remarked “Dushanbe? We knew nothing of Qurghon Teppa, let alone Dushanbe!”352 It 
                                                 
346
 Walter Ruby, ‘Tajik President Creates Guard to Crush Protests’, Christian Science Monitor (6 May 
1992); Gregory Gleason, The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1997), 106, as cited in Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 152 
347
 Markowitz, Collapsed and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia, 102, 108-10. See also: 
Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 111-2. 
348
 Splidsboel-Hansen, ‘The Outbreak and Settlement of Civil War’, 11. 
349
 Markowitz, Collapsed and Prebendal States in Post-Soviet Eurasia, 125.  
350
 Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 111-2, 
quoting/translating Vechernii Dushanbe, 29 May 1992. 
351
 Henry Dunant Centre, ‘Humanitarian engagement with armed groups’, 13. 
352
 Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 167. Similarly, Izvestia reported that most residents of Tajikistan 
were confused about the two sides and what they were fighting for. See: Vadim Belykh and Nikolai 
Burbyga, ‘Cartridges instead of Bread’, Izvestia (15 Sept 1992) 1, in The Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press, Vol. XLIV, No. 37 (14 October 1992). There was a possible mutual information vacuum in 
Dushanbe as well. Anna Matveeva writes: “Residents of Dushanbe had little information about the 
fighting in the south, since the mass media was in crisis and the remaining media outlets based in 
Dushanbe and Khujand did not cover events in the south.” See: Matveeva, ‘The Perils of Emerging 
 278 
was in this environment in southern Tajikistan that “isolated home-grown vigilante 
groups” were forming.353  
 
Regionalism 
 
Roy de-emphasises ethnicity and religion, instead stressing that the conflict was 
between “solidarity groups formed in networks.” 354  Kilavuz’s work focuses on the 
causes of the conflict, and she qualifies the importance of ‘regionalism.’ Her interviews 
overwhelmingly show that people believe there were good relations between people 
from different regions of origin, and that it was the war that caused the poor relations, 
not vice versa.355 Her conclusions are as follows: 
The civil war in Tajikistan was not caused by regional animosities. Rather, 
regionalization occurred in the course of the civil war. That is, the war regionalized the 
conflict. This took place by means of the activation of regional networks, and 
intensified during the violent conflict. Persecution by militias, and murders based on 
regional origin, made regional identity and regionalism salient in the war.356 
 
Although regionalism was not the cause of the conflict, it became a tool for attracting 
support and mobilizing people for the war effort. The Communists and opposition 
forces used regional loyalties for their own aims, during the demonstrations and for the 
war effort.357  
 
Dudoignon provides an analysis of the regional patronage networks that moves the 
debate away from whether or not regionalism was the/a causal mechanism for the 
conflict or not. Rather, he focuses on how the regional patterns of patronage networks 
provided the structure, or fault lines, for the conflict. Rubin refers to Dudoignon’s 
description of social cleavages in the conflict, and notes the Marxist and Weberian 
categories he uses:  
 
…they are defined by the relations of different social groups to the means of 
production, exchange, domination and surveillance. He thus refers to various levels of 
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our party apparatus, the economic and state technocrats, the political police, the 
cultural-literary intelligentsia, directors and members of collective farms, industrial 
workers, and mafias, in the restricted sense of groups of people engaged in clearly 
criminal activity such as narcotics smuggling. […] These are the categories Dudoignon 
regards as fundamental. They are articulated, however, with others. The social 
cleavages are related to ideological ones in obvious ways, in so far as different groups 
saw their interests lying with or against the dissolution of the empire and other measures 
associated with the conflict over the nature of independent Tajikistan. Finally, each of 
the social categories had a particular regional pattern of recruitment. The regional ties of 
patronage became the mechanism of mobilization for the war that expressed the more 
fundamental cleavages defined by the relation of social actors to the assets of the 
disintegrating state.358 
 
Specifically in regards to Qurghonteppa, Markowitz writes that the worst of the fighting 
in that province did not result from “submerged emotional ties of group identity” nor 
from “manipulation of regional and ethnic differences amidst shifting circumstances,” 
but rather from the political divisions within the “political elite” of Qurghonteppa 
Province in a competition for assets and resources that fell along lines of “regional 
identities.”359 
 
Islam and Regional Solidarity 
 
“What is striking is the inability of the Islamists, just as in Afghanistan, to rise above 
national, ethnic and localist rifts.” 
- Olivier Roy360 
 
Roy repeats the often noted fact that the civil war in Tajikistan was not, on the 
whole, a war of ideology between communists and Islamists, but rather “between 
regionalist groupings whose antagonistic identity had been, if not created, at least 
reinforced by the Soviet system.”361 As for those ‘Islamists,’ numerous authors mention 
the dominance of Gharmis in the IRP and the dominance of the IRP in the Gharmi 
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communities. The IRP did not hold much appeal to those outside of Gharmi Tajiks, 
even for mullahs. For example, Roy argues that “local mullahs usually followed, rather 
than led, the groups they belonged to.”362 Kilavuz disagrees slightly and notes that there 
were numerous supporters of the opposition in Kulob, including the IRP, but that they 
were “repressed.” She specifically notes that the IRP branch in Kulob was well 
organised and controlled its own mosque.363 One notable Kulobi mullah stuck with the 
IRP – Mullah Abdullo Abdurrahim (Rahimov), a Kulobi who was a founder of the IRP 
and later a member in exile in Afghanistan.364  
As for members of the IRP in Kulob being ‘repressed,’ anecdotes do back up 
Kilavuz’s assertion – but they do not provide any evidence of widespread IRP 
membership in Kulob Province or amongst Kulobis elsewhere. For example, in early 
July 1992 unnamed attackers killed 12 IRP members in Kulob.365 In Roy’s version, the 
power of regional affiliation eventually prevailed over whatever possible appeal the IRP 
may have held for the mullahs. Roy argues that all but one of the mullahs of Kulob, 
Hisor and Leninobod “violently condemned the IRP” and its alleged brand of imported 
Wahhabi Islam, juxtaposing it with a “national and traditional Islam heavily imbued 
with Naqshbandi Sufism.” 366  Roy and Mullojonov both note that it was a Kulobi 
mullah, Haydar Sharifzoda (Sharifov), the imom-khotib of Kulob Province, who first 
challenged Turajonzoda and his new strategy of allying with the IRP and the 
opposition.367 From his base in Kulob, Haydar Sharifzoda (by now the rallying point for 
many Muslim leaders who had left the Qoziyot) called Turajonzoda a “Wahhabi” and an 
“enemy” of the Kulobi people.368 In turn Haydar Sharifzoda was branded the “Red (i.e., 
Communist) Mullah.”369 Kilavuz disagrees with Roy that Haydar Sharifzoda acted only 
out of regional loyalties. She instead stresses his personal rivalry with Turajonzoda as 
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being more important, an analysis she bases on Turajonzoda’s advisor’s writings.370 
Possible personal motivations aside, Haydar Sharifzoda’s action once returning to 
Kulob reinforced the importance of regional affiliation. 
Kilavuz argues that Turajonzoda – as an independent figure – was the key 
broker in bringing together official imams, political Islamists and Sufi notables. In 
particular she argues that it was Turajonzoda’s prestigious Sufi lineage that won him 
support among Sufi sheikhs.371 However, a prominent Naqshbandi Sufi leader from 
Hisor, Fathullokhon Sharifzoda, was firmly against both the IRP and Turajonzoda from 
the beginning.372 Fathullo Sharifzoda’s prominence led him to be selected as a rival 
mufti at a May 1992 conference in Kulob. 373  Fathullo Sharifzoda then assisted in 
recruiting for the Popular Front in the Hisor Valley. After Emomali Rahmon came to 
power, the Qoziyot was abolished and Fathullo Sharifzoda was appointed mufti of 
Tajikistan.374 Turajonzoda’s family’s lineage may have brought him a certain level of 
legitimacy among Sufis, but clearly not enough to overcome the profane loyalties of 
religious leaders, as demonstrated by the overwhelming opposition to Turajonzoda and 
the IRP by the religious notables of Kulob and Hisor.375 As noted by Oumar Arabov, 
“The Civil War showed that regionalism did not spare the Sufi milieu: Sufis were on 
both sides of the barricades.”376 
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In reference to Gharmis who were not mullahs, Roy points to the trend of 
Gharmi “apparatchiks” and farm bosses joining the IRP. Roy states that “kolkhoz 
presidents and mullahs from the same kolkhoz usually found themselves in the same 
camp: Islamic-democrat if they were ‘Garmis’, conservatives if they were 
‘Kulyabis.’”377 The end result in Tajikistan for the IRP was for it to be, in Roy’s words, 
“discredited” not just for failing to protect the civilian population associated with it, but 
also for becoming synonymous with Gharmi interests.378 
 
 
‘Regionalisation’: The Increased Significance of Regional Identity 
 
“Tajikistan was never a nation. We never liked to intermarry because we knew we had 
to keep our blood pure.” 
 
  - Kulobi fighter commenting on the conflict.379 
 
       “The Kuliabis are the lowest Tajiks. Every Tajik learns that from the time he is [a child].” 
 
      - A pro-opposition (and clearly Gharmi) commander from Kuybyshev.380 
 
 
       “We sat with them. We ate with them. We never cared whether they were Kuliabi or not.” 
         
   - Another fighter at Kuybyshev, hinting that this level of enmity is recent.381 
 
Kilavuz’s argument on the subject of regional identity in the civil war is that 
“regional animosities” were not the cause of the war, but rather something that 
gradually increased as the sides to the conflict became more “regionally homogeneous” 
during violent conflict; Kulobis became identified with the pro-government side and 
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Gharmis with the opposition, and were killed accordingly.382 Similarly, Nourzhanov 
notes that it was regional affiliation, not Islam, democracy, or “constitutional order” that 
motivated people to join the conflict once the violence started.383 Roy agrees, noting 
that despite the apparent ideological beginnings of the conflict, the combatants’ 
allegiances were determined by region of origin and by ethnicity.384  
The decision to join the conflict was sometimes not a choice, but a result of 
coercion. Kilavuz writes that many informers told her that young men were given a 
choice to join a militia or die. At the same time families were targeted for not 
contributing money or sons to the militias. And prominent members of the community 
were not exempt. Kilavuz cites example of both Kulobis and Gharmis being killed by 
their own people for not contributing money.385  Kilavuz argues that the worsening 
conflict resulted in the elimination of “moderate figures” and the rise of “aggressive 
ones” as people turned away from the more conciliatory voices.386  She claims, for 
example, that Himmatzoda, the leader of the IRP, lost control over local leaders.387 This 
is reflected in Himmatzoda’s increasingly obscure profile after the violent conflict 
started. He is not mentioned as a leader or organiser in any significant capacity.388 In 
regards to Kulob, after the pro-government demonstrators left Dushanbe, Kulobi law 
enforcement, criminal groups and local politicians cooperated in forcing anybody 
                                                 
382
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 186. Elsewhere (p. 196) Kilavuz summarises her argument: 
“…I have stressed the importance of regional identity in the network formation of elites. These networks 
were activated for the war effort, in which political and armed entrepreneurs made use of regional 
loyalties for mobilization purposes. In order to secure the support of local populations, they used the 
language of regionalism. The rural structure of the Republic embodied within the kolkhoz system, 
together with the regionally-based organization of elite networks, ensured that region would become a 
significant mobilization tool in the war.” 
383
 Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 113. This view 
is supported by Akhmedov who notes that the high-level leaders of the individual factions and parties 
were predominantly from one region. See: Akhmedov, ‘Tajikistan II’, 184-5. 
384
 Roy, ‘Is the Conflict in Tajikistan a Model for Conflicts Throughout Central Asia?’, 133-5, 137-8; 
Roy, ‘Kolkhoz and Civil Society in the Independent States of Central Asia’, 109-112; Roy, The New 
Central Asia, 85-100.  
385
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 192-3. One informer told Kilavuz: “There were some 
families. They could not say they did not support the militias. But they did not send their kids, did not 
give money. They killed them. People could not say ‘we do not support’ because of fear. They obeyed 
them and did whatever they said.” Another remarked about a rich Gharmi: “He was from Garm. He was 
killed by Garmis. He had resisted them. They wanted money. He was rich. They came at night and took 
him from his house and killed him. There are many stories like this. Kulyabis also did this. If you did not 
obey, they would kill you. Many obeyed because they were afraid.” Note that these anecdotes are not 
dated. 
386
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 188-90.  
387
 Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 188-90. Kilavuz continues: “Central leaders such as IRP 
leader Himmatzoda lost their power over local leaders. Moderates were eliminated, sometimes physically, 
by the hardliners. For example, Jienkhan Rizaev [Jurakhon/Jahonkhon/Jienkhon/Jonkhon Rizoev], 
(chairman of the Kulyab region and widely regarded as a moderate figure ready to compromise) was 
killed by Sangak Safarov. On the opposition side, such moderate leaders as Sadirov Rizvan were killed, 
and replaced by individuals advocating more radical positions.” Brackets mine.  
388
 Himmatzoda would eventually be formally replaced by Nuri. 
 284 
associated with the opposition (or suspected of being so) out of Kulob regardless of 
region of origin.389 As a first priority the Kulobi militia under the leadership of Safarov 
violently attacked all dissenters at home, totally destroying the opposition presence 
there by the end of June.390 
According to Iskander Asadulloev, the GNR blockaded Kulob in response to 
open warfare in Qurghonteppa.391 Roy refers to the blockade on the Kulob Province as 
an “economic blockade,”392 while Zartman interprets the ‘Gharmi’ blockade of Kulob as 
a response to the Popular Front’s “bloody purge of democratic sympathizers.”393 Two 
analysts, Zviagelskaya and Akiner, attempt to explain the Kulobi counter-attack on the 
Qurghonteppa region as a result of the anger and desperation generated by the 
opposition’s blockade of Kulob. Akiner claims that the blockade of Kulob further 
“inflamed the crisis by giving a focus to Kulyabi fury.”394 For example, N. Rustamov, 
Deputy Chairman of the Kulob Provincial Soviet Executive Committee remarked, in 
regards to the blockade tactic, that “A starving man – one who, moreover, has been 
driven into a corner – has only one option: to fight to the end.”395 At a lower level, a 
Kulobi fighter stated “We are fighting to break the blockade. We have no bread. We 
want to eat. We want to eat in peace. Once we have won the battle we will lay down our 
arms and go home – once there is a just government.”396  
Zviagelskaya provides a more detailed explanation. She claims that Kulob was 
at the “brink of famine” and that the opposition believed – incorrectly – that this 
pressure on the Kulobis would force them to make concessions to the opposition 
bloc.397 Whitlock’s description – illustrated with the anecdotes of a young Gharmi and a 
young Kulobi – is somewhat less dramatic and mentions the defensive aspect of the 
blockades: 
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The combined self-defence forces of different kolkhozes blocked the road to Kulab with 
tractors and concrete slabs. 'We thought only to protect ourselves,' Daler says. Other 
Hezb-e Nahzat-e Islami [IRP] forces, seeking to defend what successes they had had in 
Dushanbe, also built blockades along the two roads between the capital and Kulab. […] 
 
Jafar (also not his real name) was on the Kulab side of the barricades. 'Of course, we 
took up arms to protect ourselves,' he also says. 'Every family put up a son to join 
Sangak Safarov's militia. From my family, I was that boy.' After security, there, the 
most pressing concern of ordinary Kulabis was food. With no reserves to fall back on, 
families were rendered destitute when the Dushanbe road was cut by the blockades. 
'There was no soap, no flour, nothing,' says Jafar. 'The only way to get food was to go 
on raiding parties. Families sent their sons to fight, not for the glory of Kulab, or for 
power, or for Sangak, but because their boys might come back with some potatoes. And 
then they could manage for another day.'398 
 
Safarov did indeed capitalise on the anger, declaring in late September that if the road to 
Dushanbe is not opened “we will do this ourselves, with weapons.” 399  Qurbonali 
Mirzoaliev, the Chairman of the Kulob Province Executive Committee, described the 
situation in Kulob in mid-September, stressing the dire situation for the refugees, as 
well as medicine and food shortages that were resulting form the blockade.400 
However, Zartman doubts the ‘blockade of Kulob’ version that claims Kulobis 
were suffering behind the blockade. He maintains that “Kulobi leaders created an image 
of humanitarian crisis from the blockade to elicit support from Russia.”401 He notes that 
the blockade lasted only from June to September 1992 when the Popular front destroyed 
the blockade [note that this does not apply to the road to Dushanbe, only to the road to 
Qurghonteppa, where the Kulobi forces were not victorious until October402] and that 
the hardship in Kulob was over-exaggerated,403 contrary to media reports from 1992 
that reported a level of suffering in Kulob that varied from “severe food shortages” to 
“brink of starvation.”404  While the blockade factor may be an exaggeration, it was 
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obviously a long-term threat to the future livelihood of people in the Kulob region. 
Being cut of from Qurghonteppa and Dushanbe leaves Kulob with very little. The 
blockade must be considered as a motivating factor for Kulobis.  
Concerning Qurghonteppa, Kilavuz notes that at the beginning of the conflict 
some Gharmis sided with the ‘Communist’ government and were allied with Kulobis. 
She also notes that there were Kulobis who supported the IRP in Qurghonteppa. 
However, she also notes that they became a small minority as the process of conflict 
produced “more united regions,” with the sides to the conflict acquiring a “more 
homogeneous nature”, thanks partly to the suppression or killing of dissenters by actors 
such as Safarov.405 More importantly, Kilavuz argues: 
When the militias began to kill people according to their regional origin, the process 
itself made regional identity and regionalism one of the most important factors in war. 
Just being from Garm or the Pamirs became grounds for being killed by pro-
government forces, while the opposition came to treat Kulyabis similarly. In order to 
create loyalty, the warring parties used regional identities and allegiances to create 
antagonism towards those from other regions, and thereby generate support for 
themselves. The process forced the majority to side with people from their own 
region.406 
 
Dudoignon offers a similar analysis whereby “the evolution of the conflict conducted 
the protagonists toward further radicalization and regionalization.”407 Zartman’s view is 
also similar, but he adds an emphasis on the process of efficient mobilisation, not just 
violence. He writes that “as escalating violence drove the imperatives of resource 
mobilization through regional loyalty the salience of ideology faded.”408 Schoeberlein 
makes a similar argument: 
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It is rather a different matter that once the struggle for power developed into a 
breakdown of central authority and armed clashes, certain groups held the upper hand in 
certain regions, a logical inevitability as opposed to an “agenda.” Subsequently, as the 
stand-off intensified, demagogues on both sides identified the enemy not as supporters 
of a political agenda but simply as members of regional groups. This regionalism was 
not a significant feature of the opposition movements, but rather grew out of the armed 
conflict.409  
 
Kilavuz also points to more mundane motivations for people joining the conflict. 
She notes that some were getting involved to further their own personal interests, 
whether a long-term personal goal (securing a position that would provide power and 
wealth) or an immediate goal such as looting and theft. She also cites “personal 
enmities” as a motivating factor.410 Kilavuz notes that this could of course be an enmity 
that pre-existed the conflict, but it could also be related to a more immediate enmity, 
namely revenge for the death of a family or friends. Kilavuz quotes a political scientist 
who lived in Qurghonteppa during the war: “As the war went on, people forgot about 
ideology. Ninety percent of people fought not because of religion, region, etc., but for 
local revenge, revenge for their relatives, friends.”411 Izvestia reporters, focusing on the 
localised conflicts, stressed that “fighters on the opposing sides are acting according to 
the principal ‘They’re killing our people – we have to retaliate.’”412 Nourzhanov relays 
the local perspective on revenge, in its idealised form: 
…once cleansing on the basis of regional affiliation got underway and land 
confiscation, rape and pillage commenced, these acts affected the normative core of the 
Tajik traditional culture, epitomised in the concept of nomus, i.e. ‘honour’. The 
prescribed code of behaviour for the protection of honour (nang, or ‘dignity’) required 
all males in a patronymic association to exercise vengeance and self-assertion at all cost 
and under any circumstances.413 
 
In the course of the conflict, some attacks were motivated by rivalries and vendettas.414 
These attacks unfortunately extended beyond fighters. During the summer of 1992 both 
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sides used similar tactics, including targeting family members of the opposing side,415 a 
tactic that had a certain level of approval from civilians. Nourzhanov explains that some 
believed “that only the terror could deter the other side and claimed that their violence 
was just an act of retaliation.”416 Nourzhanov writes that vendettas arising out of the 
killing of relatives drew family and extended kin into the conflict. As an example in 
Qurghonteppa he cites Kulobis murdering relatives of Davlat Usmon, the Deputy 
Chairman of the IRP.417 The targeting of family members and the resulting vendettas 
created a conflict that became increasingly intractable.418  
Television coverage, while at times very uninformative,419 became a divisive 
issue after during and after the upheavals of spring 1992. Aside from the issue of 
contentious Russian and Iranian broadcasting,420 there were the previously mentioned 
                                                 
415
 Schoeberlein-Engel, ‘Conflict in Tajikistan and Central Asia’, 39. 
416
 Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 112-3.  
417
 Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 112-3. The 
example of a Kulobi field commander seeking revenge is also cited. The commander had this to say: 
“…you have to understand one more thing—your enemy does not deserve to tread this land. I realised 
that when I saw my family—mother, wife, and three kids—dead. Not only dead—before killing them, 
Islamists had performed despicable atrocities on them. Now, when an enemy falls to my hands, it is not 
enough for me to kill him. I want him to die slowly and painfully, being deprived first of his ears, then 
tongue, nose, fingers . . . . He screams, choking with blood, and I recall the dead bodies of my children 
with bellies stuffed with manure and pity only one thing—that I can’t extend his suffering for all 
eternity.” See: G. Khaidarov and M. Inomov, Tadzhikistan: tragediia i bol’ naroda (St. Petersburg: 
Linko, 1993), 102-3, as quoted/translated in Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the nation or robber barons? 
Warlord politics in Tajikistan’, 112-3. Another English version (this one clumsy) is available in the 
English edition of the Russian-language book cited by Nourzhanov. See: Khaidarov and Inomov, 
Tajikistan: tragedy and anguish of the nation, 95. For more on the killing of Usmon’s relatives, see: 
Bushkov and Mikulsky, Anatomiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane, 115-6, 137. 
418
 Bushkov and Mikulsky, Anatomiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane, 137.  
419
 For example, it was reported on May 4 that local television broadcast singing and dancing instead of 
news on the street demonstrations. See: Channel 1 TV, Moscow 2005gmt (4 May 1992) in SWB SU/1373 
(6 May 1992) B/7.  
420
 For example, Sherali Khayrulloev, the Deputy Interior Minister, protested what he said were grossly 
exaggerated and inflammatory accounts of small military skirmishes in the south being broadcast on CIS-
wide Ostankino TV, a favourite of pro-reform Yeltsin supporters and a target for “hardliners” in Russia. 
See: Bruce Clark, ‘TV coverage of skirmishes in Tajikistan draws flak’, The Times (29 June 1992). 
Opposition-controlled Tajik Radio was even more upset with Russian television broadcasts, particularly 
that of the ‘Russia’ TV Channel which was relayed by Kulob TV to the Qurghonteppa Province. Tajik 
Radio stated that “This television station broadcasts only false and propagandistic news, indecent and 
violent films, which has caused resentment among the inhabitants of Vakhshanzamin [lit., ‘Land of the 
people of Vakhsh’].” See: Tajik Radio (24 September 1992) in SWB SU/1495 (25 September 1992) i. As 
for Kulob TV, it was used as a tool of the counter-opposition for “broadcasting widely against” the 
coalition government. See: Moukhabbat Khodjibaeva, ‘Television and the Tajik Conflict’, Central Asia 
Monitor, No. 1, 1999, 14. In regards to TV from Uzbekistan, the Qoziyot (Muslim Spiritual Board of 
Tajikistan) under the control of Turajonzoda protested the broadcasting of TV programmes from 
Uzbekistan in Tajikistan. The Qoziyot and other unnamed organisations sent a protest to the President and 
the Council of Ministers complaining that an Uzbek TV programme broadcast on July 14 had “falsified 
the truth” and “turned the Muslim peoples of the two fraternal republics against one another”, an act 
which amounted to external interference in Tajik affairs.  See: Tajik Radio (17 July 1992) in SWB 
SU/1436 (18 July 1992) ii. In regards to opposition controlled Tajik TV, “Each night state television airs 
the Iranian news, a pastiche of veiled women, ranting mullahs and foreign coverage that shows American 
military exercises or riot police pummelling citizens in some Western capital. The announcer sits before a 
world map that neglects to show North America.” See: Adam Kelliher, ‘Gangs bring anarchy to old 
Soviet south’, The Sunday Times (2 August 1992). In addition to television, Iranian radio was also relayed 
 289 
‘Yellow Journalism’ type attacks on Kulobi Tajiks. These tactics led Davlat 
Khudonazarov, an ethnic Pamiri, to declare that the government should accept Kulobi 
demands for the removal of the leadership of the State Committee for Television and 
Radio Broadcasting, as their “one-sided position in the conflict has greatly harmed the 
prospects for a civil accord.”421 Moukhabbat Khodjibaeva, in her analysis of television 
in Tajikistan, argues that a serious mistake was made in regards to the content of the 
opposition-controlled TV broadcasting when the “opposition began openly calling all 
inhabitants of the Kulob region enemies of the nation, thereby losing any opportunity 
whatsoever of attracting people from that region to their side.”422   
 
Summary 
 
 This chapter outlined the diversity in many aspects of the conflict and the 
inability to provide a single description that is true across time, location and individual 
or group. Most fitting of this description is the emergence of armed factions and their 
attempts to recruit members and arm them. The leaders who emerged were from a 
variety of backgrounds: civilian, military, police, government, criminal, religious, 
collective farm, etc. And their methods of recruiting varied as well. Formal and informal 
networks and structures were both employed to bring in recruits. The tactics employed 
in the recruitment process depended on the circumstances, as many fighters joined 
militias willingly while some were compelled by necessity or force. In regards resources 
and arms to support their armed factions, militia leaders relied on a variety of sources, 
both foreign and domestic.    
 At the outbreak of violent conflict there were not the solid cleavages between 
regional identities and ethnicities that existed half a year later. Ideological discourses of 
communism, Tajik nationalism, democracy and Islam proved to be insufficient in 
generating the required level of mobilisation, leaving regional loyalties as the soundest 
base for recruitment and for waging war. However, conflict entrepreneurs and political 
leaders in the opposition and in government had to work towards this polarised 
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situation, ensuring benefits and power for themselves along the way. Starting with a 
significant level of political and economic relevance for regional and ethnic identities – 
with groups like Kulobis and Gharmis being over-represented on the incumbent and 
opposition sides, respectively – the violent conflict created security dilemmas whereby 
the most logical course of action was to side with your regional grouping while viewing 
other groups as a threat to your livelihood and/or your life. This created the logic of 
regional bases for conducting the war, both at the elite and non-elite level.  
Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion: The Outbreak, Spread and Eventual 
Decline of Conflict 
 
 
This dissertation provided an analysis for the outbreak, spread and eventual 
decline of violent conflict in Tajikistan – covering the first, and most violent, round of 
conflict in the civil war. The ‘security dilemma’ and ‘credible commitment problem’ 
proved to be effective tools for analysing the logic behind the outbreak and continuation 
of conflict in Tajikistan. The analysis of the distinct regional and, in some cases ethnic, 
characteristics of the opposing armed groups demonstrated how the ‘mobilising 
structures’ were limited, or even captured, by the pre-existing networks and politically 
and economically relevant regional and ethnic identities in Tajikistan. The process 
whereby national-level political competition was intimately attached to local conflicts – 
resulting in the rapid spread of violence in rural areas – was clearly illustrated using the 
concept of ‘alliance’, a process whereby seemingly unrelated local agendas quickly 
attach to broader cleavages at the national level. And finally, explaining why 
indiscriminate violence was used against civilian populations and why it was eventually 
abandoned as a tactic, an adaption of the theory of ‘indiscriminate violence’ proved to 
be a useful analytical tool. The resulting analysis, combined with a complete narrative 
of 1992, fills a gap in the literature on the Tajik Civil War as other accounts focus 
primarily on the variables that resulted in the outbreak of conflict or on the peace 
process and post-conflict era.  
  
 
The Security Dilemma and the Credible Commitment Problem 
 
 
Numerous people have made comments or provided analysis on the security 
dilemmas present in Tajikistan that led to conflict. This includes observers on the 
ground, participants, journalists and analysts. However, these comments and analysis 
are predominantly of a superficial or pluralistic nature. Jonathan Zartman has provided a 
slightly more comprehensive and theoretical outline for the emergence of the security 
dilemma in Tajikistan, stating that “In each of the three major periods of escalating 
confrontation, the conflict in Tajikistan illustrates the rational-instrumental model and 
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especially the security dilemma.”1 In the discussion that follows I will reiterate some of 
Zartman’s salient points, critically elaborated and adapted in this thesis. The security 
dilemmas were alluded to in the chapter on the transition to conflict, and more fully in 
chapter 5.  
Before the onset of the security dilemma and the beginning of the civil war, 
there were ‘dilemmas’ of a non-security nature. The potential for loss of power, jobs, 
resources, access and prestige – already a real possibility during the replacement of 
cadres in the late 1980s – would surely have been on the minds of the incumbents and 
those within their patronage networks during the election and political intrigue of late 
1991 through to the massive anti-government street demonstrations in the spring of 
1992. And true to the dual nature of the abovementioned ‘dilemma,’ those in the 
opposition also had much to lose. This was most obvious in the arrests and harassment 
endured by opposition members in late 1991 and early 1992. As noted by Kilavuz, the 
attempt by President Nabiev to purge the ranks of his own party while simultaneously 
attacking the opposition resulted in a larger, more determined, and more united 
opposition.2 
It was during the street demonstrations of the two rival sides that the security 
dilemma manifested. Throughout the demonstrations both sides spread rumours and 
made threats against each other, including thinly-veiled threats of violence. 
Accordingly, President Nabiev’s decision to distribute weapons to a hastily organised 
‘National Guard’ composed of Kulobi Tajiks is most clear example of the security 
dilemma. After this point both sides assumed the other was mobilising for combat and 
responded accordingly. 3  Zartman continues to briefly describe the outbreak and 
escalation of violence in Qurghonteppa Province as the result of a security dilemma.4 
With the opposition ascendant, ethnic Uzbeks and Kulobi Tajiks started to flee 
Qurghonteppa Province, spurred both by rumours and by attacks on them by opposition 
supporters. The continuing small-scale violence finally erupted in late June with the first 
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serious sustained round of violence at a collective farm in the Vakhsh District of 
Qurghonteppa Province. From this point the militarised mobilisation by the opposing 
sides made clear that the period of contentious politics had transitioned into open 
warfare.  
With the conflict having transitioned from the streets and political arena of the 
capital, militia commanders increasingly gained power at the expense of local 
authorities and the government and opposition leaders in the capital. The clear need for 
mediation and a negotiated settlement resulted in numerous envoys, ceasefires and 
peace proposals during summer and fall 1992. However, the envoys were ignored, the 
cease-fires were immediately violated, and peace was not an option for those 
combatants in the field. There was a definite logic to the inability of those in the war 
zones to commit to a peaceful settlement. This is where the ‘credible commitment 
problem’ becomes relevant. Nobody had the ability to enforce or guarantee a peace 
agreement. The government was obviously too weak to enforce any sort of settlement, 
and the counter-opposition forces has sufficient reason to be suspicious of the new state 
structures at the republic level. While the granting of one-third of cabinet positions to 
the opposition and some top-level appointments to some non-cabinet positions may 
seem modest, other opposition gains were quite threatening to the counter-opposition 
forces. The mid-May appointment of the deputy IRP leader Davlat Usmon to the post of 
deputy PM would seem sufficient to induce a level of discomfort with the new 
government. But his authority went far beyond that of just a deputy PM as he was 
granted oversight over the KGB (National Security Council), the republic-level 
prosecutor’s office and the Defence Committee, as well as responsibility for law 
enforcement bodies.5  While this de jure authority never manifested in practise, the 
granting of that authority surely could not have reassured the counter-opposition forces.  
Independent local peace envoys attempted to mediate between the two sides. 
One such example was Davlat Khudonazarov. Unfortunately, the Kulobi militias did not 
trust the former opposition presidential candidate while the opposition militias found 
him “too tractable.”6 Khudonazarov did have what initially appeared to be a success. 
Broad ceasefire agreements were reached at the end of June and at the end of July – and 
promptly violated. Forces in the field continued to fight each other with little regard for 
the cease-fire agreements. As fully outlined in the war summary chapter, further local 
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ceasefires, envoys and commissions through September and October were all failures. 
Outside envoys from Russia and Kyrgyzstan also attempted to mediate, with no success. 
The possibility of CIS peacekeepers serving as a third party that could ensure a ‘credible 
commitment’ was mentioned numerous times. However, no outside intervention in the 
form of ‘peacekeepers’ would materialise until 1993. As far any desire for peace, at the 
end of September the Kulobi militias and their allies began their successful counter-
attack which led to a series of gains on the ground. After this point any enthusiasm on 
their side for a settlement was lost. By late September and early October leaders on both 
sides of the conflict stated that there would be no peaceful resolution.7 When acting 
President Iskandarov, Prime Minister Abdullojonov and General Ashurov of the 201st 
Division formed a ‘State Council’ to seek a negotiated peace settlement in early 
November, the initiative was supported by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev who 
travelled to Kulob and Qurghonteppa to support the initiative. However, the proposals 
were rejected by Safarov and Emomali Rahmon.8 At this point there was obviously no 
willingness to seek any negotiated peace, especially on the part of the Popular Front 
which was making continuous gains. Serious negotiations, prompted by a ‘mutually 
hurting stalemate’9 and pressure from regional power brokers, would be years away. 
 
 
Mobilising Structures and Framing 
 
  
 Merely noting the cultural differences between Tajiks from different regions 
does not explain why so much of the violence of the civil war was between Gharmi and 
Kulobi Tajiks, nor do the differences between Uzbeks and Pamiris on one hand, and 
Tajiks on the other, explain the inter-ethnic dimension to the conflict. The politicisation 
and social-economic relevance of these identities is the key here. These factors were 
analysed at length throughout this dissertation. I will again briefly restate them for 
emphasis and connect them to the analytical framework of ‘mobilising structures’ and 
‘frames.’ 
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 The mass-migration to the Vakhsh Valley of Tajiks from the mountainous areas 
of what came to be commonly referred to as Gharm coupled with the simultaneous 
migration of Tajiks from the foothills and valleys of Kulob, and their segregation into 
separate neighbourhoods and settlements, provided for an environment where regional 
differentiation could be retained. But it was the politicisation of these regional 
differences that allowed for individuals – even a large number of individuals within a 
group – to see members of the other group, and their social, political and/or economic 
success as a threat to one’s own prosperity. These were the challenges faced by the 
organisations that sought to recruit the maximum number of followers. The Pamiri party 
La’li Badakhshon was obviously ethnically-constrained in terms of the limitations of its 
recruiting. Meanwhile, the nationalist party Rastokhez automatically limited itself to 
Tajiks – and its urban and intellectual bases further limited its potential. The Democratic 
Party of Tajikistan was similarly constrained with its urban and intelligentsia 
composition in a largely rural republic. The poor leadership of the DPT further hurt any 
small chance of popular appeal.10  
This left the Islamic Revival Party as the only opposition party that had a 
realistic chance of recruiting across urban and rural constituents and across regional and 
ethnic divides (in regards to Sunnis). Obviously, party ideology would deter a certain 
number of Sunnis in Tajikistan from supporting the IRP. But more importantly, the IRP 
was itself a thinly-disguised party for the interests of Gharmi Tajiks. The top leadership 
in the IRP was Gharmi and its base was overwhelmingly Gharmi. Olimova argued that 
Gharmi elites ought to use the IRP to promote their own interests, leading to a regional 
agenda in the party.11 However, the party was ‘captured’ by Gharmis long ago. The 
Kulobi membership amounted to a token at best, and in non-Gharmi areas where the 
IRP had support, such as Mastchoh and Khovaling,12 IRP support was insignificant in 
terms of population and influence.  This Gharmi base of support led to the party “openly 
advocating” for Gharmi interests both in Gharm and in the Vakhsh Valley.13 Of course, 
a political party appealing to its base should be no surprise. But when a party has such a 
narrow base, appealing only to the interests of a narrow spectrum of society will not 
lead to popular support. And predictably, IRP support from non-Gharmis dropped as the 
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IRP regional strategy progressed.14 The authors cited above who point to a Gharmi 
regional agenda in the IRP generally, with some exceptions,15 do not provide details of 
how this pro-Gharmi agenda manifested during the latter half of 1991 and through late 
spring 1992. Since the IRP was not in any position of power until they received a share 
of the positions in the NGR, there were few opportunities to use government structures 
to benefit Gharmi interests. However, the perception of the IRP as a ‘vehicle’ of Gharmi 
interests would have been sufficient to discourage most non-Gharmis from joining. The 
overwhelming dominance of Gharmis in the leadership and in the base of support would 
suffice to create this perception. If there was any doubt about the IRP leadership’s 
regional agenda, the summer 1992 cleansing of Kulobis from IRP third-in-command 
Nuri’s home collective farm would most likely have removed any last doubt.  
A party with a small base and a low level of popular support such as the IRP16 
can still play a part as a coalition member in politics, but the importance of street 
demonstrations and the outbreak of violent conflict both boosted the importance of the 
IRP significantly. The IRP’s ability to quickly mobilise significant numbers of people 
from nearby rural areas during the opposition’s street demonstrations significantly 
raised the prominence of the IRP. The drawback was that the people mobilised by the 
IRP were overwhelmingly Gharmi Tajiks.  
When violent conflict broke out in the Vakhsh Valley, the opposition forces 
were associated with the Gharmi population as a whole. At the same time, the 
opposition forces associated the Uzbek and Kulobi Tajik population with the incumbent 
government. For the Kulobi Tajiks, the process of ‘capturing’ a social movement came 
later than did the Gharmi dominance in the IRP. And for Kulobi Tajiks, there would be 
no political party to use as a vehicle. Kulobis were mobilised by local elites to cast pro-
incumbent votes for the government candidate in the presidential elections of November 
1991. But their votes were just a part of the pro-incumbent votes that also would have 
come in large numbers from Leninobod Province, Dushanbe and Hisor. The 
significance of Kulobis in the political process would come when the ‘process’ was 
breaking down, namely during the large street demonstrations in April and May 1992. 
                                                 
14
 Olimova and Olimov, ‘The Islamic Renaissance Party’, 26; Roy, The New Central Asia, 156; Marat, 
‘The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia’, 106. 
15
 In Dushanbe, DPT and IRP activists, after joining the coalition government, attempted to nationalise 
the “joint ventures” created the previous winter by Khujandi and Kulobi elites. See: Dudoignon, 
‘Communal Solidarity and Social Conflicts in Late 20th Century Central Asia’, 19. 
16
 Levels of support in surveys in both November 1991 and June 1992 were at 6%. Note: the percentage 
of respondents in June 1992 who answered that they supported “no party” was 39%. See: Kosach, 
‘Tajikistan: Political Parties in an Inchoate National Space’, 134-6, cit. Ozhidaniia i nadezhdy liudei v 
usloviiakh stanovleniia gosudarstvennosti (Opyt sotsiologicheskikh issledovanyi v Tadzhikistane, 
Kazakhstane, Rossii i na Ukraine) (Moscow, Russian Academy of Management, 1992) 29-43. 
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Unable to rely on security forces in Dushanbe to end the opposition demonstrations, the 
government called on its networks – primarily along links that extended into Kulob 
Province – to provide counter-demonstrators.17 The importance and power of the Kulobi 
‘junior partners’ steadily increased after the political competition in the capital 
transitioned to violent conflict. The dominant Leninobod network was far removed from 
the capital in a geographic sense, and could not mobilise supporters in sufficient 
numbers for street demonstration—and not at all for military mobilisation. This left the 
incumbent-aligned networks in Hisor and Kulob as the only force which could fight the 
opposition (i.e., the Gharmi dominated IRP). The Hisori forces would be late to the fight 
in the Vakhsh Valley, leaving Kulobi militias (including Vakhsh Valley Kulobis) and 
some local Uzbeks to be the counter-opposition force here.  
 The above summary shows that the relevant ‘mobilising structures’ – including 
both networks and political parties – in Tajikistan were becoming synonymous with 
regional identities even before the outbreak of conflict. The process of mobilising 
further ‘regionalised’ the opposing sides. This was the case not just because of the pre-
existing nature of the mobilising structures. Another very significant factor was how the 
leaders and main actors ‘framed’ the political and military struggle. In their rhetoric, 
they were framing the conflict in regional terms. First, certain Kulobi leaders stressed 
the Kulobi nature of the pro-incumbent demonstrations in Dushanbe.18 And the Kulobi 
leaders portrayed the political battles in Dushanbe as a threat to all Kulobis. 19 
Supporters of the opposition in return also stressed the Kulobi identity of their 
opponents. During and after the demonstrations the Kulobi demonstrators – especially 
after they had left the capital – were publicly mocked and denigrated as Kulobis by the 
opposition, a tactic that opposition adviser Sergei Gretsky acknowledged was a mistake. 
He admits that “some leaders of the opposition indulged in the vice of localism by 
stirring anti-Kulobi emotions that deeply offended Kulob sensibilities and made them 
more prone to fight the opposition to the end.”20 Once the violent conflict began, the 
anti-Kulobi rhetoric of the opposition was overshadowed by the more immediate and 
serious physical21 and economic22  attacks against Kulobis by pro-opposition fighters.          
                                                 
17
 For example, see: Mullojonov, ‘The Islamic Clergy in Tajikistan since the End of the Soviet Period’, 
241; Brown, ‘Whither Tajikistan’, 3; Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 179-80. 
18
 E.g., as noted by Whitlock, “Safarov took the helm at Azadi. He worked the crowds skilfully, 
scratching at their rawest fears and supplying a flattering solution. ‘Fifty Kulabis’ could restore order to 
Dushanbe, he boasted.” See: Whitlock, Land Beyond the River, 160. 
19
 See, for example: Kilavuz, Understanding Violent Conflict, 188-90. 
20
 Gretsky, ‘Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace’, 222. 
21
 E.g., see earlier references to the flow of Kulobi (and Uzbek) refugees from Qurghonteppa Province in 
May and June 1992. 
 298 
 Kulobi leaders and fighters, for their part, returned the insults – but did not 
publicly emphasise the Gharmi identity of their opponents. Instead they referred to them 
as Muslim extremists, using a variety of epithets (e.g., ‘Wahhabis’ or 
‘fundamentalists’). This tactic may have been an attempt to frame the conflict to the 
outside, especially to Russia and the neighbouring Central Asian republics in a bid for 
support. Or it may have been more of a framing process aimed at scaring the population 
of Tajikistan away from the opposition. But despite the lack of anti-Gharmi rhetoric in 
how the Kulobi commanders and their supporters framed the conflict, their attacks 
against civilians were clearly targeting Gharmi Tajiks (as well as Pamiris to a lesser 
extent).  
 
‘Alliance’: The Connection of Local and National Agendas and Cleavages 
 
The Vakhsh Valley was not an ‘empty vessel’ to be filled with national-level 
politics and grievances. There were plenty of local cleavages in Qurghonteppa Province 
that held great social and economic significance. The process in Tajikistan through 
which national-level political divisions were attached to local conflicts – resulting in the 
rapid spread of violence in rural areas – can be viewed clearly using the concept of 
‘alliance’, the process of seemingly unrelated local agendas quickly being attached to 
broader cleavages at the national level. It is worth repeating Kalyvas, the author who 
outlined this theory: 
 
….conflicts and violence “on the ground” often seem more related to local issues rather 
than the “master cleavage” that drives the civil war at the national level. This is the case 
despite the fact that local cleavages are usually framed in the discursive terminology of 
the master cleavage.23 
 
Of course, the ‘master cleavages’ of ideology and religion fail completely to explain the 
violence in the Vakhsh Valley – as the violence here was along lines of regional and 
ethnic identity (i.e., predominantly Kulobis, Uzbeks and Gharmis fighting for control of 
collective farms, land, factories and infrastructure). The failure of the ‘master cleavages’ 
to account for the conflict in the Vakhsh Valley was noted immediately after the first 
significant round of fighting, far before any analyst or academic noted the same. Former 
opposition presidential candidate Khudonazarov immediately labelled the first large 
scale battle at a collective farm in the Vakhsh District in late June 1992 as a “local 
                                                                                                                                               
22
 See the analysis of the blockade of Kulob Province in chapter 5.  
23
 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars, 364.  
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conflict” between Kulobis and Gharmis that was “born” 50 years previous with 
population transfers.24  An unnamed IRP official also commented, denying any IRP 
involvement in the fighting. He euphemistically described the outbreak of violence in 
the Vakhsh District as “an ordinary clash between self-defence forces of villages of 
different orientations.”25 Both of these descriptions are correct in the sense that Kulobis 
and Gharmis were fighting each other here. However, the attempt to explain the 
violence as ‘local’ and to downplay its significance and lack of connectivity to a major 
national-level political party or group is very problematic.  
Kalyvas convincingly demonstrates that local individuals and communities use 
the outbreak of civil war as an opportunity to pursue their own local agendas. These 
local conflicts, that usually pre-date the outbreak of war, are kept under control (i.e., 
they remain non-violent) until the opportunity arises to connect these local conflicts to 
the national-level conflict. If taken too far, this explanation could easily be included in 
the mostly discarded ‘ancient hatreds’ argument found in ‘primordialist’ or ‘essentialist’ 
explanations for ethnic conflict.26 There were, of course, no ‘ancient hatreds.’ Instead 
there was very recent – and ongoing – bureaucratic fighting and economic competition 
for control over farms, jobs and other resources in the Vakhsh Valley. And, all 
importantly, in Qurghonteppa Province these cleavages fell along lines of region of 
origin.27  
The connection (‘alliance’) of national and local issues was not a phenomenon 
that occurred suddenly. The networks that extended from the capital down to the level 
of collective farm went through the opposition on the Gharmi side and through the 
incumbent rulers on the Kulobi side. And these ties that went through the conduit of 
opposing political blocs were solidified quite recently. Kulobi elites were solidly 
connected to the incumbent elites, especially starting during the elections of November 
1991. Meanwhile, Gharmi and Pamiri elites began using the opposition parties as a tool 
to promote their interests at the expense of their rivals right around the time of the 
arrival of independence in Tajikistan.28 When the state began to fail (i.e., when armed 
men from the demonstrations in Dushanbe returned to the south in May 1992), local 
communities in the south were primed for conflict. That is to say, competition for 
limited resources within collective and state farms along lines of region or origin was an 
                                                 
24
 Interfax 1328gmt (30 June 1992) in SWB SU/1422 (2 July 1992) B5/6. 
25
 Interfax (28 June 1992) in SWB SU/1420 (30 June 1992) i. 
26
 For a full rejection of the ‘ancient hatreds’ explanation for ethnic conflict, see: Stuart J. Kaufman, 
Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
27
 See the section on regionalism in chapter 5. 
28
 See chapter 3.  
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ongoing phenomenon. For locals to attach their agendas to national-level cleavages was 
not a new strategy, it was just particularly more noticeable once the fighting started.  
 
Indiscriminate Violence 
 
 
 The argument that ‘mass killings’ are part of a strategy to increase one side’s 
share of resources is quite common. As Esteban, Morelli and Rohner put it, mass 
killings are ‘designed’ not just to “reduce the size of the opponent’s group,” but to “gain 
a larger viable share of the new social arrangement.”29 This description does generally 
work for Tajikistan. But in order to explain why the use of indiscriminate violence 
against the civilian population was used and then abandoned by the winning side, all 
within the first year of conflict, requires the application and modification of Kalyvas’ 
theory of indiscriminate violence. 
 There are some definite examples of targeted killings, such as those of IRP 
supporters in Kulob and of the state prosecutor and a Kulobi politician in the capital.  
However, the trend during summer and fall of 1992 was far less discriminate as both 
sides in Tajikistan used ‘indiscriminate violence’ against civilian populations that they 
believed, rightly or wrongly, supported their opponents. The criteria was region of 
origin (Kulobi and Gharmi), as well as ethnicity (Pamiri and Uzbek). It is clear that the 
vast majority of the killing in 1992 was indiscriminate and targeted against civilians. 
For example, the Popular Front claimed losses of between 468 and 525 fighters in 
1992,30 while overall deaths (including civilians) in 1992 were at a minimum 20,000. In 
1993 overall deaths dropped to 1,500.31 There is a broad consensus that the Popular 
Front militias indiscriminately attacked and killed civilians in from summer 1992 
through early winter 1992-1993.32  The opposition also attacked civilians. However, 
concerning the first phase of the civil war in Tajikistan, Human Rights Watch authors 
argued that “Neither side distinguished itself by humanitarian conduct in the war; 
ultimately, the side that won committed more atrocities.”33 
                                                 
29
 Esteban, Morelli and Rohner, ‘Strategic Mass Killings’, 4-5. 
30
 Calculations based on fatalities listed here: Kenjaev, Tabadduloti Tojikiston, Kitobi seyum, 361-394. 
There is a range of fatalities given as some deaths are listed without a date. 
31
 Mukomel’, ‘Demographic Consequences of Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in the CIS’, 23-4, table 1; 
Mukomel’, ‘Demograficheskie Posledstviya etnicheskikh i religional’nykh konfliktov v SNG’, table 1. 
32
 For just a few of many examples: Roy, The New Central Asia, 140; Schoeberlein-Engel, ‘Conflict in 
Tajikistan and Central Asia’, 39; Dudoignon, ‘Communal Solidarity and Social Conflicts in Late 20th 
Century Central Asia’, 7; McLean and Greene, ‘Turmoil in Tajikistan’, 326. 
33
 Denber and Rubin, Human Rights in Tajikistan: In the Wake of Civil War, xviii. 
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The question being analysed here is why the winning side abandoned those 
tactics, a phenomenon that matches with Kalyvas’ observation that “Political actors are 
likely to gradually move from indiscriminate to selective violence.”34 While Kalyvas’ 
argument that this shift usually occurs as a result of incumbents coming to the 
realisation that indiscriminate violence is ineffective in the face of a strong insurgency, 
the case in Tajikistan is different. First of all, it is not accurate to describe the 
combatants as ‘incumbents’ and ‘insurgents’ during 1992. This only applies after the 
Popular Front victory of December 1992 made de facto what the Supreme Soviet 
session in Khujand had made de jure in November. Neither the opposition parties nor 
the incumbent president and his allies had any significant control over forces in summer 
and fall 1992. There was certainly indiscriminate violence occurring as locals formed 
self-defense forces and battled each other for control of collective farms and 
neighbourhoods while evicting, looting and killing their neighbours. Even when these 
forces became more consolidated (e.g., after Sangak Safarov became an acknowledged 
top militia leader), the killings continued and expanded far beyond being between 
people who lived in close vicinity. During the final push against the opposition and their 
perceived supporters (i.e., Gharmis) is when the largest number of killings occurred.  
 The transition away from indiscriminate violence started in December and 
continued into 1993. There are several possible reasons for this. Moral considerations 
by the new government can not be discounted, but are impossible to analyse. More 
mundane strategic and tactical arguments have more explanatory value. One obvious 
reason is that the threat from the opposition had largely subsided by late December and 
early 1993. Opposition forces were heavily defeated and no hope of taking back the 
capital or any part of the Vakhsh Valley. This would reduce the need for killings of 
civilians associated with the opposition or suspected of being members or fighters 
affiliated with opposition forces (i.e., Gharmi Tajiks). Another reason would be 
international legitimacy. International recognition, cooperation and funding would come 
much easier to a state that is not massacring its own citizens. One reason for the end (or 
general subsidence) of indiscriminate violence that was discussed at the time centred on 
the status of refugees. This issue reveals other motives for the government to move 
towards protecting the Gharmi civilians rather than continuing with any further assaults. 
Concerning the refugees who had fled to Afghanistan, Emomali Rahmon issued 
statements in December and February in which he stressed that the refugees in 
Afghanistan must be repatriated, with Sangak Safarov playing a role as their guarantor 
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 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 169. 
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of safety. The motivation, according to Rahmon himself, is that if they stay for too long 
in Afghanistan they may be trained by Afghan mujahideen leaders and return as 
insurgents.35 Later, Roy brings up the issue of refugee return, claiming that Safarov was 
in favour of Gharmi Tajiks refugee return while Fayzali Saidov was against it. Roy’s 
premise here is that Safarov was worried about the “ethnic balance” shifting towards the 
Uzbeks.36 Similarly, Rubin writes that Safarov supported refugee return because “flight 
of the refugees had tilted the balance of power towards Uzbeks.”37 Safarov appeared 
enthusiastic about carrying out Rahmon’s (and his own) wishes. In front of a crowd of 
tearful refugees in Panj he stated that “The most important thing now is the refugees. 
We must do everything to bring peace. Enough blood has been spilled.”38  Safarov 
himself further reassured refugees by speaking to their representatives and personally 
guaranteeing their safety. Of course, not everyone was under the control of Rahmon 
and/or Safarov. So when Saidov’s forces in Qurghonteppa abused returning refugees, 
Safarov went to meet personally with Saidov. The result was the famous death of both 
men in an argument-turned-shootout.39 
 To summarise, the counter-opposition forces initially broadly attacked civilians 
(i.e., Gharmis) while opposition forces also did the same to Kulobis and Uzbeks. 
Eventually, the counter-opposition forces of Safarov, Saidov, Kenjaev and others gained 
a decisive level of dominance in the war and the men under their command (as well as 
locals operating independently) attacked Gharmi and Pamiri civilians in a campaign that 
led to the bulk of deaths in the war. But once the opposition forces had been defeated 
and were scattered, the new incumbent government switched strategies and turned to 
protecting Gharmi civilians in order to (1) gain international legitimacy and support, (2) 
ensure that the local ‘ethnic balance’ did not veer too far towards ethnic Uzbeks in the 
absence of the Gharmis who had fled, and (3) encourage refugees to return from 
Afghanistan from where they may be radicalised, trained and returned as insurgents. 
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Summary 
 
The analysis in this dissertation went beyond the variables that led to conflict 
and beyond the outbreak of conflict to a focus on what sustains the conflict, as well as 
on the historical and social factors that provided the fault lines and motivations for the 
civil war. In addition to filling the gap between analyses on Tajikistan that focus on the 
variables that led to conflict and on the post-conflict phase, this work has applicability 
to not just the wider region of Central Asia, but also beyond to other conflict zones – 
active or at risk of conflict. A broader focus on historical and social factors – including 
politics, economics, patronage, networks, kinship, migration, individual agency and 
multiple forms of identity – has been demonstrated to be quite important in influencing 
the composition and modi operandi of the warring organisations. The diverse and 
changing motivations, tactics and strategies of the combatants and their supporters 
challenge the popularly accepted descriptions of a conflict imbued with structural 
determinism. The attempts to prevent or end civil wars need to be informed by a broader 
set of factors that shape and drive the conflicts, as is shown clearly in the case of 
Tajikistan.  
  
Appendix 
 
 
Map No. 4 – Districts of Tajikistan1 
 
 
Note: former names in parentheses. 
 
1. Mastchoh 
2. Ghafurov 
3. Asht 
4. Zafarobod 
5. Spitamen (‘Nov’ to 2003) 
6. Rasulov 
7. Konibodom 
8. Isfara 
9. Istaravshon (Uroteppa to 2000)  
10. Shahriston 
11. Ghonchi 
12. Panjakent 
13. Ayni 
14. Kuhistoni Mastchoh 
15. Tursunzoda (Regar to 1978)  
16. Shahrinav 
17. Hisor 
                                                 
1
 Creative Commons licensed image. Credit: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Ahonc and 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Rarelibra. 
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18. Varzob 
19. Vahdat (Kofarnihon to 2003) 
20. Rasht (Gharm) 
21. Jirgatol 
22. Rudaki (Leninsky to 2003) 
23. Fayzobod 
24. Roghun 
25. Nurobod (Darband until 2003) 
26. Tojikobod 
27. Tavildara 
28. Khuroson (Ghozimalik to 2003) 
29. Yovon 
30. Norak 
31. Baljuvon 
32. Khovaling 
33. Jomi (Khojamaston to 2004, previously Kuybyshevsk) 
34. Sarband 
35. Danghara 
36. Temurmalik (Sovetsky to 2004) 
37. Muminobod (Leningradsky) 
38. Bokhtar 
39. Vakhsh 
40. Vose 
41. Kulob 
42. Shuroobod 
43. Nosiri Khusrav (Beshkent) 
44. Shahrituz 
45. Qabodiyon 
46. Jilikul 
47. Qumsangir 
48. Rumi (Kolkhozobod to 2007) 
49. Farkhor 
50. Panj 
51. Hamadoni (Moskovsky to 2004) 
52. Darvoz (Qalai-Khumb) 
53. Vanj 
54. Rushon 
55. Shughnon 
56. Roshtqala 
57. Ishkoshim 
58. Murghob 
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